Манифест Андерса Брейвика — Декларация независимости Европы 2083

Все-таки интересно почему норвежский фермер взял винтовку и пошел расстреливать молодежный форум лейбористов? Ответы видятся здесь — Манифест Андерса Брейвика «Декларация независимости Европы 2083»

Андерс Брейвик

Полный текст «Декларации независимости Европы 2083» ниже:

By Andrew Berwick, London – 2011

About the compendium — 2083

“The men the European public admires most extravagantly are the most daring liars; the men they detest most violently are those who try to tell them the truth.”

You can see a movie presentation of the compendium by visiting the below links. It will not be available for a long period so consider taking a backup copy of it: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vQOfH8Dj1mw http://www.veoh.com/watch/v21123164bZCBQeZ8 After years of work the first edition of the compendium “2083 – A European Declaration of Independence” is completed. If you have received this book, you are either one of my former 7000 patriotic Facebook friends or you are the friend of one of my FB friends. If you are concerned about the future of Western Europe you will definitely find the information both interesting and highly relevant. I have spent several years writing, researching and compiling the information and I have spent most of my hard earned funds in this process (in excess of 300 000 Euros). I do not want any compensation for it as it is a gift to you, as a fellow patriot. Much of the information presented in this compendium (3 books) has been deliberately kept away from the European peoples by our governments and the politically correct mainstream media (MSM). More than 90% of the EU and national parliamentarians and more than 95% of journalists are supporters of European multiculturalism and therefore supporters of the ongoing Islamic colonisation of Europe; yet, they DO NOT have the permission of the European peoples to implement these doctrines. The compendium, — “2083 – A European Declaration of Independence” — documents through more than 1000 pages that the fear of Islamisation is all but irrational. It covers the following main topics:

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

The rise of cultural Marxism/multiculturalism in Western Europe Why the Islamic colonization and Islamisation of Western Europe began The current state of the Western European Resistance Movements (anti-Marxist/anti-Jihad movements) Solutions for Western Europe and how we, the resistance, should move forward in the coming decades + Covering all, highly relevant topics including solutions and strategies for all of the 8 different political fronts

The compendium/book presents advanced ideological, practical, tactical, organisational and rhetorical solutions and strategies for all patriotic-minded individuals/movements. The book will be of great interest to you whether you are a moderate or a more dedicated cultural conservative/nationalist. Included are also demographical studies, historical statistics, forecasts and insights on various subjects related to the ongoing and future struggle of Europe. It covers most topics related to historical events and aspects of past and current Islamic Imperialism, which is now removed or falsified by our academia by instruction of Western Europe’s

cultural relativist elites (cultural relativism=cultural Marxism). It offers thorough analysis of Islam, which is unknown to a majority of Europeans. It documents how the political doctrines known as multiculturalism/cultural Marxism/cultural relativism was created and implemented. Multiculturalists/cultural Marxists usually operate under the disguise of humanism. A majority are anti-nationalists and want to deconstruct European identity, traditions, culture and even nation states. As we all know, the root of Europe’s problems is the lack of cultural self-confidence (nationalism). Most people are still terrified of nationalistic political doctrines thinking that if we ever embrace these principles again, new “Hitler’s” will suddenly pop up and initiate global Armageddon… Needless to say; the growing numbers of nationalists in W. Europe are systematically being ridiculed, silenced and persecuted by the current cultural Marxist/multiculturalist political establishments. This has been a continuous ongoing process which started in 1945. This irrational fear of nationalistic doctrines is preventing us from stopping our own national/cultural suicide as the Islamic colonization is increasing annually. This book presents the only solutions to our current problems. You cannot defeat Islamisation or halt/reverse the Islamic colonization of Western Europe without first removing the political doctrines manifested through multiculturalism/cultural Marxism… I have written approximately half of the compendium myself. The rest is a compilation of works from several courageous individuals throughout the world. I originally planned to add a database of high quality graphic illustrations and pictures. However, the document (file) would have been un-practically large which would complicate the process of efficient distribution.

Distribution of the book The content of the compendium truly belongs to everyone and is free to be distributed in any way or form. In fact, I ask only one favour of you; I ask that you distribute this book to everyone you know. Please do not think that others will take care of it. Sorry to be blunt, but it does not work out that way. If we, the Western European Resistance, fail or become apathetic, then Western Europe will fall, and your freedom and our children’s freedom with it… It is essential and very important that everyone is at least presented with the truth before our systems come crashing down within 2 to 7 decades. So again, I humbly ask you to re-distribute the book to as many patriotic minded individuals as you can. I am 100% certain that the distribution of this compendium to a large portion of European patriots will contribute to ensure our victory in the end. Because within these three books lies the tools required to win the ongoing Western European cultural war. As already mentioned; the compendium is a compilation of works from multiple courageous individuals throughout the world. I have spent more than three years writing and/or compiling most of the content. None of the other authors have been asked to participate in this project due to practical and security reasons but most of them have made their material available for distribution. The needs of the many outweigh the needs of the few. This is the reason why I have decided to allow the content of this compendium to be freely redistributed and translated. Consider it my personal gift and contribution to all Europeans. The sources are not embedded into the document for this reason (easier to use and distribute the various articles). However, it is required that the author(s) are credited when the material is used. As such, the intellectual property of this compendium belongs to all Europeans across the European world and can be distributed and translated without limitations. Efficient distribution and circulation will be possible if those who agree with at least some of its

content, principles or ideas contribute to spread the information. If you are reading this you will know that many people will be interested in obtaining the compendium (3 books). Let’s use this momentum to our advantage as it will surely benefit our struggle. I’m depending on you to distribute the book or some/all of its content to as many patriotic European political activists as possible. Let them know what is going on and what is required of each and every one of us. After all, we do not only have a right to resist the current development, it is our duty as Europeans to prevent the annihilation of our identities, our cultures and traditions and our nation states! Please contribute to distribute the compendium to as many patriotic minded Europeans as humanly possible in all 26 European countries. This is only be the beginning…! By including the “legal disclaimer” in ”Book 3; ” will allow everyone to distribute the content without violating any European laws. If you are still in doubt feel free to delete or change the wording in certain chapters before distribution. Please help to make this book available through various torrents, blogs, websites, on Facebook, on Twitter, on forums and through other arenas. It is truly a one-of-a-kind, unique and great tool that can and should be used by all cultural conservatives in the decades to come. Priority objective — translating the book to German, French and Spanish. I highly recommend that especially a French, German and Spanish patriot takes responsibility and ensures that this compendium is either distributed and/or translated to your respective language. It should be distributed to torrents, websites, Facebook groups and other political groups where there are high concentrations of cultural conservatives/nationalists/patriots. I have been unsuccessful to efficiently distribute the compendium to especially French, German and Spanish speaking individuals due to language barriers. It is therefore essential that someone steps up and takes responsibility to distribute it to as many as humanly possible. If you, yourself, are too busy, unavailable or unable to contribute to help translate it, please do contact one of many cultural conservative/nationalist intellectuals/writers/journalists in your country. Contact individuals you know who are not afraid to operate outside the boundaries of political correctness. We, the right wing Resistance Movements of Europe depend on efficient redistribution of this vital information included in this compendium. The efficient distribution of this book to all nationalists of Europe may significantly contribute to future regime shifts. Because within this compendium lies the tools and knowledge on exactly how to replace our current regimes. I really hope someone will accept this very important task and contribute; because if you won’t, no one will… Extracting info from the document or convert from a Word file to a PDF file + translation service It’s easy to convert the document from a Word file to a PDF file or any other format providing you have the Microsoft Word/Office software (preferably Word 2007 or newer). If you do not have this software you can either download the free “Word Viewer” which allows you to view, print and copy Word documents, even if you don’t have Word installed. Just do a search for the key word “Word Viewer” at the following site: http://www.microsoft.com/downloads or use the following direct download link:

You can also just buy the full Office package or download a free trial from the Microsoft site: http://office.microsoft.com or alternatively, go to one of the following torrent sites to download it for free: 1. thepiratebay.org 2. btscene.com 3. torrentreactor.net 4. extratorrent.com 5. torrentz.com 6. btmon.com

You must first download a torrent application. The best torrent application (uTorrent) can be downloaded here: www.utorrent.com If you want Word 2007 for longer than the 60 day trial it is likely you will have to download a serial code which allows you to unlock the software permanently or at least extend the trial period for 6-12 months. I chose to send the compendium as a Word file for the following reason:

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

MS Word is one of the most common and popular software formats Significantly easier to edit the document compared to PDF A Word file is significantly smaller than a PDF file (3,5 MB vs 8-10 MB) The quality of the images are conserved a lot better than in a PDF Distribution: it is easier to avoid spam filters with a file smaller than 5 MB

Since I have chosen to send the document in Word format you can easily extract all information and the images from the Word file. I deliberately avoided locking the document for this reason. If you want to extract the images from word you can do the following:


Simply open MS Paint (standard Windows program), copy the image from Word and paste it in Paint. You then save the image in Paint as a jpg or any other format.

It is easy to convert the file, if desired, to a PDF file or any other format. Simply save the Word file as a PDF file. As for extraction from a PDF file; several software programs including newer versions of Adobe Acrobat allow conversion and extraction. Just google the word; “PDF to Word converter” or download the following free converter software:

As for a free and powerful translator service; the google translation service offers a powerful and relatively accurate tool: http://translate.google.com Display using kindle/nook/iPad Kindle, nook or iPad is a hardware platform (LCD board) very suitable for reading ebooks and other digital media. It costs as little as 100-200 USD on the second hand market. Also, there are other hand held devices like iPhone. All you have to do is select Word as input and kindle/nook/iPad/iPhone as output and transfer the file. Converting the Word file to paper Successful self-publishers today leverage the benefits provided by print-on-demand services, where they don’t need to waste money on printing costs or on inventory and stocking fees. A “print-on-demand” (POD) service, sometimes called publish-on-demand, is a printing technology and business process in which new copies of a book are not printed until an order has been received. Many traditional small presses have replaced their traditional printing equipment with POD equipment or contract their printing out to POD providers.

When customers order their books, self-publishing outlets like Cafepress.com and others (see list) will print on-demand as many book as needed and they will also ship them and get payments for them from those ordering. These self-publishing services accept uploaded digital content such as Word or PDF files. However, due to the controversial nature of the content of this book, the individual that makes the initial arrangement has to be careful and may need to cut away certain chapters before using commercial services such as these.
Self publishing services/books on demand services:

lulu.com createspace.com cafepress.co.uk booksondemand.com

xlibris.com webook.com selfpublishing.com infinitypublishing.com

authorhouse.co.uk spirepublishing.com trafford.com lightningsource.com

unibook.com createbooks.com booksurge.com blurb.com

Guide to self publishing:

Intro to e-book format:

Sacrifices made when creating the compendium I’ve spent a total of 9 years of my life working on this project. The first five years were spent studying and creating a financial base, and the last three years was spent working full time with research, compilation and writing. Creating this compendium has personally cost me a total of 317 000 Euros (130 000 Euros spent from my own pocket and 187 500 Euros for loss of income during three years). All that, however, is barely noticeable compared to the sacrifices made in relation to the distribution of this book, the actual marketing operation;) The importance of spreading the truth and distribute sound strategies cannot be underestimated as it is at the very core of our current resistance efforts. I do hope you take the time to read it. Several aspects of the work is truly unique and no similar compendium exists today. Don’t let the topics discussed in the books startle you too much. Many of the topics may seem completely absurd or too radical today, but in a couple of decades, you will start to understand its relevancy to our struggle. Nevertheless, if the content freaks you out too much, to a degree where you want to delete it, I would highly recommend you rather save it on a USB flash drive (small memory chip) and place the chip in a safe location. Because it is likely that you will want to read it at some point in time. After all, we can only ignore central aspects of reality for so long.

A message from the author/creator of the compendium I hope you enjoy this compendium. It currently offers the most comprehensive database of solution oriented subjects. As mentioned, I only ask one thing from you; that you distribute this book to your friends and ask them to forward it to “their” friends, especially to individuals who have a patriotic mindset. Please help us and help yourself, your family and friends by contributing to spread the tools which will ensure our victory; for the truth must be known… It is not only our right but also our duty to contribute to preserve our identity, our culture and our national sovereignty by preventing the ongoing Islamisation. There is no Resistance Movement if individuals like us refuse to contribute…

Multiculturalism (cultural Marxism/political correctness), as you might know, is the root cause of the ongoing Islamisation of Europe which has resulted in the ongoing Islamic colonisation of Europe through demographic warfare (facilitated by our own leaders). This compendium presents the solutions and explains exactly what is required of each and every one of us in the coming decades. Everyone can and should contribute in one way or the other; it’s just a matter of will. Time is of the essence. We have only a few decades to consolidate a sufficient level of resistance before our major cities are completely demographically overwhelmed by Muslims. Ensuring the successful distribution of this compendium to as many Europeans as humanly possible will significantly contribute to our success. It may be the only way to avoid our present and future dhimmitude (enslavement) under Islamic majority rule in our own countries. I have been unable to send this compendium to many people, for various reasons, so I truly hope you will be willing to contribute. It should be noted that English is my secondary language and due to certain security precautions I was unable to have the documents professionally edited and proof read. Needless to say, there is a potential for improving it literarily. As such, consider it a ”first edition draft”. The responsibility falls upon you now as I will, for obvious reasons, not be able to develop it any further. Any and all individuals with the appropriate skills are encouraged to contribute to a second edition of this compendium by improving and expanding it where needed.

Sincere and patriotic regards, Andrew Berwick, London, England — 2011 Justiciar Knight Commander for Knights Templar Europe and one of several leaders of the National and pan-European Patriotic Resistance Movement With the assistance from brothers and sisters in England, France, Germany, Sweden, Austria, Italy, Spain, Finland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, the US etc.

Introduction to the compendium — “2083” The introductory chapter explains how “cultural” Marxism gradually infiltrated our postWW2 societies. It is essential to understand how it started in order to comprehend our current issues. The chapter was written for the US specifically but applies to Western Europe as well.

Introduction — What is “Political Correctness”? One of conservatism’s most important insights is that all ideologies are wrong. Ideology takes an intellectual system, a product of one or more philosophers, and says, “This system must be true.” Inevitably, reality ends up contradicting the system, usually on a growing number of points. But the ideology, by its nature, cannot adjust to reality; to do so would be to abandon the system. Therefore, reality must be suppressed. If the ideology has power, it uses its power to undertake this suppression. It forbids writing or speaking certain facts. Its goal is to prevent not only expression of thoughts that contradict what “must be true,” but thinking such thoughts. In the end, the result is inevitably the concentration camp, the gulag and the grave. But what happens today to Europeans who suggest that there are differences among ethnic groups, or that the traditional social roles of men and women reflect their different natures, or that homosexuality is morally wrong? If they are public figures, they must grovel in the dirt in endless, canting apologies. If they are university students, they face star chamber courts and possible expulsion. If they are employees of private corporations, they may face loss of their jobs. What was their crime? Contradicting the new EUSSR ideology of “Political Correctness.” But what exactly is “Political Correctness?” Marxists have used the term for at least 80 years, as a broad synonym for “the General Line of the Party.” It could be said that Political Correctness is the General Line of the Establishment in Western European countries today; certainly, no one who dares contradict it can be a member of that Establishment. But that still does not tell us what it really is. We must seek to answer that question. The only way any ideology can be understood, is by looking at its historical origins, its method of analysis and several key components, including its place in higher education and its ties with the Feminist movement. If we expect to prevail and restore our countries to full freedom of thought and expression, we need to know our enemy. We need to understand what Political Correctness really is. As you will soon see, if we can expose the true origins and nature of Political Correctness, we will have taken a giant step toward its overthrow.

How it all began — Political Correctness is Cultural Marxism Most Europeans look back on the 1950s as a good time. Our homes were safe, to the point where many people did not bother to lock their doors. Public schools were generally excellent, and their problems were things like talking in class and running in the halls. Most men treated women like ladies, and most ladies devoted their time and effort to making good homes, rearing their children well and helping their communities through volunteer work. Children grew up in two–parent households, and the mother was there to meet the child when he came home from school. Entertainment was something the whole family could enjoy. What happened? If a man of the 1950s were suddenly introduced into Western Europe in the 2000s, he would hardly recognise it as the same country. He would be in immediate danger of getting mugged, carjacked or worse, because he would not have learned to live in constant fear. He would not know that he shouldn’t go into certain parts of the city, that his car must not only be locked but equipped with an alarm, that he dare not go to sleep at night without locking the windows and bolting the doors – and setting the electronic security system. If he brought his family with him, he and his wife would probably cheerfully pack their children off to the nearest public school. When the children came home in the afternoon and told them they had to go through a metal detector to get in the building, had been given some funny white powder by another kid and learned that homosexuality is normal and good, the parents would be uncomprehending. In the office, the man might light up a cigarette, drop a reference to the “little lady,” and say he was happy to see the firm employing some coloured folks in important positions. Any of those acts would earn a swift reprimand, and together they might get him fired. When she went into the city to shop, the wife would put on a nice suit, hat, and possibly gloves. She would not understand why people stared, and mocked. And when the whole family sat down after dinner and turned on the television, they would not understand how pornography from some sleazy, blank-fronted “Adults Only” kiosk had gotten on their set. Were they able, our 1950s family would head back to the 1950s as fast as they could, with a gripping horror story to tell. Their story would be of a nation that had decayed and degenerated at a fantastic pace, moving in less than a half a century from the greatest countries on earth to Third World nations, overrun by crime, noise, drugs and dirt. The fall of Rome was graceful by comparison. Why did it happen? Over the last fifty years, Western Europe has been conquered by the same force that earlier took over Russia, China, Germany and Italy. That force is ideology. Here, as elsewhere, ideology has inflicted enormous damage on the traditional culture it came to dominate, fracturing it everywhere and sweeping much of it away. In its place came fear, and ruin. Russia will take a generation or more to recover from Communism, if it ever can. The ideology that has taken over Western Europe goes most commonly by the name of “Political Correctness.” Some people see it as a joke. It is not. It is deadly serious. It seeks to alter virtually all the rules, formal and informal, that govern relations among people and institutions. It wants to change behaviour, thought, even the words we use.

To a significant extent, it already has. Whoever or whatever controls language also controls thought. Who dares to speak of “ladies” now? Just what is “Political Correctness?” Political Correctness is in fact cultural Marxism (Cultural Communism) – Marxism translated from economic into cultural terms. The effort to translate Marxism from economics into culture did not begin with the student rebellion of the 1960s. It goes back at least to the 1920s and the writings of the Italian Communist Antonio Gramsci. In 1923, in Germany, a group of Marxists founded an institute devoted to making the transition, the Institute of Social Research (later known as the Frankfurt School). One of its founders, George Lukacs, stated its purpose as answering the question, “Who shall save us from Western Civilisation?” The Frankfurt School gained profound influence in European and American universities after many of its leading lights fled and spread all over Europe and even to the United States in the 1930s to escape National Socialism in Germany. In Western Europe it gained influence in universities from 1945. The Frankfurt School blended Marx with Freud, and later influences (some Fascist as well as Marxist) added linguistics to create “Critical Theory” and “deconstruction.” These in turn greatly influenced education theory, and through institutions of higher education gave birth to what we now call “Political Correctness.” The lineage is clear, and it is traceable right back to Karl Marx. The parallels between the old, economic Marxism and cultural Marxism are evident. Cultural Marxism, or Political Correctness, shares with classical Marxism the vision of a “classless society,” i.e., a society not merely of equal opportunity, but equal condition. Since that vision contradicts human nature – because people are different, they end up unequal, regardless of the starting point – society will not accord with it unless forced. So, under both variants of Marxism, it is forced. This is the first major parallel between classical and cultural Marxism: both are totalitarian ideologies. The totalitarian nature of Political Correctness can be seen on campuses where “PC” has taken over the college: freedom of speech, of the press, and even of thought are all eliminated. The second major parallel is that both classical, economic Marxism and cultural Marxism have single-factor explanations of history. Classical Marxism argues that all of history was determined by ownership of the means of production. Cultural Marxism says that history is wholly explained by which groups – defined by sex, race, religion and sexual normality or abnormality – have power over which other groups. The third parallel is that both varieties of Marxism declare certain groups virtuous and others evil a priori, that is, without regard for the actual behaviour of individuals. Classical Marxism defines workers and peasants as virtuous and the bourgeoisie (the middle class) and other owners of capital as evil. Cultural Marxism defines all minorities, what they see as the victims; Muslims, Feminist women, homosexuals and some additional minority groups as virtuous and they view ethnic Christian European men as evil. (Cultural Marxism does not recognise the existence of non-Feminist women, and defines Muslims, Asians and Africans who reject Political Correctness as evil, just like native Christian or even atheist Europeans.). The fourth parallel is in means: expropriation. Economic Marxists, where they obtained power, expropriated the property of the bourgeoisie and handed it to the state, as the “representative” of the workers and the peasants. Cultural Marxists, when they gain power (including through our own government), lay penalties on native European men and others who disagree with them and give privileges to the ”victim” groups they favour. Affirmative action is an example. Finally, both varieties of Marxists employ a method of analysis designed to show the correctness of their ideology in every situation. For classical Marxists, the analysis is

economic. For cultural Marxists, the analysis is linguistic: deconstruction. Deconstruction “proves” that any “text,” past or present, illustrates the oppression of Muslims, women, homosexuals, etc. by reading that meaning into words of the text (regardless of their actual meaning). Both methods are, of course, phony analyses that twist the evidence to fit preordained conclusions, but they lend a ‘scientific” air to the ideology. These parallels are neither remarkable nor coincidental. They exist because Political Correctness is directly derived from classical Marxism, and is in fact a variant of Marxism. Through most of the history of Marxism, cultural Marxists were “read out” of the movement by classical, economic Marxists. Today, with economic Marxism dead, cultural Marxism has filled its shoes. The medium has changed, but the message is the same: a society of radical egalitarianism enforced by the power of the state. Political Correctness now looms over Western European society like a colossus. It has taken over both political wings, left and right. Among so called Western European ”conservative” parties the actual cultural conservatives are shown the door because being a cultural conservative opposes the very essence of political correctness. It controls the most powerful element in our culture, the media and entertainment industry. It dominates both public and higher education: many a college campus is a small, ivycovered North Korea. It has even captured the higher clergy in many Christian churches. Anyone in the Establishment who departs from its dictates swiftly ceases to be a member of the Establishment. The most vital question is: how can Western Europeans combat Political Correctness and retake their society from the cultural Marxists? It is not sufficient just to criticise Political Correctness. It tolerates a certain amount of criticism, even gentle mocking. It does so through no genuine tolerance for other points of view, but in order to disarm its opponents, to let itself seem less menacing than it is. The cultural Marxists do not yet have total power, and they are too wise to appear totalitarian until their victory is assured. Rather, those who would defeat cultural Marxism must defy it. They must use words it forbids, and refuse to use the words it mandates; remember, sex is better than gender. They must shout from the housetops the realities it seeks to suppress, such as our opposition to Sharia on a national and local level, the Islamisation of our countries, the facts that violent crime is disproportionately committed by Muslims and that most cases of AIDS are voluntary, i.e., acquired from immoral sexual acts. They must refuse to turn their children over to public schools. Above all, those who would defy Political Correctness must behave according to the old rules of our culture, not the new rules the cultural Marxists lay down. Ladies should be wives and homemakers, not cops or soldiers, and men should still hold doors open for ladies. Children should not be born out of wedlock. Glorification of homosexuality should be shunned. Jurors should not accept Islam as an excuse for murder. Defiance spreads. When other Western Europeans see one person defy Political Correctness and survive – and you still can, for now – they are emboldened. They are tempted to defy it, too, and some do. The ripples from a single act of defiance, of one instance of walking up to the clay idol and breaking off its nose, can range far. There is nothing the Politically Correct fear more than open defiance, and for good reason; it is their chief vulnerability. That should lead cultural conservatives to defy cultural Marxism at every turn. While the hour is late, the battle is not decided. Very few Western Europeans realise that Political Correctness is in fact Marxism in a different set of clothes. As that realisation spreads, defiance will spread with it. At present, Political Correctness prospers by

disguising itself. Through defiance, and through education on our own part (which should be part of every act of defiance), we can strip away its camouflage and reveal the Marxism beneath the window-dressing of “sensitivity,” “tolerance,” and “multiculturalism.” Who dares, wins.

The Historical Roots of “Political Correctness” Western Europe is today dominated by an alien system of beliefs, attitudes and values that we have come to know as “Political Correctness.” Political Correctness seeks to impose a uniformity of thought and behaviour on all Europeans and is therefore totalitarian in nature. Its roots lie in a version of Marxism which seeks a radical inversion of the traditional culture in order to create a social revolution. Social revolution has a long history, conceivably going as far back as Plato’s Republic. But it was the French Revolution of 1789 that inspired Karl Marx to develop his theories in the nineteenth century. In the twentieth century, the success of the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 in Russia set off a wave of optimistic expectation among the Marxist forces in Europe and America that the new proletarian world of equality was finally coming into being. Russia, as the first communist nation in the world, would lead the revolutionary forces to victory. The Marxist revolutionary forces in Europe leaped at this opportunity. Following the end of World War I, there was a Communist “Spartacist” uprising in Berlin, Germany led by Rosa Luxemburg; the creation of a “Soviet” in Bavaria led by Kurt Eisner; and a Hungarian communist republic established by Bela Kun in 1919. At the time, there was great concern that all of Europe might fall under the banner of Bolshevism. This sense of impending doom was given vivid life by Trotsky’s Red Army invasion of Poland in 1919. However, the Red Army was defeated by Polish forces at the battle of the Vistula in 1920. The Spartacist, Bavarian Soviet and Bela Kun governments all failed to gain widespread support from the workers and after a brief time they were all overthrown. These events created a quandary for the Marxist revolutionaries in Europe. Under Marxist economic theory, the oppressed workers were supposed to be the beneficiaries of a social revolution that would place them on top of the power structure. When these revolutionary opportunities presented themselves, however, the workers did not respond. The Marxist revolutionaries did not blame their theory for these failures. They blamed the workers. One group of Marxist intellectuals resolved their quandary by an analysis that focused on society’s cultural “superstructure” rather than on the economic substructures as Marx did. The Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci and Hungarian Marxist Georg Lukacs contributed the most to this new cultural Marxism. Antonio Gramsci worked for the Communist International during 1923-24 in Moscow and Vienna. He was later imprisoned in one of Mussolini’s jails where he wrote his famous “Prison Notebooks.” Among Marxists, Gramsci is noted for his theory of cultural hegemony as the means to class dominance. In his view, a new “Communist man” had to be created before any political revolution was possible. This led to a focus on the efforts of intellectuals in the fields of education and culture. Gramsci envisioned a long march through the society’s institutions, including the government, the judiciary, the military, the schools and the media. He also concluded that so long as the workers had a Christian soul, they would not respond to revolutionary appeals.

Georg Lukacs was the son a wealthy Hungarian banker. Lukacs began his political life as an agent of the Communist International. His book History and Class Consciousness gained him recognition as the leading Marxist theorist since Karl Marx. Lukacs believed that for a new Marxist culture to emerge, the existing culture must be destroyed. He said, “I saw the revolutionary destruction of society as the one and only solution to the cultural contradictions of the epoch,” and, “Such a worldwide overturning of values cannot take place without the annihilation of the old values and the creation of new ones by the revolutionaries.” When he became Deputy Commissar for Culture in the Bolshevik Bela Kun regime in Hungary in 1919, Lukacs launched what became known as “Cultural Terrorism.” As part of this terrorism he instituted a radical sex education program in Hungarian schools. Hungarian children were instructed in free love, sexual intercourse, the archaic nature of middle-class family codes, the out-datedness of monogamy, and the irrelevance of religion, which deprives man of all pleasures. Women, too, were called to rebel against the sexual mores of the time. Lukacs’s campaign of “Cultural Terrorism” was a precursor to what Political Correctness would later bring to Western European schools. In 1923, Lukacs and other Marxist intellectuals associated with the Communist Party of Germany founded the Institute of Social Research at Frankfurt University in Frankfurt, Germany. The Institute, which became known as the Frankfurt School, was modelled after the Marx-Engels Institute in Moscow. In 1933, when Nazis came to power in Germany, the members of the Frankfurt School fled. Most came to the United States. The members of the Frankfurt School conducted numerous studies on the beliefs, attitudes and values they believed lay behind the rise of National Socialism in Germany. The Frankfurt School’s studies combined Marxist analysis with Freudian psychoanalysis to criticise the bases of Western culture, including Christianity, capitalism, authority, the family, patriarchy, hierarchy, morality, tradition, sexual restraint, loyalty, patriotism, nationalism, heredity, ethnocentrism, convention and conservatism. These criticisms, known collectively as Critical Theory, were reflected in such works of the Frankfurt School as Erich Fromm’s Escape from Freedom and The Dogma of Christ, Wilhelm’s Reich’s The Mass Psychology of Fascism and Theodor Adorno’s The Authoritarian Personality. The Authoritarian Personality, published in 1950, substantially influenced Western European psychologists and social scientists. The book was premised on one basic idea, that the presence in a society of Christianity, capitalism, and the patriarchal-authoritarian family created a character prone to racial and religious prejudice and German fascism. The Authoritarian Personality became a handbook for a national campaign against any kind of prejudice or discrimination on the theory that if these evils were not eradicated, another Holocaust might occur on the European continent. This campaign, in turn, provided a basis for Political Correctness. Critical Theory incorporated sub-theories which were intended to chip away at specific elements of the existing culture, including “matriarchal theory,” “androgyny theory,” “personality theory,” “authority theory,” “family theory,” “sexuality theory,” “racial theory,” “legal theory,” and “literary theory.” Put into practice, these theories were to be used to overthrow the prevailing social order and usher in social revolution. To achieve this, the Critical Theorists of the Frankfurt School recognised that traditional beliefs and the existing social structure would have to be destroyed and then replaced. The patriarchal social structure would be replaced with matriarchy; the belief that men and women are different and properly have different roles would be replaced with androgyny; and the belief that heterosexuality is normal would be replaced with the belief that homosexuality is equally “normal.”

As a grand scheme intended to deny the intrinsic worth of native Christian European, heterosexual males, the Critical Theorists of the Frankfurt School opened the door to the racial and sexual antagonisms of the Trotskyites. Many believed that oppressed Muslims, non European minorities and others like Feminists and Homosexuals could be the vanguard of a communist revolution in Europe. Trotsky’s ideas were adopted by many of the student leaders of the 1960s counterculture movement, who attempted to elevate minority revolutionaries to positions of leadership in their movement. The student revolutionaries were also strongly influenced by the ideas of Herbert Marcuse, another member of the Frankfurt School. Marcuse preached the “Great Refusal,” a rejection of all basic Western concepts, sexual liberation and the merits of feminist and black revolution. His primary thesis was that university students, ghetto blacks, the alienated, the asocial, and the Third World could take the place of the proletariat in the Communist revolution. In his book An Essay on Liberation, Marcuse proclaimed his goals of a radical transvaluation of values; the relaxation of taboos; cultural subversion; Critical Theory; and a linguistic rebellion that would amount to a methodical reversal of meaning. As for racial conflict, Marcuse wrote that white men are guilty and that blacks are the most natural force of rebellion. Marcuse may be the most important member of the Frankfurt School in terms of the origins of Political Correctness, because he was the critical link to the counterculture of the 1960s. His objective was clear: “One can rightfully speak of a cultural revolution, since the protest is directed toward the whole cultural establishment, including morality of existing society…” His means was liberating the powerful, primeval force of sex from its civilised restraints, a message preached in his book, Eros and Civilisation, published in 1955. Marcuse became one of the main gurus of the 1960s adolescent sexual rebellion; he himself coined the expression, “make love, not war.” With that role, the chain of Marxist influence via the Frankfurt School was completed: from Lukacs’ service as Deputy Commissar for Culture in the Bolshevik Hungarian government in 1919 to Western European and American students burning the flag and taking over college administration buildings in the 1960s. Today, many of these same colleges are bastions of Political Correctness, and the former student radicals have become the faculties. One of the most important contributors to Political Correctness was Betty Friedan. Through her book The Feminine Mystique, Friedantied Feminism to Abraham Maslow’s theory of self-actualisation. Maslow was a social psychologist who in his early years did research on female dominance and sexuality. Maslow was a friend of Herbert Marcuse at Brandeis University and had met Erich Fromm in 1936. He was strongly impressed by Fromm’s Frankfurt School ideology. He wrote an article, “The Authoritarian Character Structure,” published in 1944, that reflected the personality theory of Critical Theory. Maslow was also impressed with the work of Wilhelm Reich, who was another Frankfurt School originator of personality theory. The significance of the historical roots of Political Correctness cannot be fully appreciated unless Betty Friedan’s revolution in sex roles is viewed for what it really was – a manifestation of the social revolutionary process begun by Karl Marx. Friedan’s reliance on Abraham Maslow’s reflection of Frankfurt School ideology is only one indicator. Other indicators include the correspondence of Friedan’s revolution in sex roles with Georg Lukacs’ annihilation of old values and the creation of new ones, and with Herbert Marcuse’s transvaluation of values. But the idea of transforming a patriarchy into a matriarchy – which is what a sex-role inversion is designed to do – can be connected directly to Friedrich Engels book The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State. First published in 1884, this book popularised the now-accepted feminist belief that deeprooted discrimination against the oppressed female sex was a function of patriarchy. The belief that matriarchy was the solution to patriarchy flows from Marx’s comments in The

German Ideology, published in 1845. In this work Marx advanced the idea that wives and children were the first property of the patriarchal male. The Frankfurt School’s matriarchal theory and its near-relation, androgyny theory, both originated from these sources. When addressing the general public, advocates of Political Correctness – or cultural Marxism, to give it its true name – present their beliefs attractively. It’s all just a matter of being “sensitive” to other people, they say. They use words such as “tolerance” and “diversity,” asking, “Why can’t we all just get along?” The reality is different. Political Correctness is not at all about “being nice,” unless one thinks gulags are nice places. Political Correctness is Marxism, with all that implies: loss of freedom of expression, thought control, inversion of the traditional social order, and, ultimately, a totalitarian state. If anything, the cultural Marxism created by the Frankfurt School is more horrifying than the old, economic Marxism that ruined Russia. At least the economic Marxists did not exalt sexual perversion and attempt to create a matriarchy, as the Frankfurt School and its descendants have done. This short essay has sought to show one critical linkage, that between classical Marxism and the ingredients of the “cultural revolution” that broke out in Western Europe in the 1960s. Of course, the action does not stop in the ‘60s; the workings of the Frankfurt School are yet very much with us, especially in the field of education. That topic, and other present-day effects of Frankfurt School thinking, will be further analysed.

Cultural Marxist profiles Georg Lukacs • He began his political life as a Kremlin agent of the Communist International. • His History and Class-Consciousness gained him recognition as the leading Marxist theorist since Karl Marx. • In 1919 he became the Deputy Commissar for Culture in the Bolshevik Bela Kun Regime in Hungary. He instigated what become known as “Cultural Terrorism.” • Cultural Terrorism was a precursor of what was to happen in European and American schools. • He launched an “explosive” sex education program. Special lectures were organised in Hungarian schools and literature was printed and distributed to instruct children about free love, the nature of sexual intercourse, the archaic nature of the bourgeois family codes, the outdatedness of monogamy, and the irrelevance of religion, which deprives man of all pleasure. Children were urged to reject and deride paternal authority and the authority of the Church, and to ignore precepts of morality. They were easily and spontaneously turned into delinquents with whom only the police could cope. This call to rebellion addressed to Hungarian children was matched by a call to rebellion addressed to Hungarian women. • In rejecting the idea that Bolshevism spelled the destruction of civilisation and culture, Lukacs stated: “Such a worldwide overturning of values cannot take place without the annihilation of the old values and the creation of new ones by the revolutionaries.”

• Lukacs’ state of mind was expressed in his own words: — “All the social forces I had hated since my youth, and which I aimed in spirit to annihilate, now came together to unleash the First Global War.” — “I saw the revolutionary destruction of society as the one and only solution to the cultural contradictions of the speech.” — “The question is: Who will free us from the yoke of Western Civilisation?” — “Any political movement capable of bringing Bolshevism to the West would have to be ‘Demonic’.” — “The abandonment of the soul’s uniqueness solves the problem of ‘unleashing’ the diabolic forces lurking in all the violence which is needed to create revolution.” • Lukacs’ state of mind was typical of those who represented the forces of Revolutionary Marxism. • At a secret meeting in Germany in 1923, Lukacs proposed the concept of inducing “Cultural Pessimism” in order to increase the state of hopelessness and alienation in the people of the West as a necessary prerequisite for revolution. • This meeting led to the founding of the Institute for Social Research at Frankfurt University in Germany in 1923 – an organisation of Marxist and Communist-oriented psychologists, sociologists and other intellectuals that came to be known as the Frankfurt School, which devoted itself to implementing Georg Lukacs’s program.

Antonio Gramsci • He was an Italian Marxist on an intellectual par with Georg Lukacs who arrived by analysis at the same conclusions as Lukacs and the Frankfurt School regarding the critical importance of intellectuals in fomenting revolution in the West. • He had travelled to the Soviet Union after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and made some accurate observations that caused him to conclude that a Bolshevik-style uprising could not be brought about by Western workers due to the nature of their Christian souls. • Antonio Gramsci became the leader of the Italian Communist Party, which earned him a place in one of Mussolini’s jails in the 1930s, where he wrote Prison Notebooks and other documents. • These works became available in English to Brits and Americans. • His advice to the intellectuals was to begin a long march through the educational and cultural institutions of the nation in order to create a new Soviet man before there could be a successful political revolution. • This reflected his observations in the Soviet Union that its leaders could not create such a new Soviet man after the Bolshevik Revolution. • This blueprint for mind and character change made Gramsci a hero of Revolutionary Marxism in American education and paved the way for creation of the New American Child in the schools by the education cartel.

• The essential nature of Antonio Gramsci’s revolutionary strategy is reflected in Charles A. Reich’s The Greening of America: “There is a revolution coming. It will not be like revolutions in the past. It will originate with the individual and the culture, and it will change the political structure as its final act. It will not require violence to succeed, and it cannot be successfully resisted by violence. This is revolution of the New Generation.”

Wilhelm Reich • In his 1933 book entitled The Mass Psychology of Fascism, he explained that the Frankfurt School departed from the Marxist sociology that set “Bourgeois” against “Proletariat.” Instead, the battle would be between “reactionary” and “revolutionary” characters. • He also wrote a book entitled The Sexual Revolution which was a precursor of what was to come in the 1960s. • His “sex-economic” sociology was an effort to harmonise Freud’s psychology with Marx’s economic theory. • Reich’s theory was expressed in his words: “The authoritarian family is the authoritarian state in miniature. Man’s authoritarian character structure is basically produced by the embedding of sexual inhibitions and fear in the living substance of sexual impulses. Familial imperialism is ideologically reproduced in national imperialism… the authoritarian family…is a factory where reactionary ideology and reactionary structures are produced.” • Wilhelm Reich’s theory, when coupled with Georg Lukacs’ sex education in Hungary, can be seen as the source for the American education cartel’s insistence on sex education from kindergarten onwards and its complete negation of the paternal family, external authority, and the traditional character structure. • Reich’s theory encompassed other assertions that seem to have permeated American education: — The organised religious mysticism of Christianity was an element of the authoritarian family that led to Fascism. — The patriarchal power in and outside of man was to be dethroned. — Revolutionary sexual politics would mean the complete collapse of authoritarian ideology. — Birth control was revolutionary ideology. — Man was fundamentally a sexual animal. • Reich’s The Mass Psychology of Fascism was in its ninth printing as of 1991 and is available in most college bookstores.

Erich Fromm • Like Wilhelm Reich, Fromm was a social psychologist of the Frankfurt School who came to America in the 1930s. • His book Escape from Freedom, published in 1941, is an ideological companion to Wilhelm Reich’s The Mass Psychology of Fascism. • Fromm asserted that early capitalism created a social order that resulted in Calvin’s Theory of Predestination, which reflected the principle of the basic inequality of men which was revived in Nazi ideology. • He asserted the authoritarian character experiences only domination or submission and “differences, whether sex or race, to him are necessarily of superiority or inferiority.” • He asserted that “Positive Freedom” implies the principle that there is no higher power than the unique individual self; that man is the center and purpose of life; that the growth and realisation of man’s individuality is an end that can be subordinated to purposes which are supposed to have a greater dignity. • Fromm made the real meaning of this “Positive Freedom” clear in another of his many books – The Dogma of Christ — wherein he describes a revolutionary character such as himself as the man who has emancipated himself from the ties of blood and soil, from his mother and father, and from special loyalties to state, race, party or religion. • Fromm makes his revolutionary intent very clear in The Dogma of Christ…”We might define revolution in a psychological sense, saying that a revolution is a political movement led by people with revolutionary characters, and attracting people with revolutionary characters.”

Herbert Marcuse • Like Wilhelm Reich and Erich Fromm, Marcuse was an intellectual of the Frankfurt School who came to America in the 1930s. • He has often been described as a Marxist philosopher, but he was in fact a full-blooded social revolutionary who contemplated the disintegration of Western European and American society just as Karl Marx and Georg Lukacs contemplated the disintegration of German society: “One can rightfully speak of a cultural revolution, since the protest is directed toward the whole cultural establishment, including the morality of existing society…there is one thing we can say with complete assurance: the traditional idea of revolution and the traditional strategy of revolution has ended. These ideas are oldfashioned…What we must undertake is a type of diffuse and dispersed disintegration of the system.” • Marcuse published Eros and Civilisation in 1955, which became the founding document of the 1960s counterculture and brought the Frankfurt School into the colleges and universities of Western Europe and America. • He asserted that the only way to escape the one-dimensionality of modern industrial society was to liberate the erotic side of man, the sensuous instinct, in rebellion against “technological rationality.”

• This erotic liberation was to take the form of the “Great Refusal,” a total rejection of the capitalist monster and its entire works, including technological reason and ritualauthoritarian language. • He provided the needed intellectual justifications for adolescent sexual rebellion and the slogan “Make Love, Not War.” • His theory included the belief that the Women’s Liberation Movement was to be the most important component of the opposition, and potentially the most radical. • His revolutionary efforts would blossom into a full-scale war by revolutionary Marxism against the European white male in the schools and colleges.

Theodor Adorno • He was another Marxist revolutionary and a member of the Frankfurt School who came to America in the 1930s. • Along with others, Adorno authored The Authoritarian Personality, which was published in 1950. • Adorno’s book was inspired by the same kind of theoretical assertions revealed in the works of Wilhelm Reich, Erich Fromm, and Herbert Marcuse based on analytical studies of German society that were begun in 1923. • The basic theme was the same. There was such a thing as an authoritarian character that was the opposite of the desired revolutionary character. This authoritarian character was a product of capitalism, Christianity, conservatism, the patriarchal family and sexual repression. In Germany, this combination induced prejudice, anti-Semitism and fascism according to Frankfurt School theory. • It so happened that most Western Europeans and Americans were products of capitalism, Christianity, conservatism, the patriarchal family, and sexual repression in their youth. So Theodor Adorno and other members of the Frankfurt School had a golden opportunity to execute Georg Lukacs’ and Antonio Gramsci’s program for creating social revolution in Western Europe and America instead of Germany. • They would posit the existence of authoritarian personalities among Western Europeans and Americans with tendencies toward prejudice, and then exploit this to force the “scientifically planned re-education” of Western Europeans and Americans with the excuse that it was being done in order to eradicate prejudice. • This scientifically-planned re-education would become the master plan for the transformation of Europe’s and America’s system of fundamental values into their opposite revolutionary values in European education so that school children would become replicas of the Frankfurt School revolutionary characters and thus create the New Western Child. • This can be confirmed by noting that The Authoritarian Personality is the key source of the affective domain of Benjamin Bloom’s Taxonomy of Educational Objectives of 1964, which guided the education cartel thereafter.

Political Correctness in Higher Education On a growing number of university campuses the freedom to articulate and discuss ideas – a principle that has been the cornerstone of higher education since the time of Socrates – is eroding at an alarming rate. Consider just one increasing trend: hundreds (sometimes thousands) of copies of conservative student newspapers have been either stolen or publicly burned by student radicals. In many cases these acts have taken place with the tacit support of faculty and administrators. The perpetrators are rarely disciplined. While it would be easy to dismiss such demonstrations of tolerance as student pranks, these incidents are the surface manifestations of a more pervasive and insidious trend – a trend that has as its goal the destruction of the liberal arts tradition that has helped create and sustain Western civilisation. Though some pundits have claimed that the prevalence of the ideological intolerance known as political correctness has been exaggerated, the opposite is closer to the truth. Political correctness has become so deeply ingrained in Western European and American higher education that many campuses are now dominated by an atmosphere of uncertainty and apprehension. An increasing number of dedicated students and faculty members now live in fear that their intellectual pursuit of truth will offend the Grand Inquisitors of political correctness. The techniques of political correctness are now well known: attacks on the curriculum in the name of “multiculturalism,” the imposition of restrictive and vaguely-worded “speech codes,” and mandatory “sensitivity training” courses for juniors that are little more than systematic efforts at ideological indoctrination. But the influence of political correctness has spread in other disturbing ways.

The Origins of Political Correctness in Higher Education While the ideology of political correctness is hardly restricted to our campuses, there is no doubt it originated there. The intellectual roots of this phenomenon stretch back over centuries. Ultimately, the origins of PC can be traced to the rise of modern ideology and its quest for power. In contrast to the classical and Judeo-Christian traditions, which stressed man’s need to understand the moral order and conform himself to it, modern ideologies have sought to dominate and control the world. In the twentieth century these ideologies gained political power in Communist states. But in the West, ideology has not been able to make such a direct assault on our traditions of ordered liberty. Rather, radical intellectuals have sought to undermine the foundations of knowledge itself, concentrating their efforts on the transformation of the university. The turning point in the academy came in the 1960s, when militant students launched a guerrilla attack on the traditions of Western culture and the liberal arts. Seeing that they could not gain lasting power through demonstrations alone, many of these militants opted to remain “in the system,” going on to become professors themselves. This generation of “Cultural Marxist radicals” has now become the establishment in the vast majority of our institutions of higher learning. As university head masters, deans, and department chairmen, they have set about hiring other ideologues in their own image and have instigated the repressive policies we know as political correctness. These politicised academics will be extremely difficult to dislodge from their current positions of power.

Ideology vs. Liberal Education The stakes in this war of ideas are high, for they include the very concept of freedom itself. Western Europeans and Americans have always understood the intimate and vital connection between liberal education and political liberty. That is why political correctness is nothing less than a death blow aimed at the heart of our countries. In his seminal book The Idea of a University, Cardinal John Henry Newman defined the “liberal arts” as a pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. By way of contrast, he defined the “servile arts” as those modes of study that serve only specific, immediate ends. The liberal arts are liberating, Newman argued, because they enable men to discover the underlying principles that guide us toward wisdom and virtue. Were he alive today, Newman would view political correctness as “servile” because its purpose is to advance a political agenda to a position of national power. Militant professors in increasing numbers are shamelessly turning their podiums into pulpits, abandoning the search for objective truth and setting about the task of indoctrinating their students.

The Devastated Curriculum The proponents of political correctness have concentrated their efforts on the core of a liberal education, the curriculum. Their efforts will radically alter what new generations of Western Europeans and Americans will learn. In this battle the handmaiden of political correctness has been the “multicultural” movement. A number of critics have rightly pointed out that multiculturalism is more than an argument for courses that concentrate on groups that at one time were disadvantaged or oppressed. Rather, multiculturalism involves the systematic restructuring of the curriculum so as to hinder students from learning about the Western tradition. Since the ulterior motive behind political correctness is an attempt to restructure Western European and American society along egalitarian lines, it is imperative for its proponents to instill in the minds of students a thoroughgoing cultural relativism. Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the politically correct assault on the curriculum is that it has occurred at many of our elite universities. Take, for example, the case of Stanford University, an institution that has long played a leadership role in American higher education. Stanford eliminated its long-standing Western civilisation requirement in 1988 and replaced it with a multicultural program known as “Cultures, Ideas, and Values.” Under this new program freshmen at Stanford can just as easily study Marxist revolutionaries in Central America as they can Plato, Shakespeare, or Newton. Stanford has also led the movement away from serious study of history. Students at Stanford, like students at all but one of the other top 50 universities in the United States, are not required to take a single course in history. Instead, they are offered a choice of courses under the heading of “American Cultures.” According to one recent graduate at Stanford, it is impossible to fulfill the “American Cultures” requirement by studying Protestantism, Irish Americans, or the American West, while courses that do fulfill the requirement include “Film and Literature: US-Mexico Border Representations” and “Contemporary Ethnic Drama.” Stanford students must also take courses in “World Cultures” and “Gender Studies” that include “Chicana Expressive Culture” and “Misogyny and Feminism in the Renaissance.” Because elite institutions such as Stanford set an example for the rest of American and European higher education, other universities eagerly adopt these devastating assaults

on the curriculum. This “trickle-down” effect will have a long-lasting impact on the way future generations of Western Europeans and Americans will be educated.

Intolerance and the Assault on Freedom The two pillars that have traditionally sustained the liberal arts are academic freedom and freedom of speech. Without the freedom to pursue the truth and to write and speak freely, authentic scholarship is impossible. But both of these fundamental freedoms have been routinely abrogated by the establishment of speech codes, “sensitivity” classes, and a general atmosphere of fear and intimidation on campus. For example, younger professors who have not received tenure must not only be careful of what they say, but of what they publish. Ideological university administrators in the 1990s have created an environment dominated by suspicion that is far more intense than anything spawned by anti-Communist Senator Joseph McCarthy in the 1950s. The most tragic victims of this age of political correctness are the students. The traditional goal of a liberal arts education – acculturation, whereby students absorb the inherited wisdom of the past – has been set aside. Increasingly, a university education today seems to involve political indoctrination. When all is said and done, political correctness substitutes smug feelings of righteousness for the traditional habits of critical thinking. One distinguished scholar recently lamented that “higher education is increasingly about acquiring attitudes and opinions that one puts on like a uniform.” Because the academy is a relatively isolated world, it can allow politicised administrators to turn the campus into a laboratory for experiments in social transformation. When critics of political correctness have compared the atmosphere on campus to that of a totalitarian state, liberal pundits have been quick to denounce them as hysterical. Few of these pundits have any first-hand experience of daily life on campus.

The Movement for Academic Reform Despite the institutional power of the campus radicals, forces are at work seeking to spur authentic academic reform. The academic reform movement relies on the principles of accountability, communication, and a commitment to authentic scholarship. One force of academic reform is a growing demand among parents for greater accountability from colleges and universities. At a time when studies show that students are paying more and learning less than ever before, parents in increasing numbers are becoming discriminating consumers. Another force is independent student newspapers whose journalists publicise the antics of political correctness on campus. In many universities, campus radicals are still unchallenged in the enclosed world of the university. However, there are alternatives. Alternative student organisations have identified abuses at all levels of academic life and engaged in investigative journalism that has been remarkably fair and accurate. Perhaps the most well-known “scoop” came from Yale University’s alternative paper, Light & Truth, a publication supported by the Collegiate Network. The editors of Light & Truth discovered that the $20 million gift of alumnus Lee Bass was not being used for its intended purpose of supporting an integrated course in Western civilisation. Their report broke open the scandal, which ended when Yale

returned Mr. Bass’s money. The subsequent furor cost Yale a great deal more than Mr. Bass’s $20 million – both in monetary terms and in the loss of confidence of many Yale donors that the current administration can be trusted. Not all the scandals uncovered by alternative campus papers are of this magnitude, but there are innumerable abuses that can be exposed by investigative student journalism. The law school at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, banned representatives of the U.S. military from setting up recruiting tables there, despite receiving federal tax dollars from the Defence Department. An article about this outrageous assault on freedom that ran in both the student-run Carolina Review and in the national student newspaper published by ISI, CAMPUS, raised a hue and cry on and off campus. North Carolina legislators took immediate action and passed a bill prohibiting taxpayersupported schools from discriminating against the military when prospective employers come to the university. At the University of Wisconsin, Madison, the UWM Times, a conservative student newspaper, revealed that a university administrator had been soliciting signatures for local Democrat candidates for public office, in direct violation of a state law forbidding university employees from engaging in political campaigning. The university refused to reprimand the administrator in question – perhaps because the chancellor himself violated both the state law and his own directive by signing one of the petitions while at work. The story was picked up by the Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel and the abuse was brought to an end. Now that alternative newspapers and organisations dedicated to academic reform are spreading the word, the larger communities that surround our institutions of higher education are getting more involved in serious academic reform. For example, the National Association of Scholars is encouraging university trustees to take a more active and vocal role in opposing the excesses of political correctness. Efforts of this type must be expanded and intensified. In the long run, the most direct method of defeating the inquisitors of political correctness is simply to stand up to them. Individual acts of defiance often entail serious risks: students can face star-chamber proceedings that are humiliating and demoralising while faculty can lose their bids to receive tenure. But every act of resistance causes a ripple, encouraging others to stand up to ideological intimidation. With the support of a significant number of parents, donors, and alumni, these David’s may yet slay the Goliaths who tower over them. The Fire of True-Learning Perhaps the strongest force for true academic reform is that which seeks to defeat the ideological depredations of political correctness by winning the war of ideas. Moreover, some colleges and universities continue to swim against the ideological tides of our time. One of Edmund Burke’s most famous sayings is that “the only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing.” For generations, Western Europeans and Americans have treated higher education with awe – a token of their faith in the liberating power of the liberal arts. But in the face of political correctness, it is time for the Western European and American public to temper its respect with a critical sensibility, and to undertake a more direct effort to call academia to account. It is time for good men and women to demand that Western European higher education live up to its best traditions and eschew the tyranny of political correctness.

Political Correctness: Deconstruction and Literature Literature is, if not the most important cultural indicator, at least a significant benchmark of a society’s level of civilisation. Our nature and environment combine to form each individual mind, which in turn expresses itself in words. Literature, as the words society collectively holds up as exemplary, is then a starting point of sorts – a window into the culture. Today’s literary field is therefore worth examining for the insights it provides into our current cultural milieu. The contemporary Western European and American literary field is awash in “isms:” Marxism, Freudianism, feminism, and so on. Most of these are the academic cousins of what is called in the common culture “Political Correctness.” Literary theorists take their particular brand of criticism and apply it to literature in an effort to find self-affirmation in a “discovered” meaning of the text. For a feminist critic, for example, no longer does Andrew Marvel’s “Upon Appleton House” have the beauty of the grounds as its theme; it speaks instead of the evils of a patriarchal line of inheritance. These “cultural critics,” so named because they critique literature based on the point of view of a particular culture, arose in the 1960s, but their schools of criticism only truly began to pick up steam with the arrival of the school of deconstruction in the 1970s. The works of the father of deconstruction, Jacques Derrida, began to be translated from the French by American professor Gayatri Spivak in the mid-1970s, a time when the U.S. literary scene was ripe for its influence. The economic Marxists were alive and well on Western European and American campuses, and the cultural critics were still being fed by the radicalism of the times. Feminists had gained a foothold in the earlier decade, but they had in their meagre arsenals only a vague feeling of repression. What they lacked was philosophical backing – the courage prompted by having their own logos. The arrival of deconstruction from France provided that philosophy. At that time, that generation of academics was doing what all academics do, telling the previous generation that it had it all wrong. In this case the rebellion was against the New Critics – so-called even now, decades after their prime. The New Critics specialised in finding the meaning of texts without regard to background information such as authorial intent, a process that had “the text is everything” as its guiding principle. The new generation of critics set out to turn that principle on its head. Instead of “the text is everything,” the new generation claimed that “everything is text” and turned to analysing anything and everything in relation to the literary work. If a poet wrote a poem that included a female character, the critics would look into the poet’s relationship with his mother, his wife, his sister and so on in an effort to offer up an interpretation of the work. This could have (and often did have) the positive effect of using biographic information to gain new understanding of the work; however, these new interpretations were not attempts to discern the true meaning of the work (as the New Critics had done) or even to discover the author’s intended meaning (as traditional readings attempted). This new generation of critics instead became prime practitioners of what is known in literary circles as “cultural criticism.” They strained to view literature from the “woman’s point of view” or the “victims” or the “radical minority point of view.” Their attempts were not to find meaning – they were influenced too greatly by relativists for that – but to find sexism, racism or “homophobia” in the works of male, European or heterosexual authors. Derridean deconstruction became a tool for these cultural critics. Simply stated, deconstruction is a school of thought that posits that words have no meaning. Instead, words have “traces” of meaning. The meaning of a word is continually disappearing, leaving us with only the memory, or trace, of what that meaning once was. Once they realised the power of this school of thought, the cultural critics embraced it readily, for here they discovered a method of attack on the traditional interpretations of

literary works. They used deconstruction to remove traditional meaning and replaced it with new meaning. That meaning was the Political Correctness that infests our society today. For example, after the traditional meaning of “How Do I Love Thee?” has been destabilised in the process described above, a feminist critic might come along and — in the absence of a stable traditional interpretation – declare that the poem is “really” concerned with how women in nineteenth-century England were conditioned to see themselves as secondary to men. The intelligentsia had forgotten its literature in its haste to promote its politics. Unfortunately, that has not stopped the cultural critics from indoctrinating this new generation in feminist interpretation, Marxist philosophy and so-called “queer theory.” Requirements for reading Shakespeare, Milton, Chaucer, and other dead white males are disappearing, to be replaced by options to take studies in “The Roles of Women in the Renaissance” (an excuse to lament the sexism of the past) or “The Bible as Literature” (a course designed to denigrate the Bible as cleverly crafted fiction instead of God’s truth). The reliable saviour of the intelligentsia is the common man and his common sense. Common sense dictates that words do mean things, and as deconstruction posits otherwise it will be relegated to the margins of society. Sadly, its effects will linger on – it has given a sense of validity to cultural criticism and established a marketplace for its ideas.

Radical Feminism and Political Correctness Perhaps no aspect of Political Correctness is more prominent in Western European life today than feminist ideology. Is feminism, like the rest of Political Correctness, based on the cultural Marxism imported from Germany in the 1930s? While feminism’s history in Western Europe certainly extends longer than sixty years, its flowering in recent decades has been interwoven with the unfolding social revolution carried forward by cultural Marxists. Where do we see radical feminism ascendant? It is on television, where nearly every major offering has a female “power figure” and the plots and characters emphasise inferiority of the male and superiority of the female. It is in the military, where expanding opportunity for women, even in combat positions, has been accompanied by double standards and then lowered standards, as well as by a decline in enlistment of young men, while “warriors” in the services are leaving in droves. It is in government-mandated employment preferences and practices that benefit women and use “sexual harassment” charges to keep men in line. It is in colleges where women’s gender studies proliferate and “affirmative action” is applied in admissions and employment. It is in other employment, public and private, where in addition to affirmative action, “sensitivity training” is given unprecedented time and attention. It is in public schools, where “self awareness” and “self-esteem” are increasingly promoted while academic learning declines. And sadly, we see that several European countries allow and fund free distribution of contraceptive pills combined with liberal abortion policies. While the radical feminist movement is embraced by present day Political Correctness ideology, derived from cultural Marxism, feminism as such does have earlier roots. Feminism was conceived and birthed in the 1830s, in the generation experiencing the first stage of the industrial revolution. Women, who for centuries had shared the challenges of surviving in an agrarian life, were becoming part of a middle-class gentry with more time and energy to spend writing newspaper articles and novels for their “sisters.” The initial stages of the feminisation of European culture had started.

These feminists, radical in their time, supported women’s rights, egalitarianism, anticolonialism, pacifism and other causes which we now observe in popular culture. In contrast to today’s radical feminists, social feminists of the 1890s and early 20th century were of a less totalitarian character. They stood for women’s suffrage but also advocated the strengthening of the family. Today, the feminisation of European culture, moving rapidly since the 1960s continues to intensify. Indeed, the present-day radical feminist assault through support for mass Muslim immigration has a political parallel to the their anti-colonial efforts. This current assault is in part a continuation of a century-old effort to destroy traditional European structures, the very foundation of European culture. There is no doubt in the media that the “man of today” is expected to be a touchy-feely subspecies who bows to the radical feminist agenda. He is a staple of Hollywood, the television network sitcoms and movies, and the political pundits of talk shows. The feminisation is becoming so noticeable that newspapers and magazines are picking up on it. For example, the Washington Times and National Review magazine combined to tell us that “behind the breezy celebration of ‘guy stuff’ in today’s men’s magazine lurks a crisis of confidence. What does it mean to be masculine in the 90s?” It is revealed that today’s men’s magazines (Esquire, GQ, Men’s Health, Men’s Fitness, Men’s Journal, Details, Maxim, Men’s Perspective)”are all geared to a new feminised man….” Some examples? The old masculine attitude toward personal appearance is disappearing. If memory serves, our fathers’ acts of personal upkeep were mostly limited to shaving and putting on a tie. According to Lowry:
It’s hard to imagine [them] interested in articles on ‘A Flat Belly for the Beach’ (Verge), or the three new men’s fragrances for the fall season (GQ), or even ‘The New Fall Suit’ (Esquire). But somewhere along the line men became less concerned with being strong and silent, and more worried about making themselves pretty.

Indeed the feminisation of European culture is nearly completed. And the last bastion of male domination, the police force and the military, is under assault. If this “feminisation” trend were driven only by radical feminists seeking to pull down a perceived male-dominated hierarchy, there would be more hope that the cycles of history would move Europe toward a stable accommodation between men and women. But the drive is deeper, and it will not be satisfied by any accommodation. The radical feminists have embraced and been embraced by the wider and deeper movement of cultural Marxism. For dedicated Marxists, the strategy is to attack at every point where an apparent disparity leaves a potential constituency of “oppressed” victim groups – Muslims, women etc. Cultural Marxists, men and women, are making the most of it, and the theory developed by the Frankfurt School provides the ideology. The Frankfurt School theorised that the authoritarian personality is a product of the patriarchal family. This idea is in turn directly connected to Engels’s The Origins of the Family, Private Property and the State, which promotes matriarchy. Furthermore, it was Karl Marx who wrote in The Communist Manifesto about the radical notion of a “community of women.” He also, in 1845, wrote disparagingly in his The German Ideology of the idea that the family was the basic unit of society. The concept of the “authoritarian personality” is not just to be interpreted as a model for the conduct of warfare against prejudice as such. It is a handbook for psychological warfare against the European male, to render him unwilling to defend traditional beliefs and values. In other words, the aim was to emasculate him. Undoubtedly the Institute for Social Research at Frankfurt University meant this, as it used the term “psychological techniques for changing personality.”

The “authoritarian personality,” studied in the 1940s and 1950s by Western Europeans and American followers of the Frankfurt School, prepared the way for such psychological warfare against the male gender role. The aim was promoted by Herbert Marcuse and others under the guise of “women’s liberation” and in the New Left movement in the 1960s. Evidence that psychological techniques for changing personality are intended to focus in particular on the emasculation of the European male has also been provided by Abraham Maslow, founder of “third force humanist psychology” and promoter of psychotherapeutic techniques in public school classrooms. He wrote that “the next step in personal evolution is a transcendence of both masculinity and femininity to general humanness.” Cultural Marxist stalwarts apparently know exactly what they want to do and how they plan to do it. They have actually already succeeded in accomplishing much of their agenda. How did this situation come about in European universities? Gertrude Himmelfarb has observed that it slipped past traditional academics almost unobserved until it was too late. It occurred so “quietly” that when they “looked up”, postmodernism was upon them with a vengeance. “They were surrounded by such a tidal wave of multicultural subjects such as radical feminism, deconstructed relativism as history and other courses” which undermine the perpetuation of Western civilisation. Indeed, this tidal wave slipped by just as Antonio Gramsci and the Frankfurt School had envisioned – a quiet revolution propagating a European hate ideology with the goal of destroying Western civilisation and which was: anti-God, anti-Christian, anti-family, anti-nationalist, anti-patriot, anti conservative, anti-hereditarian, anti-ethnocentric, anti-masculine, anti-tradition, and anti-morality. “Cultural Marxism,” as preached by the Frankfurt School has thus spurred the widely popular and destructive concepts of “affirmative action,” “multiculturalism” and “diversity.” One can’t escape these terms today. These concepts have destroyed every defensive structure of European society which has laid the foundation for the Islamisation of Europe.

Conclusions Critical Theory as applied mass psychology has led to the deconstruction of gender in the European culture. Following Critical Theory, the distinction between masculinity and femininity will disappear. The traditional roles of the mothers and fathers are to be dissolved so that patriarchy will be ended. Children are not to be raised according to their biological genders and gender roles according to their biological differences. This reflects the Frankfurt School rationale for the disintegration of the traditional family. Thus, one of the basic tenets of Critical Theory was the necessity to break down the traditional family. The Frankfurt School scholars preached:
Even a partial breakdown of parental authority in the family might tend to increase the readiness of a coming generation to accept social change.

The transformation of European culture envisioned by the cultural Marxists goes further than pursuing gender equality. Embodied in their agenda is “matriarchal theory,” under which they purpose to transform European culture to be female-dominated. This is a direct throwback to Wilhelm Reich, a Frankfurt School member who considered

matriarchal theory in psychoanalytic terms. In 1933, he wrote in “The Mass Psychology of Fascism” that matriarchy was the only genuine family type of “natural society.” Richard Bernstein has written in his book on multiculturalism, “the Marxist revolutionary process for the past several decades in Europe and America has centered on race and sex warfare rather than class warfare” as in earlier times. This reflects a scheme more total than economics to restructure the society. As the social revolutionaries readily proclaim, their purpose is to destroy the hegemony of white males. To accomplish this, all barriers to the introduction of more women and minorities throughout the “power structure” are to be brought down by all means available. Laws and lawsuits, intimidation, and demonising of white males as racists and sexists are pursued through the mass media and the universities. The psycho–dynamic of the revolutionary process aims for psychic disempowerment – decapitation – of those who oppose. The US’s founders recognised three primal values in the Declaration of Independence, and they ranked them properly: Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. If the order of these fundamental human rights is switched – with happiness before liberty or liberty before life – we come to moral chaos and social anarchy. This very condition is what Judge Robert Bork describes as “modern liberalism.” He defines its characteristics as “‘radical egalitarianism’ (equality of outcomes rather than of opportunities) and ‘radical individualism’ (the drastic reduction of limits to personal gratification).” Judge Bork also identifies radical feminism as “the most destructive and fanatical” element of this modern liberalism. He further describes radical feminism as “totalitarian in spirit.” Most Western Europeans and Americans do not realise that they, through their institutions, are being led by social revolutionaries who think in terms of the continuing destruction of the existing social order in order to create a new one. The revolutionaries are New Age Elite Boomers. They now control the public institutions in Western Europe and the United States. Their “quiet” revolution, beginning with the counterculture revolution of their youth, is nearing completion. A key, or even a dominant element because purportedly it represents that largest political and social constituency among their potential followers, is feminism. The Marxist movement in its “quiet” cultural latter-day phase is seemingly sweeping all before it. With its sway over the media, fully in the grip of feminism, it is hard to discern the stirrings of a counter-culture. The current cultural Marxist/multiculturalist elites, the New Totalitarians, are the most dangerous generation in Western history. Not only have they managed to destroy fundamental structures of European society. They are allowing millions of Muslims to colonise Europe. In just five decades Muslim populations have increased from a few thousand to more than 25 million. Who will rise to challenge Political Correctness? The fate of European civilisation depends on European men steadfastly resisting Politically Correct feminism. Even more, they must resourcefully oppose the wider grip of Political Correctness, the cultural Marxism for which radical feminism is only one avenue of attack.

Further Readings on the Frankfurt School This is the sixth and final chapter in the Free Congress Foundation’s book on Political Correctness, or – to call it by its real name – cultural Marxism. It is a short bibliographical essay intended not as an exhaustive resource for scholars but as a guide for interested citisens who want to learn more about the ideology that is taking over Western Europe and America. To understand Political Correctness or so called cultural Marxism and the threat it poses it is necessary to understand its history, particularly the history of the institution most responsible for creating it, the Frankfurt School. The Frankfurt School, or the Institute for Social Research as it was formally known, was established at Frankfurt University in Germany in 1923. This fact alone is important, because it tells us that Political Correctness is not merely a leftover of the European student rebellions of the 1960s and 1970s. Another fact from that long-ago year, 1923, is equally significant: the intended name for the Frankfurt School was the Institute for Marxism. The Institute’s father and funder, Felix Weil, wrote in 1971 that he “wanted the Institute to become known, and perhaps famous, due to its contributions to Marxism as a scientific discipline…” Beginning a tradition Political Correctness still carries on, Weil and others decided that they could operate more effectively if they concealed their Marxism; hence, on reflection, they chose the neutral-sounding name, the Institute for Social Research (Institut fur Sozialforschung). But “Weil’s heartfelt wish was still to create a foundation similar to the Marx-Engels Institute in Moscow – equipped with a staff of professors and students, with libraries and archives – and one day to present it to a German Soviet Republic.” In 1933, this disguised “Institute for Marxism” left Germany and reestablished itself in New York City, where in time it shifted its focus to injecting its ideology into Western European and American society. The most readable English-language history of the Frankfurt School is Martin Jay’s book, The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute for Social Research, 1932 — 1950 (University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 1973 – new edition in 1996). This book is in print in paperback and can be ordered through any bookstore. The reader should be aware that Jay’s book is, in the words of another work on the Frankfurt School, a “semiofficial” history, which is to say that it is largely uncritical. Like virtually all other English-language authors on the Institute, Jay is on the political left. Nonetheless, the book provides a solid factual introduction to the Frankfurt School, and the reader should have little trouble discerning in it the roots and origins of today’s Political Correctness. In his first chapter, “The Creation of the Institut fur Sozialforschung and Its First Frankfurt Years,” Jay lays bare the Institute’s Marxist origins and nature, and equally its efforts to conceal both: “The original idea of calling it the Institut fur Marxismus (Institute for Marxism) was abandoned as too provocative, and a more Aesopian alternative was sought (not for the last time in the Frankfurt School’s history).” Of the Institute’s first director, Carl Grunberg, Jay writes, “Grunberg concluded his opening address by clearly stating his personal allegiance to Marxism as a scientific methodology. Just as liberalism, state socialism, and the historical school had institutional homes elsewhere, so Marxism would be the ruling principle at the Institut.” Jay’s first chapter also introduces the Institute’s critical shift that laid the basis for today’s Political Correctness, a.k.a. cultural Marxism: “if it can be said that in early years of its history the Institut concerned itself primarily with an analysis of bourgeois society’s socio-economic substructure, in the years after 1930 its prime interest lay in its cultural superstructure.” The second chapter, “The Genius of Critical Theory,” gets at the heart of the “Critical Studies” departments that now serve as the fonts of Political Correctness on college

campuses. All of these are branches and descendants of the Critical Theory first developed in the 1930s by the Frankfurt School. The term “Critical Theory” is itself something of a play on words. One is tempted to ask, “OK, what is the theory?” The answer is, “The theory is to criticise.” Jay writes, “Critical Theory, as its name implies, was expressed through a series of critiques of other thinkers and philosophical traditions…Only by confronting it in its own terms, as a gadly of other systems, can it be fully understood.” The goal of Critical Theory was not truth, but praxis, or revolutionary action: bringing the current society and culture down through unremitting, destructive criticism. According to Jay, “The true object of Marxism, Horkheimer argued (Max Horkheimer succeeded Carl Grunberg as director of the Institute in July, 1930), was not the uncovering of immutable truths, but the fostering of social change.” The central question facing the Institute in the early 1930s was how to apply Marxism to the culture. The title of Jay’s third chapter gives the answer: “The Integration of Psychoanalysis.” Here, Jay’s book falls down to some extent, in that it does not offer a clear understanding of how the Institute integrated Marx and Freud. The answer appears to be that Freud’s later critiques were made conditional on a capitalist, bourgeois order: a revolutionary, post-capitalist society could “liberate” man from his Freudian repression. Here again one sees key aspects of Political Correctness emerging, including a demand for sexual “liberation” and the attack on “patriarchal” Western culture. If the precise nature of the blending of Marx and Freud is left open by Jay, his next chapter makes the blend’s application clear: “The Institute’s First Studies of Authority.” The Institute left Germany for New York in 1933 because the Nazis came to power in Germany. Not surprisingly, one of the Institute’s first tasks in New York was to oppose Nazism. It did so largely by concocting a psychological “test” for an “authoritarian personality.” Supposedly, people with this authoritarian personality were likely to support Nazism. Both the concept and the methodology were doubtful at best. But the Institute’s work laid down an important tool for the left, namely a notion that anyone on the right was psychologically unbalanced. And it marked a key turning for the Institute in the birth of Political Correctness in Western Europe and America, in that the empirical research the studies demanded was done on Western Europeans and Americans. Ultimately, the result was Institute member Theodor Adorno’s vastly influential book, The Authoritarian Personality, published in 1950. Jay’s fifth chapter, “The Institute’s Analysis of Nazism,” continues the theme of the “authoritarian personality.” But his sixth, “Aesthetic Theory and the Critique of Mass Culture,” provides an answer to the question of why most “serious” modern art and music is so awful. It is intended to be. Theodor Adorno was the Institute’s lead figure on high culture – he began life as a music critic and promoter of Schonberg – and his view was that in the face of the “repressiveness” of bourgeois society, art could only be “true” if it were alienating, reflecting the alienated society around it. Jay quotes Adorno: “A successful work is not one which resolves objective contradictions in a spurious harmony, but one which expresses the idea of harmony negatively by embodying the contradictions, pure and uncompromised, in its innermost structure.” Adorno despised the new mass culture – film, radio, and jazz – in what seems to be a case of missed opportunity: today, the entertainment industry is the single most powerful promoter of Political Correctness. Another key Frankfurt School figure, Walter Benjamin, did see the potential: “he paradoxically held out hope for the progressive potential of politicised, collectivised art.” At some point, someone – the question of who lies beyond the boundaries of Jay’s book – put Benjamin’s perception together with the Frankfurt School’s general view, which Jay summarises as “the Institut came to feel that the culture industry enslaved men in far more subtle and effective ways than the crude methods of domination practiced in earlier eras.”

In the remainder of the book, Jay traces the (sort of) empirical work of the Institute in the 1940s, which was beset by the same problems as their earlier survey “research,” and follows the Institute in its return to Frankfurt, Germany after World War II. But by this point, the reader will already have the picture. He will have seen how Marxism was translated from economic into cultural terms; discerned the themes of sexual liberation, feminism, “victims” and so on that make up today’s Political Correctness; and found in Critical Theory the origins of the endless wailing about “racism, sexism and homophobia” that “PC” pours forth. One key piece of history is missing: “an analysis of Marcuse’s influential transmission of the Frankfurt School’s work to a new Western European and American audience in the 1960s,” as Jay puts it in his epilogue. Also, Jay curiously passes over with only the most minimal discussion the effective move of the Institute, in the persons of Horkheimer and Adorno, to Los Angeles during the war. Did the connections they built there play any role in injecting the Frankfurt School’s philosophy into Western European and American film and, after the war, television? Jay does not touch upon the subject. But for the reader new to the Frankfurt School as the source of today’s Political Correctness, Jay’s The Dialectical Imagination offers a solid base. The book concludes with an extensive (though not annotated) bibliography of works by and about the Frankfurt School. As to other accessible works about the Frankfurt School, the definitive modern work in German has recently been translated into English: The Frankfurt School: Its History, Theories and Political Significance by Rolf Wiggershaus, (translated by Michael Robertson, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, first paperback edition 1995). This covers much of the same ground as Martin Jay’s book, although it also follows the Institute from its post-war return to Germany up to Adorno’s death in 1969. Wiggershaus is more detailed than Jay, and, although he too is on the left politically, he is more critical than Jay. In the book’s Afterword, Wiggershaus offers a brief look (and a hostile one) at some German conservative critiques of the Frankfurt School. A picture emerges that will seem familiar to Western Europeans and Americans entrapped in the coils of Political Correctness: Since the publication in 1970 of his book The Poverty of Critical Theory, Rohrmoser has promulgated, in constantly varying forms, the view that Marcuse, Adorno, and Horkheimer were the terrorists’ intellectual foster-parents, who were using Cultural Revolution to destroy the traditions of the Christian West. Academics such as Ernst Topitsch and Kurt Sontheimer, who saw themselves as educators and liberal democrats, followed in Rohrmoser’s footsteps. In 1972 Topitsch, a critical rationalist who was Professor of Philosophy in Graz, had stated that behind the slogans of “rational discussion” and “dialogue free of domination” there was being established at the universities “a distinct terrorism of political convictions such as never existed before, even under Nazi tyranny.”

Additional works on the Frankfurt School • The Frankfurt School by T.B. Bottomore (Tavistock, London, 1984). Another history written by a sympathiser; you are better off with Jay or Wiggershaus. • “The New Dark Age: The Frankfurt School and ‘Political Correctness’” by Michael Minnicino, in Fidelio, Vol. 1, No. 1, Winter 1992 (KMW Publishing, Washington, DC) One of the few looks at the Frankfurt School by someone not a sympathiser, this long journal article explains the role of the Institute for Social Research in creating the ideology we now know as “Political Correctness.” Unfortunately, its value is reduced by some digressions that lack credibility.

• Angela Davis: An Autobiography by Angela Davis (Random House, New York 1974) Angela Davis, a leading American black radical and Communist Party member, was described by Frankfurt School member Herbert Marcuse as “my best student.” She also studied in Frankfurt under Adorno. This book shows the link between the Institute for Social Research and the New Left of the 1960s through the eyes of a key participant. • The Young Lukacs and the Origins of Western Marxism by Andrew Arato (Seabury Press, New York, 1979). The author is, as usual, a sympathiser, but this work shows the key role Lukacs played in the thinking of the Frankfurt School and, later, the New Left. • The Origin of Negative Dialectics: Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin and the Frankfurt Institute by Susan Buck-Morss (Free Press, New York, 1977). An important book on the relationship of the Frankfurt School and Critical Theory to the New Left. • Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas by David Held (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1980). Yet another history by a fan of the Frankfurt School, but valuable for its discussion of the impact of Nietzsche on key Frankfurt School figures. • Adorno: A Political Biography by Lorenz Jager (translated by Stewart Spencer, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2004) This recent study of Theodor Adorno, the Frankfurt School’s most important “creative spirit,” offers a highly readable introduction to the origins of Political Correctness, perhaps the best available to the layman. Lorenz Jager is an editor of the Frankfurter Allgemeine, one of Germany’s most influential newspapers. He is no uncritical admirer of the Frankfurt School, and thus offers a balanced treatment of Adorno instead of the usual hagiography. Beyond these secondary works lies the vast literature produced by members of the Frankfurt School itself. Some key works were written in English, and many of those written in German are available in translation. As is usually the case with Marxist works, the prose style and vocabulary are often so convoluted as to make them almost unreadable. Further, the refusal of the Frankfurt School to make its own future vision plain led many of its members to write in aphorisms, which adds yet another layer of impenetrableness. One work, however, is of such importance that it must be recommended despite its difficulty: Eros and Civilisation by Herbert Marcuse (Beacon Press, Boston, first paperback edition in 1974 and still in print). Subtitled A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud, this book holds center stage for two reasons. First, it completes the task of integrating Marx and Freud. While the Marxism is sotto voce, the whole framework of the book is in fact Marxist, and it is through the framework that Freud is considered. Second, Eros and Civilisation and its author were the key means of transmission by which the intellectual work of the Frankfurt School was injected into the student rebellion of the 1960s. This book became the bible of the young radicals who took over Western European and America’s college campuses from 1965 onward, and who are still there as faculty members. In brief, Eros and Civilisation urges total rebellion against traditional Western culture – the “Great Refusal” – and promises a Candyland utopia of free sex and no work to those who join the revolution. About two-thirds of the way through the book, Marcuse offers this summary of its arguments: Our definition of the specific historical character of the established reality principle led to a re-examination of what Freud considered to be universal validity. We questioned this validity in view of the historical possibility of the abolition of the repressive controls imposed by civilisation. The very achievements of this civilisation seemed to make the performance principle obsolete, to make the repressive utilisation of the instincts archaic. But the idea of a non-repressive civilisation on the basis of the achievements of the

performance principle encountered the argument that instinctual liberation (and consequently total liberation) would explode civilisation itself, since the latter is sustained only through renunciation and work (labour) – in other words, through the repressive utilisation of instinctual energy. Freed from these constraints, man would exist without work and without order; he would fall back into nature, which would destroy culture. To meet this argument, we recalled certain archetypes of imagination which, in contrast to the culture-heroes of repressive productivity, symbolised creative receptivity. These archetypes envisioned the fulfilment of man and nature, not through domination and exploitation, but through release of inherent libidinal forces. We then set ourselves the task of “verifying” these symbols – that is to say, demonstrating their truth value as symbols of a reality beyond the performance principle. We thought that the representative content of the Orphic and Narcissistic images was the erotic reconciliation (union) of man and nature in the aesthetic attitude, where order is beauty and work is play. Marcuse continues after this summary to lay out the erotic content of the “reality beyond the performance principle,” i.e., a new civilisation where work and productivity were unimportant. “The basic experience in this (aesthetic) dimension is sensuous rather than conceptual,” that is, feelings are more important than logic: “The discipline of aesthetics installs the order of sensuousness as against the order of reason.” “In German, sensuousness and sensuality are still rendered by one and the same term: Sinnlichkeit. It connotes instinctual (especially sexual) gratification… No longer used as a full-time instrument of labour, the body would be re-sexualised… (which) would first manifest itself in a reactivation of all erotogenic zones and, consequently, in a resurgence of pre-genital polymorphous sexuality and in a decline of genital supremacy. The body in its entirety would become an object of cathexis, a thing to be enjoyed – an instrument of pleasure. This change in the value and scope of libidinal relations would lead to a disintegration of the institutions in which the private interpersonal relations have been organised, particularly the monogamic and patriarchal family.” This in a book which Marcuse dedicated to Sophie Marcuse, his wife of fifty years! It is easy to see how this message – “If it feels good, do it” – published in 1955 resonated with the student rebels of the 1960s. Marcuse understood what most of the rest of his Frankfurt School colleagues did not: the way to destroy Western civilisation – the objective set forth by George Lukacs in 1919 – was not through abstruse theory, but through sex, drugs, and rock ‘n’ roll. Marcuse wrote other works for the new generation that spawned the New Left – One Dimensional Man (1964), Critique of Pure Tolerance (1965), An Essay on Liberation (1969), Counterrevolution and Revolt (1972). But Eros and Civilisation was and remains the key work, the one that put the match to the tinder. Other central works by members of the Frankfurt School include: • The Authoritarian Personality by Theodor Adorno (Harper, New York, 1950). This book is the basis for everything that followed that portrayed conservatism as a psychological defect. It had enormous impact, not least on education theory. • Dialectic of Enlightenment by Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer (trans. By John Cumming, Verso, London, 1979). A complex philosophical work written during World War II largely in response to Nazism (and extensively devoted to discussions of antiSemitism), this work seeks to find a kernel of “liberating” reason in the ruins of the Enlightenment. • Minima Moralia: Reflections from a Damaged Life by Theodor Adorno (trans. E.F.N. Jophcott, New Left Books, London, 1974). A book of aphorisms, almost entirely incomprehensible, but the effective conclusion of Adorno’s work.

• Escape from Freedom by Erich Fromm (Farrar & Rinehart, New York, 1941, still in print in paperback) Fromm was the Institute’s “happy face,” and this book was often required reading at colleges in the 1960s. The thesis is that man’s nature causes him to throw his freedom away and embrace fascism unless he “masters society and subordinates the economic machine to the purposes of human happiness,” i.e., adopts socialism. At this point Fromm was in the process of breaking away from the Institute and his subsequent works cannot be considered as part of the Frankfurt School corpus. • Eclipse of Reason (Oxford University Press, New York, 1947). Essentially a sequel to Dialectic of Enlightenment, the book is heavily the work of Adorno and other Frankfurt School personages, although only Horkheimer’s name appeared on it. Its contents are based on a series of lectures Horkheimer gave at Columbia University in 1944. The prose style is surprisingly readable, but the contents are odd; there is throughout a strong nostalgia, which was normally anathema to the Frankfurt School. The key chapter, “The Revolt of Nature,” reflects a strange Retro anarchism: “The victory of civilisation is too complete to be true. Therefore, adjustment in our times involves an element of resentment and suppressed fury.” • Critical Theory: Selected Essays by Max Horkheimer (trans. Matthew O’Connell, Seabury Press, New York, 1972). The essay, “Traditional and Critical Theory” is especially important. This small bibliography will be enough to get an interested reader started; the full literature on and by the Frankfurt School is immense, as the bibliographies in Jay’s and Wiggershaus’s books attest. What has been missing from it, at least in English, is a readable book, written for the layman, that explains the Frankfurt School and its works in terms of the creation of Political Correctness. This short volume is at least a start in filling that gap.
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frankfurt_School http://www.freecongress.org/centers/cc/pcessay.aspx

1. What you need to know, our falsified history and other forms of cultural Marxist/multiculturalist propaganda (Book 1)
History, Marxism and Islam – What your government, the academia and the media are hiding from you. Revisionism based on appeasement and anti-European thinking.
“Who controls the present, controls the past.” George Orwell

1.1 Historical revisionism (negationism) Historical revisionism is the attempt to change commonly held ideas about the past[1]. Negationism is the denial of historic crimes. From; Islam and the West, Bernard Lewis:
We live in a time when great efforts have been made, and continue to be made, to falsify the record of the past and to make history a tool of propaganda; when governments, religious movements, political parties, and sectional groups of every kind are busy rewriting history as they would wish it to have been, as they would like their followers to believe that it was. All this is very dangerous indeed, to ourselves and to others, however we may define otherness — dangerous to our common humanity. Because, make no mistake, those who are unwilling to confront the past will be unable to understand the present and unfit to face the future.

Ironically though, this harsh criticism of state sanctioned revisionism comes from an Armenian Genocide denier who has downplayed the brutality of the Ottoman Empire considerably. However, Lewis is seen as a moderate Orientalist frequently sought by many mainstream policy makers including the current Bush administration. Given the ignorance with which it is treated, the history of the last 1400 year Islamic Jihad against non-Muslims and Europe comprises one of the most radical forms of historical negationism. The First chapter of this book is therefore dedicated in memory of this ongoing Jihad. We must strive to combat and reverse state sanctioned falsification process by preparing for the time when the true history of Islam will be reintroduced. When our current European regimes fall (and our current systems based on multiculturalism will collapse) within the next 150 years it will allow us to once again re-introduce and make use of the true history of Islam, including: Islamic history, Islamic jurisprudence, and true descriptions of Jihad, Dhimmitude and other falsified aspects of Islam. The essential aim of this is to prevent historical amnesia by preserving this true uncensored history.

Since the creation of Islam in the 7th century and to up to this day, the Islamic Jihad has systematically killed more than 300 million non Muslims and tortured and enslaved more than 500 million individuals. Since 9/11 2001, more than 12 000 Jihadi terrorist attacks have occurred around the world which have led to the death of one or more non-Muslims [2] per attack. In other words; there are around 150 deadly Jihadi attacks per month around the world. This trend will continue as long as there are non-Muslim targets available and as long as Islam continues to exist. I must admit, when I first started the study on Islamic history and Islamic atrocities more than 3 years ago I really had my doubts about the “politically correct” information available. I started to scratch the surface and I was shocked as I uncovered the vast amount of “ugly, unknown” truths concerning Islamic atrocities. There is a common misconception regarding Islam and Christianity. A lot of people believe today that Christianity still is and was as evil as Islam?! I can attest to the fact that this is absolutely incorrect. Jihadi motivated killings, torture and enslavement count for more than 10 times as Christian motivated killings. However, the politically correct Western establishments want us to think otherwise. The essence of multiculturalism is that all cultures and religions are “equal”. In this context our Western governments launched a great “campaign of deception” against their own people with the goal of creating a falsified version of the Islamic and European Civilisation, in order to make them equal. According to them, this is needed in order to successfully implement multiculturalism. Islamists, Arab Nationalists and Marxist theorists have been at the forefront of falsifying our history since WW2. Especially Edward Said’s book Orientalism published in 1978, have been the driving force in this process. In the past, Europe has had a stereotypical view of Islam just as Islam has had a stereotypical view of us — and these views are largely hostile. For century after century Islam was an enormous threat to what might loosely be called Christendom. It shaped every aspect of European history and was directly responsible for Europe’s colonial empires. Up till around 1750 they were a dangerous and direct competitor to our interests. Gibbon writing in the 1780s was the first to think that the danger had passed. On a local scale the threat lasted even longer. Barbary pirates ravaged the coast of England up till the 1830s carting off coastal villages into slavery and at even later dates on the west coast of Ireland and Iceland. And this was at the height of the British Empire. More than 1,5 million Europeans have been enslaved since the first Jihadi invasion of Andalusia, most of which were brought to North Africa.

Encyclopedia Britannica
Fact: Encyclopedia Britannica was first published in 1768. The contributors often came from other countries and included some of the world’s most respected authorities in their fields.

Western state sanctioned negationism or “politically motivated historical revisionism” on the subject of Islam started for the first time in Great Britain in the late 19 th century. The process was politically motivated with the goal of creating a good foundation for BritishMuslim cooperation and trade. During the Russo-Turkish War[3], Russia succeeded in defeating the Islamic Ottoman Empire. In 1878, after the “Congress of Berlin[4]”, Disraeli-Great Britain decided to strike a deal with the Ottomans promising to protect them militarily from Russia for “thirty

pieces of silver” which in this case was Cyprus. In order to improve British-Ottoman relationships it was decided to introduce a wide scale revision of Encyclopedia Britannica (10th edition and onward) and other source materials which up to then had described Islam, Muslims and Islamic practices as “evil”. This was the beginning of the official European historical falsification process. To understand this we need to study British-Russian relations: The super power of the 19th century, Great Britain, waged a «territorial war» with the other potential super power: Russia. Where interests of the two crossed was — Balkans (then under Turkish occupation). It would be most natural that Russia should have the influence in the area. Most of the subdued Balkan nations (Serbs, Greeks, Rumanians, and Bulgarians) are Eastern Orthodox — like Russians. That did not fit British interests. That is how Britain allied itself with Turkey and invented the myth of the Muslim tolerance. When Turks cut throats, raped women and stole children of Balkan Christians — it was OK for the Brits — it was an expression of tolerance… As long as Russians did not get influence in the Balkans.

Examples of falsification and apologist rhetoric include:

• • • • • •

Exaggerated claims of Muslim cultural and scientific contributions. The Ottoman Empire was tolerant. The, “Jewish experience” in the Ottoman Empire “…was a calm, peaceful, and a fruitful one..”. Balkan Christian boys could acquire great social advancement through “recruitment” into the Ottoman devshirme system. The Armenian Genocide never happened. It was rather a struggle between two peoples for the possession of a single homeland. Muslim Andalusia (Moorish Spain) is often pointed out by Muslim apologists as a kind of multicultural wonderland, in which Jews and Christians were permitted by the Islamic government to rise through the ranks of learning and government administration. Jihad means personal struggle Islam is a religion of peace Christianity and Islam are equal in terms of historic atrocities Maronite Christians (Lebanese Christians) falsely claim to be victims.

• • • •

Examples of systematic deletion/ignoration of important issues The Western European governments have sanctioned deleting and ignoring large chunks of our history, including censorships of school curriculum’s on the following fields:

• • • • • • • • •

Hindu Kush, the largest Genocide in the history of man Armenian Genocides Greek Genocides Assyrian Genocides Coptic Genocides The past Jihads, torture and enslavement of Christians and other non-Muslim peoples in the Middle East and Asia The ongoing Jihads, torture and enslavement of Christian and other non-Muslim peoples or individuals in the Middle East and Asia Jus Primae Noctis — Officially sanctioned rape under the Ottoman Empire The West’s unwillingness to prevent or defend Christian Lebanon against Jihadi invasions by the Global Islamic Ummah (among them many Muslim countries including Iran, Syria, Egypt, Jordan). This Jihad eventually lead to the fall of the Christian state of Lebanon. In 1911 there were 80% Christians in Lebanon, today there are less than 25% left, a minority who are still being persecuted) What the Crusades Were Really Like European Slaves, Arab Masters – more than 1,5 million Europeans were enslaved

• •

Examples of anti Western propaganda in our school curriculums

• •

Falsified information about the Crusades (it was a defensive campaign not offensive) Western colonial history (anti Western bias, this (primarily financial exploitation) was nothing compared to the 1400 years of Islamic Jihad which resulted in countless genocides of more than 300 million people, and the enslavement and forceful conversion of more than 300 million)

The above information serves as reminder why Muslim apologists and the European state falsification process has to be fought and defeated.

Unfortunately for us, more than 95% of today’s Journalists, editors, publishers are proEurabians (support European multiculturalism). The same goes for 85% of Western European politicians and more than 90% of EU parliamentarians. Also, we shouldn’t forget that it’s the EU [5] that is the driving force behind European revisionism on Islam in Europe. From The Eurabia Code:
Euro-Arab Dialogue Symposia conducted in Venice (1977) and Hamburg (1983) included recommendations that have been successfully implemented… 4. The necessity of cooperation between European and Arab specialists in order to present a positive picture of Arab-Islamic civilisation and contemporary Arab issues to the educated public in Europe. The Euro-Arab Dialogue (EAD) is a political, economic and cultural institution designed to ensure perfect cohesion between Europeans and Arabs. Its structure was set up at conferences in Copenhagen (15 December 1973), and Paris (31 July 1974). The principal agent of this policy is the European Parliamentary Association for Euro-Arab Cooperation, founded in 1974. The other principal organs of The Dialogue are the MEDEA Institute and the European Institute of Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperation, created in 1995 with the backing of the European Commission. In an interview with Jamie Glazov of Frontpage Magazine, Ye’or explained how «in domestic policy, the EAD established a close cooperation between the Arab and European media television, radio, journalists, publishing houses, academia, cultural centers, school textbooks, student and youth associations, tourism. Church interfaith dialogues were determinant in the development of this policy. Eurabia is therefore this strong Euro-Arab network of associations — a comprehensive symbiosis with cooperation and partnership on policy, economy, demography and culture.» Eurabia’s driving force, the Parliamentary Association for Euro-Arab Cooperation, was created in Paris in 1974. It now has over six hundred members — from all major European political parties — active in their own national parliaments, as well as in the European parliament. France continues to be the key protagonist of this association. One of the documents Bat Ye’or was kind enough to send me (which she mentions in the French version of her book about Eurabia but not in the English version) is the Common Strategy of the European Council — Vision of the EU for the Mediterranean Region, from June 19th 2000. It includes many recommendations, such as:

«to elaborate partnership-building measures, notably by promoting regular consultations and exchanges of information with its Mediterranean partners, support the interconnection of infrastructure between Mediterranean partners, and between them and the EU, take all necessary measures to facilitate and encourage the involvement of civil society as well as the further development of human exchanges between the EU and the Mediterranean partners. NGOs will be encouraged to participate in cooperation at bilateral and regional levels. Particular attention will be paid to the media and universities [my emphasis].»

The Strategy also wants to «pursue, in order to fight intolerance, racism and xenophobia, the dialogue between cultures and civilisations.»

The Algiers Declaration [11] for a Shared Vision of the Future was made after a Congress held in Algeria in February 2006. The document states that: «It is essential to create a Euro-Mediterranean entity founded on Universal Values» and that «It is crucial to positively emphasise all common cultural heritage, even if marginalised or forgotten.» A Common Action Plan draws up a large number of recommendations on how to achieve this new EuroMediterranean entity. Among these recommendations are:

• •

Adapt existing organisations and the contents of media to the objectives of the North- South dialogue, and set up a Euro-Mediterranean journalism centre Set up a network jointly managed by the Mediterranean partners in order to develop «a harmonised education system» [A «harmonised education system» between the Arab world and Europe? What does that include? Do I want to know? Will they tell us before it is a fait accompli?]

These agreements, completely rewriting European history books to make them more Islamfriendly and gradually silencing «Islamophobia» as racism, are being implemented even now. In June 2005 in Rabat [14], Morocco, a conference was held on «Fostering Dialogue among Cultures and Civilisations.» The Conference was jointly organised by UNESCO, the Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (ISESCO), the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the Arab League Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organisation (ALECSO), the Danish Centre for Culture and Development (DCCD) and the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures (Alexandria, Egypt). Among the recommendations that were raised by Mr. Olaf Gerlach Hansen, Director General of the DCCD: «We are interested in new actions in the media, in culture and in education. These proposals include:

— Concrete initiatives to develop «intercultural competencies» in the training of new generations of journalists — Concrete initiatives for links and exchanges between journalists, editors, media-institutions, which encourage intercultural co-operation» — Concrete initiatives for curriculum development through new educational materials and revision of existing textbooks.

Although not stated directly, one may reasonably assume that among the «negative stereotypes» to be removed from the textbooks used to teach history to European schoolchildren are any and all references to the 1300 years of continuous Jihad warfare against Europe. These recommendations were accepted and incorporated into The Rabat Commitment. The ECRI called on the EU member states to adopt measures that would effectively outlaw any serious debate about Islam and introduce pro-Muslim «affirmative action.» European countries should:

• •

Modify curricula to prevent «distorted interpretations of religious and cultural history» and «portrayal of Islam on perceptions of hostility and menace»; Encourage debate in the media on the image which they convey of Islam and on their responsibility to avoid perpetuating prejudice and bias.

1.2 General characteristics of European Islamic Negationism

“When a land rejects her legends, Sees but falsehoods in the past; And its people view their Sires in the light of fools and liars, ‘Tis a sign of its decline and its glories cannot last. Branches that but blight their roots yield no sap for lasting fruits.” Rudyard Kipling

Europe has its own full-fledged brand of negationism: a movement to deny the largescale and long-term crimes against humanity committed by Islam. This movement is led by Islamic apologists and Marxist academics, and followed by all the politicians, journalists and intellectuals who call themselves secularists. Similar to the Turkish negationism regarding the Armenian genocide, the European negationism regarding the terrible record of Islam is fully supported by the establishment (The EU, Western European governments). It has nearly full control of the media and dictates all state and government parlance concerning the communal problem (more properly to be called the Islam problem). Its techniques are essentially the same as those of negationists elsewhere: 1. Head-on denial: The crassest form of negationism is obviously the simple denial of the facts. This is mostly done in the form of general claims, such as: «Islam is tolerant», «Islamic Spain was a model of multicultural harmony», «the anti-Jewish hatred was unknown among Muslims until Zionism and anti-Semitism together entered the Muslim world from Europe». Since it is rare that a specific crime of Islam is brought to the public’s notice, there is little occasion to come out and deny specific crimes. Exceptions are the Armenian genocide, officially denied in Turkey and the entire Muslim world. The Rushdie affair was the occasion for negationism on a grand scale. There happens to be an unambiguous answer to the question: «Is it Islamic to kill those who voice criticism of the Prophet?» According to the media and most experts, the answer was definitely: no. According to the basic traditions of Islam, it was: yes. Mohammed as well as his immediate successors have killed critics, both in formal executions and in night-time stabbings. In Islamic law, the Prophet’s example is valid precedent. At most there could be some quarrelling over the procedure: some jurists thought that Rushdie should first be kidnapped to an Islamic country and given a chance to recant before an Islamic court, though the ayatollahs have ruled that no amount of remorse can save Rushdie. If he stands by his book, even the so-called moderates think he must be killed. Islamic law punishes both apostasy and insults to the Prophet with the death penalty: twice there is no escape for Rushdie. Yet, the outside public was told by many experts that killing Rushdie is un-Islamic. Flat denial will work very well if your grip on the press and education media is sufficient. Otherwise, there is a danger of being shown up as the negationist one really is. In that case, a number of softer techniques are available. 2. Ignoring the facts: This passive negationism is certainly the safest and the most popular. The media and textbook-writers simply keep the vast corpus of inconvenient testimony out of the readers’ view. This includes most of the information about the systematic slaughter, torture and enslavement of non-Muslims in historical and present context (including Genocides and Dhimmitude), demographic developments which show the systematic and gradual Muslim takeover of societies (Including Kosovo, Lebanon and now in many Western European countries) and alTaqiyya/ketman – Ummah — Quranic abrogation and Jihads importance in Islam. Other essential facts are also ignored like Saudi Arabia’s role in spreading traditional

Islam (so called Islamic theofascism or Wahhabism which the Eurabians like to refer to it). They have failed to inform the people of Europe that Saudi Arabia have spent more than 87 billion USD abroad the past two decades propagating “true Islam”. The bulk of this funding goes to the construction and operating expenses of thousands of mosques, madrassas and Muslim cultural centers throughout the world. These Islamic institutions are now found in every single country in the West — all over Western Europe. 3. Minimising the facts: If the inconvenient fact is pointed out that numerous Muslim chroniclers have reported a given massacre of unbelievers themselves, one can posit a priori that they must have exaggerated to flatter their patron’s martial vanity — as if it is not significant enough that Muslim rulers felt flattered by being described as mass-murderers of infidels. Apart from minimising the absolute size of Islamic crimes, there is the popular technique of relative minimising: make the facts look smaller by comparing them with other, carefully selected facts. Thus, one can say that «all religions are intolerant», which sounds plausible to many though it is patently false: in the Roman Empire only those sects were persecuted which had political ambitions (Jews when they fought for independence, Christians because they sought to take over the Empire and outlaw all other religions, as they effectively did), while the others enjoyed the status of religio licita; similarly with the Persian Empire and many other states and cultures. An oft-invoked counterweight for the charge-sheet against Islam, is the fanaticism record of Christianity. It is indeed well-known that Christianity has been guilty of numerous temple destructions and persecutions. But the reason for this fanaticism is found in the common theological foundation of both religions: exclusivist prophetic monotheism. The case against Christianity is at once a case against Islam. Moreover, in spite of its theologically motivated tendency to intolerance, Christianity has had to go through the experience of «live and let live» because in its formative period, it was but one of the numerous sects in the pluralist Roman Empire. Islam never had this experience, and in order to bring out its full potential of fanaticism, Christianity has needed the influence of Islam on a few occasions. Thus, it is no coincidence that Charlemagne, who defeated the Saxons by force, was the grandson of Charles Martel, who defeated the Islamic army in Poitiers; no coincidence either that the Teutonic knights who forcibly converted the Balts, were veterans of the Crusades, i.e. the campaign to liberate Palestine from Islam; nor is it a coincidence that the Spanish Inquisition emerged in a country that had needed centuries to shake off Islamic oppression. Finally, Christianity is, by and large, facing the facts of its own history, though it’s still struggling with the need to own up the responsibility for these facts. An even more general way of drowning Islamic fanaticism in relativist comparisons is to point out that after all — every imperialistically motivated war has been less than gentle. That may well be true, but then, we are not setting up cults for the Genghis Khans of this world. A religion should contribute to man’s transcending his natural defects like greed and cruelty, and not sanction and glorify them. 4. Whitewashing: When one cannot conceal, deny or minimise the facts, one can still claim that on closer analysis, they are not as bad as they seem. One can call right what is obviously wrong. This can go very far, e.g. in his biography of Mohammed, Maxime Rodinson declared unashamedly that the extermination of the Medinese Jews by Mohammed was doubtlessly the best solution. In numerous popular introductions to Islam, the fact that Islam imposes the death penalty on apostates (in modern terminology: that Islam opposes freedom of religion in the most radical manner) is acknowledged; but then it is explained that «since Islam was at war with

the polytheists, apostasy equalled treason and desertion, something which is still punished with death in our secular society». All right, but the point is precisely that Islam chose to be at war with the traditional religion of Arabia, as also with all other religions, and that it has made this state of war into a permanent feature of its law system. 5. Playing up unrepresentative facts: A popular tactic in negationism consists in finding a positive but uncharacteristic event, and highlighting it while keeping the over-all picture out of the public’s view. For instance, a document is found in which Christians, whose son has forcibly been inducted in the Ottoman Janissary army, express pride because their son has made it to high office within this army. The fact that these people manage to see the bright side of their son’s abduction, enslavement and forced conversion, is then used to prove that non-Muslims were quite happy under Muslim rule, and to conceal the fact that the devshirme, the forcible conversion and abduction of one fifth of the Christian children by the Ottoman authorities, constituted a constant and formidable terror bewailed in hundreds of heart-rending songs and stories. For another example, negationists always mention cases of collaboration by nonMuslims (German support in the Armenian Genocide etc.) to suggest that these were treated as partners and equals and that Muslim rule was quite benevolent; when in fact every history of an occupation, even the most cruel one, is also the history of a collaboration. As has been pointed out, the Nazis employed Jewish guards in the Warsaw ghetto, disprove the Nazi oppression of the Jews. 6. Denying the motive: Negationists sometimes accept the facts, but disclaim their hero’s responsibility for them. Thus, Mohammed Habib tried to exonerate Islam by ascribing to the Islamic invaders alternative motives: Turkish barbarity, greed, the need to put down conspiracies brewing in temples. In reality, those rulers who had secular reasons to avoid an all-out confrontation with the unbelievers were often reprimanded by their clerical courtiers for neglecting their Islamic duty. The same clerics were never unduly worried over possible secular motives in a ruler’s mind as long as these prompted him to action against the unbelievers. At any rate, the fact that Islam could be used routinely to justify plunder and enslavement (unlike, say, Buddhism), is still significant enough. 7. Smokescreen: Another common tactic consists in blurring the problem by questioning the very terms of the debate: «Islam does not exist, for there are many Islam’s, with big differences between countries etc.» It would indeed be hard to criticise something that is so ill- defined. But the simple fact is that Islam does exist: it is the doctrine contained in the Quran, normative for all Muslims, and in the Hadith, normative for at least all Sunni Muslims. There are differences between the law schools concerning minor points, and of course there are considerable differences in the extent to which Muslims are effectively faithful to Islamic doctrine, and correspondingly, the extent to which they mix it with un-Islamic elements. 8. Blaming fringe phenomena: When faced with hard facts of Islamic fanaticism, negationists often blame them on some fringe tendency, now popularly known as fundamentalism or Wahhabism. This is said to be the product of post-colonial frustration, basically foreign to genuine Islam. In reality, fundamentalists like Maulana Maudoodi and Ayatollah Khomeini knew their Quran better than the self-deluding secularists who brand them as bad Muslims. What is called fundamentalism or Wahhabism is in fact the original Islam, as is proven by the fact that fundamentalists have existed since long before colonialism, e.g. the 13th century theologian Ibn Taimiya, who is still a lighthouse for today’s Maudoodis, Turabis, Madanis and Khomeini’s. When Ayatollah Khomeini declared that the goal of Islam is the conquest of all non- Muslim countries, this was merely a reformulation of Mohammed’s long-

term strategy and of the Quranic assurance that God has promised the entire world to Islam. In the case of communism, one can shift the blame from Marx to Lenin and Stalin, but Islamic terrorism has started with Mohammed himself. 9. Arguments ad hominem: If denying the evidence is not tenable, one can always distort it by means of selective quoting and imputing motives to the original authors of the source material; or manipulating quotations to make them say the opposite of the over-all picture which the original author has presented. Focus all attention on a few real or imagined flaws in a few selected pieces, and act as if the entire corpus of evidence has been rendered untrustworthy. To extend the alleged untrustworthiness of one piece of evidence to the entire corpus of evidence, it is necessary to create suspicion against those who present the evidence: the implication is that they have a plan of history falsification, that this plan has been exposed in the case of this one piece of evidence, but that it is only logical that such motivated history falsifiers are also behind the concoction of the rest of the alleged evidence. If the discussion of inconvenient evidence cannot be prevented, disperse it by raising other issues, such as the human imperfections which every victim of crimes against humanity inevitably has (Jewish harshness against the Palestinians, Hindu untouchability); describe the demand for the truth as a ploy to justify and cover up these imperfections. If the facts have to be faced at all, then blame the victim. If people ignore or refute your distorted version of history, accuse them of distortion and political abuse of history. Slander scholars whose testimony is inconvenient; impute political or other motives to them in order to pull the attention away from the hard evidence they present. 10. Slogans: Finally, all discussion can be sabotaged with the simple technique of shouting slogans: prejudice, myth, «racism/Islamophobia». Take the struggle from the common battlefield of arguments into the opponent’s camp: his self-esteem as a member of the civilised company that abhors ugly things like prejudice and Islamophobia. After all, attack is the best defence. After summing up the forms of negationism, we have to look into its causes. The following factors come to mind: 1. Orientalism and Islamology: After the medieval Christian pamphlets against «Mohammed the impostor» whose media campaigns ended in the late 19th century, not much has been published schematising the ideological and factual crimes of Islam. Books on, say, «slavery in Islam» are extremely rare: the raw information that could fill such a publication will have to be found in more general publications, in which Islam is only referred to in passing, often without the author’s realising the implications for an evaluation of Islam. It is often said (when introducing «refutations of prejudice») that people always associate Islam with intolerance; but finding a book specifically devoted to the subject of Islamic intolerance will be harder. How many tens of millions have been killed by Islam simply because they were non-Muslims? Nobody has yet tabulated the figures available to prepare a general estimate. We can only notice that critical research of Islam is not exactly encouraged, and that there is an increasing tendency to self-censorship regarding Islam criticism. In part, this is due to a much delayed reaction against the long-abandoned Christian polemical approach. Now that Islamic Studies departments in Europe are increasingly manned by Muslims and sponsored by Islamic foundations and states, the climate for critical studies of Islam is only worsening. When comparing the first (pre-World War 2) edition of the Encyclopaedia of Islam (Leiden, Netherlands) with the new edition, it is striking how

critical observations have been ironed out. But even in the past, Islam has enjoyed a rather favourable treatment in academic circles. Thus, about Islamic slavery the prominent Dutch Islamologist C. Snouck-Hurgronje wrote in 1887 (i.e. thirty years after the Americans had waged a war to impose the abolition of slavery in their southern states, and some seventy years after its abolition in the colonies): «For most slaves their abduction was a blessing… They themselves are convicted that it is their enslavement that has for the first time made them human.» The political context of the growth phase of Islamology provides a part of the explanation. Mature colonialism was not waging war against Islam, but sought the cooperation of the established social forces in the colonised populations. The British cooperation with the Indian Muslims is well- known; it is epitomised by the founding in 1906 of the Muslim League, which sought to «inculcate loyalty to the British Empire in the Indian Muslims». In French West Africa, in the same period, Islam was accepted as a factor of social stability, and General Lyautey pursued a dream of a FrancoIslamic synthesis culture in Algeria. In the 1930s, in the last European attempt at fresh colonisation, the Italian Fascists actively supported the spread of Islam in the Horn of Africa. But already since 1853 the colonial powers had been supporting the Caliphate against a Christian power, Russia, esp. in the Crimean War (a mistaken war if ever there was one), and this had strongly contributed to climate of benevolence towards the Muslim culture. 2. Church policy: Christianity has for centuries waged a lively polemic against Islam. Recently, this criticism has subsided. Worse, polemical works by clerics have been withdrawn or kept unpublished (such as, early this century, Father Henri Lammens’ paper arguing that Mohammed’s revelations were a psychopathological phenomenon). One reason is that the Church is aware of the similarity between Jesus’ and Mohammed’s missions, so that a criticism of the foundations of Islam may backfire on Christianity. The second reason is the fear that Christians in the Muslim world would have to pay for even ideological attack on Islam (that is why Church polemists save their sharpest words for harmless religions like Hinduism). This fear also motivates other Church policies, such as the non-recognition of the state of Israel. Meanwhile, the face of the Church has changed. A small but significant event in the wake of the Second Vatican Council was the deletion from the Saints’ calendar of Our Lady of the Redemption of Slaves, whose feast was on 24 September. In the Middle Ages, there was a special clerical order and a whole fund-raising network devoted to the redemption («buying back») of Christian slaves held in Barbary. Until the 19th century, coastal villages in Italy had watchtowers to alarm the people when a ship of the slave-catching Barbarese pirates was in sight. The terror of Islamic slavery was a permanent feature of Christian history from the 7th till the 19th century, but now the Church is working hard to erase this memory. Today, its pastors are the most fervent pleaders for the rights of Islam. Muslims in Europe are for them a substitute for the disappearing parish members. Separate Christian institutions, whose reason of existence is being questioned, find a new legitimacy in the fact that Islam in its turn is also opening separate schools, charities and even political parties. Islam has become a sister religion regularly praised as a religion of peace. 3. Anti-colonialism: One of the ideological guidelines of anti-colonialism was: «Of the (ex) colonised, nothing but good must be said.» Therefore, mentioning the colonialism and mass slavery practised by the Muslims had become undesirable. Add to this general taboo the warning that Islam criticism effectively implies support to Israel, described by Maxime Rodinson as a «colonial settler-state». If one

acknowledges that Islam has always oppressed the Jews, one accepts that Israel was a necessary refuge for the Jews fleeing not only the European but also the Islamic variety of anti-Judaism. Let us not forget that decolonisation was followed immediately by renewed discrimination of and attacks on the Jewish and Christian minorities, and that those Jews who could get out have promptly fled to Israel (or France, in the case of Algeria). It is no coincidence that these Sephardic Jews are mostly supporters of the hard- liners in Israel. 4. The enemy’s enemy is a friend: Many people brought up as Christians, or as nominal Hindus, never outgrow their pubescent revolt against their parents’ religion, and therefore automatically sympathise with every rival or opponent of the religion they have come to despise. Because Islam poses the most formidable threat, they like it a lot. 5. Leftism: In this century, Islam has come to be advertised as a naturally leftist «religion of equality». This line has been developed by Muslim apologists such as Mohammed Habib, and they have even taken it as a rationalisation of the irrational claim that Mohammed was the «last Prophet»: after all, as the «prophet of equality», he had brought the ultimate message upon which no improvement is possible. Sir Mohammed Iqbal, one of the fathers of Pakistan, had claimed that «Islam equals Communism plus Allah». The Iranian Ayatollahs, by contrast, and most of the vocal Muslims after the Soviet-Islamic war in Afghanistan, have restated the orthodox position that Communism is un-Islamic, not only because of its atheism but also because of its rejection of free enterprise; the current claim is that Islam provides a «better form of equality» than Communism. Even while Communists were slaughtered in Islamic Iran, and even while political analysts classify the Islamist movements as «extreme rightist», most leftists have kept on cultivating some sympathy for Islam. During the Lebanese civil war, they fed us news stories about «leftist Muslims, rightist Christians», «Islamo-progressive, Christiano- reactionnaire». Negationism in Europe is practised with the most prowess by historians and writers who are under the spell of Marxism. Lenin had wanted to use the Muslims against the French and British colonialists. Modern Leftists with Marxist sympathies see Islam as an ally against Israel and the US. 6. Rightist traditionalism: There is also a rightist sympathy for Islam. An obvious point of agreement is of course anti-Judaism. A subtler basis for sympathy is the socalled traditionalist current, which was represented by the converts Rene Guenon and Frithjof Schuon, and still has a following: it has been idealising Islam and esp. Sufism as the preserver of the age-old philosophia pernnis against modernity. In Russia, some Slavophile anti-Western groups now seek an alliance with Islam against the impending Americanisation of their society. In the U.S., Christian fundamentalists and Islamic organisations are increasingly creating common platforms to speak out against trends of moral decay (abortion, pornography, etc.). Some of these phenomena of traditionalist alliance-building are quite respectable, but they are nevertheless conducive to Islam negationism. 7. Economic Liberalists: Liberalists see Muslim immigration as an endless source of cheap labour and seek to defend them as often as they can. In addition, they support EU membership for Turkey. 8. Liberal Islam: In the Islamic world, it is unwise to attack Islam head-on. Yet, sometimes people in those countries feel the need to oppose Islamic phenomena and campaigns, such as the witch-hunt on un-Islamic cultural remnants, violence on the

non-Muslims, extreme forms of gender inequality. In order to have a chance, these people have to use Islamic language:
«Mohammed was actually against polygamy», «violence against others is in conflict with the tolerance which Mohammed has taught us», «and respect for other cultures is part of Islamic tradition».

In order to press their humanist point, they have to formally identify with Islam and lie about its contents. Many Muslims have started to believe their own rhetoric. If you point out to them that the Quran teaches intolerance and war against the unbelievers in the most explicit terms, many of them will sincerely protest, and not know what to say when you show them the Quranic passages concerned. There is no reason to doubt that the Moroccan authoress Fatima Mernissi genuinely believes in her own argument that the Quranic instructions on how to organise your polygamous household are to be read as an abolition of polygamy (albeit in veiled terms, because Allah, the same Allah Almighty who went straight against the prevalent customs of idolatry and pluralism, had to be careful not to offend the spirit of the times). Many nominal Muslims have outgrown Islamic values and developed a commitment to modern values, but their sentimental attachment to the religion imbibed in their childhood prevents them from formally breaking with Islam and makes them paint a rosy picture of it. Among Muslim spokesmen, is certainly not the fundamentalists who are the most active proponents of negationism. It is liberals like Asghar Ali Engineer who deny that Islam ordains war on the infidels. It is those who are acclaimed by Europeans as being good «secular» Muslims. An Islam that wants to be secular cannot be and is therefore dishonest and untrue to itself. Unfortunately, a tolerant Islam is a contradiction, and the “creation” of a tolerant past for Islam to appease the position of liberal Muslims, is a lie. 9. Muslims differing from Islam: Many people have a Muslim neighbour who is a fine man, and from this empirical fact they conclude: Islam cannot be all that bad considering our friend Mustapha. This one empirical fact gives them a tremendous resistance against all information about Islamic intolerance. People usually reduce the world to their own sphere of experience, and general historical facts of Islamic fanaticism are not allowed to disturb the private experience of good neighbourly relations. Many nominal Muslims have retained some vague generalities about morality from the Quran, and they normally go by their own conscience and sensibility without ever developing the doctrinally prescribed hostility towards non-Muslims. These good people, although bad Muslims, can ignore but not change Islamic doctrine. They cannot prevent the Quranic message of hatred from infecting at least some of the more susceptible among their brethren and perhaps even their children or grandchildren in the future. There have certainly been situations where sane Muslims have calmed down their more riotous brethren, and such individuals do make a real difference. We should not make the Islamic mistake of judging people simply by their belonging or not belonging to the Muslim community, rather than by their human qualities. But the fact remains that the presence of a doctrine of intolerance as the official and identity-defining ideology of a community, exerts a constant pressure tending towards separatism and confrontation. The alleviating presence of the humanist

factor even within the Muslim community should not be used to deny the ominous presence of Islamic factors. «Those who deny history are bound to repeat it»: While Nazism is simply too stained to get a second chance, Islam is certainly in a position to force unbelievers into Dhimmitude (as is happening in dozens of Muslim countries in varying degrees), and even to wage new jihads, this time with weapons of mass-destruction. Those who are trying to close people’s eyes to this danger by distorting or concealing the historical record of Islam are effective accomplices in the injustice and destruction which Islam is sure to cause before the time of its dissolution comes. Therefore, I consider it a duty of all intellectuals to expose and denounce the phenomenon of negationism whenever it is practised.

Another example of falsified history: H. M. Elliot and John Dowson, The History of India as Told by Its Own Historians, (London, 1867-1877) described the Muslim tyranny and barbary in great detail. 100 years later, several Western countries had implemented several reforms of historical falsification already: Stanley Lane-Poole, Medieval India under Mohammedan Rule, 712-1764, G.P. Putnam’s Sons. New York, 1970. p. 9-10 which was very Muslim friendly. Describing the invasions as almost a peaceful and friendly gesture… The motives of these campaigns must be seen in context. Britain/US/France/Germany was now pro Arab/pro Muslim in the cold war environment where you saw India/Russia/China on the axis of ”evil”. Western historians after 1900 was therefore not allowed to write anything negative about their new Muslim allies. Most of western sources after year 1900 are therefore falsified. The source material is basically a compilation of falsified fairytales with the only objective of appeasing a strategic ally which proved to be an advantage in the war against the Soviets. It’s a well known fact that British (Western historians) before 1900 had a totally different view than post 1900 historians.

Sources: 1. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negationism 2. http://www.thereligionofpeace.com/ 3. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russo-Turkish_War_(1877%E2%80%931878) 4. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congress_of_berlin 5. See: The Eurabia Code 6. Alex Alexiev, «Terrorism: Growing Wahhabi Influence in the United States», Testimony before the US Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security, 26 June 2003.

1.3 The Failure of Western Universities By Fjordman Kari Vogt, historian of religion at the University of Oslo, has stated that Ibn Warraq’s book “Why I am Not a Muslim” is just as irrelevant to the study of Islam as The Protocols

of the Learned Elders of Zion are to the study of Judaism. She is widely considered as one of the leading expert on Islam in Norway, and is frequently quoted in national media on matters related to Islam and Muslim immigration. People who get most of their information from the mainstream media, which goes for the majority of the population, will thus be systematically fed biased information and half-truths about Islam from our universities, which have largely failed to uphold the ideal of free inquiry. Unfortunately, this situation is pretty similar at universities[1] and colleges[2] throughout the West[3]. London’s School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS[4]), scene to a growing number of anti-Semitic incidents from an increasingly pro-Islamic campus, issued a threat to one of its Jewish students to cease his protests against anti-Semitism at the University. Gavin Gross, an American, had been leading a campaign against the deterioration of conditions for Jewish students at SOAS, which is part of the University of London. SOAS had witnessed an escalation of anti-Jewish activity, in both severity and frequency. At the beginning of the year, the Islamic Society screened a video which compared Judaism with Satanism. Meanwhile, in a move to “promote understanding between Islam and the West,” Saudi Arabia donated about SR13 million to a leading British museum[5]. The officials said the money from Prince Sultan would pay for a new Saudi and Islamic gallery, which would help to portray Islamic culture and civilisation in right perspectives. It would also help fund scholarships for Saudi students at Oxford University. The Saudis and other oil-rich Arabs are busy buying influence over what Westerners hear about Islam. Prince Al-Waleed bin Talal bin Abdul Aziz Al-Saud, a member of the Saudi Royal Family, is an international investor currently ranked among the ten richest persons in the world. He is known in the USA for a $10 million check he offered to New York City Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani in October 2001 for the Twin Towers Fund. Mayor Giuliani returned the gift when he learned that the prince had called for the United States to “reexamine its policies in the Middle East and adopt a more balanced stance toward the Palestinian cause.” Prince Talal is also creating a TV channel, Al-Resalah[6], to target American Muslims. He already broadcasts in Saudi Arabia. In 2005, Bin Talal bought 5.46% of voting shares in News Corp, the parent of Fox News. In December 2005 he boasted to Middle East Online about his ability to change what viewers see on Fox News[7]. Covering the riots in France[8] that fall, Fox ran a banner saying: “Muslim riots.” Bin Talal was not happy. “I picked up the phone and called Murdoch […] [and told him] these are not Muslim riots, these are riots out of poverty,” he said. “Within 30 minutes, the title was changed from Muslim riots to civil riots.” A survey conducted by Cornell University found that around half of Americans had a negative view of Islam[9]. Addressing a press conference at the headquarters of the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), Paul Findley, a former US Congressman, said that the cancer of anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic sentiments was spreading in American society and required corrective measures to stamp out. It was announced that the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) would be launching a massive $50 million media campaign involving television, radio and newspapers. “We are planning to meet Prince Alwaleed ibn Talal for his financial support to our project. He has been generous in the past.” The World Assembly of Muslim Youth, founded by the nephew of Osama Bin Laden in the US, is sharing offices with the Islamic Society of North America and the Islamic Centre of Canada. WAMY Canada runs[10] a series of Islamic camps and pilgrimages for youth. US Special Agent Kane quoted from a publication prepared by the WAMY that said: “Hail! Hail! O Sacrificing Soldiers! To Us! To Us! So we may defend the flag on this Day of Jihad, are you miserly with your blood?! And has life become dearer to you? And staying behind

sweeter?” According to him, 14- to 18-year-olds were the target audience for these teachings. Harvard University and Georgetown University received $20 million donations[11] from Prince bin Talal to finance Islamic studies. “For a university with global aspirations, it is critical that Harvard have a strong program on Islam that is worldwide and interdisciplinary in scope,” said Steven E. Hyman, Harvard’s provost. Georgetown said it would use the gift – the second-largest it has ever received – to expand its Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding. Martin Kramer, the author of “Ivory Towers on Sand: The Failure of Middle Eastern Studies in America,” said: “Prince Alwaleed knows that if you want to have an impact, places like Harvard or Georgetown, which is inside the Beltway, will make a difference.” Georgetown professor John Esposito, founding director of the Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding, has, probably more than any other academic, contributed to downplaying[12] the Jihadist threat to the West. Kramer states that[13] during his early days in the 1970s, Esposito had prepared his thesis under his Muslim mentor Ismail R. Faruqi, a Palestinian pan-Islamist and theorist of the “Islamisation of knowledge.” During the first part of his career, John L. Esposito never studied or taught at a major Middle East center. In the 80s, he published books such as Islam: The Straight Path, the first of a series of favorable books on Islam. In 1993, Esposito arrived at Georgetown University, and has later claimed the status of “authority” in the field. In 2003, officials from the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) recognised Esposito[14] as the current “Abu Taleb of Islam” and the Muslim community, not only in North America but also worldwide. In appreciation of his “countless effort towards dispelling myths about Muslim societies and cultures,” Dr. Sayyid Syeed, Secretary General of the ISNA compared the role of Esposito to that of Abu Taleb, Muhammad’s non-Muslim uncle who gave unconditional support to the Muslim community in Mecca at a time when it was still weak and vulnerable. The rise to prominence of Esposito symbolises the failure of critical studies of Islam – some would argue critical studies of just about anything non-Western – in Western Universities in the 1980s and 90s. Frenchman Olivier Roy as early as 1994 published a book entitled The Failure of Political Islam and wrote of the Middle East as having entered the stage of “post-Islamism.” As Martin Kramer puts it, “the academics were so preoccupied with “Muslim Martin Luthers” that they never got around to producing a single serious analysis of bin Laden and his indictment of America. Bin Laden’s actions, statements, and videos were an embarrassment to academics who had assured Americans that “political Islam” was retreating from confrontation. At least US Universities are noticing bin Laden now. Bruce Lawrence, Duke professor[15] of religion, has published a book of Osama bin Laden’s speeches and writings. “If you read him in his own words, he sounds like somebody who would be a very high-minded and welcome voice in global politics,” Lawrence said. Lawrence has also claimed that Jihad means “being a better student, a better colleague, a better business partner. Above all, to control one’s anger.” Others believe we make too much fuss about this whole Jihad business. John Mueller, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, in the September 2006 issue of Foreign Affairs[16] asked whether the terrorist threat to the USA had just been made up: “A fully credible explanation for the fact that the United States has suffered no terrorist attacks since 9/11 is that the threat posed by homegrown or imported terrorists – like that presented by Japanese Americans during World War II or by American Communists after it – has been massively exaggerated.” “The massive and expensive homeland security apparatus erected since 9/11 may be persecuting some, spying on many,

inconveniencing most, and taxing all to defend the United States against an enemy that scarcely exists.” Lee Kaplan joined a conference[17] of MESA, the Middle East Studies Association, in San Francisco: “Free copies of a glossy newsmagazine called the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs were being distributed to the academics in attendance. Most people, upon seeing the publication, might assume it was similar to Newsweek or Time.” “What most people don’t know is that the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs magazine and Web site – indeed, the entire organisation behind it – are funded by Saudi Arabia, a despotic regime that has been quietly buying its way onto every campus in America, particularly through Middle East Studies centers in the U.S.” “I met Nabil Al-Tikriti, a professor from the University of Chicago.” “I’d invite those academic Middle East scholars who actually support America’s war effort overseas and security needs here at home. People like Daniel Pipes or Martin Kramer.” I continued, “Why aren’t they here at the MESA Conference?” “They’d be shouted down,” replied AlTikriti. Jihad Watch Board Vice President Hugh Fitzgerald shares his worries about MESA[18]: “As an organisation, MESA has over the past two decades slowly but surely been taken over by apologists for Islam.” “The apologetics consists in hardly ever discussing Jihad, dhimmitude, or indeed even introducing the students to Qur’an, Hadith, and Sira.” “Books on the level of [Karen] Armstrong and Esposito are assigned, and feelgood nonsense like Maria Rosa Menocal’s The Ornament of the World.” “No member of MESA has done as much to make available to a wide public important new work on Muhammad, on the origins of the Qur’an, and on the history of early Islam, as that lone wolf, Ibn Warraq. No one has done such work on the institution of the dhimmi as that lone louve, Bat Ye’or[19]. It is an astounding situation, where much of the most important work is not being done in universities, because many university centers have been seized by a kind of Islamintern International.” Hugh Fitzgerald is right. The Legacy of Jihad, one of the most important works on Jihad to appear in recent years, was written by Andrew Bostom, a medical doctor who was dissatisfied with much of the material available on the subject following the terror attacks in 2001. Bat Ye’or, perhaps the leading expert on the Islamic institution of dhimmitude, is self-taught. And Ibn Warraq has written several excellent books on the origins of the Koran and the early days of Islamic history while remaining outside of the established University system. This is all a great credit to them personally, but it is not a credit to the status of Western Universities. It is difficult to understand why American or Western authorities still allow the Saudis to fund what is being taught about Islam to future Western leaders, years after several Saudi nationals staged the worst terror attack in Western history. The United States didn’t allow Nazi Germany to buy influence at US Universities. Although the Soviet Communists had their apologists in the West as well as paid agents, the US never allowed the Soviet Union to openly sponsor its leading colleges. So why are they allowing Saudi Arabia and other Islamic nations to do so? The Saudis are enemies, and should be banned from exerting direct influence over our Universities and major media. It is a matter of national security. Still, although bribes and Saudi oil money represent a serious obstacle to critical Western studies of Islam, they do by no means make up all of the problems. Quite a few academics are so immersed with anti-Western ideology that they will be happy to bash the West and applaud Islam for free.

Few works have done more to corrupt critical debate of Islam in Western institutions for higher learning during the past generation than the 1979 book Orientalism by Edward Said. It spawned a veritable army of Saidists, or Third World Intellectual Terrorism[20] as Ibn Warraq puts it. According to Ibn Warraq, “the latter work taught an entire generation of Arabs the art of self-pity – “were it not for the wicked imperialists, racists and Zionists, we would be great once more” – encouraged the Islamic fundamentalist generation of the 1980s, and bludgeoned into silence any criticism of Islam.” “The aggressive tone of Orientalism is what I have called ‘intellectual terrorism,’ since it does not seek to convince by arguments or historical analysis but by spraying charges of racism, imperialism, Eurocentrism” on anybody who might disagree. “One of his preferred moves is to depict the Orient as a perpetual victim of Western imperialism, dominance and aggression. The Orient is never seen as an actor, an agent with free-will, or designs or ideas of its own.” Ibn Warraq also criticises Said for his lack of recognition of the tradition of critical thinking in the West. Had he delved a little deeper into Greek civilisation and history, and bothered to look at Herodotus’ great history, Said “would have encountered two features which were also deep characteristics of Western civilisation and which Said is at pains to conceal and refuses to allow: the seeking after knowledge for its own sake.” “The Greek word, historia, from which we get our “history,” means “research” or “inquiry,” and Herodotus believed his work was the outcome of research: what he had seen, heard, and read but supplemented and verified by inquiry.” “Intellectual inquisitiveness is one of the hallmarks of Western civilisation. As J.M. Roberts put it, “The massive indifference of some civilisations and their lack of curiosity about other worlds is a vast subject. Why, until very recently, did Islamic scholars show no wish to translate Latin or western European texts into Arabic? Why when the English poet Dryden could confidently write a play focused on the succession in Delhi after the death of the Mogul emperor Aurungzeb, is it a safe guess that no Indian writer ever thought of a play about the equally dramatic politics of the English seventeenth-century court? It is clear that an explanation of European inquisitiveness and adventurousness must lie deeper than economics, important though they may have been.” Martin Kramer points out the irony that novelist Salman Rushdie praised Said’s courage: “Professor Said periodically receives threats to his safety from the Jewish Defense League in America,” said Rushdie in 1986, “and I think it is important for us to appreciate that to be a Palestinian in New York – in many ways the Palestinian – is not the easiest of fates.” But as it happened, Said’s fate became infinitely preferable to Rushdie’s, after Khomeini called for Rushdie’s death in 1989. It was ironic that Rushdie, a postcolonial literary lion of impeccable left-wing credentials, should have been made by some Muslims into the very personification of Orientalist hostility to Islam.” In his essay The Intellectuals and Socialism, F.A. Hayek noted already decades ago that “Socialism has never and nowhere been at first a working-class movement. It is a construction of theorists” and intellectuals, “the secondhand dealers in ideas.” “The typical intellectual need not possess special knowledge of anything in particular, nor need he even be particularly intelligent, to perform his role as intermediary in the spreading of ideas. The class does not consist of only journalists, teachers, ministers, lecturers, publicists, radio commentators, writers of fiction, cartoonists, and artists.” It also “includes many professional men and technicians, such as scientists and doctors.” “These intellectuals are the organs which modern society has developed for spreading knowledge and ideas, and it is their convictions and opinions which operate as the sieve through which all new conceptions must pass before they can reach the masses.”

“The most brilliant and successful teachers are today more likely than not to be socialists.” According to Hayek, this is not because Socialists are more intelligent, but because “a much higher proportion of socialists among the best minds devote themselves to those intellectual pursuits which in modern society give them a decisive influence on public opinion.” “Socialist thought owes its appeal to the young largely to its visionary character.” “The intellectual, by his whole disposition, is uninterested in technical details or practical difficulties. What appeal to him are the broad visions.” He warns that “It may be that as a free society as we have known it carries in itself the forces of its own destruction, that once freedom has been achieved it is taken for granted and ceases to be valued, and that the free growth of ideas which is the essence of a free society will bring about the destruction of the foundations on which it depends.” “Does this mean that freedom is valued only when it is lost, that the world must everywhere go through a dark phase of socialist totalitarianism before the forces of freedom can gather strength anew?” “If we are to avoid such a development, we must be able to offer a new liberal program which appeals to the imagination. We must make the building of a free society once more an intellectual adventure, a deed of courage.” In his book Modern Culture, Roger Scruton[21] explains the continued attraction of leftwing ideology in this way: “The Marxist theory is as form of economic determinism, distinguished by the belief that fundamental changes in economic relations are invariably revolutionary, involving a violent overthrow of the old order, and a collapse of the political “super-structure” which had been built on it. The theory is almost certainly false: nevertheless, there is something about the Marxian picture which elicits, in enlightened people, the will to believe. By explaining culture as a by-product of material forces, Marx endorses the Enlightenment view, that material forces are the only forces there are. The old culture, with its gods and traditions and authorities, is made to seem like a web of illusions – ‘the opiate of the people,’ which quietens their distress.” Hence, according to Scruton, in the wake of the Enlightenment, “there came not only the reaction typified by Burke and Herder, and embellished by the romantics, but also a countervailing cynicism towards the very idea of culture. It became normal to view culture from the outside, not as a mode of thought which defines our moral inheritance, but as an elaborate disguise, through which artificial powers represent themselves as natural rights. Thanks to Marx, debunking theories of culture have become a part of culture. And these theories have the structure pioneered by Marx: they identify power as the reality, and culture as the mask; they also foretell some future ‘liberation’ from the lies that have been spun by our oppressors.” It is striking to notice that this is exactly the theme of author Dan Brown’s massive international hit The Da Vinci Code from 2003, thought to be one of the ten best-selling books of all time. In addition to being a straightforward thriller, the novel claims that the entire modern history of Christianity is a conspiracy of the Church to cover up the truth about Jesus and his marriage to Mary Magdalene. Australian writer Keith Windschuttle[22], a former Marxist, is tired of that anti-Western slant that permeates academia: “For the past three decades and more, many of the leading opinion makers in our universities, the media and the arts have regarded Western culture as, at best, something to be ashamed of, or at worst, something to be opposed. The scientific knowledge that the West has produced is simply one of many “ways of knowing.” “Cultural relativism claims there are no absolute standards for assessing human culture. Hence all cultures should be regarded as equal, though different.” “The plea for acceptance and open-mindedness does not extend to Western culture itself, whose

history is regarded as little more than a crime against the rest of humanity. The West cannot judge other cultures but must condemn its own.” He urges us to remember how unique some elements of our culture are: “The concepts of free enquiry and free expression and the right to criticise entrenched beliefs are things we take so much for granted they are almost part of the air we breathe. We need to recognise them as distinctly Western phenomena. They were never produced by Confucian or Hindu culture.” “But without this concept, the world would not be as it is today. There would have been no Copernicus, Galileo, Newton or Darwin.” The re-writing of Western history has become so bad that even playwright William Shakespeare has been proclaimed a closet Muslim. “Shakespeare would have delighted in Sufism,” said the Islamic scholar Martin Lings, himself a Sufi Muslim. According to The Guardian, Lings argued that Shakespeare’s “work resembles the teachings of the Islamic Sufi sect” in the International Shakespeare Globe Fellowship Lecture at Shakespeare’s own Globe Theatre in London. Lings spoke during Islam Awareness Week. “It’s impossible for Shakespeare to have been a Muslim,” David N. Beauregard, a Shakespeare scholar and co-editor of Shakespeare and the Culture of Christianity in Early Modern England, told. Shakespeare “maintained Roman Catholic beliefs on crucial doctrinal differences.” Beauregard notes that “this is not to say that Shakespeare was occupied with writing religious drama, but only that a specific religious tradition informs his work.” According to Robert Spencer[23], “Shakespeare is just the latest paradigmatic figure of Western Christian culture to be remade in a Muslim-friendly manner.” Recently the [US] State Department asserted, without a shred of evidence, that Christopher Columbus (who in fact praised Ferdinand and Isabella for driving the Muslims out of Spain in 1492, the same year as his first visit to the Americas) was aided on his voyages by a Muslim navigator. “The state of American education is so dismal today that teachers themselves are ill-equipped to counter these historical fantasies.” The Gates of Vienna blog[24] quoted a report by The American Council of Trustees and Alumni (ACTA) on US Universities. Their survey revealed “a remarkable uniformity of political stance and pedagogical approach. Throughout the humanities and social sciences, the same issues surface over and over, regardless of discipline. In courses on literature, philosophy, and history; sociology, anthropology, and religious studies; women’s studies, American studies, […] the focus is consistently on a set list of topics: race, class, gender, sexuality, and the “social construction of identity”; globalisation, capitalism, and U.S. “hegemony”; the ubiquity of oppression and the destruction of the environment.” “In class after class, the same essential message is repeated, in terms that, to an academic “outsider,” often seem virtually unintelligible.” “In short, the message is that the status quo, which is patriarchal, racist, hegemonic, and capitalist, must be “interrogated” and “critiqued” as a means of theorising and facilitating a social transformation whose necessity and value are taken as a given.” “Differences between disciplines are beginning to disappear. Courses in such seemingly distinct fields as literature, sociology, and women’s studies, for example, have become mirror images of one another.” Writer Charlotte Allen commented[25] on how Harvard University President Lawrence Summers caused a storm by giving a speech speculating that innate differences between the sexes may have something to do with the fact that proportionately fewer women than men hold top positions in science. Summers in 2006 announced his intention to step down at the end of the school year, in part due to pressure caused by this speech. “Even if you’re not up on the scientific research – a paper Mr. Summers cited demonstrating

that, while women overall are just as smart as men, significantly fewer women than men occupy the very highest intelligence brackets that produce scientific genius – common sense tells you that Mr. Summers has got to be right. Recently, Harvard’s Faculty of Arts and Sciences passed a vote of no confidence in Mr. Summers. Wouldn’t it be preferable to talk openly about men’s and women’s strengths and weaknesses?” Yes, Ms. Allen, it would. Summers may have been wrong, but it’s dangerous once we embark on a road where important issues are not debated at all. One of the hallmarks of Western civilisation has been our thirst for asking questions about everything. Political Correctness is thus anti-Western both in its form and in its intent. It should be noted that in this case, Feminists were in the vanguard of PC, the same ideology that has blinded our Universities to the Islamic threat. It makes it even worse when we know that other Feminists in academia are asserting that the veil, or even the burka, represent “an alternative Feminism.” Dr. Wairimu Njambi is an Assistant Professor of “Women’s Studies” at the Florida Atlantic University. Much of her scholarship is dedicated to advancing the notion that the cruel practice of female genital mutilation (FGM) is actually a triumph for Feminism and that it is hateful to suggest otherwise. According to Njambi “anti-FGM discourse perpetuates a colonialist assumption by universalising a particular western image of a ‘normal’ body and sexuality.” Still, there are pockets of resistance. Professor Sigurd Skirbekk[26] at the University of Oslo questions many of the assumptions underlying Western immigration policies. One of them is the notion that rich countries have a duty to take in all people from other nations that are suffering, either from natural disasters, political repression or overpopulation. According to him, it cannot be considered moral of the cultural, political and religious elites of these countries to allow their populations to grow unrestrained and then push their excess population onto other countries. Skirbekk points out that European countries have earlier rejected the Germans when they used the argument of lebensraum as a motivation for their foreign policy. We should do the same thing now when other countries invoke the argument that they lack space for their population. According to him, there is plenty of literature available about the ecological challenges the world will be facing in this century. Running a too liberal immigration policy while refusing to confront such unpleasant moral issues is not a sustainable alternative in the long run. We will then only push difficult dilemmas onto future generations. In Denmark, linguist Tina Magaard[27] concludes that Islamic texts encourage terror and fighting to a far greater degree than the original texts of other religions. She has a PhD in Textual Analysis and Intercultural Communication from the Sorbonne in Paris, and has spent three years on a research project comparing the original texts of ten religions. “The texts in Islam distinguish themselves from the texts of other religions by encouraging violence and aggression against people with other religious beliefs to a larger degree. There are also straightforward calls for terror. This has long been a taboo in the research into Islam, but it is a fact we need to deal with.” Moreover, there are hundreds of calls in the Koran for fighting against people of other faiths. “If it is correct that many Muslims view the Koran as the literal words of God, which cannot be interpreted or rephrased, then we have a problem. It is indisputable that the texts encourage terror and violence. Consequently, it must be reasonable to ask Muslims themselves how they relate to the text, if they read it as it is,” says Magaard. The examples of Skirbekk, Magaard and others are indeed encouraging, but not numerous enough to substantially change the overall picture of Western academics largely paralysed by Political Correctness and anti-Western sentiments.

Writer Mark Steyn[28] comments on how “out in the real world it seems the true globalisation success story of the 1990s was the export of ideology from a relatively obscure part of the planet to the heart of every Western city.” “Writing about the collapse of nations such as Somalia, the Atlantic Monthly’s Robert D. Kaplan referred to the “citizens” of such “states” as “re-primitivised man.” “When lifelong Torontonians are hot for decapitation, when Yorkshiremen born and bred and into fish ‘n’ chips and cricket and lousy English pop music self-detonate on the London Tube, it would seem that the phenomenon of “re-primitivised man” has been successfully exported around the planet. It’s reverse globalisation: The pathologies of the remotest backwaters now have franchise outlets in every Western city.” It is possible to see a connection here. While multiculturalism is spreading ideological tribalism in our universities, it is spreading physical tribalism in our major cities. Since all cultures are equal, there is no need to preserve Western civilisation, nor to uphold our laws. It is true that we may never fully reach the ideal of objective truth, since we are all more or less limited in our understanding by our personal experiences and our prejudice. However, this does not mean that we should abandon the ideal. That’s what has happened during the past decades. Our colleges aren’t even trying to seek truth; they have decided that there is no such thing as “truth” in the first place, just different opinions and cultures, all equally valid. Except Western culture, which is inherently evil and should be broken down and “deconstructed.” Western Universities have moved from the Age of Reason to the Age of Deconstruction. While Chinese, Indian, Korean and other Asian Universities are graduating millions of motivated engineers and scientists every year, Western Universities have been reduced to little hippie factories, teaching about the wickedness of the West and the blessings of barbarism. This represents a serious challenge to the long-term economic competitiveness of Western nations. That’s bad, but it is the least of our worries. Far worse than failing to compete with non-Muslim Asians is failing to identify the threat from Islamic nations who want to subdue us and wipe out our entire civilisation. That is a failure we quite simply cannot live with. And we probably won’t, unless we manage to deal with it.

Sources: http://www.brusselsjournal.com/node/1282 1. http://www.brusselsjournal.com/node/849 2. http://www.brusselsjournal.com/node/1155 3. http://www.brusselsjournal.com/node/1145 4. http://www.jihadwatch.org/dhimmiwatch/archives/006260.php 5. http://www.arabnews.com/?page=1§ion=0&article=62487&d=21&m=4&y=2005 6. http://www.americanthinker.com/comments.php?comments_id=5418 7. http://frontpagemagazine.com/Articles/Printable.asp?ID=20490 8. http://amconmag.com/2005/2005_12_05/cover.html 9. http://www.arabnews.com/?page=1§ion=0&article=84122&d=21&m=6&y=2006&pix=kingdom.jpg&category=Kingdom 10. http://littlegreenfootballs.com/weblog/?entry=8263 11. http://www.jihadwatch.org/dhimmiwatch/archives/009405.php 12. http://www.jihadwatch.org/dhimmiwatch/archives/008907.php 13. http://www.geocities.com/martinkramerorg/IslamObscured.htm 14. http://www.campus-watch.org/article/id/773 15. http://www.jihadwatch.org/dhimmiwatch/archives/008113.php 16. http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060901facomment85501/john-mueller/is-there-still-a-terrorist-threat.html 17. http://www.jihadwatch.org/dhimmiwatch/archives/004191.php 18. http://www.jihadwatch.org/archives/004791.php 19. http://www.brusselsjournal.com/node/840 20. http://www.secularislam.org/articles/debunking.htm 21. http://www.brusselsjournal.com/node/1126 22. http://www.sydneyline.com/Adversary Culture.htm 23. http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=15701

24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29.

http://gatesofvienna.blogspot.com/2006/06/little-churchills-inhabiting-sterile.html http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/dn/opinion/points/stories/040305dnediallen.35261.html http://folk.uio.no/sigurds/ http://fjordman.blogspot.com/2005/09/islam-is-most-warlike-religion.html http://www.brusselsjournal.com/node/1142МБ

1.4 Review 1: Religion of Peace? Islam’s war against the world — Islam 101 Islam 101 is meant to help people become better educated about the fundamentals of Islam and to help the more knowledgeable better convey the facts to others. With the aim of lending clarity to the public understanding of Islam and of exposing the inadequacy of prevailing views. Table of Contents 1. The Basics a. The Five Pillars of Islam b. The Quran — the Book of Allah c. The Sunnah — the «Way» of the Prophet Muhammad i. Battle of Badr ii. Battle of Uhud iii. Battle of Medina iv. Conquest of Mecca d. Sharia Law 2. Jihad and Dhimmitude a. What does «jihad» mean? b. Muslim Scholar Hasan Al-Banna on jihad c. Dar al-Islam and dar al-harb: the House of Islam and the House of War i. al-Taqiyya — Religious Deception ii. How al-Taqiyya is a central part of the Islamisation of Europe iii. Quranic abrogation (Naskh) d. Jihad Through History i. The First Major Wave of Jihad: the Arabs, 622-750 AD ii. The Second Major Wave of Jihad: the Turks, 1071-1683 AD e. The Dhimma f. Jihad in the Modern Era 3. Conclusion 4. Frequently Asked Questions

a. What about the Crusades? b. If Islam is violent, why are so many Muslims peaceful? c. What about the violent passages in the Bible? d. Could an Islamic «Reformation» pacify Islam? e. What about the history of Western colonialism in the Islamic world? f. How can a violent political ideology be the second-largest and fastest-growing religion on earth? g. Is it fair to paint all Islamic schools of thought as violent? h. What about the great achievements of Islamic civilisation? 5. Further Resources 1. The Basics a. The Five Pillars of Islam The five pillars of Islam constitute the most basic tenets of the religion. They are: 1. Faith (iman) in the oneness of Allah and the finality of the prophethood of Muhammad (indicated by the declaration [the Shahadah] that, «There is no God but Allah and Muhammad is the messenger of Allah»). 2. Keeping of the five scheduled daily prayers (salah). 3. Almsgiving (zakat). 4. Fasting (sawm). 5. Pilgrimage (hajj) to Mecca for those who are able. The five pillars in and of themselves do not tell us a lot about the faith or what a Muslim is supposed to believe or how he should act. The second through fifth pillars — prayer, almsgiving, fasting, pilgrimage — are aspects shared by many religions. The finality of the prophethood of Muhammad, however, is unique to Islam. To understand Islam and what it means to be a Muslim, we must come to understand Muhammad as well as the revelations given through him by Allah, which make up the Quran. b. The Quran — the Book of Allah According to Islamic teaching, the Quran came down as a series of revelations from Allah through the Archangel Gabriel to the Prophet Muhammad, who then dictated it to his followers. Muhammad’s companions memorised fragments of the Quran and wrote them down on whatever was at hand, which were later compiled into book form under the rule of the third Caliph, Uthman, some years after Muhammad’s death. The Quran is about as long as the Christian New Testament. It comprises 114 suras (not to be confused with the Sira, which refers to the life of the Prophet) of varying lengths, which may be considered chapters. According to Islamic doctrine, it was around 610 AD in a cave near the city of Mecca (now in southwest Saudi Arabia) that Muhammad received the first revelation from Allah by way of the Archangel Gabriel. The revelation merely commanded Muhammad to «recite» or «read» (Sura 96); the words he was instructed to utter were not his own but Allah’s. Over the next twelve or so years in Mecca, other revelations came to Muhammad that constituted a message to the inhabitants of the city to forsake their pagan ways and turn in worship to the one Allah.

While in Mecca, though he condemned paganism (for the most part), Muhammad showed great respect for the monotheism of the Christian and Jewish inhabitants. Indeed, the Allah of the Quran claimed to be the same God worshipped by Jews and Christians, who now revealed himself to the Arab people through his chosen messenger, Muhammad. It is the Quranic revelations that came later in Muhammad’s career, after he and the first Muslims left Mecca for the city of Medina, that transformed Islam from a relatively benign form of monotheism into an expansionary, military-political ideology that persists to this day. Orthodox Islam does not accept that a rendering of the Quran into another language is a «translation» in the way that, say, the King James Bible is a translation of the original Hebrew and Greek Scriptures. A point often made by Islamic apologists to defang criticism is that only Arabic readers may understand the Quran. But Arabic is a language like any other and fully capable of translation. Indeed, most Muslims are not Arabic readers. In the below analysis, we use a translation of the Quran by two Muslim scholars, which may be found here. All parenthetical explanations in the text are those of the translators save for my interjections in braces, { }.

c. The Sunnah — the «Way» of the Prophet Muhammad In Islam, Muhammad is considered al-insan al-kamil (the «ideal man»). Muhammad is in no way considered divine, nor is he worshipped (no image of Muhammad is permitted lest it encourage idolatry), but he is the model par excellence for all Muslims in how they should conduct themselves. It is through Muhammad’s personal teachings and actions -which make up the «way of the Prophet,» the Sunnah — that Muslims discern what a good and holy life is. Details about the Prophet — how he lived, what he did, his nonQuranic utterances, his personal habits — are indispensable knowledge for any faithful Muslim. Knowledge of the Sunnah comes primarily from the Hadith’s («reports») about Muhammad’s life, which were passed down orally until codified in the eighth century AD, some hundred years after Muhammad’s death. The Hadith’s comprise the most important body of Islamic texts after the Quran; they are basically a collection of anecdotes about Muhammad’s life believed to have originated with those who knew him personally. There are thousands upon thousands of Hadith’s, some running to multiple pages, some barely a few lines in length. When the Hadith’s were first compiled in the eighth century AD, it became obvious that many were inauthentic. The early Muslim scholars of Hadith spent tremendous labour trying to determine which Hadith’s were authoritative and which were suspect. The Hadith’s here come exclusively from the most reliable and authoritative collection, Sahih Al-Bukhari, recognised as sound by all schools of Islamic scholarship, translated by a Muslim scholar and which may be found here. Different translations of Hadith’s can vary in their breakdown of volume, book, and number, but the content is the same. For each Hadith, the classifying information is listed first, then the name of the originator of the Hadith (generally someone who knew Muhammad personally), and then the content itself. While the absolute authenticity of even a sound Hadith is hardly assured, they are nonetheless accepted as authoritative within an Islamic context. Because Muhammad is himself the measuring stick of morality, his actions are not judged according to an independent moral standard but rather establish what the standard for Muslims properly is.

Volume 7, Book 62, Number 88; Narrated Ursa: The Prophet wrote the (marriage contract) with Aisha while she was six years old and consummated his marriage with her while she was nine years old and she remained with him for nine years (i.e. till his death). Volume 8, Book 82, Number 795; Narrated Anas: The Prophet cut off the hands and feet of the men belonging to the tribe of Uraina and did not cauterise (their bleeding limbs) till they died. Volume 2, Book 23, Number 413; Narrated Abdullah bin Umar: The Jews {of Medina} brought to the Prophet a man and a woman from amongst them who have committed (adultery) illegal sexual intercourse. He ordered both of them to be stoned (to death), near the place of offering the funeral prayers beside the mosque. Volume 9, Book 84, Number 57; Narrated Ikrima: Some Zanadiqa (atheists) were brought to Ali {the fourth Caliph} and he burnt them. The news of this event, reached Ibn ‘Abbas who said, «If I had been in his place, I would not have burnt them, as Allah’s Apostle forbade it, saying, «Do not punish anybody with Allah’s punishment (fire).» I would have killed them according to the statement of Allah’s Apostle, «Whoever changes his Islamic religion, then kill him.» Volume 1, Book 2, Number 25; Narrated Abu Huraira: Allah’s Apostle was asked, «What is the best deed?» He replied, «To believe in Allah and His Apostle (Muhammad). The questioner then asked, «What is the next (in goodness)?» He replied, «To participate in Jihad (religious fighting) in Allah’s Cause.»

In Islam, there is no «natural» sense of morality or justice that transcends the specific examples and injunctions outlined in the Quran and the Sunnah. Because Muhammad is considered Allah’s final prophet and the Quran the eternal, unalterable words of Allah himself, there is also no evolving morality that permits the modification or integration of Islamic morality with that from other sources. The entire Islamic moral universe devolves solely from the life and teachings of Muhammad. Along with the reliable Hadith’s, a further source of accepted knowledge about Muhammad comes from the Sira (life) of the Prophet, composed by one of Islam’s great scholars, Muhammad bin Ishaq, in the eighth century AD. Muhammad’s prophetic career is meaningfully divided into two segments: the first in Mecca, where he laboured for fourteen years to make converts to Islam; and later in the city of Medina (The City of the Apostle of God), where he became a powerful political and military leader. In Mecca, we see a quasi-Biblical figure, preaching repentance and charity, harassed and rejected by those around him; later, in Medina, we see an able commander and strategist who systematically conquered and killed those who opposed him. It is the later years of Muhammad’s life, from 622 AD to his death in 632, that are rarely broached in polite company. In 622, when the Prophet was better than fifty years old, he and his followers made the Hijra (emigration or flight), from Mecca to the oasis of Yathrib — later renamed Medina — some 200 miles to the north. Muhammad’s new monotheism had angered the pagan leaders of Mecca, and the flight to Medina was precipitated by a probable attempt on Muhammad’s life. Muhammad had sent emissaries to Medina to ensure his welcome. He was accepted by the Medinan tribes as the leader of the Muslims and as arbiter of inter-tribal disputes. Shortly before Muhammad fled the hostility of Mecca, a new batch of Muslim converts pledged their loyalty to him on a hill outside Mecca called Aqaba. Ishaq here conveys in the Sira the significance of this event:

Sira, p208: When God gave permission to his Apostle to fight, the second {oath of allegiance at} Aqaba contained conditions involving war which were not in the first act of fealty. Now they {Muhammad’s followers} bound themselves to war against all and sundry for God and his Apostle, while he promised them for faithful service thus the reward of paradise.

That Muhammad’s nascent religion underwent a significant change at this point is plain. The scholarly Ishaq clearly intends to impress on his (Muslim) readers that, while in its early years, Islam was a relatively tolerant creed that would «endure insult and forgive the ignorant,» Allah soon required Muslims «to war against all and sundry for God and his Apostle.» The Islamic calendar testifies to the paramouncy of the Hijra by setting year one from the date of its occurrence. The year of the Hijra, 622 AD, is considered more significant than the year of Muhammad’s birth or death or that of the first Quranic revelation because Islam is first and foremost a political-military enterprise. It was only when Muhammad left Mecca with his paramilitary band that Islam achieved its proper political-military articulation. The years of the Islamic calendar (which employs lunar months) are designated in English «AH» or «After Hijra.» i. The Battle of Badr The Battle of Badr was the first significant engagement fought by the Prophet. Upon establishing himself in Medina following the Hijra, Muhammad began a series of razzias (raids) on caravans of the Meccan Quraish tribe on the route to Syria.

Volume 5, Book 59, Number 287; Narrated Kab bin Malik: The Apostle had gone out to meet the caravans of Quraish, but Allah caused them (i.e. Muslims) to meet their enemy unexpectedly (with no previous intention). Volume 5, Book 59, Number 289; Narrated Ibn Abbas: On the day of the battle of Badr, the Prophet said, «O Allah! I appeal to You (to fulfill) Your Covenant and Promise. O Allah! If Your Will is that none should worship You (then give victory to the pagans).» Then Abu Bakr took hold of him by the hand and said, «This is sufficient for you.» The Prophet came out saying, «Their multitude will be put to flight and they will show their backs.» (54:45)

Having returned to Medina after the battle, Muhammad admonished the resident Jewish tribe of Qaynuqa to accept Islam or face a similar fate as the Quraish (3:12-13). The Qaynuqa agreed to leave Medina if they could retain their property, which Muhammad granted. Following the exile of the Bani Qaynuqa, Muhammad turned to individuals in Medina he considered to have acted treacherously. The Prophet particularly seems to have disliked the many poets who ridiculed his new religion and his claim to prophethood — a theme evident today in the violent reactions of Muslims to any perceived mockery of Islam. In taking action against his opponents, «the ideal man» set precedents for all time as to how Muslims should deal with detractors of their religion.

Sira, p367: Then he {Kab bin al-Ashraf} composed amatory verses of an insulting nature about the Muslim women. The Apostle said: «Who will rid me of Ibnul-Ashraf?» Muhammad bin Maslama, brother of the Bani Abdu’l-Ashhal, said, «I will deal with him for you, O Apostle of God, I will kill him.» He said, «Do so if you can.» «All that is incumbent upon you is that you should try» {said the Prophet to Muhammad bin Maslama}. He said, «O Apostle of God, we shall have to tell lies.» He {the Prophet} answered, «Say what you like, for you are free in the matter.»

Volume 4, Book 52, Number 270; Narrated Jabir bin ‘Abdullah: The Prophet said, «Who is ready to kill Kab bin Al-Ashraf who has really hurt Allah and His Apostle?» Muhammad bin Maslama said, «O Allah’s Apostle! Do you like me to kill him?» He replied in the affirmative. So, Muhammad bin Maslama went to him (i.e. Kab) and said, «This person (i.e. the Prophet) has put us to task and asked us for charity.» Kab replied, «By Allah, you will get tired of him.» Muhammad said to him, «We have followed him, so we dislike to leave him till we see the end of his affair.» Muhammad bin Maslama went on talking to him in this way till he got the chance to kill him.

A significant portion of the Sira is devoted to poetry composed by Muhammad’s followers and his enemies in rhetorical duels that mirrored those in the field. There seems to have been an informal competition in aggrandising oneself, one’s tribe, and one’s God while ridiculing one’s adversary in eloquent and memorable ways. Kab bin Malik, one of the assassins of his brother, Kab bin al-Ashraf, composed the following:
Sira, p368: Kab bin Malik said: Of them Kab was left prostrate there (After his fall {the Jewish tribe of} al-Nadir were brought low). Sword in hand we cut him down By Muhammad’s order when he sent secretly by night Kab’s brother to go to Kab. He beguiled him and brought him down with guile Mahmud was trustworthy, bold.

ii. The Battle of Uhud The Meccan Quraish regrouped for an attack on the Muslims at Medina. Muhammad got wind of the Meccan force coming to attack him and encamped his forces on a small hillock north of Medina named Uhud, where the ensuing battle took place.
Volume 5, Book 59, Number 377; Narrated Jabir bin Abdullah: On the day of the battle of Uhud, a man came to the Prophet and said, «Can you tell me where I will be if I should get martyred?» The Prophet replied, «In Paradise.» The man threw away some dates he was carrying in his hand, and fought till he was martyred. Volume 5, Book 59, Number 375; Narrated Al-Bara: when we faced the enemy, they took to their heel till I saw their women running towards the mountain, lifting up their clothes from their legs, revealing their leg-bangles. The Muslims started saying, «The booty, the booty!» Abdullah bin Jubair said, «The Prophet had taken a firm promise from me not to leave this place.» But his companions refused (to stay). So when they refused (to stay there), (Allah) confused them so that they could not know where to go, and they suffered seventy casualties.

Though deprived of victory at Uhud, Muhammad was by no means vanquished. He continued making raids that made being a Muslim not only virtuous in the eyes of Allah but lucrative as well. In an Islamic worldview, there is no incompatibility between wealth, power, and holiness. Indeed, as a member of the true faith, it is only logical that one should also enjoy the material bounty of Allah — even if that means plundering it from infidels. As Muhammad had neutralised the Jewish tribe of Bani Qaynuqa after Badr, he now turned to the Bani Nadir after Uhud. According to the Sira, Allah warned Muhammad of an attempt to assassinate him, and the Prophet ordered the Muslims to prepare for war against the Bani Nadir. The Bani Nadir agreed to go into exile if Muhammad permitted them to retain their movable property. Muhammad agreed to these terms save that they leave behind their armour. iii. The Battle of Medina

In 627 AD, Muhammad faced the greatest challenge to his new community. In that year, the Quraish of Mecca made their most determined attack on the Muslims at Medina itself. Muhammad thought it advisable not to engage them in a pitched battle as at Uhud but took shelter in Medina, protected as it was by lava flows on three sides. The Meccans would have to attack from the northwest in a valley between the flows, and it was there that Muhammad ordered a trench dug for the city’s defence.
Volume 4, Book 52, Number 208; Narrated Anas: On the day (of the battle) of the Trench, the Ansar {new converts to Islam} were saying, «We are those who have sworn allegiance to Muhammad for Jihad (for ever) as long as we live.» The Prophet replied to them, «O Allah! There is no life except the life of the Hereafter. So honour the Ansar and emigrants {from Mecca} with Your Generosity.» And Narrated Mujashi: My brother and I came to the Prophet and I requested him to take the pledge of allegiance from us for migration. He said, «Migration has passed away with its people.» I asked, «For what will you take the pledge of allegiance from us then?» He said, «I will take (the pledge) for Islam and Jihad.»

The Meccans were foiled by the trench and only able to send small raiding parties across it. After several days, they turned back for Mecca. Following his victory, Muhammad turned to the third Jewish tribe at Medina, the Bani Quraiza. While the Bani Qaynuqa and Bani Nadir had suffered exile, the fate of the Bani Quraiza would be considerably more dire.
Sira, p463-4: Then they {the tribe of Quraiza} surrendered, and the apostle confined them in Medina in the quarter of d. al-Harith, a woman of Bani al-Najjar. Then the apostle went out to the market of Medina and dug trenches in it. Then he sent for them and struck off their heads in those trenches as they were brought out to him in batches. Among them was the enemy of Allah Huyayy bin Akhtab and Kab bin Asad their chief. There were 600 or 700 in all, though some put the figure as high as 800 or 900. As they were being taken out in batches to the Apostle they asked Kab what he thought would be done with them. He replied, «Will you never understand? Don’t you see that the summoner never stops and those who are taken away do not return? By Allah it is death!» This went on until the Apostle made an end of them.

Thus do we find the clear precedent that explains the peculiar penchant of Islamic terrorists to behead their victims: it is merely another precedent bestowed by their Prophet. Following yet another of the Muslims’ raids, this time on a place called Khaibar, «The women of Khaibar were distributed among the Muslims» as was usual practice. (Sira, p511) The raid at Khaibar had been against the Bani Nadir, whom Muhammad had earlier exiled from Medina.
Sira, p515: Kinana bin al-Rabi, who had the custody of the treasure of Bani al-Nadir, was brought to the Apostle who asked him about it. He denied that he knew where it was. A Jew came to the Apostle and said that he had seen Kinana going round a certain ruin every morning early. When the Apostle said to Kinana, «Do you know that if we find you have it I shall kill you?» he said, Yes. The Apostle gave orders that the ruin was to be excavated and some of the treasure was found. When he asked him about the rest he refused to produce it, so the Apostle gave orders to al-Zubayr bin al-Awwam, «Torture him until you extract what he has,» so he kindled a fire with flint and steel on his chest until he was nearly dead. Then the Apostle delivered him to Muhammad bin Maslama and he struck off his head, in revenge for his brother Mahmud.

iv. The Conquest of Mecca Muhammad’s greatest victory came in 632 AD, ten years after he and his followers had been forced to flee to Medina. In that year, he assembled a force of some ten thousand Muslims and allied tribes and descended on Mecca. «The Apostle had instructed his commanders when they entered Mecca only to fight those who resisted them, except a small number who were to be killed even if they were found beneath the curtains of the Kaba.» (Sira, p550)

Volume 3, Book 29, Number 72; Narrated Anas bin Malik: Allah’s Apostle entered Mecca in the year of its Conquest wearing an Arabian helmet on his head and when the Prophet took it off, a person came and said, «Ibn Khatal is holding the covering of the Kaba (taking refuge in the Kaba).» The Prophet said, «Kill him.»

Following the conquest of Mecca, Muhammad outlined the future of his religion.
Volume 4, Book 52, Number 177; Narrated Abu Huraira: Allah’s Apostle said, «The Hour {of the Last Judgment} will not be established until you fight with the Jews, and the stone behind which a Jew will be hiding will say. «O Muslim! There is a Jew hiding behind me, so kill him.» Volume 1, Book 2, Number 24; Narrated Ibn Umar: Allah’s Apostle said: «I have been ordered (by Allah) to fight against the people until they testify that none has the right to be worshipped but Allah and that Muhammad is Allah’s Apostle, and offer the prayers perfectly and give the obligatory charity, so if they perform that, then they save their lives and property from me except for Islamic laws and then their reckoning (accounts) will be done by Allah.»

It is from such warlike pronouncements as these that Islamic scholarship divides the world into dar al-Islam (the House of Islam, i.e., those nations who have submitted to Allah) and dar al-harb (the House of War, i.e., those who have not). It is this dispensation that the world lived under in Muhammad’s time and that it lives under today. Then as now, Islam’s message to the unbelieving world is the same: submit or be conquered. d. Sharia Law Unlike many religions, Islam includes a mandatory and highly specific legal and political plan for society called Sharia, which translates approximately as «way» or «path.» The precepts of Sharia are derived from the commandments of the Quran and the Sunnah (the teachings and precedents of Muhammad as found in the reliable Hadith’s and the Sira). Together, the Quran and the Sunnah establish the dictates of Sharia, which is the blueprint for the good Islamic society. Because Sharia originates with the Quran and the Sunnah, it is not optional. Sharia is the legal code ordained by Allah for all mankind. To violate Sharia or not to accept its authority is to commit rebellion against Allah, which Allah’s faithful are required to combat. There is no separation between the religious and the political in Islam; rather Islam and Sharia constitute a comprehensive means of ordering society at every level. While it is in theory possible for an Islamic society to have different outward forms — an elective system of government, a hereditary monarchy, etc. — whatever the outward structure of the government, Sharia is the prescribed content. It is this fact that puts Sharia into

conflict with forms of government based on anything other than the Quran and the Sunnah. The precepts of Sharia may be divided into two parts:
1. Acts of worship (al-ibadat), which includes: Ritual Purification (Wudu) Prayers (Salah) Fasts (Sawm and Ramadan) Charity (Zakat) Pilgrimage to Mecca (Hajj) 2. Human interaction (al-muamalat), which includes: Financial transactions Endowments Laws of inheritance Marriage, divorce, and child care Food and drink (including ritual slaughtering and hunting) Penal punishments War and peace Judicial matters (including witnesses and forms of evidence)

As one may see, there are few aspects of life that Sharia does not specifically govern. Everything from washing one’s hands to child-rearing to taxation to military policy falls under its dictates. Because Sharia is derivate of the Quran and the Sunnah, it affords some room for interpretation. But upon examination of the Islamic sources (see above), it is apparent that any meaningful application of Sharia is going to look very different from anything resembling a free or open society in the Western sense. The stoning of adulterers, execution of apostates and blasphemers, repression of other religions, and a mandatory hostility toward non-Islamic nations punctuated by regular warfare will be the norm. It seems fair then to classify Islam and its Sharia code as a form of totalitarianism. 2. Jihad and Dhimmitude a. What does «Jihad» mean? Jihad literally translates as «struggle.» Strictly speaking, jihad does not mean «holy war» as Muslim apologists often point out. However, the question remains as to what sort of «struggle» is meant: an inner, spiritual struggle against the passions, or an outward, physical struggle. As in any case of trying to determine Islamic teaching on a particular matter, one must look to the Quran and the Sunnah. From those sources (see above) it is evident that a Muslim is required to struggle against a variety of things: laziness in prayer, neglecting to give zakat (alms), etc. But is it also plain that a Muslim is commanded to struggle in physical combat against the infidel as well. Muhammad’s impressive military career attests to the central role that military action plays in Islam. b. Hasan Al-Banna on jihad Below are excerpts from Hasan Al-Banna’s treatise, Jihad. In 1928, Al-Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood, which today is the most powerful organisation in Egypt after the

government itself. In this treatise, Al-Banna cogently argues that Muslims must take up arms against unbelievers. As he says, «The verses of the Qur’an and the Sunnah summon people in general (with the most eloquent expression and the clearest exposition) to jihad, to warfare, to the armed forces, and all means of land and sea fighting.»
All Muslims Must Make Jihad Jihad is an obligation from Allah on every Muslim and cannot be ignored nor evaded. Allah has ascribed great importance to jihad and has made the reward of the martyrs and the fighters in His way a splendid one. Only those who have acted similarly and who have modelled themselves upon the martyrs in their performance of jihad can join them in this reward. Furthermore, Allah has specifically honoured the Mujahideen {those who wage jihad} with certain exceptional qualities, both spiritual and practical, to benefit them in this world and the next. Their pure blood is a symbol of victory in this world and the mark of success and felicity in the world to come. Those who can only find excuses, however, have been warned of extremely dreadful punishments and Allah has described them with the most unfortunate of names. He has reprimanded them for their cowardice and lack of spirit, and castigated them for their weakness and truancy. In this world, they will be surrounded by dishonour and in the next they will be surrounded by the fire from which they shall not escape though they may possess much wealth. The weaknesses of abstention and evasion of jihad are regarded by Allah as one of the major sins, and one of the seven sins that guarantee failure. Islam is concerned with the question of jihad and the drafting and the mobilisation of the entire Ummah {the global Muslim community} into one body to defend the right cause with all its strength than any other ancient or modern system of living, whether religious or civil. The verses of the Qur’an and the Sunnah of Muhammad (PBUH {Peace Be Unto Him}) are overflowing with all these noble ideals and they summon people in general (with the most eloquent expression and the clearest exposition) to jihad, to warfare, to the armed forces, and all means of land and sea fighting.

Here Al-Banna offers citations from the Quran and the reliable Hadith’s that demonstrate the necessity of combat for Muslims. The citations are comparable to those included in Islam 101 section 1b and are here omitted.
The Scholars on Jihad I have just presented to you some verses from the Qur’an and the Noble Ahadith concerning the importance of jihad. Now I would like to present to you some of the opinions from jurisprudence of the Islamic Schools of Thought including some latter day authorities regarding the rules of jihad and the necessity for preparedness. From this we will come to realise how far the ummah has deviated in its practice of Islam as can be seen from the consensus of its scholars on the question of jihad. The author of the ‘Majma’ al-Anhar fi Sharh Multaqal-Abhar’, in describing the rules of jihad according to the Hanafi School, said: ‘Jihad linguistically means to exert one’s utmost effort in word and action; in the Sharee’ah {Sharia — Islamic law} it is the fighting of the unbelievers, and involves all possible efforts that are necessary to dismantle the power of the enemies of Islam including beating them, plundering their wealth, destroying their places of worship and smashing their idols. This means that jihad is to strive to the utmost to ensure the strength of Islam by such means as fighting those who fight you and the dhimmies {non-Muslims living under Islamic rule} (if they violate any of the terms of the treaty) and the apostates (who are the worst of unbelievers, for they disbelieved after they have affirmed their belief). It is fard (obligatory) on us to fight with the enemies. The Imam must send a military expedition to the Dar-al-Harb {House of War — the non-Muslim world} every year at least once or twice, and the people must support him in this. If some of the people fulfill the

obligation, the remainder are released from the obligation. If this fard kifayah (communal obligation) cannot be fulfilled by that group, then the responsibility lies with the closest adjacent group, and then the closest after that etc., and if the fard kifayah cannot be fulfilled except by all the people, it then becomes a fard ‘ayn (individual obligation), like prayer on everyone of the people. The scholarly people are of one opinion on this matter as should be evident and this is irrespective of whether these scholars were Mujtahideen or Muqalideen and it is irrespective of whether these scholars were salaf (early) or khalaf (late). They all agreed unanimously that jihad is a fard kifayah imposed upon the Islamic ummah in order to spread the Da’wah of Islam, and that jihad is a fard ‘ayn if an enemy attacks Muslim lands. Today, my brother, the Muslims as you know are forced to be subservient before others and are ruled by disbelievers. Our lands have been besieged, and our hurruma’at (personal possessions, respect, honour, dignity and privacy) violated. Our enemies are overlooking our affairs, and the rites of our din are under their jurisdiction. Yet still the Muslims fail to fulfill the responsibility of Da’wah that is on their shoulders. Hence in this situation it becomes the duty of each and every Muslim to make jihad. He should prepare himself mentally and physically such that when comes the decision of Allah, he will be ready. I should not finish this discussion without mentioning to you that the Muslims, throughout every period of their history (before the present period of oppression in which their dignity has been lost) have never abandoned jihad nor did they ever become negligent in its performance, not even their religious authorities, mystics, craftsmen, etc. They were all always ready and prepared. For example, Abdullah ibn al Mubarak, a very learned and pious man, was a volunteer in jihad for most of his life, and ‘Abdulwahid bin Zayd, a sufi and a devout man, was the same. And in his time, Shaqiq al Balkhi, the shaykh of the sufis encouraged his pupils towards jihad. Associated Matters Concerning Jihad Many Muslims today mistakenly believe that fighting the enemy is jihad asghar (a lesser jihad) and that fighting one’s ego is jihad akbar (a greater jihad). The following narration [athar] is quoted as proof: «We have returned from the lesser jihad to embark on the greater jihad.» They said: «What is the greater jihad?» He said: «The jihad of the heart, or the jihad against one’s ego.» This narration is used by some to lessen the importance of fighting, to discourage any preparation for combat, and to deter any offering of jihad in Allah’s way. This narration is not a saheeh (sound) tradition: The prominent muhaddith Al Hafiz ibn Hajar al-Asqalani said in the Tasdid al-Qaws: ‘It is well known and often repeated, and was a saying of Ibrahim ibn ‘Abla.’ Al Hafiz Al Iraqi said in the Takhrij Ahadith al-Ahya’: ‘Al Bayhaqi transmitted it with a weak chain of narrators on the authority of Jabir, and Al Khatib transmitted it in his history on the authority of Jabir.’ Nevertheless, even if it were a sound tradition, it would never warrant abandoning jihad or preparing for it in order to rescue the territories of the Muslims and repel the attacks of the disbelievers. Let it be known that this narration simply emphasises the importance of struggling against one’s ego so that Allah will be the sole purpose of everyone of our actions. Other associated matters concerning jihad include commanding the good and forbidding the evil. It is said in the Hadeeth: «One of the greatest forms of jihad is to utter a word of truth in the presence of a tyrannical ruler.» But nothing compares to the honour of shahadah kubra (the supreme martyrdom) or the reward that is waiting for the Mujahideen. Epilogue

My brothers! The ummah that knows how to die a noble and honourable death is granted an exalted life in this world and eternal felicity in the next. Degradation and dishonour are the results of the love of this world and the fear of death. Therefore prepare for jihad and be the lovers of death. Life itself shall come searching after you. My brothers, you should know that one day you will face death and this ominous event can only occur once. If you suffer on this occasion in the way of Allah, it will be to your benefit in this world and your reward in the next. And remember brother that nothing can happen without the Will of Allah: ponder well what Allah, the Blessed, the Almighty, has said: ‘Then after the distress, He sent down security for you. Slumber overtook a party of you, while another party was thinking about themselves (as to how to save themselves, ignoring the others and the Prophet) and thought wrongly of Allah the thought of ignorance. They said, «Have we any part in the affair?» Say you (O Muhammad): «Indeed the affair belongs wholly to Allah.» They hide within themselves what they dare not reveal to you, saying: «If we had anything to do with the affair, none of us would have been killed here.» Say: «Even if you had remained in your homes, those for whom death was decreed would certainly have gone forth to the place of their death: but that Allah might test what is in your hearts; and to purify that which was in your hearts (sins), and Allah is All-Knower of what is in (your) hearts.»‘ {Sura 3:154}

c. Dar al-Islam and dar al-harb: the House of Islam and the House of War The violent injunctions of the Quran and the violent precedents set by Muhammad set the tone for the Islamic view of politics and of world history. Islamic scholarship divides the world into two spheres of influence, the House of Islam (dar al-Islam) and the House of War (dar al-harb). Islam means submission, and so the House of Islam includes those nations that have submitted to Islamic rule, which is to say those nations ruled by Sharia law. The rest of the world, which has not accepted Sharia law and so is not in a state of submission, exists in a state of rebellion or war with the will of Allah. It is incumbent on dar al-Islam to make war upon dar al-harb until such time that all nations submit to the will of Allah and accept Sharia law. Islam’s message to the non-Muslim world is the same now as it was in the time of Muhammad and throughout history: submit or be conquered. The only times since Muhammad when dar al-Islam was not actively at war with dar alharb were when the Muslim world was too weak or divided to make war effectively. But the lulls in the ongoing war that the House of Islam has declared against the House of War do not indicate a forsaking of jihad as a principle but reflect a change in strategic factors. It is acceptable for Muslim nations to declare hudna, or truce, at times when the infidel nations are too powerful for open warfare to make sense. Jihad is not a collective suicide pact even while «killing and being killed» (Sura 9:111) is encouraged on an individual level. For the past few hundred years, the Muslim world has been too politically fragmented and technologically inferior to pose a major threat to the West. But that is changing.

1.5 Al-Taqiyya – Religious/political deception Due to the state of war between dar al-Islam and dar al-harb, systematic lying to the infidel must be considered part and parcel of Islamic tactics. The parroting by Muslim organisations throughout dar al-harb that «Islam is a religion of peace,» or that the origins of Muslim violence lie in the unbalanced psyches of particular individual «fanatics,» must be considered as disinformation intended to induce the infidel world to let down its guard. Of course, individual Muslims may genuinely regard their religion as «peaceful»,

but only insofar as they are ignorant of its true teachings, or in the sense of the Egyptian theorist Sayyid Qutb, who posited in his Islam and Universal Peace that true peace would prevail in the world just as soon as Islam had conquered it. A telling point is that, while Muslims who present their religion as peaceful abound throughout dar al-harb, they are nearly non-existent in dar al-Islam. A Muslim apostate once suggested to me a litmus test for Westerners who believe that Islam is a religion of «peace» and «tolerance»: try making that point on a street corner in Ramallah, or Riyadh, or Islamabad, or anywhere in the Muslim world. He assured me you wouldn’t live five minutes.
{A} problem concerning law and order {with respect to Muslims in dar al-harb} arises from an ancient Islamic legal principle — that of taqiyya, a word the root meaning of which is «to remain faithful» but which in effect means «dissimulation.» It has full Quranic authority (3:28 and 16:106) and allows the Muslim to conform outwardly to the requirements of unIslamic or non-Islamic government, while inwardly «remaining faithful» to whatever he conceives to be proper Islam, while waiting for the tide to turn. (Hiskett, Some to Mecca Turn to Pray, 101.) Volume 4, Book 52, Number 269; Narrated Jabir bin ‘Abdullah: The Prophet said, «War is deceit.»

Historically, examples of al-taqiyya include permission to renounce Islam itself in order to save one’s neck or ingratiate oneself with an enemy. It is not hard to see that the implications of taqiyya are insidious in the extreme: they essentially render negotiated settlement — and, indeed, all veracious communication between dar al-Islam and dar alharb — impossible. It should not, however, be surprising that a party to a war should seek to mislead the other about its means and intentions. Jihad Watch’s own Hugh Fitzgerald sums up taqiyya and kitman, a related form of deception.
«Taqiyya» is the religiously-sanctioned doctrine, with its origins in Shi’a Islam but now practiced by non-Shi’a as well, of deliberate dissimulation about religious matters that may be undertaken to protect Islam, and the Believers. A related term, of broader application, is «kitman,» which is defined as «mental reservation.» An example of «Taqiyya» would be the insistence of a Muslim apologist that «of course» there is freedom of conscience in Islam, and then quoting that Qur’anic verse — «There shall be no compulsion in religion.» {2:256} But the impression given will be false, for there has been no mention of the Muslim doctrine of abrogation, or naskh, whereby such an early verse as that about «no compulsion in religion» has been cancelled out by later, far more intolerant and malevolent verses. In any case, history shows that within Islam there is, and always has been, «compulsion in religion» for Muslims, and for non-Muslims. «Kitman» is close to «taqiyya,» but rather than outright dissimulation, it consists in telling only a part of the truth, with «mental reservation» justifying the omission of the rest. One example may suffice. When a Muslim maintains that «jihad» really means «a spiritual struggle,» and fails to add that this definition is a recent one in Islam (little more than a century old), he misleads by holding back, and is practicing «kitman.» When he adduces, in support of this doubtful proposition, the hadith in which Muhammad, returning home from one of his many battles, is reported to have said (as known from a chain of transmitters, or isnad), that he had returned from «the Lesser Jihad to the Greater Jihad» and does not add what he also knows to be true, that this is a «weak» hadith, regarded by the mostrespected muhaddithin as of doubtful authenticity, he is further practicing «kitman.»

In times when the greater strength of dar al-harb necessitates that the jihad take an indirect approach, the natural attitude of a Muslim to the infidel world must be one of deception and omission. Revealing frankly the ultimate goal of dar al-Islam to conquer

and plunder dar al-harb when the latter holds the military trump cards would be strategic idiocy. Fortunately for the jihadists, most infidels do not understand how one is to read the Quran, nor do they trouble themselves to find out what Muhammad actually did and taught, which makes it easy to give the impression through selective quotations and omissions that «Islam is a religion of peace.» Any infidel who wants to believe such fiction will happily persist in his mistake having been cited a handful of Meccan verses and told that Muhammad was a man of great piety and charity. Digging only slightly deeper is sufficient to dispel the falsehood.

ii. How al-Taqiyya is a central part of the Islamisation of Europe The following article will demonstrate that the concept of «al-Taqiyya» is an integral part of Islam, and that it is NOT a Shi’ite concoction. I had to shorten the analysis considerably. You can however see sources for more material. The word «al-Taqiyya» literally means: «Concealing or disguising one’s beliefs, convictions, ideas, feelings, opinions, and/or strategies at a time of eminent danger, whether now or later in time, to save oneself from physical and/or mental injury.» A one-word translation would be «Dissimulation.» Rejecting al-Taqiyya is rejecting the Quran, as will be shown:

Reference 1: ———-Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti in his book, «al-Durr al-Manthoor Fi al-Tafsir al-Ma’athoor,» narrates Ibn Abbas’, the most renowned and trusted narrator of tradition in the sight of the Sunnis, opinion regarding al-Taqiyya in the Quranic verse: «Let not the believers take for friends or helpers unbelievers rather than believers: if any do that, (they) shall have no relation left with Allah except by way of precaution («tat-taqooh»), that ye may guard yourselves («tooqatan») from them….[3:28]» that Ibn Abbas said:
«al-Taqiyya is with the tongue only; he who has been coerced into saying that which angers Allah, and his heart is comfortable (i.e., his true faith has not been shaken.), then (saying that which he has been coerced to say) will not harm him (at all); (because) al-Taqiyya is with the tongue only, (not the heart).»

NOTE 1: The two words «tat-taqooh» and «tooqatan,» as mentioned in the Arabic Quran, are both from the same root of «al-Taqiyya.» NOTE 2: The «heart» as referred to above and in later occurrences refers to the center of faith in an individual’s existence. It is mentioned many times in the Quran. Reference 2: ———-Ibn Abbas also commented on the above verse, as narrated in Sunan al-Bayhaqi and Mustadrak al-Hakim, by saying:
«al-Taqiyya is the uttering of the tongue, while the heart is comfortable with faith.»

NOTE: The meaning is that the tongue is permitted to utter anything in a time of need, as long as the heart is not affected; and one is still comfortable with faith. Reference 3: ———-Abu Bakr al-Razi in his book, «Ahkam al-Quran,» v2, p10, has explained the aforementioned verse «…except by way of precaution («tat-taqooh»), that ye may guard yourselves («tooqatan») from them….[3:28]» by affirming that al-Taqiyya should be used when one is afraid for life and/or limb. In addition, he has narrated that Qutadah said with regards to the above verse:
«It is permissible to speak words of unbelief when al-Taqiyya is mandatory.»

Reference 4: ———-It has been narrated by Abd al-Razak, Ibn Sa’d, Ibn Jarir, Ibn Abi Hatim, Ibn Mardawayh, al-Bayhaqi in his book «al- Dala-il,» and it was corrected by al-Hakim in his book «alMustadrak» that:
«The non-believers arrested `Ammar Ibn Yasir and (tortured him until) he uttered foul words about Muhammad, and praised their gods (idols); and when they released him, he went straight to the Prophet. The Prophet said: «Is there something on your mind?» `Ammar Ibn Yasir said: «Bad (news)! They would not release me until I defamed you and praised their gods!» The Prophet said: «How do you find your heart to be?» `Ammar answered: «Comfortable with faith.» So the Prophet said: «Then if they come back for you, then do the same thing all over again.» Allah at that moment revealed the verse: «….except under compulsion, his heart remaining firm in faith…[16:106]»

NOTE: The full verse that was quoted partially as part of the tradition above, is: «Anyone who, after accepting Faith in Allah, utters unbelief, except under compulsion, his heart remaining firm in faith — but such as open their breast to unbelief, — on them is Wrath from Allah, and theirs will be a dreadful Chastisement [16:106].» (Emphasis Mine) Reference 5: ———-It is narrated in Sunan al-Bayhaqi that Ibn Abbas explained the above verse «Anyone who, after accepting Faith in Allah, utters unbelief….[16:106]» by saying:
«The meaning that Allah is conveying is that he who utters unbelief after having believed, shall deserve the Wrath of Allah and a terrible punishment. However, those who have been coerced, and as such uttered with their tongues that which their hearts did not confirm to escape persecution, have nothing to fear; for Allah holds His servants responsible for that which their hearts have ratified.»

Reference 6: ———-Another explanation of the above verse is provided by Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti in his book, «al-Durr al-Manthoor Fi al- Tafsir al-Ma-athoor,» vol. 2, p178; he says:

«Ibn Abi Shaybah, Ibn Jarir, Ibn Munzir, and Ibn Abi Hatim narrated on the authority of Mujtahid (a man’s name) that this verse was revealed in relation to the following event: A group of people from Mecca accepted Islam and professed their belief; as a result, the companions in Medina wrote to them requesting that they emigrate to Medina; for if they don’t do so, they shall not be considered as those who are among the believers. In compliance, the group left Mecca, but were soon ambushed by the non-believers (Quraish) before reaching their destination; they were coerced into disbelief, and they professed it. As a result, the verse «…except under compulsion, his heart remaining firm in faith [16:106]…» was revealed.»

Reference 7: ———-Ibn Sa’d in his book, «al-Tabaqat al-Kubra,» narrates on the authority of Ibn Sirin that:
The Prophet saw `Ammar Ibn Yasir crying, so he wiped off his (RA) tears, and said: «The non-believers arrested you and immersed you in water until you said such and such (i.e., bad-mouthing the Prophet and praising the pagan gods to escape persecution); if they come back, then say it again.»

Reference 8: ———-It is narrated in al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah, v3, p61, that:
After the conquest of the city of Khaybar by the Muslims, the Prophet was approached by Hajaj Ibn`Aalat and told: «O Prophet of Allah: I have in Mecca some excess wealth and some relatives, and I would like to have them back; am I excused if I bad-mouth you (to escape persecution)?» The Prophet excused him and said: «Say whatever you have to say.»

Reference 9: ———-It is narrated by al-Ghazzali in his book, «Ihya `Uloom al-Din,» that:
Safeguarding of a Muslim’s life is a mandatory obligation that should be observed; and that lying is permissible when the shedding of a Muslim’s blood is at stake.

Reference 10: ————Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti in his book, «al-Ashbah Wa al-Naza’ir,» affirms that:
«it is acceptable (for a Muslim) to eat the meat of a dead animal at a time of great hunger (starvation to the extent that the stomach is devoid of all food); and to loosen a bite of food (for fear of choking to death) by alcohol; and to utter words of unbelief; and if one is living in an environment where evil and corruption are the pervasive norm, and permissible things (Halal) are the exception and a rarity, then one can utilise whatever is available to fulfill his needs.»

NOTE: The reference to the consumption of a dead animal is meant to illustrate that even forbidden things become permissible in a time of need.

Reference 11: ————Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti in his book, «al-Durr al-Manthoor Fi al-Tafsir alMa’athoor,» v2, p176, narrates that:
Abd Ibn Hameed, on the authority of al-Hassan, said: «al-Taqiyya is permissible until the Day of Judgment.»

Reference 12: ————Narrated in Sahih al-Bukhari, v7, p102, that Abu al-Darda’ said:
«(Verily) we smile for some people, while our hearts curse (those same people).»

Reference 13: ————Narrated in Sahih al-Bukhari, v7, p81, that the Prophet said:
«O `Aisha, the worst of people in the sight of Allah are those that are avoided by others due to their extreme impudence.»

NOTE: The meaning here is that one is permitted to use deception to get along with people. The above tradition was narrated when a person sought permission to see the Holy Prophet and prior to his asking permission the Prophet said that he was not a good man, but still I shall see him. The Prophet talked to the person with utmost respect, upon which Aisha inquired as to why the Prophet talked to the person with respect despite his character, upon which the above reply was rendered. Reference 14: ————Narrated in Sahih Muslim (English version), Chapter MLXXVII, v4, p1373, Tradition #6303:
Humaid b. ‘Abd al-Rahman b. ‘Auf reported that his mother Umm Kulthum daughter of ‘Uqba b. Abu Mu’ait, and she was one amongst the first emigrants who pledged allegiance to Allah’s Apostle, as saying that she heard Allah’s Messenger as saying: A liar is not one who tries to bring reconciliation amongst people and speaks good (in order to avert dispute), or he conveys good. Ibn Shihab said he did not hear that exemption was granted in anything what the people speak as lie but in three cases: in battle, when infiltrating the enemy and for bringing temporary reconciliation amongst persons.

The (Sunni) commentator of this volume of Sahih Muslim, Abdul Hamid Siddiqi, provides the following commentary:
Telling of a lie is a grave sin but a Muslim is permitted to tell a lie in some several cases.

Please refer to Sahih Muslim Volume IV, Chapter MLXXVII, Tradition no. 6303 p1373, English only — Abdul Hamid Siddiqui

Al-Taqiyya vs. Hypocrisy [2] Some people have fallen victim to confusing al-Taqiyya with hypocrisy, when in fact they (al-Taqiyya and Hypocrisy) are two opposite extremes. Al-Taqiyya is concealing faith and displaying non-belief; while Hypocrisy is the concealment of unbelief and the display of belief. They are total opposites in function, form, and meaning. The Quran reveals the nature of hypocrisy with the following verse:
«When they meet those who believe, they say: `We Believe;’ but when they are alone with their evil ones, they say: `We are really with you, we (were) only jesting [2:14].»

The Quran then reveals al-Taqiyya with the following verses:
«A Believer, a man from among the people of Pharaoh, who had concealed his faith, said: «Will ye slay a man because he says,`My Lord is Allah’?….[40:28]»

«Anyone who, after accepting Faith in Allah, utters unbelief, except under compulsion, his heart remaining firm in faith — but such as open their breast to unbelief, — on them is Wrath from Allah, and theirs will be a dreadful Chastisement [16:106].»

And also:
«Let not the believers take for friends or helpers unbelievers rather than believers: if any do that, (they) shall have no relation left with Allah except by way of precaution («tattaqooh»), that ye may guard yourselves («tooqatan») from them….[3:28]»

And when Moses returned unto his people, angry and grieved, he said: Evil is that (course) which ye took after I had left you. Would ye hasten on the judgment of your Lord? And he cast down the tablets, and he seized his brother by the head, dragging him toward him. (Aaron) said: «Son of my mother! Lo! People did oppress me and they were about to kill me. Make not the enemies neither rejoice over my misfortune nor count thou me amongst the sinful people. [7:150]»

Now, we see that Allah himself has stated that one of His faithful servants CONCEALED his faith and pretended that he was a follower of the Pharaoh’s religion to escape persecution. We also see that Prophet Aaron (Haroon) observed Taqiyya when his life was in danger. We also observe that al-Taqiyya is CLEARLY permitted in a time of need. In fact, the Book of Allah instructs us that we should escape a situation which causes our destruction for nothing:
«and make not your own hands contribute to your destruction [2:195]»

Reason and Logic for performing al-Taqiyya Aside from the instructions of the Quran and Hadith on the permissibility and necessity of Taqiyya, such necessity can also be derived from a logical and rational standpoint. It is apparent to any discerning observer that Allah has bestowed upon His creation certain defence mechanisms and instincts to protect themselves from impending danger. What follows are some examples that serve to illustrate the above point. It is clear that al-Taqiyya as a defence or attack mechanism is Allah’s mercy to His creation, such that He has not left them unprotected. As such, al-Taqiyya, build upon an instinctive defence/attack mechanism that Allah has endowed humans with. The ability to use one’s tongue to escape persecution when you are weak or vulnerable is indeed a supreme example of defence. Al-Taqiyya is a truism because it satisfies an instinctive need to survive and prosper.

Comments It has been demonstrated under the section of «Sunni Sources In Support of al-Taqiyya» that it is permissible to lie and deceive if you are at a disadvantage or vulnerable to any non-Muslim (F example as long as Muslims are still a minority in Europe), as al-Ghazzali asserted; and that it is legitimate to utter words of unbelief as al-Suyuti stated; and that it is acceptable to smile at a person while your heart curses him as al-Bukhari confirms; and that al- Taqiyya is an integral part of the Quran itself, as has been shown under the section of «al-Taqiyya vs. Hypocrisy;» and that it was practiced by one of the most notable companions of the Prophet, none other than `Ammar Ibn Yasir; and we have seen that al-Suyuti narrates that al-Taqiyya is permissible until the Day of Judgment (When Islam has conquered the entire world); and that a person can say anything he wants, even to badmouth the Prophet if he is in a dangerous and restrictive situation; and we have also seen that even the Prophet himself practiced al-Taqiyya in a manner of deception that served to advance “temporary” good relations among selected neighbouring people until they could be conquered. Furthermore, keep in mind that the Prophet Muhammad did not disclose his mission for the first three years of his prophet hood, which was, in fact, another practice of al- Taqiyya by the Prophet to save the young Islam from annihilation. There is NO difference between the Sunnis and Shia vis-a-vis al-Taqiyya, except that the Shia practices al-Taqiyya for fear of persecution from Sunnis, while the Sunnis are actively using it in its relations with the Western world (Especially for the majority of Muslims (Sunnis) who have immigrated to Europe and the US). It is enough to say «I am a Shi’i» to get your head chopped off, even today in countries like Saudi Arabia. As for the Sunnis, they were never subjected to what the Shia have been subjected to, primarily because they have always been the friends of the so-called Islamic governments throughout the ages.

My comment here is that Wahhabis themselves do indeed practice al-Taqiyya, but they have been psychologically programmed by their mentors in such a way that they don’t even recognise al-Taqiyya when they do actually practice it. Ahmad Didat said that the Christians have been programmed in such a way that they may read the Bible a million times, but will never spot an error! They are fixed on believing it because their scholars say so, and they read at a superficial level. I say that this also applies to those who oppose al-Taqiyya. Dr. al-Tijani wrote a short event where he was sitting next to a Sunni scholar on a flight to London; they were both on their way to attend an Islamic Conference. At that time, there was still some tension due to the Salman Rushdi affair. The conversation between the two was naturally concerned with the unity of the Ummah. Consequently, the Sunni/Shia issue introduced itself as part of the conversation. The Sunni scholar said: «The Shia must drop certain beliefs and convictions that cause disunity and animosity among the Muslims.» Dr. al-Tijani answered: «Like what?» The Sunni scholar answered: «Like the Taqiyya and Muta’ ideas.» Dr. al-Tijani immediately provided him with plenty of proofs in support of these notions, but the Sunni scholar was not convinced, and said that although these proofs are all authentic and correct, we must discard them for the sake of uniting the Ummah!!! When they both got to London, the immigration officer asked the Sunni scholar: «What is the purpose of your visit sir?» The Sunni scholar said: «For medical treatment.» Then Dr. al-Tijani was asked the same question, and he answered: «To visit some friends.» Dr. al-Tijani followed the Sunni scholar and said: «Didn’t I tell you that al-Taqiyya is for all times and occasions!» The Sunni scholar said: «How so?» Dr. al-Tijani answered: «Because we both lied to the airport police: I by saying that I came to visit some friends, and you by saying that you are here for medical treatment; when, in fact, we are here to attend the Islamic Conference!» The Sunni scholar smiled, and said: «Well, doesn’t an Islamic Conference provide healing for the soul?!» Dr. al-Tijani was swift to say: «And doesn’t it provide an opportunity to visit friends?!» So you see, the Sunnis practice al-Taqiyya whether they acknowledge the fact or not. It is an innate part of human nature to save oneself, and most often we do it without even noticing. My comment again is: Who, in Allah’s Name, is this Scholar to state that although the proofs provided to him by Dr. al-Tijani are ALL authentic, they must be discarded for the sake of uniting the Ummah?! Do you truly believe that the Ummah will be united by abandoning Allah’s commandments? Does the above statement represent scholarly merit, or pure rhetoric, ignorance, and hypocrisy on the part of that scholar? Is a scholar who utters such words of ignorance worthy of being obeyed and listened to? Who is he to tell Allah, the Creator of the Universe, and His Messenger what is right and wrong? Does he know more than Allah about al-Taqiyya? Exalted be Allah from being insulted by those who lack ALL forms of intelligence to interpret His religion. al-Imam Ja’far al-Sadiq [The Sixth Imam of Ahlul-Bayt] said:
«al-Taqiyya is my religion, and the religion of my ancestors.» He also said: «He who doesn’t practice al-Taqiyya, doesn’t practice his religion.»

Sources: http://www.al-islam.org/ENCYCLOPEDIA/chapter6b/1.html 1. http://www.al-islam.org/ENCYCLOPEDIA/chapter6b/3.html

1.6 Naskh — Quranic abrogation Quranic abrogation (Naskh) is another central and under-analysed part of Islam. Those Westerners who manage to pick up a translation of the Quran are often left bewildered as to its meaning thanks to ignorance of a critically important principle of Quranic interpretation known as «abrogation.» The principle of abrogation — al-naskh wa al-mansukh (the abrogating and the abrogated) — directs that verses revealed later in Muhammad’s career «abrogate» — i.e., cancel and replace — earlier ones whose instructions they may contradict. Thus, passages revealed later in Muhammad’s career, in Medina, overrule passages revealed earlier, in Mecca. The Quran itself lays out the principle of abrogation:
2:106. Whatever a Verse (revelation) do We {Allah} abrogate or cause to be forgotten, We bring a better one or similar to it. Know you not that Allah is able to do all things?

It seems that 2:106 was revealed in response to scepticism directed at Muhammad that Allah’s revelations were not entirely consistent over time. Muhammad’s rebuttal was that «Allah is able to do all things» — even change his mind. To confuse matters further, though the Quran was revealed to Muhammad sequentially over some twenty years’ time, it was not compiled in chronological order. When the Quran was finally collated into book form under Caliph Uthman, the suras were ordered from longest to shortest with no connection whatever to the order in which they were revealed or to their thematic content. In order to find out what the Quran says on a given topic, it is necessary to examine the other Islamic sources that give clues as to when in Muhammad’s lifetime the revelations occurred. Upon such examination, one discovers that the Meccan suras, revealed at a time when the Muslims were vulnerable, are generally benign; the later Medinan suras, revealed after Muhammad had made himself the head of an army, are bellicose.

Let us take, for example, 50:45 and Sura 109, both revealed in Mecca:
50:45. We know of best what they say; and you (O Muhammad) are not a tyrant over them (to force them to Belief). But warn by the Qur’an, him who fears My Threat. 109:1. Say (O Muhammad to these Mushrikun and Kafirun): «O Al-Kafirun (disbelievers in Allah, in His Oneness, in His Angels, in His Books, in His Messengers, in the Day of Resurrection, and in Al-Qadar {divine foreordainment and sustaining of all things}, etc.)! 109:2. 109:3. 109:4. 109:5. 109:6. «I worship not that which you worship, «Nor will you worship that which I worship. «And I shall not worship that which you are worshipping. «Nor will you worship that which I worship. «To you be your religion, and to me my religion (Islamic Monotheism).»

Then there is this passage revealed just after the Muslims reached Medina and were still vulnerable:
2:256. There is no compulsion in religion. Verily, the Right Path has become distinct from the wrong path. Whoever disbelieves in Taghut {idolatry} and believes in Allah, then he has grasped the most trustworthy handhold that will never break. And Allah is All-Hearer, AllKnower.

In contrast, take 9:5, commonly referred to as the «Verse of the Sword», revealed toward the end of Muhammad’s life:
9:5. Then when the Sacred Months (the 1st, 7th, 11th, and 12th months of the Islamic calendar) have passed, then kill the Mushrikun {unbelievers} wherever you find them, and capture them and besiege them, and prepare for them each and every ambush. But if they repent and perform As-Salat (Iqamat-as-Salat {the Islamic ritual prayers}), and give Zakat {alms}, then leave their way free. Verily, Allah is Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful.

Having been revealed later in Muhammad’s life than 50:45, 109, and 2:256, the Verse of the Sword abrogates their peaceful injunctions in accordance with 2:106. Sura 8, revealed shortly before Sura 9, reveals a similar theme:
8:39. And fight them until there is no more Fitnah (disbelief and polytheism: i.e. worshipping others besides Allah) and the religion (worship) will all be for Allah Alone [in the whole of the world]. But if they cease (worshipping others besides Allah), then certainly, Allah is All-Seer of what they do. 8:67. It is not for a Prophet that he should have prisoners of war (and free them with ransom) until he had made a great slaughter (among his enemies) in the land. You desire the good of this world (i.e. the money of ransom for freeing the captives), but Allah desires (for you) the Hereafter. And Allah is All-Mighty, All-Wise. 9:29. Fight against those who believe not in Allah, nor in the Last Day, nor forbid that which has been forbidden by Allah and His Messenger and those who acknowledge not the religion of truth (i.e. Islam) among the people of the Scripture (Jews and Christians), until they pay the Jizya with willing submission, and feel themselves subdued. 9:33. It is He {Allah} Who has sent His Messenger (Muhammad) with guidance and the religion of truth (Islam), to make it superior over all religions even though the Mushrikun (polytheists, pagans, idolaters, disbelievers in the Oneness of Allah) hate (it).

The Quran’s commandments to Muslims to wage war in the name of Allah against nonMuslims are unmistakable. They are, furthermore, absolutely authoritative as they were revealed late in the Prophet’s career and so cancel and replace earlier instructions to act peaceably. Without knowledge of the principle of abrogation (naskh), Westerners will continue to misread the Quran and misdiagnose Islam as a «religion of peace.» Naskh – Quranic abrogation – origin and implementaion Naskh (Quranic abrogation) is a legal practice first put in place by 9th century Islamic scholars with the intention of understanding seemingly contradictory verses in the Quran and the hadith. Its practical consequence in relation to Jihad is that the aggressive Medina verses of the Quran cancels the peaceful Mecca verses. As far back as the

sources will take us, Muslim jurisprudence discerned Quranic abrogation (‘Naskh’ or ‘Man-sookh’) in the Quran. One of the earliest extended discussions of Quranic abrogation was; al-Naskh wa-al-mansukh fi al-quran by Abu Ubayd (839 AD). Another source from the ninth century is; Kitab Fahm al-quran of al-Harith ibn Asad al-Muhasibi. Other sources from the same century are the writings of al-Shafii and Ibn Qutaybah. The conclusions of these “works” were among other things that Medina (war mongering) verses cancel Mecca (peaceful) verses whenever appropriate. Even though the abrogated texts remain a part of the Qur’an and are even recited during prayers, the application thereof, or applicable information therefrom is inappropriate. This foundation for duality makes the Quran and the Hadith extremely effective when opposing different challenges. It allows every Muslim to use the appropriate texts based on the circumstances. The Mecca verses are given emphasis for tactical reasons in the ongoing peaceful conquering of nations through demographic warfare (as we see in Europe) or whenever appropriate, while the aggressive Medina verses are given emphasis through regular Jihad (warfare) as we see in Sudan. Basis for abrogation The concept of abrogation has been mainly extrapolated from two Quranic texts:
[Q 2:106] What We [Allah] cancel of ‘Ayaaat’ or made forgotten, We replace it with something better than it, or at least similar. Do you not know that truly, Allah is powerful over everything?

The word ‘Ayaaat’ used in the above text, means «signs». Throughout the Qur’an, this word is used for a variety of meanings, and is not limited to the Quranic verses [see 30:21, for example]. The second passage usually referred to as the basis for Quranic abrogation is the following:
[Q 87:6-7] We [Allah] will relate to you [knowledge], so do not forget, except what Allah wills. Surely, he knows what the apparent and the hidden.

We can understand the development of the concept of Naskh in the following manner; commentators were perplexed in understanding seemingly contradictory verses. They therefore evaluated the practices of the Prophet (especially the various hadiths) and the actions of the first generations of Muslims. By doing so much confusion could be avoided. For example; [Q 8:61], which commands Muslims to remain in a peaceful setting with those who maintain a similar stance, has been replaced with 9:73, which reads as follows;
[Q 9:73] O Prophet, fight against the disbelievers and the hypocrites and be harsh upon them. And their refuge is Hell, and wretched is the destination.

By ignoring the peaceful verse 8:61 which was clearly of a limited scope, given to the Prophet at a time when Islam was weak and vulnerable and when he was under constant attack from his foes (thus the peaceful Medina verses), a foundation for constant Jihad until Islam has conquered the world was created.

Texts such as 9:73 are cited by Islamists everywhere. Look at 2:62 as the perfect example. It, along with 5:69, actually names some NonMuslim religious groups as being rewarded by God for their faith and deeds. These verses are however cancelled by Q 3:85 [and other texts, such as 5:3], or are said to refer to nations prior to Muhammad’s time. At the end of the day, there is really no doubt whatsoever what Muhammads own agenda and conclusions were as the following authentic Hadith explains:
Hadith of the Prophet «Lataftahanna al-Qustantiniyya wa lani`ma al-amiru amiruha wa lani`ma al-jayshu dhalika al-jaysh.» «Verily you shall conquer Constantinople. What a wonderful leader will he be, and what a wonderful army will that army be!»

Needless to say; every single kuffar capital is considered modern day Constantinople’s. The only difference is that the strategic weapon used in the Jihad against Europe is Islamic demographic warfare instead of regular infantry units (which is the preferred method in the Sudan Jihad).

d. Jihad Through History In 622 AD (year one in the Islamic calendar, AH 1), Muhammad abandoned Mecca for the city of Medina (Yathrib) some 200 farther north in the Arabian peninsula. In Medina, Muhammad established a paramilitary organisation that would spread his influence and that of his religion throughout Arabia. Because there has never been a separation of the political-military and the religious in Islam, this development was entirely natural by Islamic principles. By the time of his death in 632 AD, Muhammad had extended his control in a series of raids and battles over most of southern Arabia. The conquered populations of these areas either had to submit to Muslim rule and pay a protection tax or convert to Islam.

i. The First Major Wave of Jihad: the Arabs, 622-750 AD Near the end of his life, Muhammad sent letters to the great empires of the Middle East demanding their submission to his authority. This dispels any notion that the Prophet intended Islam’s expansion to stop with Arabia. Indeed, it is only logical that the one true religion, revealed by the final and fullest prophet, should have universal sway. Thus, as Muhammad had fought and subdued the peoples of the Arabian peninsula, his successors Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, and Ali (known as «the four rightly-guided Caliphs») and other Caliphs fought and subdued the people of the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and Europe in the name of Allah.
Volume 4, Book 53, Number 386; Narrated Jubair bin Haiya: Umar {the second Caliph} sent the Muslims to the great countries to fight the pagans. When we reached the land of the enemy, the representative of Khosrau {Persia} came out with forty-thousand warriors,

and an interpreter got up saying, «Let one of you talk to me!» Al-Mughira replied, «Our Prophet, the Messenger of our Lord, has ordered us to fight you till you worship Allah Alone or give Jizya (i.e. tribute); and our Prophet has informed us that our Lord says: «Whoever amongst us is killed (i.e. martyred), shall go to Paradise to lead such a luxurious life as he has never seen, and whoever amongst us remain alive, shall become your master.»

Unleashing upon the world the blitzkrieg of its day, Islam rapidly spread into the territories of Byzantium, Persia, and Western Europe in the decades after Muhammad’s death. The creaking Byzantine and Persian powers, having battled each other into mutual decline, offered little resistance to this unanticipated onslaught. The Arab Muslim armies charged into the Holy Land, conquered what is now Iraq and Iran, then swept west across North Africa, into Spain, and finally into France. The Muslim offensive was finally halted in the West at the Battle of Poitiers/Tours, not far from Paris, in 732 AD. In the east, the jihad penetrated deep into Central Asia. As Muhammad had plundered his foes, so his successors also stripped the conquered areas — incomparably richer both materially and culturally than the desolate sands of Arabia — of their wealth and manpower. Almost overnight, the more advanced civilisations of the Middle East, North Africa, Persia, and Iberia saw their agriculture, native religions, and populations destroyed or plundered. Save for a handful of walled cities that managed to negotiate conditional surrenders, the catastrophes those lands suffered were very nearly complete. Ibn Hudayl, a 14th century Granadan author of an important treatise on Jihad, explained the original methods which facilitated the violent, chaotic Jihad conquest of the Iberian peninsula, and other parts of Europe:
It is permissible to set fire to the lands of the enemy, his stores of grain, his beasts of burden if it is not possible for the Muslims to take possession of them as well as to cut down his trees, to raze his cities, in a word, to do everything that might ruin and discourage him, provided that the imam deems these measures appropriate, suited to hastening the Islamisation of that enemy or to weakening him. Indeed, all this contributes to a military triumph over him or to forcing him to capitulate.

The historian al-Maqqari, who wrote in seventeenth-century Tlemcen in Algeria, explains that the panic created by the Arab horsemen and sailors, at the time of the Muslim expansion in the zones that saw those raids and landings, facilitated the later conquest, if that was decided on:
Allah, he says, thus instilled such fear among the infidels that they did not dare to go and fight the conquerors; they only approached them as suppliants, to beg for peace.»

Bat Ye’or, the leading scholar of Islam’s expansion and its treatment of non-Muslims, has provided an inestimable service through the compilation and translation of numerous primary source documents describing centuries of Islamic conquest. She includes these documents in her works on Islamic history and the plight of non-Muslims under Islamic rule. In the history of jihad, the slaughter of civilians, the desecration of churches, and the plundering of the countryside are commonplace. Here is Michael the Syrian’s account of the Muslim invasion of Cappodocia (southern Turkey) in 650 AD under Caliph Umar:
… when Muawiya {the Muslim commander} arrived {in Euchaita in Armenia} he ordered all the inhabitants to be put to the sword; he placed guards so that no one escaped. After gathering up all the wealth of the town, they set to torturing the leaders to make them

show them things [treasures] that had been hidden. The Taiyaye {Muslim Arabs} led everyone into slavery — men and women, boys and girls — and they committed much debauchery in that unfortunate town: they wickedly committed immoralities inside churches. They returned to their country rejoicing. (Michael the Syrian, quoted in Bat Ye’or, The Decline of Eastern Christianity under Islam, 276-7.)

The following description by the Muslim historian, Ibn al-Athir (1160-1233 AD), of razzias (raiding expeditions) in Northern Spain and France in the eighth and ninth centuries AD, conveys nothing but satisfaction at the extent of the destruction wrought upon the infidels, including non-combatants.
In 177 <17 April 793>, Hisham, prince of Spain, sent a large army commanded by Abd alMalik b. Abd al-Wahid b. Mugith into enemy territory, and which made forays as far as Narbonne and Jaranda . This general first attacked Jaranda where there was an elite Frank garrison; he killed the bravest, destroyed the walls and towers of the town and almost managed to seize it. He then marched on to Narbonne, where he repeated the same actions, then, pushing forward, he trampled underfoot the land of the Cerdagne {near Andorra in the Pyrenees}. For several months he traversed this land in every direction, raping women, killing warriors, destroying fortresses, burning and pillaging everything, driving back the enemy who fled in disorder. He returned safe and sound, dragging behind him God alone knows how much booty. This is one of the most famous expeditions of the Muslims in Spain. In 223 <2 December 837>, Abd ar-Rahman b. al Hakam, sovereign of Spain, sent an army against Alava; it encamped near Hisn al-Gharat, which it besieged; it seized the booty that was found there, killed the inhabitants and withdrew, carrying off women and children as captives. In 231 <6 September 845>, a Muslim army advanced into Galicia on the territory of the infidels, where it pillaged and massacred everyone. In 246 <27 March 860>, Muhammad b. Abd ar-Rahman advanced with many troops and a large military apparatus against the region of Pamplona. He reduced, ruined and ravaged this territory, where he pillaged and sowed death. (Ibn al-Athir, Annals, quoted in Bat Ye’or, The Decline of Eastern Christianity under Islam, 281-2.)

This first wave of jihad engulfed much of the Byzantine, Visigothic, Frankish, and Persian Empires and left the newborn Islamic Empire controlling territory from Southern France, south through Spain, east across North Africa to India, and north to Russia. Early in the second millennium AD, the Mongol invasion from the east greatly weakened the Islamic Empire and ended Arab predominance therein.

ii. The Second Major Wave of Jihad: the Turks, 1071-1683 AD Some twenty-five years before the first Crusading army set out from central Europe for the Holy Land, the Turkish (Ottoman) armies began an assault on the Christian Byzantine Empire, which had ruled what is now Turkey since the Roman Empire’s capital was moved to Constantinople in 325 AD. At the battle of Manzikert, in 1071, the Christian forces suffered a disastrous defeat, which left much of Anatolia (Turkey) open to invasion. This second wave of jihad was temporarily held up by the invading Latin Armies during the Crusades (see Islam 101 FAQs), but, by the beginning of the 14th century, the Turks were threatening Constantinople and Europe itself. In the West, Roman Catholic armies were bit by bit forcing Muslim forces down the Iberian peninsula, until, in 1492, they were definitively expelled (the Reconquista). In Eastern Europe, however, Islam continued in the ascendant. One of the most significant engagements between the invading Muslims and the indigenous peoples of the region was the Battle of Kosovo in 1389, where the Turks annihilated a multinational army under the Serbian King, St. Lazar, though their progress into Europe was significantly slowed. After numerous attempts dating back to the seventh century, Constantinople, the jewel

of Eastern Christendom, finally fell in 1453 to the armies of Sultan Mahomet II. Lest one ascribe the atrocities of the first wave of jihad to the «Arabness» of its perpetrators, the Turks showed they were fully capable of living up to the principles of the Quran and the Sunnah. Paul Fregosi in his book Jihad describes the scene following the final assault on Constantinople:
Several thousand of the survivors had taken refuge in the cathedral: nobles, servants, ordinary citizens, their wives and children, priests and nuns. They locked the huge doors, prayed, and waited. {Caliph} Mahomet {II} had given the troops free quarter. They raped, of course, the nuns being the first victims, and slaughtered. At least four thousand were killed before Mahomet stopped the massacre at noon. He ordered a muezzin {one who issues the call to prayer} to climb into the pulpit of St. Sophia and dedicate the building to Allah. It has remained a mosque ever since. Fifty thousand of the inhabitants, more than half the population, were rounded up and taken away as slaves. For months afterward, slaves were the cheapest commodity in the markets of Turkey. Mahomet asked that the body of the dead emperor be brought to him. Some Turkish soldiers found it in a pile of corpses and recognised Constantine {XI} by the golden eagles embroidered on his boots. The sultan ordered his head to be cut off and placed between the horse’s legs under the equestrian bronze statue of the emperor Justinian. The head was later embalmed and sent around the chief cities of the Ottoman Empire for the delectation of the citizens. Next, Mahomet ordered the Grand Duke Notaras, who had survived, be brought before him, asked him for the names and addresses of all the leading nobles, officials, and citizens, which Notaras gave him. He had them all arrested and decapitated. He sadistically bought from their owners {i.e., Muslim commanders} high-ranking prisoners who had been enslaved, for the pleasure of having them beheaded in front of him. (Fregosi, Jihad, 2567.)

This second, Turkish wave of jihad reached its farthest extent at the failed sieges of Vienna in 1529 and 1683, where in the latter instance the Muslim army under Kara Mustapha was thrown back by the Roman Catholics under the command of the Polish King, John Sobieski. In the decades that followed, the Ottomans were driven back down through the Balkans, though they were never ejected from the European continent entirely. Still, even while the imperial jihad faltered, Muslim land- and sea-borne razzias into Christian territory continued, and Christians were being abducted into slavery from as far away as Iceland into the 19th century.

e. Dhimmitude Islam’s persecution of non-Muslims is in no way limited to jihad, even though that is the basic relationship between the Muslim and non-Muslim world. After the jihad concludes in a given area with the conquest of infidel territory, the dhimma, or treaty of protection, may be granted to the conquered «People of the Book» — historically, Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians. The dhimma provides that the life and property of the infidel are exempted from jihad for as long as the Muslim rulers permit, which has generally meant for as long as the subject non-Muslims — the dhimmi — prove economically useful to the Islamic state. The Quran spells out the payment of the jizya (poll- or head-tax; Sura 9:29), which is the most conspicuous means by which the Muslim overlords exploit the dhimmi. But the jizya is not merely economic in its function; it exists also to humiliate the dhimmi and impress on him the superiority of Islam. Al-Maghili, a fifteenth century Muslim theologian, explains:
On the day of payment {of the jizya} they {the dhimmi} shall be assembled in a public place like the suq {place of commerce}. They should be standing there waiting in the lowest and dirtiest place. The acting officials representing the Law shall be placed above them and shall adopt a threatening attitude so that it seems to them, as well as to others,

that our object is to degrade them by pretending to take their possessions. They will realise that we are doing them a favour in accepting from them the jizya and letting them go free. (Al-Maghili, quoted in Bat Ye’or, The Decline of Eastern Christianity under Islam, 361.)

Islamic law codifies various other restrictions on the dhimmi, all of which derive from the Quran and the Sunnah. Several hundred years of Islamic thought on the right treatment of dhimmi peoples is summed up by Al-Damanhuri, a seventeenth century head of AlAzhar University in Cairo, the most prestigious center for learning in the Muslim world:
… just as the dhimmis are prohibited from building churches, other things also are prohibited to them. They must not assist an unbeliever against a Muslim … raise the cross in an Islamic assemblage … display banners on their own holidays; bear arms … or keep them in their homes. Should they do anything of the sort, they must be punished, and the arms seized. … The Companions [of the Prophet] agreed upon these points in order to demonstrate the abasement of the infidel and to protect the weak believer’s faith. For if he sees them humbled, he will not be inclined toward their belief, which is not true if he sees them in power, pride, or luxury garb, as all this urges him to esteem them and incline toward them, in view of his own distress and poverty. Yet esteem for the unbeliever is unbelief. (Al-Damanhuri, quoted in Bat Ye’or, The Decline of Eastern Christianity under Islam, 382.)

The Christian, Jewish, and Zoroastrian peoples of the Middle East, North Africa, and much of Europe suffered under the oppressive strictures of the dhimma for centuries. The status of these dhimmi peoples is comparable in many ways to that of former slaves in the post-bellum American South. Forbidden to construct houses of worship or repair extant ones, economically crippled by the jizya, socially humiliated, legally discriminated against, and generally kept in a permanent state of weakness and vulnerability by the Muslim overlords, it should not be surprising that their numbers dwindled, in many places to the point of extinction. The generally misunderstood decline of Islamic civilisation over the past several centuries is easily explained by the demographic decline of the dhimmi populations, which had provided the principle engines of technical and administrative competence. Should the dhimmi violate the conditions of the dhimma — perhaps through practicing his own religion indiscreetly or failing to show adequate deference to a Muslim — then the jihad resumes. At various times in Islamic history, dhimmi peoples rose above their subjected status, and this was often the occasion for violent reprisals by Muslim populations who believed them to have violated the terms of the dhimma. Medieval Andalusia (Moorish Spain) is often pointed out by Muslim apologists as a kind of multicultural wonderland, in which Jews and Christians were permitted by the Islamic government to rise through the ranks of learning and government administration. What we are not told, however, is that this relaxation of the disabilities resulted in widespread rioting on the part of the Muslim populace that killed hundreds of dhimmis, mainly Jews. By refusing to convert to Islam and straying from the traditional constraints of the dhimma (even at the behest of the Islamic government, which was in need of capable manpower), the dhimmi had implicitly chosen the only other option permitted by the Quran: death.

Dhimmitude in Spain (Iberian peninsula) The Iberian peninsula was conquered in 710-716 C.E. by Arab tribes originating from northern, central and southern Arabia. Massive Berber and Arab immigration, and the colonisation of the Iberian peninsula, followed the conquest. Most churches were converted into mosques. Although the conquest had been planned and conducted jointly

with a faction of Iberian Christian dissidents, including a bishop, it proceeded as a classical jihad with massive pillages, enslavements, deportations and killings. Toledo, which had first submitted to the Arabs in 711 or 712, revolted in 713. The town was punished by pillage and all the notables had their throats cut. In 730, the Cerdagne (in Septimania, near Barcelona) was ravaged and a bishop burned alive. In the regions under stable Islamic control, subjugated non-Muslim dhimmis -Jews and Christians- like elsewhere in other Islamic lands were prohibited from building new churches or synagogues, or restoring the old ones. Segregated in special quarters, they had to wear discriminatory clothing. Subjected to heavy taxes, the Christian peasantry formed a servile class exploited by the dominant Arab ruling elites; many abandoned their land and fled to the towns. Harsh reprisals with mutilations and crucifixions would sanction the Mozarab (Christian dhimmis) calls for help from the Christian kings. Moreover, if one dhimmi harmed a Muslim, the whole community would lose its status of protection, leaving it open to pillage, enslavement and arbitrary killing. By the end of the eighth century, the rulers of North Africa and of Andalusia had introduced rigorous and harsh Maliki jurisprudence as the predominant school of Muslim law. Three quarters of a century ago, at a time when political correctness was not dominating historical publication and discourse, Evariste Levi-Provencal, the pre-eminent scholar of Andalusia wrote:
The Muslim Andalusian state thus appears from its earliest origins as the defender and champion of a jealous orthodoxy, more and more ossified in a blind respect for a rigid doctrine, suspecting and condemning in advance the least effort of rational speculation.

Dufourcq provides this illustration of the resulting religious and legal discriminations dhimmis suffered, and the accompanying incentives for them to convert to Islam: by converting [to Islam], one would no longer have to be confined to a given district, or be the victim of discriminatory measures or suffer humiliations. Furthermore, the entire Islamic law tended to favour conversions. When an «infidel» became a Muslim, he immediately benefited from a complete amnesty for all of his earlier crimes, even if he had been sentenced to the death penalty, even if it was for having insulted the Prophet or blasphemed against the Word of God: his conversion acquitted him of all his faults, of all his previous sins. A legal opinion given by a mufti from al-Andalus in the ninth century is very instructive: a Christian dhimmi kidnapped and violated a Muslim woman; when he was arrested and condemned to death, he immediately converted to Islam; he was automatically pardoned, while being constrained to marry the woman and to provide for her a dowry in keeping with her status. The mufti who was consulted about the affair, perhaps by a brother of the woman, found that the court decision was perfectly legal, but specified that if that convert did not become a Muslim in good faith and secretly remained a Christian, he should be flogged, slaughtered and crucified. Al-Andalus represented the land of jihad par excellence. Every year (sometimes twice a year) raiding expeditions were sent to ravage the Christian Spanish kingdoms to the north, the Basque regions, or France and the Rhone valley, bringing back booty and slaves. Andalusian corsairs attacked and invaded along the Sicilian and Italian coasts, even as far as the Aegean Islands, looting and burning as they went. Many thousands of non-Muslim captives were deported to slavery in Andalusia, where the caliph kept a militia of tens of thousand of Christian slaves, brought from all parts of Christian Europe (the Saqaliba), and a harem filled with captured Christian women. Society was sharply divided along ethnic and religious lines, with the Arab tribes at the top of the hierarchy, followed by the Berbers who were never recognised as equals, despite their Islamisation;

lower in the scale came the mullawadun converts and, at the very bottom, the dhimmi Christians and Jews. The Andalusian Maliki jurist Ibn Abdun (d. 1134) offered these telling legal opinions regarding Jews and Christians in Seville around 1100 A.D.: No Jew or Christian may be allowed to wear the dress of an aristocrat, nor of a jurist, nor of a wealthy individual; on the contrary they must be detested and avoided. It is forbidden to [greet] them with the [expression], «Peace be upon you”. In effect, Satan has gained possession of them, and caused them to forget God’s warning. They are the confederates of Satan’s party; Satan’s confederates will surely be the losers!» (Quran 58:19 [modern Dawood translation]). A distinctive sign must be imposed upon them in order that they may be recognised and this will be for them a form of disgrace. Ibn Abdun also forbade the selling of scientific books to dhimmis under the pretext that they translated them and attributed them to their co-religionists and bishops. In fact, plagiarism is difficult to prove since whole Jewish and Christian libraries were looted and destroyed. Another prominent Andalusian jurist, Ibn Hazm of Cordoba (d. 1064), wrote that Allah has established the infidels ownership of their property merely to provide booty for Muslims. In Granada, the Jewish viziers Samuel Ibn Naghrela, and his son Joseph, who protected the Jewish community, were both assassinated between 1056 to 1066, followed by the annihilation of the Jewish population by the local Muslims. It is estimated that up to five thousand Jews perished in the pogrom by Muslims that accompanied the 1066 assassination. This figure equals or exceeds the number of Jews reportedly killed by the Crusaders during their pillage of the Rhineland, some thirty years later, at the outset of the First Crusade. The Granada pogrom was likely to have been incited, in part, by the bitter anti-Jewish ode of Abu Ishaq a well known Muslim jurist and poet of the times, who wrote:
Bring them down to their place and Return them to the most abject station. They used to roam around us in tatters Covered with contempt, humiliation, and scorn. They used to rummage amongst the dungheaps for a bit of a filthy rag to serve as a shroud for a man to be buried in…Do not consider that killing them is treachery. Nay, it would be treachery to leave them scoffing.» [The translator then summarises: The Jews have broken their covenant (i.e., overstepped their station, with reference to the Covenant of Umar) and compunction would be out of place.]

The Muslim Berber Almohads in Spain and North Africa (1130-1232) wreaked enormous destruction on both the Jewish and Christian populations. This devastation- massacre, captivity, and forced conversion- was described by the Jewish chronicler Abraham Ibn Daud, and the poet Abraham Ibn Ezra. Suspicious of the sincerity of the Jewish converts to Islam, Muslim «inquisitors» (i.e., antedating their Christian Spanish counterparts by three centuries) removed the children from such families, placing them in the care of Muslim educators 13 . Maimonides, the renowned philosopher and physician, experienced the Almohad persecutions, and had to flee Cordoba with his entire family in 1148, temporarily residing in Fez — disguised as a Muslim — before finding asylum in Fatimid Egypt. Indeed, although Maimonides is frequently referred to as a paragon of Jewish achievement facilitated by the enlightened rule of Andalusia, his own words debunk this utopian view of the Islamic treatment of Jews:
..the Arabs have persecuted us severely, and passed baneful and discriminatory legislation against us…Never did a nation molest, degrade, debase, and hate us as much as they..

Ottoman Dhimmitude Even the Turcophilic 19th century travel writer Ubicini acknowledged the oppressive burden of Ottoman dhimmitude in this moving depiction:
The history of enslaved peoples is the same everywhere, or rather, they have no history. The years, the centuries pass without bringing any change to their situation. Generations come and go in silence. One might think they are afraid to awaken their masters, asleep alongside them. However, if you examine them closely you discover that this immobility is only superficial. A silent and constant agitation grips them. Life has entirely withdrawn into the heart. They resemble those rivers which have disappeared underground; if you put your ear to the earth, you can hear the muffled sound of their waters; then they re-emerge intact a few leagues away. Such is the state of the Christian populations of Turkey under Ottoman rule.

Ottoman Devshirme-janissary system Scholars who have conducted serious, detailed studies of the devshirme-janissary system have made the following conclusions; Vryonis, Jr. for example, makes these deliberately understated, but cogent observations;
…in discussing the devshirme we are dealing with the large numbers of Christians who, in spite of the material advantages offered by conversion to Islam, chose to remain members of a religious society which was denied first class citizenship. Therefore the proposition advanced by some historians, that the Christians welcomed the devshirme as it opened up wonderful opportunities for their children, is inconsistent with the fact that these Christians had not chosen to become Muslims in the first instance but had remained Christians. There is abundant testimony to the very active dislike with which they viewed the taking of their children. One would expect such sentiments given the strong nature of the family bond and given also the strong attachment to Christianity of those who had not apostacised to Islam. First of all the Ottomans capitalised on the general Christian fear of losing their children and used offers of devshirme exemption in negotiations for surrender of Christian lands. Such exemptions were included in the surrender terms granted to Jannina, Galata, the Morea, Chios, etc. Christians who engaged in specialised activities which were important to the Ottoman state were likewise exempt from the tax on their children by way of recognition of the importance of their labours for the empire. Exemption from this tribute was considered a privilege and not a penalty. …there are other documents wherein their [i.e., the Christians] dislike is much more explicitly apparent. These include a series of Ottoman documents dealing with the specific situations wherein the devshirmes themselves have escaped from the officials responsible for collecting them. A firman… in 1601 [regarding the devshirme] provided the [Ottoman] officials with stern measures of enforcement, a fact which would seem to suggest that parents were not always disposed to part with their sons. “..to enforce the command of the known and holy fetva [fatwa] of Seyhul [Shaikh]Islam. In accordance with this whenever some one of the infidel parents or some other should oppose the giving up of his son for the Janissaries, he is immediately hanged from his door-sill, his blood being deemed unworthy.”

Vasiliki Papoulia highlights the continuous desperate, often violent struggle of the Christian populations against this brutally imposed Ottoman levy:
It is obvious that the population strongly resented this measure [and the levy] could be carried out only by force. Those who refused to surrender their sons- the healthiest, the handsomest and the most intelligent- were on the spot put to death by hanging. Nevertheless we have examples of armed resistance. In 1565 a revolt took place in Epirus and Albania. The inhabitants killed the recruiting officers and the revolt was put down only after the sultan sent five hundred janissaries in support of the local sanjak-bey. We are better informed, thanks to the historic archives of Yerroia, about the uprising in Naousa in 1705 where the inhabitants killed the Silahdar Ahmed Celebi and his assistants and fled to the mountains as rebels. Some of them were later arrested and put to death.. Since there was no possibility of escaping [the levy] the population resorted to several subterfuges. Some left their villages and fled to certain cities which enjoyed exemption from the child levy or migrated to Venetian-held territories. The result was a depopulation of the countryside. Others had their children marry at an early age …Nicephorus Angelus… states that at times the children ran away on their own initiative, but when they heard that the authorities had arrested their parents and were torturing them to death, returned and gave themselves up. La Giulletiere cites the case of a young Athenian who returned from hiding in order to save his father’s life and then chose to die himself rather than abjure his faith. According to the evidence in Turkish sources, some parents even succeeded in abducting their children after they had been recruited. The most successful way of escaping recruitment was through bribery. That the latter was very widespread is evident from the large amounts of money confiscated by the sultan from corrupt officials. Finally, in their desperation the parents even appealed to the Pope and the Western powers for help.

Papoulia concludes:
…there is no doubt that this heavy burden was one of the hardest tribulations of the Christian population.

Dhimmitude in Greece under Ottoman rule A.E. Vacalopoulos, History of Macedonia, 1354-1833, Thessaloniki, 1973, pp. 67-74, 353358, 636-652; «Background and Causes of the Greek Revolution», Neo-Hellenika, Vol. 2, 1975, pp.53-68; The Greek Nation, 1453-1669, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1976, Chaps. 1-4. Vacalopoulos describes how jihad imposed dhimmitude under Ottoman rule provided critical motivation for the Greek Revolution (Background and Causes of the Greek Revolution, Neo-Hellenika, pp.54-55):
The Revolution of 1821 is no more than the last great phase of the resistance of the Greeks to Ottoman domination; it was a relentless, undeclared war, which had begun already in the first years of servitude. The brutality of an autocratic regime, which was characterised by economic spoliation, intellectual decay and cultural retrogression, was sure to provoke opposition. Restrictions of all kinds, unlawful taxation, forced labour, persecutions, violence, imprisonment, death, abductions of girls and boys and their confinement to Turkish harems, and various deeds of wantonness and lust, along with numerous less offensive excesses — all these were a constant challenge to the instinct of survival and they defied every sense of human decency. The Greeks bitterly resented all insults and humiliations, and their anguish and frustration pushed them into the arms of rebellion. There was no exaggeration in the statement made by one of the beys if Arta, when he

sought to explain the ferocity of the struggle. He said: ‘We have wronged the rayas [dhimmis] (i.e. our Christian subjects) and destroyed both their wealth and honour; they became desperate and took up arms. This is just the beginning and will finally lead to the destruction of our empire.’ The sufferings of the Greeks under Ottoman rule were therefore the basic cause of the insurrection; a psychological incentive was provided by the very nature of the circumstances.

Dhimmitude in Palestine In his comprehensive study of 19th century Palestinian Jewry under Ottoman rule (The Jews of Palestine, pp. 168, 172-73), Professor Tudor Parfitt made these summary observations:
«…Inside the towns, Jews and other dhimmis were frequently attacked, wounded, and even killed by local Muslims and Turkish soldiers. Such attacks were frequently for trivial reasons: Wilson [in British Foreign Office correspondence] recalled having met a Jew who had been badly wounded by a Turkish soldier for not having instantly dismounted when ordered to give up his donkey to a soldier of the Sultan. Many Jews were killed for less. On occasion the authorities attempted to get some form of redress but this was by no means always the case: the Turkish authorities themselves were sometimes responsible for beating Jews to death for some unproven charge. After one such occasion [British Consul] Young remarked: ‘I must say I am sorry and surprised that the Governor could have acted so savage a part- for certainly what I have seen of him I should have thought him superior to such wanton inhumanity- but it was a Jew- without friends or protection- it serves to show well that it is not without reason that the poor Jew, even in the nineteenth century, lives from day to day in terror of his life’.»

Dhimmitude during and after the Tanzimat period – Ottoman Empire The Tanzimat, meaning reorganisation of the Ottoman Empire, was a period of reformation that began in 1839 and ended with the First Constitutional Era in 1876. The Tanzimat reform era was characterised by various attempts to modernise the Ottoman Empire, to secure its territorial integrity against nationalist movements and aggressive powers. The reforms encouraged Ottomanism among the diverse ethnic groups of the Empire, attempting to stem the tide of nationalist movements within the Ottoman Empire. The reforms attempted to integrate non-Muslims and non-Turks more thoroughly into Ottoman society by enhancing their civil liberties and granting them equality throughout the Empire. Edouard Engelhardt, La Turquie et La Tanzimat, 2 Vols. In 1882, Paris; Engelhardt made these observations from his detailed analysis of the Tanzimat period, noting that a quarter century after the Crimean War (1853-56), and the second iteration of Tanzimat reforms, the same problems persisted:
Muslim society has not yet broken with the prejudices which make the conquered peoples subordinate…the raya [dhimmis] remain inferior to the Osmanlis; in fact he is not rehabilitated; the fanaticism of the early days has not relented…[even liberal Muslims rejected]…civil and political equality, that is to say, the assimilation of the conquered with the conquerors.

A systematic examination of the condition of the Christian rayas was conducted in the 1860s by British consuls stationed throughout the Ottoman Empire, yielding extensive primary source documentary evidence. [54]. Britain was then Turkey’s most powerful ally, and it was in her strategic interest to see that oppression of the Christians was eliminated, to prevent direct, aggressive Russian or Austrian intervention. On July 22, 1860, Consul James Zohrab sent a lengthy report from Sarajevo to his ambassador in Constantinople, Sir Henry Bulwer, analysing the administration of the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, again, following the 1856 Tanzimat reforms. Referring to the reform efforts, Zohrab states:
I can safely say, [they] practically remain a dead letter…while [this] does not extend to permitting the Christians to be treated as they formerly were treated, is so far unbearable and unjust in that it permits the Mussulmans to despoil them with heavy exactions. False imprisonments (imprisonment under false accusation) are of daily occurence. A Christian has but a small chance of exculpating himself when his opponent is a Mussulman (…) Christian evidence, as a rule, is still refused (…) Christians are now permitted to possess real property, but the obstacles which they meet with when they attempt to acquire it are so many and vexatious that very few have as yet dared to brave them… Such being, generally speaking, the course pursued by the Government towards the Christians in the capital (Sarajevo) of the province where the Consular Agents of the different Powers reside and can exercise some degree of control, it may easily be guessed to what extend the Christians, in the remoter districts, suffer who are governed by Mudirs (governors) generally fanatical and unacquainted with the (new reforms of the) law..

Even the modern Ottomanist Roderick Davison (in «Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian-Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth Century» American Historical Review, Vol. 59, pp. 848, 855, 859, 864) concedes, that the reforms failed, and offers an explanation based on Islamic beliefs intrinsic to the system of dhimmitude:
No genuine equality was ever attained…there remained among the Turks an intense Muslim feeling which could sometimes burst into an open fanaticism…More important than the possibility of fanatic outbursts, however, was the innate attitude of superiority which the Muslim Turk possessed. Islam was for him the true religion. Christianity was only a partial revelation of the truth, which Muhammad finally revealed in full; therefore Christians were not equal to Muslims in possession of truth. Islam was not only a way of worship, it was a way of life as well. It prescribed man’s relations to man, as well as to God, and was the basis for society, for law, and for government. Christians were therefore inevitably considered second-class citizens in the light of religious revelation—as well as by reason of the plain fact that they had been conquered by the Ottomans. This whole Muslim outlook was often summed up in the common term gavur (or kafir), which means ‘unbeliever’ or ‘infidel’, with emotional and quite uncomplimentary overtones. To associate closely or on terms of equality with the gavur was dubious at best. “Familiar association with heathens and infidels is forbidden to the people of Islam,” said Asim, an early nineteenth-century historian, “and friendly and intimate intercourse between two parties that are one to another as darkness and light is far from desirable”…The mere idea of equality, especially the anti-defamation clause of 1856, offended the Turks’ inherent sense of the rightness of things. “Now we can’t call a gavur a gavur”, it was said, sometimes bitterly, sometimes in matter-of-fact explanation that under the new dispensation the plain truth could no longer be spoken openly. Could reforms be acceptable which forbade calling a spade a spade?…The Turkish mind, conditioned by centuries of Muslim and Ottoman dominance, was not yet ready to accept any absolute equality…Ottoman equality was not attained in the Tanzimat period [i.e., mid to late 19th century, 1839-1876], nor yet after the Young Turk revolution of 1908…

Dhimmitude – Zorastrians in Iran

Boyce, A Persian Stronghold of Zoroastrianism, pp. 7-8; Napier Malcolm lived among the Zoroastrians in the central Iranian town of Yezd at the end of the 19th century. He documented the following in his narrative, Five Years in a Persian Town, New York, 1905, pp. 45-50: Up to 1895 no Parsi (Zoroastrian) was allowed to carry an umbrella. Even during the time that I was in Yezd they could not carry one in town. Up to 1895 there was a strong prohibition upon eye-glasses and spectacles; up to 1885 they were prevented from wearing rings; their girdles had to be made of rough canvas, but after 1885 any white material was permitted. Up to 1896 the Parsis were obliged to twist their turbans instead of folding them. Up to 1898 only brown, grey, and yellow were allowed for the qaba [outer coat] or arkhaluq [under coat] (body garments), but after that all colours were permitted except blue, black, bright red, or green. There was also a prohibition against white stockings, and up to about 1880 the Parsis had to wear a special kind of peculiarly hideous shoe with a broad, turned-up toe. Up to 1885 they had to wear a torn cap. Up to 1880 they had to wear tight knickers, self-coloured, instead of trousers. Up to 1891 all Zoroastrians had to walk in town, and even in the desert they had to dismount if they met a Mussulman of any rank whatsoever. During the time that I was in Yezd they were allowed to ride in the desert, and only had to dismount if they met a big Mussulman. There were other similar dress restrictions too numerous and trifling to mention. Then the houses of both the Parsis and the Jews, with the surrounding walls, had to be built so low that the top could be reached by a Mussulman with his hand extended; they might, however, dig down below the level of the road. The walls had to be splashed with white around the door. Double doors, the common form of Persian door, were forbidden, also rooms containing three or more windows. Bad-girs [Air-shafts] were still forbidden to Parsis while we were in Yezd, but in 1900 one of the bigger Parsi merchants gave a large present to the Governor and to the chief mujtahid (Mohammedan priest) to be allowed to build one. Upper rooms were also forbidden. Up to about 1860 Parsis could not engage in trade. They used to hide things in their cellar rooms, and sell them secretly. They can now trade in the caravanserais or hostelries, but not in the bazaars, nor may they trade in linen drapery. Up to 1870 they were not permitted to have a school for their children. The amount of the Jizya, or tax upon infidels, differed according to the wealth of the individual Parsi, but it was never less than two tomans [a sum of money, 10,000 dinars]. A toman is now worth about three shillings and eight pence, but it used to be worth much more. Even now, when money has much depreciated, it represents a labourer’s wage for ten days. The money must be paid on the spot, when the farrash [literally, a carpet sweeper. Really a servant, chiefly, outdoor], who was acting as collector, met the man. The farrash was at liberty to do what he liked when collecting the jizya. The man was not even allowed to go home and fetch the money, but was beaten at once until it was given. About 1865 a farrash collecting this tax tied a man to a dog, and gave a blow to each in turn. About 1891 a mujtahid caught a Zoroastrian merchant wearing white stockings in one of the public squares of the town. He ordered the man to be beaten and the stockings taken off. About 1860 a man of seventy went to the bazaars in white trousers of rough canvas. They hit him about a good deal, took off his trousers, and sent him home with them under his arm. Sometimes Parsis would be made to stand on one leg in a mujtahid’s house until they consented to pay a considerable sum of money. In the reign of the late Shah Nasirud Din, Manukji Limji, a British Parsi from India, was for a long while in Tehran as Parsi representative. Almost all the Parsi disabilities were withdrawn, the Jizya, the clothes restrictions, and those with regard to houses, but the law of inheritance was not altered, according to which a Parsi who becomes a Mussulman

takes precedence of his Zoroastrian brothers and sisters. The Jizya was actually remitted, and also some of the restrictions as to houses, but the rest of the firman was a dead letter. In 1898 the present Shah, Muzaffarud Din, gave a firman to Dinyar, the present Qalantar [Head Man] of the Parsi Anjuman, or Committee, revoking all the remaining Parsi disabilities, and also declaring it unlawful to use fraud or deception in making conversions of Parsis to Islam. This firman does not appear to have had any effect at all. About 1883, after the firman of Nasirud Din Shah had been promulgated, one of the Parsis, Rustami Ardishiri Dinyar, built in Kucha Biyuk, one of the villages near Yezd, a house with an upper room, slightly above the height to which the Parsis used to be limited. He heard that the Mussulmans were going to kill him, so he fled by night to Tehran. They killed another Parsi, Tirandaz, in mistake for him, but did not destroy the house. So the great difficulty was not to get the law improved, but rather to get it enforced. When Manukji [British Parsi and consul in Tehran] was at Yezd, about 1870, two Parsis were attacked by two Mussulmans outside the town, and one was killed, the other terribly wounded as they had tried to cut off his head. The Governor brought the criminals to Yezd, but did nothing to them. Manukji got leave to take them to Tehran. The Prime Minister, however, told him that no Mussulman would be killed for a Zardushti, or Zoroastrian, and that they would only be bastinadoed. About this time Manukji enquired whether it was true that the blood-price of a Zardushti was to be seven tomans. He got back the reply that it was to be a little over. The Yezd Parsis have been helped considerably by agents from Bombay, who are British subjects, and of late years things have improved slightly.

f. Jihad in the Modern Era Following its defeat at the walls of Vienna in 1683, Islam entered a period of strategic decline in which it was increasingly dominated by the rising European colonial powers. Due to its material weakness vis-a-vis the West, dar al-Islam was unable to prosecute large-scale military campaigns into infidel territory. The Islamic Empire, then ruled by the Ottoman Turks, was reduced to fending of the increasingly predatory European powers. In 1856, Western pressure compelled the Ottoman government to suspend the dhimma under which the Empire’s non-Muslim subjects laboured. This provided hitherto unknown opportunities for social and personal improvement by the former dhimmis, but it also fomented resentment by orthodox Muslims who saw this as a violation of the Sharia and their Allah-given superiority over unbelievers. By the late 19th century, tensions among the European subjects of the Empire broke out into the open when the Ottoman government massacred 30,000 Bulgarians in 1876 for allegedly rebelling against Ottoman rule. Following Western intervention that resulted in Bulgarian independence, the Ottoman government and its Muslim subjects were increasingly nervous about other non-Muslim groups seeking independence. It was in this atmosphere that the first stage of the Armenian genocide took place in 1896 with the slaughter of some 250,000 Armenians. Both civilians and military personnel took place in the massacres. Peter Balakian, in his book, The Burning Tigris, documents the whole horrific story. But the massacres of the 1890s were only the prelude to the much larger holocaust of 1915, which claimed some 1.5 million lives. While various factors contributed to the slaughter, there is no mistaking that the

massacres were nothing other than a jihad waged against the Armenians, no longer protected as they were by the dhimma. In 1914, as the Ottoman Empire entered World War I on the side of the central powers, an official anti-Christian jihad was proclaimed.
To promote the idea of jihad, the sheikh-ul-Islam’s {the most senior religious leader in the Ottoman Empire} published proclamation summoned the Muslim world to arise and massacre its Christian oppressors. “Oh Moslems,” the document read, “Ye who are smitten with happiness and are on the verge of sacrificing your life and your good for the cause of right, and of braving perils, gather now around the Imperial throne.” In the Ikdam, the Turkish newspaper that had just passed into German ownership, the idea of jihad was underscored: “The deeds of our enemies have brought down the wrath of God. A gleam of hope has appeared. All Mohammedans, young and old, men, women, and children must fulfil their duty. … If we do it, the deliverance of the subjected Mohammedan kingdoms is assured.” … “He who kills even one unbeliever,” one pamphlet read, “of those who rule over us, whether he does it secretly or openly, shall be rewarded by God.” (quoted in Balakian, The Burning Tigris, 169-70.)

The anti-Christian jihad culminated in 1922 at Smyrna, on the Mediterranean coast, where 150,000 Greek Christians were massacred by the Turkish army under the indifferent eye of Allied warships. All in, from 1896-1923, some 2.5 million Christians were killed, the first modern genocide, which to this day is denied by the Turkish government. Since the break-up of the Islamic Empire following World War I, various jihads have been fought around the globe by the independent Muslim nations and sub-state jihadist groups. The most sustained effort has been directed against Israel, which has committed the unpardonable sin of rebuilding dar al-harb on land formerly a part of dar al-Islam. Other prominent jihads include that fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan, the Muslim Bosnians against the Serbs in the former Yugoslavia, the Muslim Albanians against the Serbs in Kosovo, and the Chechens against the Russians in the Caucasus. Jihads have also been waged throughout northern Africa, the Philippines, Thailand, Kashmir, and a host of other places throughout the world. In addition, the overwhelming majority of terrorist attacks around the world have been committed by Muslims, including, of course, the spectacular attacks of 9/11/01 (USA), 3/11/04 (Spain), and 7/7/05 (UK). (For a more comprehensive list of Muslim attacks, visit www.thereligionofpeace.com.) The fact is, the percentage of conflicts in the world today that do not include Islam is pretty small. Islam is making a comeback.

3. Conclusion The chief barrier today to a better understanding of Islam — apart, perhaps, from outright fear — is sloppy language. Let us take, to start with, the much-vaunted «war on terror.» Upon scrutiny, the phrase «war on terror» makes as much sense as a war on «blitzkrieg,» «bullets,» or «strategic bombing.» The «war on terror» implies that it is perfectly fine if the enemy seeks to destroy us — and, indeed, succeeds in doing so — as long as he does not employ «terror» in the process. «Terrorism,» it should be obvious, is a tactic or stratagem used to advance a goal; it is the goal of Islamic terrorism that we must come to understand, and this logically requires an understanding of Islam. As we have seen, contrary to the widespread insistence that true Islam is pacific even if a handful of its adherents are violent, the Islamic sources make clear that engaging in

violence against non-Muslims is a central and indispensable principle to Islam. Islam is less a personal faith than a political ideology that exists in a fundamental and permanent state of war with non-Islamic civilisations, cultures, and individuals. The Islamic holy texts outline a social, governmental, and economic system for all mankind. Those cultures and individuals who do not submit to Islamic governance exist in an ipso facto state of rebellion with Allah and must be forcibly brought into submission. The misbegotten term «Islamo-fascism» is wholly redundant: Islam itself is a kind of fascism that achieves its full and proper form only when it assumes the powers of the state. The spectacular acts of Islamic terrorism in the late 20th and early 21st centuries are but the most recent manifestation of a global war of conquest that Islam has been waging since the days of the Prophet Muhammad in the 7th Century AD and that continues apace today. This is the simple, glaring truth that is staring the world today in the face — and which has stared it in the face numerous times in the past — but which it seems few today are willing to contemplate. It is important to realise that we have been talking about Islam — not Islamic «fundamentalism,» «extremism,» «fanaticism,» «Islamo-fascism,» or «Islamism,» but Islam proper, Islam in its orthodox form as it has been understood and practiced by rightbelieving Muslims from the time of Muhammad to the present. The mounting episodes of Islamic terrorism in the late 20th and early 21st centuries are due largely to the geostrategic changes following the end of the Cold War and the growing technical options available to terrorists. With the collapse of Soviet hegemony over much of the Muslim world, coupled with the burgeoning wealth of the Muslim oil-producing countries, the Muslim world increasingly possesses the freedom and means to support jihad around the globe. In short, the reason that Muslims are once again waging war against the non-Muslim world is because they can. It is paramount to note, however, that, even if no major terrorist attack ever occurs on Western soil again, Islam still poses a mortal danger to the West. A halt to terrorism would simply mean a change in Islam’s tactics — perhaps indicating a longer-term approach that would allow Muslim immigration and higher birth rates to bring Islam closer to victory before the next round of violence. It cannot be overemphasised that Muslim terrorism is a symptom of Islam that may increase or decrease in intensity while Islam proper remains permanently hostile. Muhammad Taqi Partovi Samzevari, in his “Future of the Islamic Movement” (1986), sums up the Islamic worldview.
Our own Prophet … was a general, a statesman, an administrator, an economist, a jurist and a first-class manager all in one. … In the Qur’an’s historic vision Allah’s support and the revolutionary struggle of the people must come together, so that Satanic rulers are brought down and put to death. A people that is not prepared to kill and to die in order to create a just society cannot expect any support from Allah. The Almighty has promised us that the day will come when the whole of mankind will live united under the banner of Islam, when the sign of the Crescent, the symbol of Muhammad, will be supreme everywhere. … But that day must be hastened through our Jihad, through our readiness to offer our lives and to shed the unclean blood of those who do not see the light brought from the Heavens by Muhammad in his mi’raj {“nocturnal voyages to the ‘court’ of Allah”}. … It is Allah who puts the gun in our hand. But we cannot expect Him to pull the trigger as well simply because we are faint-hearted.

It must be emphasised that all of the analysis provided here derives from the Islamic sources themselves and is not the product of critical Western scholarship. (Indeed, most modern Western scholarship of Islam is hardly “critical” in any meaningful sense.) It is Islam’s self-interpretation that necessitates and glorifies violence, not any foreign interpretation of it. 4. Frequently Asked Questions There are a handful of questions that invariably arise when the point is made that Islam is violent. These questions for the most part are misleading or irrelevant and do not contest the actual evidence or arguments that violence is inherent to Islam. Nonetheless, they have proven rhetorically effective in deflecting serious scrutiny from Islam, and so I deal with some of them here.

a. What about the Crusades? The obvious response to this question is, «Well, what about them?» Violence committed in the name of other religions is logically unconnected to the question of whether Islam is violent. But, by mentioning the Crusades, the hope of the Islamic apologist is to draw attention away from Islamic violence and paint religions in general as morally equivalent. In both the Western academia and media as well as in the Islamic world, the Crusades are viewed as wars of aggression fought by bloody-minded Christians against peaceful Muslims. While the Crusades were certainly bloody, they are more accurately understood as a belated Western response to centuries of jihad than as an unprovoked, unilateral attack. Muslim rule in the Holy Land began in the second half of the 7th century during the Arab wave of jihad with the conquests of Damascus and Jerusalem by the second «rightly-guided Caliph,» Umar. After the initial bloody jihad, Christian and Jewish life there was tolerated within the strictures of the dhimma and the Muslim Arabs generally permitted Christians abroad to continue to make pilgrimage to their holy sites, a practice which proved lucrative for the Muslim state. In the 11th century, the relatively benign Arab administration of the Holy Land was replaced with that of Seljuk Turks, due to civil war in the Islamic Empire. Throughout the latter half of the 11th century, the Turks waged war against the Christian Byzantine Empire and pushed it back from its strongholds in Antioch and Anatolia (now Turkey). In 1071, Byzantine forces suffered a crushing defeat at the Battle of Manzikert in what is now Eastern Turkey. The Turks resumed the jihad in the Holy Land, abusing, robbing, enslaving, and killing Christians there and throughout Asia Minor. They threatened to cut off Christendom from its holiest site, the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem, rebuilt under Byzantine stewardship after it was destroyed by Caliph Al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah in 1009. It was in this context of a renewed jihad in the Middle East that the Roman Pope, Urban II, issued a call in 1095 for Western Christians to come to the aid of their Eastern cousins (and seems to have harbored the hope of claiming Jerusalem for the Papacy after the Great Schism with Eastern Christianity in 1054). This «armed pilgrimage,» in which numerous civilians as well as soldiers took part, would eventually become known years later as the First Crusade. The idea of a «crusade» as we now understand that term, i.e., a Christian «holy war,» developed years later with the rise of such organisations as the Knights Templar that made «crusading» a way of life. It worth noting that the most ardent Crusaders, the Franks, were exactly those who had faced jihad and razzias for centuries along the Franco-Spanish border and knew better than most the horrors to which Muslims subjected Christians. At the time of the First Crusade, the populations of Asia Minor, Syria, and Palestine, though ruled by Muslims, were still overwhelmingly Christian. The «Crusading» campaigns of the Western Christian armies were justified at the time as a war liberating the Eastern Christians, whose population, lands, and culture had been

devastated by centuries of jihad and dhimmitude. Conquering territory for God in the mode of jihad was an alien idea to Christianity and it should not be surprising that it eventually died out in the West and never gained ascendancy in the East. Following the very bloody capture of Jerusalem in 1099 by the Latin armies and the establishment of the Crusader States in Edessa, Antioch, and Jerusalem, the Muslim and Christian forces fought a see-saw series of wars, in which both parties were guilty of the usual gamut of wartime immorality. Over time, even with reinforcing Crusades waged from Europe, the Crusader States, strung out on precarious lines of communication, slowly succumbed to superior Muslim power. In 1271, the last Christian citadel, Antioch, fell to the Muslims. No longer having to divert forces to subdue the Christian beachhead on the Eastern Mediterranean, the Muslims regrouped for a 400-year-long jihad against Southern and Eastern Europe, which twice reached as far as Vienna before it was halted. In geo-strategic terms, the Crusades can be viewed as an attempt by the West to forestall its own destruction at the hands of Islamic jihad by carrying the fight to the enemy. It worked for a while. Significantly, while the West has for some time now lamented the Crusades as mistaken, there has never been any mention from any serious Islamic authority of regret for the centuries and centuries of jihad and dhimmitude perpetrated against other societies. But this is hardly surprising: while religious violence contradicts the fundamentals of Christianity, religious violence is written into Islam’s DNA.

b. If Islam is violent, why are so many Muslims peaceful? This question is a bit like asking, «If Christianity teaches humility, tolerance, and forgiveness, why are so many Christians arrogant, intolerant, and vindictive?» The answer in both cases is obvious: in any religion or ideology there will be many who profess, but do not practice, its tenets. Just as it is often easier for a Christian to hit back, play holier-than-thou, or disdain others, so it is often easier for a Muslim to stay at home rather than embark on jihad. Hypocrites are everywhere. Furthermore, there are also people who do not really understand their own faith and so act outside of its prescribed boundaries. In Islam, there are likely many Muslims who do not really understand their religion thanks to the importance of reciting the Quran in Arabic but not having to understand it. It is the words and sounds of the Quran that attract Allah’s merciful attention rather than Quranic knowledge on the part of the supplicant. Especially in the West, Muslims here are more likely to be attracted by Western ways (which explains why they are here) and less likely to act violently against the society to which they may have fled from an Islamic tyranny abroad. However, in any given social context, as Islam takes greater root — increasing numbers of followers, the construction of more mosques and «cultural centers,» etc. — the greater the likelihood that some number of its adherents will take its violent precepts seriously. This is the problem that the West faces today.

c. What about the violent passages in the Bible? First, violent Biblical passages are irrelevant to the question of whether Islam is violent. Second, the violent passages in the Bible certainly do no amount to a standing order to commit violence against the rest of the world. Unlike the Quran, the Bible is a huge collection of documents written by different people at different times in different

contexts, which allows for much greater interpretative freedom. The Quran, on the other hand, comes exclusively from one source: Muhammad. It is through the life of Muhammad that the Quran must be understood, as the Quran itself says. His wars and killings both reflect and inform the meaning of the Quran. Furthermore, the strict literalism of the Quran means that there is no room for interpretation when it comes to its violent injunctions. As it is through the example of Christ, the «Prince of Peace,» that Christianity interprets its scriptures, so it is through the example of the warlord and despot Muhammad that Muslims understand the Quran.

d. Could an Islamic «Reformation» pacify Islam? As should be plain to anyone who has examined the Islamic sources, to take the violence out of Islam would require it to jettison two things: the Quran as the word of Allah and Muhammad as Allah’s prophet. In other words, to pacify Islam would require its transformation into something that it is not. The Western Christian Reformation, that is often used as an example, was an attempt (successful or not) to recover the essence of Christianity, namely, the example and teachings of Christ and the Apostles. Trying to get back to the example of Muhammad would have very different consequences. Indeed, one may say that Islam is today going through its «Reformation» with the increasing jihadist activity around the globe. Today, Muslims of the Salafi («early generations») school are doing exactly that in focusing on the life of Muhammad and his early successors. These reformers are known to their detractors by the derogative term Wahhabi. Drawing their inspiration from Muhammad and the Quran, they are invariably disposed to violence. The unhappy fact is that Islam today is what it has been fourteen centuries: violent, intolerant, and expansionary. It is folly to think that we, in the course of a few years or decades, are going to be able to change the basic world outlook of a foreign civilisation. Islam’s violent nature must be accepted as given; only then will we be able to come up with appropriate policy responses that can improve our chances of survival.

e. What about the history of Western colonialism in the Islamic world? Following the defeat of the Ottoman army outside Vienna on September 11, 1683 by Polish forces, Islam went into a period of strategic decline in which it was overwhelmingly dominated by the European powers. Much of dar al-Islam was colonised by the European powers who employed their superior technology and exploited the rivalries within the Muslim world to establish colonial rule. While many of the practices of the Western imperial powers in the governance of their colonies were clearly unjust, it is utterly unwarranted to regard Western imperialism — as it often is — as an endemic criminal enterprise that is the basis of modern resentment against the West. It was only due to the assertive role of the Western powers that modern nation-states such as India, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa, Zimbabwe, etc. came to exist in the first place. Without Western organisation, these areas would have likely remained chaotic and tribal as they had existed for centuries. When one looks at the post-colonial world, it is apparent that the most successful postcolonial nations have a common attribute: they are not Muslim. The United States, Australia, Hong Kong, Israel, India, and the South American nations clearly outshine their Muslim-majority post-colonial counterparts — Iraq, Algeria, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, etc. — by just about any standard.

f. How can a violent political ideology be the second-largest and fastest-growing religion on earth? It should not be surprising that a violent political ideology is proving so attractive to much of the world. The attractive power of fascist ideas has been proven through history. Islam combines the interior comfort provided by religious faith with the outward power of a world-transforming political ideology. Like the revolutionary violence of Communism, jihad offers an altruistic justification for waging death and destruction. Such an ideology will naturally draw to it violent-minded people while encouraging the non-violent to take up arms themselves or support violence indirectly. Because something is popular hardly makes it benign. Furthermore, the areas in which Islam is growing most rapidly, such as Western Europe, have been largely denuded of their religious and cultural heritage, which leaves Islam as the only vibrant ideology available to those in search of meaning.

g. Is it fair to paint all Islamic schools of thought as violent? Islamic apologists often point out that Islam is not a monolith and that there are differences of opinion among the different Islamic schools of thought. That is true, but, while there are differences, there are also common elements. Just as Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Protestant Christians differ on many aspects of Christianity, still they accept important common elements. So it is with Islam. One of the common elements to all Islamic schools of thought is jihad, understood as the obligation of the Ummah to conquer and subdue the world in the name of Allah and rule it under Sharia law. The four Sunni Madhhabs (schools of fiqh [Islamic religious jurisprudence]) — Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, and Hanbali — all agree that there is a collective obligation on Muslims to make war on the rest of the world. Furthermore, even the schools of thought outside Sunni orthodoxy, including Sufism and the Jafari (Shia) school, agree on the necessity of jihad. When it comes to matters of jihad, the different schools disagree on such questions as whether infidels must first be asked to convert to Islam before hostilities may begin (Osama bin Laden asked America to convert before Al-Qaeda’s attacks); how plunder should be distributed among victorious jihadists; whether a long-term Fabian strategy (Wearing your opponent down) against dar al-harb is preferable to an all-out frontal attack; etc.

h. What about the great achievements of Islamic civilisation through history? Islamic achievements in the fields of art, literature, science, medicine, etc. in no way refute the fact that Islam is intrinsically violent. Roman and Greek civilisations produced many great achievements in these fields as well, but also cultivated powerful traditions of violence. While giving the world the brilliance of Virgil and Horace, Rome was also a home to gladiatorial combat, the slaughter of Christians, and, at times, rampant militarism. Furthermore, the achievements of Islamic civilisation are pretty modest given its 1300 year history when compared to Western, Hindu, or Confucian civilisations. Many Islamic achievements were in fact the result of non-Muslims living within the Islamic Empire or of recent converts to Islam. One of the greatest Islamic thinkers, Averroes, ran afoul of Islamic orthodoxy through his study of non-Islamic (Greek) philosophy and his preference for Western modes of thought. Once the dhimmi populations of the Empire dwindled toward the middle of the second millennium AD, Islam began its social and cultural «decline.»

Original source (original source have been further developed/expanded by author of 2083): http://jihadwatch.org/islam101/ by Gregory M. Davis

1.7 Review 2: Islam – What the West needs to know Table of Contents 1. Introduction 2. There is no God but Allah and Muhammad is his prophet 3. The struggle 4. Expansion 5. War is Deceit 6. More than a Religion 7. The House of War

This film documentary is also available here:

1. Introduction
Tony Blair: I wish to say finally as I’ve said many times before that this is not a war with Islam. It angers me as it angers the vast majority of Muslims to hear Bin Laden and his associates described as Islamic terrorists. They are terrorists pure and simple. Islam is a peaceful and tolerant religion, and the acts of these people are holy contrary to the teachings of the Quran. George Bush: We respect your faith. It’s practiced freely by many millions of Americans and by millions more in countries that America counts as friends. Its teachings are good and peaceful and those who commit evil in the name of Allah blaspheme the name of Allah. Bill Clinton: Our actions were not aimed against Islam. The faith of hundreds of millions of good, peace loving people all around the world including the United States. No religion condones the murder of innocent men, women and children. But our actions were aimed at fanatics and killers who wrapped murder in the cloak of righteousness and in so doing profaned the great religion in whose name they claim to act.

Serge Trifkovic, Foreign Affairs Editor, Chronicles Magazine The tendency of western political leaders to deny the connection between Orthodox Islamic Mainstream and terrorist violence are replicated in Universities and the media wherever you look both in Western Europe and North America. The members of the elite class have the tendency to proclaim that Islam is peaceful and tolerant and those Muslims related to violence are a non representative group. I would really appreciate if people who make such claims could then explain the continuity of violence from the earliest day of Islam, from the earliest days of the prophet Muhammad and his immediate successors throughout the 1300th century of recorded history. Robert Spencer, Author, Islam Unveiled, Director of Jihadwatch.org Do Islam and an Islamic civilisation actually sanction the violence that we are seeing being perpetrated in its name around the world? If we are going to be honest about this we would have to answer an absolute yes. The Islamic sources, the Islamic texts starting with the Quran but not limited to the Quran, Islamic texts including the Hadith, Islamic tradition, Islamic theology, Islamic law, the traditions of the interpretations of the Quran throughout history and Islamic history itself; All bear witness to the fact that Islam has a developed doctrine theology and law that mandates violence against unbelievers. Bat Ye’or, Author – The Dhimmi: Jews and Christians under Islam The origins are, of course, in the Muslim desire to impose all over the world; the only religion – the only just religion – which is Islam and the suppression of all other religions in order to establish the rule of Allah throughout the world. This is a religious duty, which binds the whole community, and which the Muslim community is obliged to impose because they are obliged to obey the order of Allah and this is the desire of Allah as expressed in the Quranic revelation. Abdullah Al-Araby – Director, The Pen vs. The Sword Publications I believe that those terrorists that want to do harm to others are applying the true Islam who was practiced by Muhammad and his followers in the early stage of Islam.

2. There is no God but Allah and Muhammad is his prophet Robert Spencer

In Islamic theology the prophet Muhammad is considered ” al-insan al-kamil” the perfect man. The more a Muslim is like him the better off he is. So the prophet Mohammad is revered today in the Islamic world as the primary model of human behaviour.

Abdullah Al-Araby As an illustration, the following examples by Muhammad inspire current Palestinian groups to fight Jihad against the Jews in Palestine. Authoritative Islamic History – The Life of Muhammad/Sirat Rasul Allah – By Muhammad bin Ishaq (d 773 AD). Edited by Abdul Malik bin Hisham (d 840 AD). Translated by Prof Alfred Guillaume (1955).
The life of Muhammad – P 464 They surrendered, and the Apostle confined them in Medina,,, Then the Apostle went out to the market of Medina and dug trenches in it.

Robert Spencer Another example which is the most chilling of the influence that Muhammad’s influence has today on the Islamic world was exemplified recently by an Egyptian leader of a radical Muslim party. He recently wrote that he couldn’t believe that the beheadings in Iraq were being protested by Muslims. Weren’t they aware that the prophet Muhammad himself beheaded between 600 and 900 men personally, members of the Jewish Quraiza tribe in Arabia after he had defeated them. Didn’t they realise that if the prophet did it then this was the proper way to behave? So the Mujahideen in Iraq who were beheading people are simply obeying the example of the prophet. Now we can see then, since the prophet Muhammad himself participated in many battles and raids and did indeed perpetrate these beheadings, he ordered the assassination of several of his political opponents and he behaved in general like a typical 7th century warlord. The problem is that when this is transferred to 21st century behaviour and 21st century contexts of behaviour then what you get are terrorists. The Quran occupies a place that has no parallel in Western civilisation. The Quran is considered by Muslims and by traditional Islamic theology to be dictated word for word by Allah himself through the Angel Gabriel to the prophet Muhammad. As a result every word of it is the word of Allah himself. Every word of the Quran except if it is cancelled by another section of the Quran itself is valid for all time and can not be questioned, can not be reformed, can not be changed within an Islamic context. This means that moderate Muslims, peaceful Muslims if they are sincere, have to reject entirely Quranic literalism but to do so put them outside the sphere anything that has been considered orthodox Islam throughout history. To do so is to reject the very basic premise of Islam that this is a book that is dictated by Allah which is a perfect copy of a perfect book, the “Umm AlKitab”, the mother of the book that has existed forever with Allah in heaven. The Noble Koran

Translated with Parenthetical Notes by Dr. Muhammad Taqi-du-Din Al-Hilali and Dr. Muhammad Muhsin Khan.
Sura 98 Verse 6 Verily, those who disbelieve (in the religion of Islam, the Quran and the prophet Muhammad) from among the People of the Scripture (Jews and Christians) and AlMusrhikun (other disbelievers) will abide in the Fire of Hell. They are he worst of creatures.

Serge Trifkovic So the Quran is simply a set of direct commandments, descriptions, sometimes much distorted descriptions of Judaism and Christianity. Because of the nature of those commandments a second ”body” for Islamic interpretation is the Hadith, the tradition of the prophet Muhammad. Robert Spencer The Hadith is absolutely necessary to make any sense of the Quran because Allah addresses Mohammad in the Quran and they talk about incidents in Muhammad’s life but they don’t fill in the narrative details. You have to go to the Hadith, the traditions of the prophet Muhammad in order to understand what’s being said in the Quran and why. The Hadith are many volumes of the traditions of the prophet, various Muslim scholars beginning in the 8th century which is some considerable time after the life of Mohammad who died in 632. They started to collect these traditions and try to window out the authentic ones from the in-authentic. From an Islamic standpoint, if something Muhammad said or did is recorded in of those books then it has authority second only to the Quran. And in those books there is a great that illuminates what the Quran says and how it is applicable to Muslims in the presence. Authoritative Traditions of the prophet Muhammad – The Hadith’s of Sahih AlBukhari, translated with Parenthetical Notes by Dr Muhammad Muhsin Khan.
Sahih Al- Bukhari Vol 4, Bk 52, Hadith 53 The Prophet said; ”Nobody who dies and finds good from Allah (in the Hereafter) would wish to come back to this world even if he were given the whole world and whatever is in it. … except the martyr who, on seeing the superiority of martyrdom, would like to come back to the world and get killed again (in Allah’s Cause). The Prophet said, ”A single endeavour (of fighting) in Allah’s Cause in the afternoon or in the forenoon is better than all the world and whatever is in it.”

Serge Trifkovic Since there is no sense of natural morality in Islam you have to go in to the Quran or the Hadith to find out what is allowed and what is not allowed Robert Spencer And in those books we have very clear instructions from Muhammad that it is the responsibility of every Muslim to meet the unbelievers on the battlefield to invite them

either to accept Islam or to accept second class Dhimmi status in the Islamic state. If they refuse both alternatives then they will wage war against them.
Sura 9 Verse 29 Fight against those who believe not in Allah, nor in the Last Day, nor forbid that which has been forbidden by Allah and His Messenger. … and fight against those who acknowledge not the religion of truth (i.e., Islam) among the People of the Scripture (Jews and Christians), until they pay the Jizyah (Tax for Jews/Christians) with willing submission and feel themselves subdued.

The Quran is broken down into two sections, one is called Mecca which means what was inspired to Muhammad in Mecca and one is called Medina, what was inspired to Muhammad in Medina. In Mecca you find many of the peaceful Verses, Mohammad used to live with the Jewish and Christian community in peace and harmony. Those Verses almost invariably date back to beginning of Muhammad’s prophetic career and his native city of Mecca where he was powerless, where he was only beginning to attract followers. Abdullah Al-Araby – Director, the Pen vs. the Sword Publications Only relatives and friends accepted the religion at that time. He has many foes so the revelations of that time are very peaceful. This all changes with the establishment of Muhammad’s theocratic state let in the city of Medina. He becomes a warlord and head of a totalitarian state, he becomes very rich and powerful and very intolerant and then many of these early Verses get abrogated. In Sura 2 Verse 106 Allah says that if I abrogate a Verse I will give you one that is better.
Sura 2 Verse 106 Whatever a Verse (revelation) do we abrogate or cause to be forgotten, we bring a better one or similar to it. Know you not that Allah is able to do all things?

Robert Spencer This is the basis, the foundation of the Quranic doctrine of ” Naskh” which is abrogation. And it is the idea that when there are Verses that are contradictory in the Quran the one that is revealed later chronologically is better as Allah has promised and cancels the earlier one. Walid Shoebat – Former Muslim and member of PLO Fatah Brigade, Author; Why I Left Jihad Now the violence started, now you had to weigh between peaceful Verses and nonpeaceful Verses. The result was that the peaceful ones were made null and void. Serge Trifkovic

It is indeed a very curious concept for a non-Muslim to accept a notion that God may change his mind about a topic. He may issue one injunction in AD 614;
Sura 2 Verse 256 There is no compulsion (i.e., coercion) in religion.

And then a very different one in AD 627;
Sura 9 Verse 5 Kill the unbelievers wherever you find them. …But if they repent and accept Islam … then leave their way free.

But this is indeed what has happened in Islam. Robert Spencer It’s very important to understand that the Quran is not arranged chronologically, it’s arranged on the basis of the longest chapter to the shortest. Serge Trifkovic So you will find in the book itself some of these more tolerant Verses at a later point in the book than the very intolerant ones advocating violence and the subjugation of the infidels. But that doesn’t mean they came into being later, on quite the contrary. It is therefore the ones that came in ”Medina” that retains their validity and the ones that came early in Mecca that have been abrogated. Walid Shoebat The peaceful Verses became null and void compared to Verses of the Sword. Robert Spencer Traditional Islamic theology has it that the ninth chapter of the Quran – Sura 9, is the last revealed in the career of the prophet. And it is the only one that doesn’t begin with; In the name of Allah the compassionate, the merciful. Some have said that’s because there is no compassion or mercy in this particular chapter and that it is the Quran’s last word on Jihad and in particular on how Muslims should behave toward unbelievers. In it is the celebrated Verse of the Sword. Walid Shoebat So what does the Verse of the Sword say? It’s very clear; Kill the people of the book (Christians and Jews) wherever you find them, lay siege for them, lay ambush for them, kill them wherever you find them. In fact, I converted to Christianity, Mohammad clearly stated that on the end of days there will be many who defect from the faith, kill them

when you see them wherever you find them. So this is the question the West needs to understand, what part of kill don’t they understand?

3. The struggle
Condoleezza Rice; We are a country that judges people not by their religious beliefs and not by their colour but by the fact that we are all Americans so that was the first part of the message. The second part of the message is that we have a lot of friends around the world who are Muslim, we have countries that are long friends of the United States who are of the Islamic faith and the President want it to be very clear that this is not a war of civilisations, this is not a war against Islam. This is a war against people who in many ways pervert what Islam stands for. Islam stands for peace and stands for non-violence.

Robert Spencer Islam and the Islamic civilisation are unique in their stance against non-believers. Islam is the only religion in the world that has a developed doctrine theology and law that mandates violence against un-believers. It is no doubt that there are peaceful Muslims, that there are Muslims around the world who are moderate, who live in harmony with their non-Muslim neighbours and have no intention of ever waging war against them in any way. But the fact is that they have a very slim justification for their own peacefulness within the Islamic sources themselves. They are only at peace with their neighbours so far as they are either ignorant of what Islam teaches about how Muslims should behave toward un-believers or they have explicitly and consciously rejected those elements of Islam. In short there are peaceful and moderate Muslims but no peaceful and moderate Islam. The idea that Islam is a religion of peace however is paradoxically even held by the most violent and radical of Muslims. Sayved Qutb, the Egyptian Muslim theorist (1906-1966, wrote Islam and Universal Peace), whose writings are revered by radical Muslims and terrorists today. He wrote and insisted that Islam is a religion of peace. When you study his writings it becomes clear that he meant that Islam is dedicated to establishing the hegemony of Islamic law throughout the world. When that hegemony is established peace will reign in the world. Therefore, Islam is a religion of peace. Walid Shoebat The problem is that the peaceful Muslims don’t understand the ”edicts” that comes out of the jurisprudence of Islam. If you look at the interpretation of these Verses in Al-Azhar University, in Islamic Sharia schools in Jerusalem, in Jordan, In Syria, In Damascus, all throughout the Middle East the jurisprudence of Islam clearly state that the Verse of the Sword make the peaceful Verses null and void. So what does the Verse of the Sword say?
Sura 9 Verse 5

Then when the sacred months (the 1st, 7th, 11th, and 12th months of the Islamic calendar) have passed, then kill the Mushrikun (un-believers) wherever you find them, and capture them and besiege them, and prepare for them each and every ambush. But if they repent and perform Iqamat-as-Salat (The Islamic prayers), and give Zakat, then leave their way free. Verily, Allah is Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful.

Walid Shoebat Kill them when you see them, wherever you find them. This is not an allegoric kill, it’s a literal kill. Its the killing of Zarqawi right in front of the camera, its the lynching that you see in Ramallah, its the killing of more than a million Sudanese, cutting the hands and feet from opposite sides. And here’s a dilemma. Even the peaceful Verse that is quoted by Bush, the Verse goes as follows;
Whoever kills a life without just cause or for doing mischief in the land then he has killed the entire earth.

You will find the same Verse in the Judea biblical tradition but most Westerners stop after that Verse. It continues; But those that do mischief in the land, then cut their hands and their feet from opposite sides and crucify them. And that is what you see happen in Afghanistan, in Sudan, a huge amount of crucifixions, killings and beheadings. There are also amputations and public assassinations. They really want to revive Islam as it used to be. This is why they call it Islamic fundamentalism.
Sura 5 Verse 33 The recompense of those who wage war against Allah and His Messenger and do mischief in the land is only that they shall be killed or crucified, or their hands and their feet be cut off on the opposite sides, or be exiled from the land. That is their disgrace in this world, and a great torment is theirs in the Hereafter. Sahih Al-Bukhari Vol 8, Bk 82, Hadith 795 The Prophet cut off the hands and feet of the men belonging to the tribe of Uraina and did not cauterise their bleeding limbs till they died.

Walid Shoebat In Islam’s thinking, the assurance of your salvation is dying as a martyr. In accordance to the Verse in the Quran; ”Do not think that the ones that die in Jihad are dead but are living”. So this ensures salvation. Robert Spencer This is the calculus behind modern suicide bombing, modern Muslim advocates will say; “Islam forbids suicide” and this is plainly dishonest because all the defenders of suicide bombings in the Islamic world start out by saying; “This is not suicide”. The intention of

the person is not to kill himself. The intention of the person is to kill others. And that is sanctioned because it is Islamic Jihad. And if they in the process are killed themselves, that’s an unavoidable consequence of their actions and they will be rewarded with the reward of martyrs in paradise. Serge Trifkovic The Quran is quite clear about heavenly reward for a Jihadist who falls fighting in the path of Allah. He will be granted instant access to paradise and a Muslim paradise is an extremely sensual one. It is full of “whories” – black eyed beauties (72 virgins) that will await the martyr and the gratification that follows is endless. Robert Spencer The Quran contains no guarantee of paradise except for those who slay and are slain in the cause of Allah.
Sura 9 Verse 111 Verily, Allah has purchased of the believers their lives and their properties; for the price that theirs shall be the Paradise. They fight in Allah’s cause, so they kill others and are killed. Then rejoice in the bargain which you have concluded. That is the supreme success.

Robert Spencer In other words, the guarantees of paradise are for people who are killed while they are killing to establish the hegemony of Allah or Islamic law in the world. Jihad can be spiritual or physical. The spiritual Jihad is striving to be a better Muslim. The physical Jihad is however something that can’t be ignored. Walid Shoebat Jihad in Islam means struggle. That’s the literal meaning of the word. But what the West doesn’t understand is that there are more than 100 Hadith’s about Jihad. And if you look at every single one of them they all contain a sword, war or a military effort. Serge Trifkovic It is a very dangerous element of the Islamic teaching because this instant gratification from martyrdom is an attractive concept. When a so called martyr operation is carried out by f. example Hamas what is announced from the minarets in Mosques is not the deaths of person “x”, who carried out the attack, but the wedding of person “x” to the whories (70 virgins). In other words they immediately make the implication that person “x’s” family, parents etc, instead of cry and mourn over the disappearance and end of his physical life should instead celebrate, be happy and throw a party because their son is now not only being transported to paradise but greeted there by 70 virgins. Walid Shoebat

The word Shaheed means witness, to testify. To testify that there is no God but Allah and Muhammad is his messenger. And you die as a Shadeed for that cause. You’re a witness, a martyr. And a martyr becomes glorified. You’re family will glorify you after you die. As a Muslim fundamentalist living in the Middle East, you have to be initiated. You have to basically kill your first Jew or destroy your first Zionist infrastructure. You have to prove without a shadow of a doubt that you are worthy. And there are ample amounts of students, teenagers, men who are willing to die a martyr’s death, willing to put explosives. The martyr applications are filled. There are many applicants. There are not enough bombs to fulfil the applicants. And to get on one of those missions you have to be a strong candidate, you have to be violent enough, you have to have joined every demonstration in the streets of Jerusalem, in Bethlehem, you have to show that you are worthy of a greater operation. If you are about to die or are taking a considerate amount of risk you struggle between the requirements of your Islamic upbringing and between the realities that you value your life.

4. Expansion Robert Spencer Islam understands its earthly mission to extend the law of Allah over the world by force. Now this is distinct from extending the religion by force. Muslims often indignantly deny that Islam was spread by the sword as the old expression goes and that anybody is ever forced to convert to Islam. Forced conversions are a constant hallmark of Islamic history but they are technically forbidden by Islamic law. The idea in Islam is that Muslims must wage war to establish the hegemony of Islamic law. Not everyone will be forced to become Muslim but the non-Muslims will be relegated to second class status. They will not be able to live in the society as equals to the Muslims and it is the responsibility of Muslims around the world to fight, to institute that kind of society.
Sahih Al-Bukhari – Vol 4, Bk 53, Hadith 392 While we were in the Mosque, the Prophet came out and said, ”Let us go to the Jews”. We went out till we reached Bait-ul-Midras. He said to them, ”If you embrace Islam, you will be safe. You should know that the earth belongs to Allah and His Apostle, and I want to expel you from this land. So, if anyone amongst you owns some property, he is permitted to sell it, otherwise you should know that the Earth belongs to Allah and His Apostle.

Bat Ye’or The Muslims see the extension of Jihad as a war liberating the infidels from their infidelity and a privilege for them to enter in the religion of Islam and to abandon their wrong belief. So Jihad is seen as a favour which is given to the infidel population in order to change their ways and convert to the true religion; Islam.
Sura 8, Verse 67 It is not for a Prophet that he should have prisoners of war (and free them with ransom) until he had made a great slaughter (among his enemies) in the land. You desire the good of this world (i.e. the money of ransom for freeing the captives), but Allah desires (for you) the Hereafter. And Allah is All-Mighty, All-Wise.

Walid Shoebat In the Muslim thinking, in the Muslim Sharia, the way the world is depicted in two houses; the House of Islam or the House of War. So the whole world is under these two houses. If you’re not a Muslim you’re under the House of War. In the West the Islamic apologists would say; no, that’s not accurate. it is the House of Peace and the House of Islam. And in fact that’s not accurate, if you look in the Hadith and if you look what comes from the highest jurisprudence in the Middle East that’s what is being taught.

Bat Ye’or Now the infidel populations are seeing this war as a genocidal war since as it is described by the Muslim historians of Jihad as well as extremely numerous Christian sources this war was conducted in great ferocity, whole cities were given up to massacres, entire populations were deported in slavery or massacred.
Sahih Al-Bukhari – Vol 4, Bk 53, Hadith 386 Umar sent the Muslims to the great countries to fight the pagans. … When we reached the land of the enemy, the representative of Khosrau (Persia) came out with forty-thousand warriors, and an interpreter got up saying, ”Let one of you talk to me!” Al-Mughira replied… ”Our Prophet, the Messenger of our Lord, has ordered us to fight you till you worship Allah alone or give Jizyah (tribute) and our Prophet has informed us that our Lord says: Whoever amongst us is killed (martyred), shall go to Paradise to lead such a luxurious life as he has never seen, and whoever amongst us remains alive, shall become your master.

Bat Ye’or There have been two big waves of Jihad; the Arab waves which started in the 7th century and in the cause of only one century had Islamised huge territories, mainly Christian territory from Portugal to Armenia but also Persia. Iraq was at the time Christian in the north and Jewish/Christian in the south. First wave
634 635 636 637 641 666 670 698 711 720 732 AD AD AD AD AD AD AD AD AD AD AD Battle of Basra (Christian/Jewish) Damascus Conquered Ctesiphon Conquered Jerusalem Conquered Alexandria Conquered Sicily Conquered Kabul Conquered Carthage Conquered Southern Spain Conquered Narbonne (South France) Conquered Battle of Poitiers – Muslim Advance Halted

Second wave
1064 AD Armenia Conquered

1071 1331 1453 1460 1389 1521 1683


Battle of Manzikert Nicaea Conquered Constantinople Conquered Greece Conquered Battle of Kosovo Belgrade Conquered Siege of Vienna – Muslim Advance halted

The second wave of Islamisation started in the eleventh century with the Turkish tribes. All the regions of Eastern Europe, Anatolia which was the seat of the Christian Byzantine Empire (Now Turkey), Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania. All the countries around the Mediterranean which once were Christian became the Islamic Empire. This Turkish wave lasted from the eleventh century until the seventeenth century where the Ottoman army was stopped at the gate of Vienna in 1683. The Crusades 1095-1270 AD Serge Trifkovic The Crusades are not understood in the Muslim world today very differently to the way they are understood in the Western academia and among the Western elite class. Both talk of the Crusades as an aggressive war of conquest by Christian Europe against peaceful innocent Muslims. One may ask however what those Muslims were doing in the holy land in the first place. What happened was that Muhammad and his successors laid a series of wars of conquest and in one such onslaught in 624 AD the holy land – Palestine, Jerusalem was conquered by Muslims. Then Seljuk Turks started interfering with the ability of Christian pilgrims to go to the Holy Land, Jerusalem. When their physical safety was no longer guaranteed, the western Christians acted not only as reconquerors of the Holy Land that had been once theirs, they also acted quite rightly one might say as protectors of their holy places. A defensive war in the case of the Muslims is even a war of conquest. They are obligated to spread Islam but a land which had once been Muslim in particular must be re-conquered and the Jihad is the rightful name of that war of re-conquest. They could never accept the Crusader states in Antioch and Jerusalem because they were ”dar al-harb” or “the House of War” – reinstated into ” ”Dar al-Islam” or ”the House of Islam”. This is a contemporary aspect of the IsraeliPalestinian conflict which many Westerners are not fully aware of. Exactly the same psychology that prompted Saladin and others to fight the Crusaders is now motivating Hamas. In both cases it is not only a matter of the nationalistic desire of Arabs to expel Europeans and Jewish settlers. It is also the Quranic obligation of all good Muslims to make sure the land once ruled by Muslims will be reverted to their rule again. From the British historian Hilaire Belloc’s – The Great Heresies – 1938
”… It has always seemed to me possible, and even probable, that there would be a resurrection of Islam and that our sons or grandsons would see the renewal of that tremendous struggle between the Christian culture and what has been for more than a thousand years its greatest opponent.” ”The suggestion that Islam may re-arise sounds fantastic – but this is only because men are always powerfully affected by the immediate past: — one might say that they are blinded by it…” ”But not so very long ago, less than a hundred years before the Declaration of Independence… Vienna was almost taken and only saved by the Christian army under the command of the King of Poland… on a date that ought to be among the most famous in history —

September 11, 1683,

Robert Spencer On September 11th, 1683 the siege of Vienna was broken. That was the high point of Islamic Jihad expansion into Europe. After that Islam went into a decline and the Islamic world was colonised and in a drastically weakened state. It seems very likely, almost certain as far as I’m concerned that Osama Bin Laden chose September 11 in 2001 to signal that the decline of the Islamic world was over and that the Jihadists were back and that they were going to pick up where they left of in Vienna in 1683. Serge Trifkovic If we look at the tectonic plates between the Islamic world and the non-Islamic world today we notice something very interesting. That even very dI’Verse Muslim societies which can not be easily branded under one civilisation label have something in common and it is the tendency that they are in conflict with their neighbours. If we look at the extreme outreach of Islam we see East Timor were Indonesian Muslims slaughtered a third of the population of this former Portuguese colony who are Roman Catholics. In Southern Philippines an extremely violent Islamic rebellion has gradually escalated the last years. In Indonesia itself we had religious conflicts in the Spice Islands where the Christian minority are in danger of extinction. We have very active Islamic movements both in Thailand and in China, Xingjian. On the Indian subcontinent the history is tragic indeed, that’s where the Hindu holocaust took place in medieval times, a little known episode in the history of Islam in the Western world, but a one that left a deep traumatic mark on the people of the region and where the conflict is still present in the province of Kashmir. In Africa there is the constant war in Sudan which has been going on since 1987. It’s hard to estimate the number of lives that have been claimed but its most likely several hundreds of thousands. There is the constant instability in Nigeria between the resurgent central northern states which are increasingly pressuring the government into accepting Sharia law as the law of the lands in those provinces. And of course there is Mauritania where Muslims constantly battle non-Muslim southerners. Then there is of course Caucasus-Chechnya and in Europe itself we have the conflict in former Yugoslavia between the Bosnian Muslims, Serbs and Croats and the conflict between Albanians, Serbs and Macedonians and quite possibly within not too long the conflict between the Albanians and Greeks. If we eliminate these conflicts, Chechnya, the Balkans, Sudan the world is a pretty peaceful place. If we eliminate from the terrorist equation, terrorist acts carried out by Muslims the past 5 years we would come to realise that the war on terror is un-necessary because terror is not a very big problem.

5. War is Deceit
US Senator from Nevada; I’ve been on the floor before speaking about Islam and what a great religion it is. I’ve said before and I repeat; my wife’s primary physicians are two members of the Islamic faith, her internist and the person that has performed surgery on her. I know them well, been in their homes, socialised with them, talked about very serious things with them; we’ve helped each other with family problems. I’ve been to the new Mosque with them in Las Vegas. They are wonderful people with great families and I’ve come to realise that Islam is a good religion, it’s a good way of life, people have a good health code as their religion dictates and they have great spiritual values as their religion dictates. It’s too bad that there are some people, misdirected people, around the world trying to take away from this

very fine religion. I believe that they cannot give this religion a bad name; I think that the power of this religion and the power of the people in this religion will overcome these evil people that are using this fine religion to do bad things to innocent people.

Robert Spencer Islam is a religion and is a political system that dictates that one must carry out warfare against un-believers until they either convert or submit. This is the justification that the terrorists around the world are using for what they are doing and that justification is based on core elements of Islamic tradition. That being the case; it’s very difficult for moderate Muslims, peaceful Muslims to stand up within the Islamic community and to say; this is not part of Islam. They only do so out of conscious deception intending to mislead Westerners in accord with the Islamic doctrine of ” Taqiyya” — religious deception, or they do so on the basis of simply being unaware of what Islam actually teaches.
Sahih Al-Bukhari – Vol 4, Bk 52, Hadith 269 The Prophet said; ”War is deceit.”

Abdullah Al-Araby Lying, generally speaking, is not allowed in Islam. But unlike other religions there are certain situations where a Muslim can lie and that would be acceptable, even encouraged. This concept is called ”al-Taqiyya” which means ”prevention”. So a Muslim is allowed to lie to prevent harm that may come to him, his group or to Islam Robert Spencer When one is under pressure one may lie in order to protect the religion. This is taught in the Quran, Chapter 3, Verse 28 and Chapter 16, Verse 106. Abdullah Al-Araby There are certain provisions for lying. A Muslim can lie for the cause of Islam, can lie to his family to keep peace, so he can lie to his wife. A Muslim can lie to his fellow Muslim to keep peace in the society. Mohammad himself ordered people to lie. When people that he ordered to go and kill somebody, they told him; we cannot kill them unless we lie to that person. He said; ok, fine, lie.
The life of Muhammad – P 367 The Apostle said… ”Who will rid me of Ibnul-Ashraf?” Muhammad bin Maslama, brother of the Bani Abdul-Ashal, said, ”I will deal with him for you, O Apostle of God, I will kill him”. The Apostle said; ”Do so if you can.” … He said, ”O Apostle of God, we shall have to tell lies.” He answered; ”Say what you like, for you are free in the matter.”

Serge Trifkovic

The spokesman for Islam in the Western world knows how to play the game. They know how to present their cause in a way that is not only regarded as acceptable by the society mainstream but also reasonable and just. They will appeal to democratic institutions and their human rights in the full knowledge that given the power to do so, they will abolish those institutions and deny those rights to others.

Sahih Al-Bukhari – Vol 7, Bk 67, Hadith 427 ”By Allah, and Allah willing, if I take an oath and later find something else that is better than that, then I do what is better and expiate my oath.”

Walid Shoebat – Personal experiences around committing “al-Taqiyya” When I used to work as a translator at the Luc College in Chicago we arranged fund raising events for Jihadi movements, PLO being one of those organisations. We handed out and placed announcements for the event on the walls of the College. And I remember on Arabic it would be basically the facts; bring your friends, we were intending to raise funds to support our Jihadi brothers in Lebanon during the fighting in SouthernLebanon against Israel. And then comes the English part. In the English part it would be the standard; we would be conducting a Middle-Eastern cultural event, you are all welcome, we will be serving lamb and ”baklava”… So the West really does not comprehend the magnitude of the “social deceit” that is going on in every aspect of social life, even from moderate Muslims. When we get together as a group our conversations are different. As soon as a Westerner would come into the scene then the whole conversation changes. It becomes compatible to western minds. When I used to go to work, I worked for an American company during the Gulf war, everyone would be hovering around the TV sets as soon as there was a scud missile hitting Riad or something like that and everyone would be distraught, unhappy if a scud lands in the American camp. And I would be among my American colleagues and say; “oh that’s too bad, I’m sorry that we had loss of life”. Out of frustration from having to keep the truth of what I really felt I would roll down the window on my way home on the freeway and scream as loud as I could; Allahu achbar!, Allahu achbar! This is the incantation you do when the enemy is killed, when you win. So if it was a victorious day for the Iraqi’s, when they land a scud missile it would be “Allahu achbar” on the freeway where no one could hear me. When I came home to my apartment the rest of the apartment complex were also Arabs from the Middle East. We would get together in my apartment, watch the Gulf war on satellite TV and we would be praising Allah every time there was an incident where Americans got killed. But it wasn’t the same face we put on in an American environment. In an American environment you played a different scenario, you acted as if you were on their side. So this whole facade is in place and the truth is often hidden from the west Bat Ye’or It was Edward Said, who wrote “Orientalism”, who is the main contributor in the creation of the view of this new version of Islam as a religion of peace and tolerance. These views are now established in all Western Universities and in academia. On this basis the whole history of Dhimmitude and Jihad disappeared.

Robert Spencer Edward Said who in his book “Orientalism” wrote that criticism of the Islamic world on the part of Westerners was racist and imperialist. It is spread in order to make political points, to accustom Westerners to the idea that Muslims are here to stay in Europe and the US and that they must not be questioned in terms of their loyalty to the secular framework of Western society. They must not be questioned in this despite Islam’s historical, political character because Islam is the religion of peace. This fiction has become so entrenched in American and European public discourse such that anyone who does question it is immediately branded as a racist, a hate monger and a bigot. Furthermore, this is a very effective tool in a country where racism is the cardinal sin among all, to silence any effective debate about the continuing attachment of Muslim immigrants to Sharia law and their intentions toward the secular systems in which they now reside.

6. More than a Religion
Spokesperson for the Bush administration: This is not a clash between Islam or Arabs, this is about freedom, not culture. It’s about working with Islamic governments who want to move forward into the modern world. Working with Islamic governments who see their face as a face of peace, and working against the violence and terror and the people who seek to hold back the world and who seek to disrupt peace and freedom for others. So that is what it’s about for us, the true faith of Islam, we believe, is a religion of peace and we intend to work with them in that regard.

Abdullah Al-Araby Islam has to be known as more than a religion. The idea that Islam is a spiritual religion like f. example Christianity is completely incorrect. Serge Trifkovic It would be incorrect to describe Islam primarily as a religion. Since its early beginning in Muhammad’s lifetime it has also been a geo political project and a system of government and a political ideology. Robert Spencer Islam from its beginnings was both a religion and a system of government. F. example; the Islamic calendar doesn’t base year 1 from the time that Muhammad was born or the time that Muhammad received his first revelation from Allah which I think that both are what Westerners might expect. Year 1 is from the time that Muhammad became the leader of an army and a head of state in Medina. This is the beginning of the Islamic calendar because in the Islamic understanding Islam is a political and social system as well as an individual faith. Serge Trifkovic

In Islam the separation between temporal secular and religious power is not only impossible, it is heretical. Only in the complete blending of all aspects of human activity and all aspects of political and legal functions of the state can we have the Caliphate, the properly organised state that is pleasing to Allah.

Walid Shoebat When Westerners think of religion whether its Islam, Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism and Buddhism, Westerners think that it’s a personal issue, a Buddhist will go to the temple and worship peacefully, a Jew goes to the temple and does his “mitzvah”, a Muslim goes to the mosque and pays “zakat”, a Christian goes to church on Sunday to pray. They think it’s a personal issue, that religion is a personal issue. So when they look at Islam they compare Islam with the way they understand religions, and that’s the first mistake. Islam is not a religion for personal use, Islam is Sharia law, Islam is a form of government to the world, THEN a personal application. It is not just how you pray and that you pray towards Mecca, it’s how you dress, you dress in Arab culture, you speak Arabic, you can’t go to heaven unless you pray in Arabic, you can’t read the Quran in English and expect to get good deeds to go to heaven. You read the Quran in Arabic. It becomes an imperialistic system where everybody now must speak Arabic, think Arabic and practice the religion in Arabic. it’s a form of law, not just in how you eat but how you get married, how you deal with your government, how you deal with your military, how you deal with the youth, how you deal with women – EVERY aspect of your life becomes Islam. Everything is Islam.
Sahih Al-Bukhari – Vol 2, Bk 23, Hadith 413 The Jews brought to the Prophet a man and a woman from amongst them who had committed (adultery) illegal sexual intercourse. The Prophet ordered both of them to be stoned (to death) near the place of offering the funeral prayers beside the mosque. Sahih Al-Bukhari – Vol 7, Bk 62, Hadith 88 The Prophet wrote the marriage contract with Aisha while she was six years old and consummated his marriage with her while she was nine years old and she remained with him for nine years (i.e. till his death).

Robert Spencer In no way is Islamic Sharia, Islamic government compatible with Western understandings of human rights and freedom of conscience. Traditional Islam forbids conversion from Islam and forbids anyone to leave Islam. There is no way out. It forbids Muslims and non-Muslims to live as equals in society. It mandates the second class status (dhimmi) of non-Muslims, forbidding them to hold authority over Muslims thus forbidding them to hold certain jobs as a result. It even historically mandated that houses of worship (of Jews and Christians) were neither to be built or repaired resulting in communities ending up in a constant state of decline.
Sura 5, Verse 51

O you who believe! Take not the Jews and the Christians as Auliya (friends, protectors, helpers, etc.), they are but Auliya to one another. And if any amongst you takes them as Auliya, then surely he is one of them.

Serge Trifkovic It is not possible for a non-Muslim, living in a Muslim society to invoke his civil rights and human rights that would be independent or separate from the Sharia concept. He is expected to submit to Sharia willingly and if he accepts his Dhimmitude he will be a protected person. A protected person is someone who is in fact a willing subordinate to the Muslim overlords.
The life of Muhammad – P 368 We saluted him as he stood praying, and he came out to us, and we told him that we had killed God’s enemy. He spat upon our comrade’s wounds and both he and we returned to our families. Our attack upon God’s enemy cast terror among the Jews, and there was no Jew in Medina who did not fear for his life.

Walid Shoebat Muhammad very clearly said, which is documented through the Hadith, that; “I have been ordered to fight until everyone says that “there is no god but Allah and Muhammad is the messenger of Allah”. This is how Islam spread to North-Africa, this is how Islam spread all the way to Indonesia and this is how Islam spread throughout the Middle-East. Syria was not a Muslim country, Lebanon was not Muslim. Saudi Arabia even, was a mixed multitude. That is how Islam spread all throughout the Middle-East, by the sword. This is why you don’t see any synagogues and churches in Saudi Arabia. Christianity is virtually non-existent. Even in the village in Bethlehem, Muslims are taking over. There is only 20% left of the Christian population. In Lebanon, Christian Lebanese are moving by the droves, Hezbollah there are very active. Lebanon used to be a Christian nation. Now all of a sudden it is being Islamised so Islam is on the move and has been since its creation. Robert Spencer Muslims who come to the United States and come to Europe with an idea that Sharia is the law of Allah, they look upon our freedom of religion and they look upon the fact that non-Muslims are in power making laws that are not on the basis of the law of Allah but on the basis of consensus and free elections. They look upon all that as a manifestation of “Jahelia” or unbelief — the pre-Islamic period of ignorance, as the times in any nation’s history before it became Muslim. You have Pakistan, Iran and so on; they refer to the period of their history before they became Muslim as the period of “Jahelia”. They will also consider the United States and Europe to be in periods of Jahelia today. And many Muslims coming into the United States and Western Europe will work to establish Islamic mechanisms of government here where the goal is to create Islamic states on the basis of the idea that secular states and the state based on elections has no legitimacy. You don’t have elections about the law of Allah, you simply obey what God says.

7. The House of War

Robert Spencer The most important thing of what the west needs to know about Islam today is that it has a political character and that it is not simply a religion. It is a religion and a belief system that mandates warfare against unbelievers for the purpose for establishing a societal model that is absolutely incompatible with Western society. Americans needs to know this, Europeans need to know this because Muslims are coming in to Western countries while holding these beliefs and intending to act upon them. They are the motivation behind modern terrorist activity and they are the goals of millions of Muslims in the West and around the world. We need to know this so that we can protect ourselves. But unfortunately because of political correctness and because of media and general government unwillingness to face the sources of Islamic terrorism these things remain largely unknown. Walid Shoebat Islamic fundamentalism is a sleeper cell in Europe and the US. A good casing point is Saladin. Saladin is a great hero in Islam. Saladin was the one who defeated the Crusades. There was a treaty that was supposed to be happening between the Crusaders and Saladin and the story goes as follows; the Arab mediator came to Saladin and said – the Quran says: “If they concede to peace than concede to it”, which means that if the enemy wants peace let’s have peace which is a Verse you can find directly in the Quran. And Saladin responded with a great answer when he stated to the guy; you are an Arab and I’m a Kurd. You should know the Quran better than me… Don’t forget that the Quran also says; “Why should we concede for peace when we have the upper hand”. So you find both Verses in the Quran. You concede to peace when you are the weaker party. This is why you hear the term “hudna”. “Hudna” is a peace treaty, a cease fire. In Iraq, Sadr asked for hudna because he knew he couldn’t defeat the Americans. You find hudna’s in several conflicts when the enemy is stronger than you are. But as soon as you gain strength then you don’t concede for peace. This is why the face of Islamic fundamentalism in the West has a facade that Islam is a peaceful religion. Because they are waiting to have more Islamic immigrants, they are waiting to increase in number, waiting to increase their political power. Once they do then history will repeat itself. You will see the real face of Islamic fundamentalism here in your country. Robert Spencer It’s unfortunate but it’s no negotiating with Jihadists. There is no striking a deal with them. Islamic law is very clear on that and here once again is an example; we need to take Islam seriously! Islamic law does not allow for treaties. It does not allow for negotiated settlements between Muslim states and non-Muslim states. All it allows for is a temporary period of up to 10 years of hudna or what is commonly translated as truce. To allow the Islamic forces to gather its strength. But that’s not the same as peace as we know it. That’s not the same as the absence of the state of war, that’s only a temporary truce. In a war that the Jihadists consider has gone on for 14 centuries and are willing to fight for 14 more.
Sura 47, Verse 4 So, when you meet (in fight, Jihad in Allah’s Cause) those who disbelieve, smite at their necks till when you have killed and wounded many of them, then bind a bond firmly on them (i.e. take them as captives). … Thus you are ordered by Allah to continue in carrying out Jihad against the disbelievers till they embrace Islam (i.e. are saved from the

punishment in the Hell-fire) or at least come under your protection), but if it had been Allah’s Will, He Himself could certainly have punished them (without you). But (he lets you fight), In order to test you, some with others. But those who are killed in the Way of Allah, He will never let their deeds be lost.

Serge Trifkovic In Islamic thinking the world is divided into the “House of Islam”, where Islamic law has been established, where Allah rules supreme, and the “House of War” which is the rest of the world. This dichotomy is reminiscent of other totalitarian ideologies and most explicitly communism. Both communism and Islam seek the end of history in this world. The end of history will come when the entire world becomes Islam or when the proletarian revolution brings the working class to power all over the world which will be the end of state, the end of money and the end of class oppression. In both cases it is possible to have a period of truce. It is possible to have peaceful co-existence but that peaceful co-existence is a tactical ploy and not a permanent solution.
Sahih Al-Bukhari – Vol 4, Bk 52, Hadith 196 Allah’s Apostle said, “I have been ordered to fight with the people till they say, none has the right to be worshipped but Allah.

Robert Spencer If we consider that, if only we changed our policies toward Israel and if only we changed our policies toward Iraq or changed our policies on something else, if only we hadn’t taken out the “Mossadegh regime” in Iran in 1953… These ideas are ridiculous. They are based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the motives and goals of the Jihadists. This is not a conflict that was created with the creation of the state of Israel or a conflict that was created when the American army went into Iraq. The global Jihad has been going on without any significant interruption since the 7th century. And it only declined in force and activity at periods when the Islamic world was too weak to prosecute it. Bat Ye’or The question now that we have to ask ourselves is; do we want to preserve our JudeaChristian values and our own civilisation or do we want, do we choose to go towards a dhimmitude, an enlarged dhimmitude in Europe which will engulf the whole of Europe. This process is not that imminent for the US but it will result in US isolation. It will have to deal in geopolitics with an Islamised, Dhimmi Europe. And these are problems that have to be taken into consideration by Europeans and Americans themselves in choosing their identity and their future – freedom or dhimmitude. Serge Trifkovic In order to defend itself against the onslaught of global Jihad which will come in the century ahead, the West would need to really find itself and to say; what exactly is the geographic and cultural space to be defended and in the name of what? Defending the West in the name of the ideology of multiculturalism would be impossible. Multiculturalism and post-modern liberalism are not worthy dying for. They are not something that can inspire people to do what their ancestors had done at “Poitier” during the first wave and at the walls of Vienna in 1683 during the second wave. What global Jihad has on its side is simple minded commitment of millions of people to not only

spread the faith but also better themselves at the expense of the infidel in the first instance through immigration and later on if necessary by other means. Walid Shoebat What the west needs to understand about Islam is that Islam has the potential of replacing the dangers that National Socialism and Communism brought with them. Like Nazism and like communism, in Islamism the end justifies the means. There is no respect for national borders. And the whole ideology is to promote their way of thinking and to promote their way of life throughout the entire world. That’s what’s being taught in the Middle-East, that’s what’s coming out from all the jurisprudence in Saudi Arabia and all throughout the Muslim world. Islam will conquer and will continue to conquer until it triumphs, until everyone in the world says; there’s no god but Allah and Muhammad is his prophet. Serge Trifkovic The peculiarity of Islam has to be faced. Unlike others, and I’m against saying this in the full knowledge that it will offend some Westerners, unlike the Hindus, unlike the Confucians, unlike the enemies of sub-Saharan Africa, the Muslims have an inherent tendency to expand and to convert the rest of the world. Not only to their religion but to their outlook and to their legal and moral system. They will not state this openly while they’re in a minority in the countries to which they immigrate, but we have seen this time and over again throughout history. Once they reach the numbers necessary to impose their will they will do so. Miracles do happen. I do not know if it is another maybe even deadlier terrorist attack that will act as a catalyst or whether it will be a geo-political confrontation in the MiddleEast itself, with Israel perhaps at serious peril, but I do hope and trust that a jolt will bring back into the minds and hearts of Europeans the awareness of the need to stand up and be counted. Before it is too late…
Produced and Directed by Gregory M. Davis and Bryan Daly. Produced and Distributed by Quixotic Media, LLC USA 2006

1.8 European Slaves, Arab Masters By Andrew G. Bostom

A public protest in Washington, DC, April 5, 2005 highlighted the current (ongoing, for centuries) plight of black Mauritanians enslaved by Arab masters. The final two decades of the 20th century, moreover, witnessed a frank jihad genocide, including mass enslavement, perpetrated by the Arab Muslim Khartoum government against black Christians and animists in the Southern Sudan, and the same governments continued massacres and enslavement of Animist—Muslim blacks in Darfur. These tragic contemporary phenomena reflect the brutal living legacy of jihad slavery. Jihad Slavery

The fixed linkage between jihad — a permanent, uniquely Islamic institution— and enslavement, provides a very tenable explanation for the unparalleled scale and persistence of slavery in Muslim dominions, and societies. This general observation applies as well to ‘specialised’ forms of slavery, including the (procurement and) employment of eunuchs, slave soldiering (especially of adolescents), other forms of child slavery, and harem slavery. Jihad slavery, in its myriad manifestations, became a powerful instrument for both expansive Islamisation, and the maintenance of Muslim societies.

Juridical Rationale and Role in Islamisation Patricia Crone, in her recent analysis of the origins and development of Islamic political thought, makes an important nexus between the mass captivity and enslavement of non —Muslims during jihad campaigns, and the prominent role of coercion in these major modalities of Islamisation. Following a successful jihad, she notes:
Male captives might be killed or enslaved, whatever their religious affiliation. (People of the Book were not protected by Islamic law until they had accepted dhimma.) Captives might also be given the choice between Islam and death, or they might pronounce the confession of faith of their own accord to avoid execution: jurists ruled that their change of status was to be accepted even though they had only converted out of fear. Women and children captured in the course of the campaigns were usually enslaved, again regardless of their faith…Nor should the importance of captives be underestimated. Muslim warriors routinely took large numbers of them. Leaving aside those who converted to avoid execution, some were ransomed and the rest enslaved, usually for domestic use. Dispersed in Muslim households, slaves almost always converted, encouraged or pressurised by their masters, driven by a need to bond with others, or slowly, becoming accustomed to seeing things through Muslim eyes even if they tried to resist. Though neither the dhimmi nor the slave had been faced with a choice between Islam and death, it would be absurd to deny that force played a major role in their conversion. [1]

For the idolatrous Hindus, enslaved in vast numbers during the waves of jihad conquests that ravaged the Indian subcontinent for well over a half millennium (beginning at the outset of the 8th century C.E.), the guiding principles of Islamic law regarding their fate were unequivocally coercive. Jihad slavery also contributed substantively to the growth of the Muslim population in India. K.S. Lal elucidates both of these points: [2]
The Hindus who naturally resisted Muslim occupation were considered to be rebels. Besides they were idolaters (mushrik) and could not be accorded the status of Kafirs, of the People of the Book — Christians and Jews… Muslim scriptures and treatises advocated jihad against idolaters for whom the law advocated only Islam or death… The fact was that the Muslim regime was giving [them] a choice between Islam and death only. Those who were killed in battle were dead and gone; but their dependents were made slaves. They ceased to be Hindus; they were made Musalmans in course of time if not immediately after captivity…slave taking in India was the most flourishing and successful [Muslim] missionary activity…Every Sultan, as [a] champion of Islam, considered it a political necessity to plant or raise [the] Muslim population all over India for the Islamisation of the country and countering native resistance.

Vryonis describes how jihad slavery, as practiced by the Seljuk’s and early Ottomans, was an important modality of Islamisation in Asia Minor during the 11th through the 14th century [3]:

A further contributing factor to the decline in the numbers of Christian inhabitants was slavery…Since the beginning of the Arab razzias into the land of Rum, human booty had come to constitute a very important portion of the spoils. There is ample testimony in the contemporary accounts that this situation did not change when the Turks took over the direction of the jihad in Anatolia. They enslaved men, women, and children from all major urban centers and from the countryside where the populations were defenceless. In the earlier years before the Turkish settlements were permanently affected in Anatolia, the captives were sent off to Persia and elsewhere, but after the establishment of the Anatolian Turkish principalities, a portion of the enslaved were retained in Anatolia for the service of the conquerors.

After characterising the coercive, often brutal methods used to impose the devshirme child levy, and the resulting attrition of the native Christian populations (i.e., from both expropriation and flight), Papoulia concludes that this Ottoman institution, a method of Islamisation par excellence, also constituted a de facto state of war: [4]
…that the sources speak of piasimo (seizure) aichmalotos paidon (capture) and arpage paidon (grabbing of children) indicates that the children lost through the devshirme were understood as casualties of war. Of course, the question arises whether, according to Islamic law, it is possible to regard the devshirme as a form of the state of war, although the Ottoman historians during the empire’s golden age attempted to interpret this measure as a consequence of conquest by force be’anwa. It is true that the Greeks and the other peoples of the Balkan peninsula did not as a rule surrender without resistance, and therefore the fate of the conquered had to be determined according to the principles of the Koran regarding the Ahl-al-Qitab: i.e. either to be exterminated or be compelled to convert to Islam or to enter the status of protection, of aman, by paying the taxes and particularly the jizya (poll-tax). The fact that the Ottomans, in the case of voluntary surrender, conceded certain privileges one of which was exemption from this heavy burden, indicates that its measure was understood as a penalisation for the resistance of the population and the devshirme was an expression of the perpetuation of the state of war between the conqueror and the conquered… the sole existence of the institution of devshirme is sufficient to postulate the perpetuation of a state of war.

Under Shah Abbas I (1588—1626 C.E.), the Safavid Shi’ite theocracy of Iran expanded its earlier system of slave razzias into the Christian Georgian and Armenian areas of the Caucasus. Georgian, Armenian, and Circassian inhabitants of the Caucasus were enslaved in large numbers, and converted, thereby, to Shi’a Islam. The males were made to serve as (primarily) military or administrative slaves, while the females were forced into harems. A transition apparently took place between the 17th and 18th centuries such that fewer of the slaves came from the Caucasus, while greater numbers came via the Persian Gulf, originating from Africa. [5] Ricks notes that by the reign of Shah Sultan Husayn;
The size of the royal court had indeed expanded if the numbers of male and female slaves including white and black eunuchs are any indicators. According to a contemporary historian, Shah Sultan Husayn (d. 1722) made it a practice to arrive at Isfahan’s markets on the first days of the Iranian New Year (March 21) with his entire court in attendance. It was estimated by the contemporary recorder that 5,000 male and female black and white slaves including the 100 black eunuchs comprised the royal party. [6]

Clement Huart, writing in the early 20th century (1907), observed that slaves, continued to be the most important component of the booty acquired during jihad campaigns or razzias: [7]

Not too long ago several expeditions crossed Amou-Derya, i.e. the southern frontier of the steppes, and ravaged the eastern regions of Persia in order to procure slaves; other campaigns were launched into the very heart of unexplored Africa, setting fire to the inhabited areas and massacring the peaceful animist populations that lived there.

Willis characterises the timeless Islamic rationale for the enslavement of such ‘barbarous’ African animists, as follows: [8]
…as the opposition of Islam to kufr erupted from every corner of malice and mistrust, the lands of the enslavable barbarian became the favourite hunting ground for the ‘people of reason and faith’—the parallels between slave and infidel began to fuse in the heat of jihad. Hence whether by capture or sale, it was as slave and not citizen that the kafir was destined to enter the Muslim domain. And since the condition of captives flowed from the status of their territories, the choice between freedom and servility came to rest on a single proof: the religion of a land is the religion of its amir (ruler); if he be Muslim, the land is a land of Islam (dar al—Islam); if he be pagan, the land is a land of unbelief (dar al—kufr). Appended to this principle was the kindred notion that the religion of a land is the religion of its majority; if it be Muslim, the land is a land of Islam; if it be pagan, the land is a land of kufr, and its inhabitants can be reckoned within the categories of enslavement under Muslim law. Again, as slavery became a simile for infidelity, so too did freedom remain the signal feature of Islam…The servile estate was hewn out of the ravaged remains of heathen villages — from the women and children who submitted to Islam and awaited their redemption…[according to Muslim jurist] al—Wanshirisi (d.1508), slavery is an affliction upon those who profess no Prophecy, who bear no allegiance to religious law. Moreover, slavery is an humiliation — a subjection— which rises from infidelity.

Based on his study and observations of Muslim slave razzias gleaned while serving in the Sudan during the Mahdist jihad at the close of the 19th century, Winston Churchill wrote this description (in 1899): [9]
all [of the Arab Muslim tribes in The Sudan], without exception, were hunters of men. To the great slave markets of Jeddah a continual stream of negro captives has flowed for hundreds of years. The invention of gunpowder and the adoption by the Arabs of firearms facilitated the traffic…Thus the situation in the Sudan for several centuries may be summed up as follows: The dominant race of Arab invaders was increasingly spreading its blood, religion, customs, and language among the black aboriginal population, and at the same time it harried and enslaved them…The warlike Arab tribes fought and brawled among themselves in ceaseless feud and strife. The negroes trembled in apprehension of capture, or rose locally against their oppressors.

All these elements of jihad slavery— its juridical rationale, employment as a method of forcible Islamisation (for non—Muslims in general, and directed at Sub—Saharan African Animists, specifically), and its association with devshirme—like levies of adolescent males for slave soldiering— are apparent in the contemporary jihad being waged against the Animists and Christians of southern Sudan, by the Arab Muslim—dominated Khartoum regime. [10]

Extent and Persistence The scale and scope of Islamic slavery in Africa are comparable to the Western trans— Atlantic slave trade to the Americas, and as Willis has observed (somewhat wryly), [11]

the former ‘…out—distances the more popular subject in its length of duration.’ Quantitative estimates for the trans-Atlantic slave trade (16th through the end of the 19th century) of 10,500,000 (or somewhat higher [12]), are at least matched (if not exceeded by 50%) by a contemporary estimate for the Islamic slave trade out of Africa. Professor Ralph Austen’s working figure for this composite of the trans-Saharan, Red Sea, and Indian Ocean traffic generated by the Islamic slave trade from 650 through 1905 C.E., is 17,000,000. [13] Moreover, the plight of those enslaved animist peoples drawn from the savannah and northern forest belts of western and central Africa for the trans—Saharan trade was comparable to the sufferings experienced by the unfortunate victims of the trans—Atlantic slave trade. [14]
In the Nineteenth Century, slaves reached the ports of Ottoman Tripoli by three main Saharan routes, all so harsh that the experience of slaves forced to travel them bore comparison with the horrors of the so—called ‘middle—passage’ of the Atlantic.

This illuminating comparison, important as it is, ignores other vast domains of jihad slavery: throughout Europe (Mediterranean and Western Europe, as well as Central and Eastern Europe, involving the Arabs [Western/Mediterranean], and later the Ottoman Turks and Tatars [Central and Eastern Europe]); Muscovite Russia (subjected to Tatar depredations); Asia Minor (under Seljuk and Ottoman domination); Persia, Armenia, and Georgia (subjected to the systematised jihad slavery campaigns waged by the Shi’ite Safavids, in particular); and the Indian subcontinent (razzias and jihad campaigns by the Arabs in the 7th and 8th centuries, and later depredations by the Ghaznavids, during the Delhi Sultanate, the Timurid jihad, and under the Mughals). As a cursory introduction to the extent of jihad slavery beyond the African continent, three brief examples are provided: the Seljuks in Asia Minor (11th and 12th centuries); the Ottomans in the Balkans (15th century); and the Tatars in southern Poland and Muscovite Russia (mid— 15th through 17th centuries). The capture of Christians in Asia Minor by the Seljuk Turks was very extensive in the 11th and 12th centuries. [15] Following the seizure and pillage of Edessa, 16,000 were enslaved. [16] Michael the Syrian reported that when the Turks of Nur al—Din were brought into Cilicia by Mleh the Armenian, they enslaved 16,000 Christians, whom they sold at Aleppo. [17] A major series of razzias conducted in the Greek provinces of Western Asia Minor enslaved thousands of Greeks (Vryonis believes the figure of 100,000 cited in a contemporary account is exaggerated [18]), and according to Michael the Syrian, they were sold in slave markets as distant as Persia. [19] During razzias conducted by the Turks in 1185 and over the next few years, 26,000 inhabitants from Cappadocia, Armenian, and Mesopotamia were captured and sent off to the slave markets. [20] Vryonis concludes: [21]
…these few sources seem to indicate that the slave trade was a flourishing one. In fact, Asia Minor continued to be a major source of slaves for the Islamic world through the 14th century.

The Ottoman Sultans, in accord with Shari’a prescriptions, promoted jihad slavery aggressively in the Balkans, especially during the 15th century reigns of Mehmed I (1402 —1421), Murad II (1421—1451), and Mehmed II (1451—1481). [22] Alexandrescu— Dersca summarises the considerable extent of this enslavement, and suggests the importance of its demographic effect: [23]

The contemporary Turkish, Byzantine and Latin chroniclers are unanimous in recognising that during the campaigns conducted on behalf of the unification of Greek and Latin Romania and the Slavic Balkans under the banner of Islam, as well as during their razzias on Christian territory, the Ottomans reduced masses of inhabitants to slavery. The Ottoman chronicler Asikpasazade relates that during the expedition of Ali pasha Evrenosoghlu in Hungary (1437), as well as on the return from the campaign of Murad II against Belgrade (1438), the number of captives surpassed that of the combatants. The Byzantine chronicler Ducas states that the inhabitants of Smederevo, which was occupied by the Ottomans, were led off into bondage. The same thing happened when the Turks of Mentese descended upon the islands of Rhodes and Cos and also during the expedition of the Ottoman fleet to Enos and Lesbos. Ducas even cites numbers: 70,000 inhabitants carried off into slavery during the campaign of Mehmed II in Moree (1460). The Italian Franciscan Bartholome de Yano (Giano dell’Umbria) speaks about 60,000 to 70,000 slaves captured over the course of two expeditions of the akingis in Transylvania (1438) and about 300,000 to 600,000 Hungarian captives. If these figures seem exaggerated, others seem more accurate: forty inhabitants captured by the Turks of Mentese during a razzia in Rhodes, 7,000 inhabitants reduced to slavery following the siege of Thessalonika (1430), according to John Anagnostes, and ten thousand inhabitants led off into captivity during the siege of Mytilene (1462), according to the Metropolitan of Lesbos, Leonard of Chios. Given the present state of the documentation available to us, we cannot calculate the scale on which slaves were introduced into Turkish Romania by this method. According to Bartholome de Yano, it would amount to 400,000 slaves captured in the four years from 1437 to 1443. Even allowing for a certain degree of exaggeration, we must acknowledge that slaves played an important demographic part during the fifteenth—century Ottoman expansion.

Fisher [24] has analysed the slave razzias conducted by the Muslim Crimean Tatars against the Christian populations of southern Poland and Muscovite Russia during the mid—15th through late 17th century (1463—1794). Relying upon admittedly incomplete sources (‘…no doubt there are many more slave raids that the author has not uncovered’ [25]), his conservative tabulations [26] indicate that at least 3 million (3,000,000) persons — men, women, and children — were captured and enslaved during this so—called ‘harvesting of the steppe’. Fisher describes the plight of those enslaved: [27]
…the first ordeal [of the captive] was the long march to the Crimea. Often in chains and always on foot, many of the captives died en route. Since on many occasions the Tatar raiding party feared reprisals or, in the seventeenth century, attempts by Cossack bands to free the captives, the marches were hurried. Ill or wounded captives were usually killed rather than be allowed to slow the procession. Heberstein wrote… ‘the old and infirm men who will not fetch much as a sale, are given up to the Tatar youths either to be stoned, or thrown into the sea, or to be killed by any sort of death they might please.’ An Ottoman traveler in the mid—sixteenth century who witnessed one such march of captives from Galicia marveled that any would reach their destination — the slave markets of Kefe. He complained that their treatment was so bad that the mortality rate would unnecessarily drive their price up beyond the reach of potential buyers such as himself. A Polish proverb stated: ‘Oh how much better to lie on one’s bier, than to be a captive on the way to Tartary’ The persistence of Islamic slavery is as impressive and unique as its extent. Slavery was openly practiced in both Ottoman Turkey [28], and Shi’ite (Qajar) Iran [29], through the first decade of the 20th century. As Toledano points out, [30] regarding Ottoman Turkey, kul (administrative)/ harem slavery,

…survived at the core of the Ottoman elite until the demise of the empire and the fall of the house of Osman in the second decade of the 20th century.

Moreover, Ricks [31] indicates that despite the modernising pressures and reforms culminating in the Iranian Constitutional Movement of 1905—1911, which effectively eliminated military and agricultural slavery,
The presence of domestic slaves, however, in both the urban and rural regions of Southern Iran had not ceased as quickly. Some Iranians today attest to the continued presence of African and Indian slave girls…

Slavery on the Arabian peninsula was not abolished formally until 1962 in Saudi Arabia, 32 and 1970 in Yemen and Oman. 33 Writing in 1989, Gordon [34] observed that although Mauritania abolished slavery officially on July 15, 1980,
…as the government itself acknowledges, the practice is till alive and well. It is estimated that 200,000 men, women, and children are subject to being bought and sold like so many cattle in this North African country, toiling as domestics, shepherds, and farmhands.

Finally, as discussed earlier, there has been a recrudescence of jihad slavery, since 1983 in the Sudan. [35] An Overview of Eunuch Slavery—the ‘Hideous Trade’ Eunuch slaves — males castrated usually between the ages of 4 and 12 (due to the high risk of death, preferentially, between ages 8 and 12), [36] were in considerable demand in Islamic societies. They served most notably as supervisors of women in the harems of the rulers and elites of the Ottoman Empire, its contemporary Muslim neighbours (such as Safavid Iran), and earlier Muslim dominions. The extent and persistence of eunuch slavery — becoming prominent within 200 years of the initial 7th century Arab jihad conquests [37], through the beginning of the 20th century [38] — are peculiar to the Islamic incarnation of this aptly named ‘hideous trade’. For example, Toledano documents that as late as 1903, the Ottoman imperial harem contained from 400 to 500 female slaves, supervised and guarded by 194 black African eunuchs. [39] But an equally important and unique feature of Muslim eunuch slavery was the acquisition of eunuchs from foreign ‘slave producing areas’ [40] , i.e., non—Muslim frontier zones subjected to razzias. As David Ayalon observed, [41]
…the overwhelming majority of the eunuchs, like the overwhelming majority of all other slaves in Islam, had been brought over from outside the borders of Muslim lands.

Eunuch slaves in China, in stark contrast, were almost exclusively Chinese procured locally. [42] Hogendorn [43] has identified the three main slave producing regions, as they evolved in importance over time, from the 8th through the late 19th centuries:

These areas were the forested parts of central and eastern Europe called by Muslims the ‘Bild as—Saqaliba’ (‘slave country’), the word saqlab meaning slave in Arabic (and related to the ethnic designation ‘Slav’); the steppes of central Asia called the ‘Bilad al—Atrak’ (‘Turks’ country’ or Turkestan); and eventually most important, the savanna and the fringes of the wooded territory south of the Sahara called the country of the blacks or ‘Bilad as— Sudan’.

Lastly, given the crudeness of available surgical methods and absence of sterile techniques, the human gelding procedure by which eunuchs were ‘manufactured’ was associated with extraordinary rates of morbidity and mortality. Hogendorn describes the severity of the operation, and provides mortality information from West and East Africa: [44]
Castration can be partial (removal of the testicles only or removal of the penis only), or total (removal of both). In the later period of the trade, that is, after Africa became the most important source for Mediterranean Islam, it appears that most eunuchs sold to the markets underwent total removal. This version of the operation, though considered most appropriate for slaves in constant proximity to harem members, posed a very high danger of death for two reasons. First was the extensive hemorrhaging, with the consequent possibility of almost immediate death. The hemorrhaging could not be stopped by traditional cauterisation because that would close the urethra leading to eventual death because of inability to pass urine. The second danger lay in infection of the urethra, with the formation of pus blocking it and so causing death in a few days. …when the castration was carried out in sub—Saharan West and West—Central Africa…a figure of 90% [is] often mentioned. Even higher death rates were occasionally reported, unsurprising in tropical areas where the danger of infection of wounds was especially high. At least one contemporary price quotation supports a figure of over 90% mortality: Turkish merchants are said to have been willing to pay 250 to 300 (Maria Theresa) dollars each for eunuchs in Borno (northeast Nigeria) at a time when the local price of young male slaves does not seem to have exceeded about 20 dollars…Many sources indicate very high death rates from the operation in eastern Africa.. Richard Millant’s [1908] general figure for the Sudan and Ethiopia is 90%.

Conclusion Contemporary manifestations of Islamic slavery—certainly the razzias (raids) waged by Arab Muslim militias against their black Christian, animist, and animist—Muslim prey in both the southern Sudan and Darfur—and even in its own context, the persistence of slavery in Mauritania (again, black slaves, Arab masters)—reflect the pernicious impact of jihad slavery as an enduring Muslim institution. Even Ottoman society, arguably the most progressive in Muslim history, and upheld just recently at a United Nations conference as a paragon of Islamic ecumenism, never produced a William Wilberforce, much less a broad, religiously—based slavery abolition movement spearheaded by committed Muslim ulema. Indeed, it is only modern Muslim freethinkers, anachronistically referred to as ‘apostates,’ who have had the courage and intellectual integrity to renounce the jihad, including jihad slavery, unequivocally, and based upon an honest acknowledgement of its devastating military and social history. When the voices of these Muslim freethinkers are silenced in the Islamic world—by imprisonment and torture, or execution—the outcome is tragic, but hardly unexpected. That such insightful and courageous voices have been marginalised or ignored altogether in the West is equally tragic and reflects the distressing ignorance of Western policymaking elites.

Sources: 1. Patricia Crone. God’s Rule. Government and Islam. New York: Columbia University Press, 2004, pp. 371—72 2. K.S. Lal, Muslim Slave System India, New Delhi, Aditya Prakashan, 1994, pp. 46, 69. 3. Speros Vryonis, Jr. The Decline of Medieval Hellenism and the Islamization of Asia Minor, 11th Through 15th Century, 1971, Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 174—175. 4. Vasiliki Papoulia. ‘The impact of devshirme on Greek society’ in East Central European society and war in the prerevolutionary eighteenth century. Gunther E. Rothenberg, B?la K. Kir?ly and Peter F. Sugar, editors. Boulder : Social Science Monographs ; New York : Distributed by Columbia University Press, 1982, pp. 555—556. 5. Thomas Ricks. ‘Slaves and Slave Trading in Shi’i Iran, AD 1500—1900’, Journal of Asian and African Studies, 2001, Vol. 36, pp. 407—418. 6. Ricks, ‘Slaves and Slave Trading in Shi’i Iran’, pp. 411—412. 7. Clement Huart. ‘Le droit de la guerre’ Revue du monde musulman, 1907, p. 337. English translation by Michael J. Miller. 8. John Ralph Willis. «Jihad and the ideology of enslavement», in Slaves and slavery in Muslim Africa— vol. 1. Islam and the ideology of enslavement, London, England; Totowa, N.J.: Frank Cass, 1985, pp. 17—18; 4. 9. Winston Churchill. The River War, Vol. II , London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1899, pp. 248—50. 10. John Eibner. ‘My career redeeming slaves’, Middle East Quarterly, December, 1999, Vol. 4, Number 4, http://www.meforum.org/article/449 . Eibner notes: …based on the pattern of slave raiding over the past fifteen years and the observations of Western and Arab travelers in southern Darfur and Kordofan, conservatively puts the number of chattel slaves close to or over 100,000. There are many more in state—owned concentration camps, euphemistically called «peace camps» by the government of Sudan, and in militant Qur’anic schools, where boys train to become mujahidun (warriors of jihad). 11. John Ralph Willis. Slaves and slavery in Muslim Africa, Preface, p. vii. 12. This controversial topic is discussed here: Philip D. Curtin, Roger Antsey, J.E. Inikori. The Journal of African History, 1976, Vol. 17, pp. 595—627. 13. John Ralph Willis. Slaves and slavery in Muslim Africa, Preface, p. x. 14. John Wright. ‘The Mediterranean Middle Passage: The Nineteenth Century Slave Trade Between Triploi and the Levant’, The Journal of North African Studies, 1996, Vol. 1, p. 44. 15. Vryonis, The Decline of Medieval Hellenism, p.175, note 245. 16. Bar Hebraeus. The chronography of Gregory Ab?’l Faraj, the son of Aaron, the Hebrew physician, commonly known as Bar Hebraeus; being the first part of his political history of the world, translated from the Syriac by Ernest A. Wallis Budge, Oxford University Press, 1932, Vol. 1, pp. 268—273; Michael the Syrian, Chronique de Michel le Syrien, Patriarche Jacobite d’Antioche (1166—1199), translated by J—B Chabot, 1895, Vol. 3, p. 331. 17. Michael the Syrian, Chronique, Vol. 3, p. 331. 18. Vryonis, The Decline of Medieval Hellenism, p.175, note 245. 19. Michael the Syrian, Chronique, Vol. 3, p. 369. 20. Michael the Syrian, Chronique, Vol. 3, pp. 401—402; Bar Hebraeus, The Chronography, Vol. 1, p. 321. 21. Vryonis, The Decline of Medieval Hellenism, p.175, note 245. 22. M—M Alexandrescu—Dersca Bulgaru. ‘Le role des escalves en Romanie turque au XVe siecle’ Byzantinische Forschungen, vol. 11, 1987, p. 15. 23. Alexandrescu—Dersca Bulgaru, ‘Le role des escalves en Romanie turque au XVe siecle’, pp. 16—17. 24. Alan Fisher ‘Muscovy and the Black Sea Slave Trade’, Canadian American Slavic Studies, 1972, Vol. 6, pp. 575—594. 25. Fisher ‘Muscovy and the Black Sea Slave Trade’, p. 579, note 17. 26. Fisher ‘Muscovy and the Black Sea Slave Trade’, pp. 580—582. 27. Fisher ‘Muscovy and the Black Sea Slave Trade’, pp. 582—583. 28. Reuben Levy, The Social Structure of Islam, Cambridge University Press, 1957, p. 88. 29. Ricks, ‘Slaves and Slave Trading in Shi’i Iran’, p. 408. 30. Ehud Toledano. Slavery and Abolition in the Ottoman Middle East, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1998, p. 53. 31. Ricks, ‘Slaves and Slave Trading in Shi’i Iran’, p. 415. 32. Murray Gordon. Slavery in the Arab World, New York: New Amsterdam, 1989, p. 232. 33. Gordon. Slavery in the Arab World, p. 234. 33. http://59.334.18.097plusf87:RQqljii569218397413КЂ 34. Gordon. Slavery in the Arab World, Preface, second page (pages not numbered). 35. Eibner, ‘My career redeeming slaves’. 36. Jan Hogendorn. ‘The Hideous Trade. Economic Aspects of the ‘Manufacture’ and Sale of Eunuchs’, Paideuma, 1999, Vol. 45, p. 143, especially, note 25. 37. Hogendorn. ‘The Hideous Trade’, p. 137. 38. Ehud Toledano. ‘The Imperial Eunuchs of Istanbul: From Africa to the Heart of Islam’, Middle Eastern Studies, 1984, Vol. 20, pp. 379—390. 39. Toledano. ‘The Imperial Eunuchs of Istanbul’, pp. 380—381. 40. Hogendorn. ‘The Hideous Trade’, p. 138. 41. David Ayalon. ‘On the Eunuchs in Islam’, Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam, 1979, Vol. 1, pp. 69—70.

42. Hogendorn. ‘The Hideous Trade’, p. 139, note 5. 43. Hogendorn. ‘The Hideous Trade’, p. 139. 44. Hogendorn. ‘The Hideous Trade’, pp. 143, 145—146.

1.9 Hindu Kush, the largest Genocides in the history of man By Shrinandan Vyas All the Encyclopedias and National Geographic agree that Hindu Kush region is a place of Hindu genocide (similar to Dakau and Auschwitz). All the references are given for your convenience. Abstract All Standard reference books agree that the name ‘Hindu Kush’ of the mountain range in Eastern Afghanistan means ‘Hindu Slaughter’ or ‘Hindu Killer’. History also reveals that until 1000 A.D. the area of Hindu Kush was a full part of Hindu cradle. More likely, the mountain range was deliberately named as ‘Hindu Slaughter’ by the Moslem conquerors, as a lesson to the future generations of Indians. However Indians in general and Hindus in particular are completely oblivious to this tragic genocide. This article also looks into the reasons behind this ignorance. 21 References — (Mainly Encyclopedia Britannica & other reference books, National Geographic Magazines and standard history books). Introduction The Hindu Kush is a mountain system nearly 1000 miles long and 200 miles wide, running northeast to southwest, and dividing the Amu Darya River Valley and Indus River Valley. It stretches from the Pamir Plateau near Gilgit, to Iran. The Hindu Kush ranges mainly run through Afghanistan and Pakistan. It has over two dozen summits of more than 23,000 ft in height. Below the snowy peaks the mountains of Hindu Kush appear bare, stony and poor in vegetation. Historically, the passes across the Hindu Kush have been of great military significance, providing access to the northern plains of India. The Khyber Pass constitutes an important strategic gateway and offers a comparatively easy route to the plains of Punjab. Most foreign invaders, starting from Alexander the Great in 327 BC, to Timur Lane in 1398 AD, and from Mahmud of Ghazni, in 1001 AD, to Nader Shah in 1739 AD attacked Hindustan via the Khyber Pass and other passes in the Hindu Kush (1,2,3). The Greek chroniclers of Alexander the Great called Hindu Kush as Parapamisos or Paropanisos (4). The Hindu name of the Hindu Kush mountains was ‘Paariyaatra Parvat'(5). Early history of Hindu Kush region (up to 1000 AD)

History of Hindu Kush and Punjab shows that two major kingdoms of Gandhaar & Vaahic Pradesh (Balkh of Bactria) had their borders extending far beyond the Hindu Kush. Legend has it that the kingdom of Gandhaar was established by Taksha, grandson of Bharat of Ayodhya (6). Gandhaar’s borders extended from Takshashila to Tashkent (corruption of ‘Taksha Khand’) in the present day Uzbekistan. In the later period, Mahabharat relates Gaandhaari as a princess of Gandhaar and her brother, Shakuni as a prince and later as Gandhaar’s ruler. In the well documented history, Emperor Chandragupt Maurya took charge of Vaahic Pradesh around 325 BC and then took over Magadh. Emperor Ashok’s stone tablets with inscriptions in Greek and Aramaic are still found at Qandahar (corruption of Gandhaar?) and Laghman in eastern Afganistan(3). One such stone tablet, is shown in the PBS TV series ‘Legacy with Mark Woods’ in episode 3 titled ‘India: The Spiritual Empire’. After the fall of Mauryan Empire, Gandhaar was ruled by Greeks. However some of these Greek rulers had converted to Buddhism, such as Menander, known to Indian historians as Milinda, while some other Greeks became followers of Vishnav sects (Hinduism)(7). Recent excavations in Bactria have revealed a golden hoard which has among other things a figurine of a Greek goddess with a Hindu mark on its forehead (Bindi) showing the confluence of Hindu-Greek art (8). Later Shaka and KushaaN ruled Gandhaar and Vaahic Pradesh. KushaaN emperor Kanishka’s empire stretched from Mathura to the Aral Sea (beyond the present day Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgystan)(9). Kanishaka was a Buddhist and under KushaaN influence Buddhism flourished in Gandhaar. Two giant sandstone Buddhas carved into the cliffs of Bamian (west of Kabul) date from the Kushan period. The larger Buddha (although defaced in later centuries by Moslem invaders) is about 175 ft tall (10,11). The Kushan empire declined by 450 AD. The Chinese traveller Hsuan-Tsang (Xuan-zang) travelled thru the region in 7 th century AD and visited many Buddhist religious centers (3) including Hadda, Ghazni, Qonduz, Bamian (3,10,11), Shotorak and Bagram. From the 5 th thru 9 th cenury AD Persian Sasanians and Hepthalites ruled Gandhaar. During their rule Gandhaar region was again influenced by Hinduism. The Hindu kings (Shahiya) were concentrated in the Kabul and Ghazni areas. The last Hindu Shahiya king of Kabul, Bhimapal was killed in 1026 AD. The heroic efforts of the Hindu Shahiya Kings to defend the northwestern gates of India against the invaders are described by even al-Biruni, the court historian of Mahmud of Ghazni (12). Some excavated sites of the period include a major Hindu Shahiya temple north of Kabul and a chapel that contains both Buddhist and Hindu images, indicating that there was a mingling of two religions (3). Islamic invasions on Afghanistan started in 642 AD, but over the next several centuries their effect was marginal and lasted only a short time after each raid. Cities surrendered only to rise in revolt and the hastily converted returned to their old religion (Hinduism or Buddhism) once the Moslem armies had passed (3). THUS TILL THE YEAR 1000 AD AFGHANISTAN WAS A FULL PART OF HINDU CRADLE. Hindu Kush and the Hindu Genocides Now Afghanistan is a Moslem country. Logically, this means either one or more of the following must have happened: a. original residents of Hindu Kush converted to Islam, or b. they were slaughtered and the conquerors took over, or c. they were driven out.

Encyclopedia Britannica (3) already informs us above about the resistance to conversion and frequent revolt against to the Moslem conqueror’s rule from 8 th thru 11 th Century AD. The name ‘Hindu Kush’ itself tells us about the fate of the original residents of Gandhaar and Vaahic Pradesh during the later period of Moslem conquests, because HINDU KUSH in Persian MEANS HINDU SLAUGHTER (13) (as per Koenraad Elst in his book ‘Ayodhya and After’). Let us look into what other standard references say about Hindu Kush. Persian-English dictionary (14) indicates that the word ‘Kush’ is derived from the verb Kushtar — to slaughter or carnage. Kush is probably also related to the verb Koshtan meaning to kill. In Urdu, the word Khud-kushi means act of killing oneself (khud — self, Kushi- act of killing). Encyclopedia Americana comments on the Hindu Kush as follows: The name Hindu Kush means literally ‘Kills the Hindu’, a reminder of the days when (Hindu) SLAVES from Indian subcontinent died in harsh Afgan mountains while being transported to Moslem courts of Central Asia (15). The National Geographic Article ‘West of Khyber Pass’ informs that ‘Generations of raiders brought captive Hindus past these peaks of perpetual snow. Such bitter journeys gave the range its name Hindu Kush «Killer of Hindus»‘(10). The World Book Encyclopedia informs that the name Kush, .. means Death ..(16). While Encyclopedia Britannica says ‘The name Hindu Kush first appears in 1333 AD in the writings of Ibn Battutah, the medieval Berber traveller, who said the name meant ‘Hindu Killer’, a meaning still given by Afgan mountain dwellers who are traditional enemies of Indian plainsmen (i.e. Hindus)(2). However, later the Encyclopedia Britannica gives a negationist twist by adding that ‘more likely the name is a corruption of Hindu-Koh meaning Hindu mountains’. This is unlikely, since the term Koh is used in its proper, uncorrupted form for the western portion of Hindu Kush, viz. Koh-iBaba, for the region Swat Kohistan, and in the names of the three peaks of this range, viz. Koh-i-Langer, Koh-i-Bandakor, and Koh-i-Mondi. Thus to say that corruption of term Koh to Kush occurred only in case of Hindu Kush is merely an effort to fit in a deviant observation to a theory already proposed. In science, a theory is rejected if it does not agree with the observations, and not the other way around. Hence the latter negationist statement in the Encyclopedia Britannica must be rejected. IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT ONE OF THE FEW PLACE NAMES ON EARTH THAT REMINDS US NOT OF THE VICTORY OF THE WINNERS BUT RATHER THE SLAUGHTER OF THE LOSERS, CONCERNS A GENOCIDE OF HINDUS BY THE MOSLEMS (13). Ibn Battuta (famous traveller and explorer) c. 1334, wrote:
«Another reason for our halt was fear of the snow, for on the road there is a mountain called Hindukush, which means «Slayer of Indians,» because the slave boys and girls who are brought from India die there in large numbers as a result of the extreme cold and the quantity of snow.»

Unlike the Jewish holocaust, the exact toll of the Hindu genocide suggested by the name Hindu Kush is not available. However the number is easily likely to be in millions. Few known historical figures can be used to justify this estimate. Encyclopedia Britannica informs that in December 1398 AD, Timur Lane ordered the execution of at least 50,000 captives before the battle for Delhi, .. and after the battle those inhabitants (of Delhi) not killed were removed (as slaves) (17), while other reference says that the number of captives butchered by Timur Lane’s army was about 100,000 (18). Later on Encyclopedia Britannica mentions that the Mughal emperor Akbar ‘ordered the massacre of about 30,000 (captured) Rajput Hindus on February 24, 1568 AD, after the battle for Chitod’ (19). Another reference indicates that this massacre of 30,000 Hindu peasants at Chitod

is recorded by Abul Fazl, Akbar’s court historian himself (20). These two ‘one day’ massacres are sufficient to provide a reference point for estimating the scale of Hindu genocide. The Afghan historian Khondamir records that during one of the many repeated invasions on the city of Herat in western Afghanistan, 1,500,000 residents perished (11). Scholar K.S. Lal[22] analysed Indian demography for the period between 1000-1525. Lal estimates that the numbers of Hindus who perished as a result of these campaigns was approximately 80 million. Since some of the Moslem conquerors took Indian plainsmen as slaves, a question comes: whatever happened to this slave population? The startling answer comes from New York Times (May-June 1993 issues). The Gypsies are wandering peoples in Europe. They have been persecuted in almost every country. Nazis killed 300,000 gypsies in the gas chambers. These Gypsies have been wandering around Central Asia and Europe since around the 12th Century AD. Until now their country of origin could not be identified. Also their Language has had very little in common with the other European languages. Recent studies however show that their language is similar to Punjabi and to a lesser degree to Sanskrit. Thus the Gypsies most likely originated from the greater Punjab. This is also backed up by DNA comparisons. The time frame of Gypsy wanderings also coincides early Islamic conquests hence most likely their ancestors were driven out of their homes in Punjab and taken as slaves over the Hindu Kush. The theory of Gypsy origins in India was first proposed over two centuries ago. It is only recently theta linguistic and other proofs have been verified. Even the Gypsy leadership now accepts India as the country of their origin. Thus it is evident that the mountain range was named as Hindu Kush as a reminder to the future Hindu generations of the slaughter and slavery of Hindus during the Moslem conquests. Deliberate ignorance about Hindu Kush If the name Hindu Kush relates such a horrible genocide of Hindus, why are Hindus ignorant about it? and why the Government of India does not teach them about Hindu Kush? The history and geography curriculum’s in Indian Schools barely even mention Hindu Kush. The horrors of the Jewish holocaust are taught not only in schools in Israel, Europe and USA, but also in Germany; because both Germany and Israel consider the Jewish holocaust a ‘dark chapter’ in the history. The Indian Government instead of giving details of this ‘dark chapter’ in Indian history is busy in whitewash of Moslem atrocities and the Hindu holocaust. In 1982, the National Council of Educational Research and Training issued a directive for the rewriting of school texts. Among other things it stipulated that: ‘Characterisation of the medieval period as a time of conflict between Hindus and Moslems is forbidden’. Thus denial of history or Negationism has become India’s official ‘educational’ policy (21). Often the official governmental historians brush aside questions such as those that Hindu Kush raises. They argue that the British version is the product of their ‘divide and rule’ policy’ hence their version is not necessarily true. However it must be remembered that the earliest reference of the name Hindu Kush and its literal meaning ‘Hindu Killer’ comes from Ibn Battutah in 1333 AD, and at that time British were nowhere on the Indian scene. Secondly, if the name indeed was a misnomer then the Afghans should have protested against such a barbaric name and the last 660 plus years should have been adequate for a change of name to a more ‘civil’ name. There has been no effort for such a change of name by the Afghans. On the contrary, when the Islamic fundamentalist regime of the Mujahadeens came to power in 1992, tens of thousands of Hindus and Sikhs from Kabul were literally deported, became refugees, and had to pay steep ransom to enter into Pakistan without a visa.

In the last 46 years the Indian Government also has not even once demanded that the Afghan Government change such an insulting and barbaric name. But in July 1993, the Government of India asked the visiting Jerusalem Symphony Orchestra to change its name because the word Jerusalem in its name is offensive to Moslem Fundamentalists. Conclusion It is evident that Hindus from ancient India’s (Hindustan’s) border states such as Gandhaar and Vaahic Pradesh were massacred or taken as slaves by the Moslem invaders who named the region as Hindu Kush (or Hindu Slaughter,or Hindu Killer) to teach a lesson to the future Hindu generations of India. Unfortunately Hindus are not aware of this tragic history. The Indian government does not want the true history of Hindu Moslem conflicts during the medieval ages to be taught in schools. This policy of negationism is the cause behind the ignorance of Hindus about the Hindu Kush and the Hindu genocide. Comments Although in this article Hindu Kush has been referred to as Hindu slaughter, it is obvious that it was really a Hindu and Buddhist slaughter. Since prior to Moslem invasions influence of Buddhism in Gandhaar and Vaahic Pradesh was considerable. Also as the huge 175 ft stone Buddhas of Bamian show, Buddhists were idol worshipers par excellence. Hence for Moslem invaders the Buddhists idol worshipers were equally deserving of punishment. It is also likely that Buddhism was considered an integral part of the Hindu pantheon and hence was not identified separately. This article barely scratches the surface of the Hindu genocide, the true depth of which is as yet unknown.
Sources: 1. Encyclopedia Britannica, 15 th Ed, Vol.5, p.935, 1987 2. Encyclopedia Britannica, 15 th Ed, Vol.14, pp.238-240, 1987 3. Encyclopedia Britannica, 15 th Ed, Vol.13, pp.35-36, 1987 4. The Invasion of India by Alexander the Great (as described by Arrian, Q.Curtius, Diodoros, Plutarch & Justin), By J.W.McCrindle, Methuen & Co., London, p.38, 1969 5. Six Glorious Epochs of Indian History, by Veer Savarkar, Savarkar Prakashan, Bombay, 2nd Ed, p.206, 1985 6. Chanakya — a TV series by Doordarshan, India 7. Encyclopedia Britannica, 15 th Ed, Vol.21, pp.36-41, 1987 8. V.Sarianidi, National Geographic Magazine, Vol.177, No.3, p.57, March 1990 9. Hammond Historical Atlas of the World, pp. H4 & H10, 1993 10. W.O.Douglas, National Geographic Magazine, vol.114, No.1, pp.13-23, July 1958 11. T.J.Abercrombie, National Geographic Magazine, Vol.134, No.3, pp.318-325, Sept.1968 12. An Advanced History of India, by R.C.Majumdar, H.C.Raychaudhuri, K.Datta, 2nd Ed., MacMillan and Co, London, pp.18283, 1965 13. Ayodhya and After, By Koenraad Elst, Voice of India Publication, p.278, 1991 14. A Practical Dictionary of the Persian Language, by J.A.Boyle, Luzac & Co., p.129, 1949 15. Encyclopedia Americana, Vol.14, p.206, 1993 15.ШИ 16. The World Book Encyclopedia, Vol.19, p.237, 1990 17. Encyclopedia Britannica, 15 th Ed, Vol.21, pp. 54-55, 1987 18. An Advanced History of India, by R.C.Majumdar, H.C.Raychaudhuri, K.Datta, 2nd Ed., MacMillan and Co, London, pp.33637, 1965 19. Encyclopedia Britannica, 15 th Ed, Vol.21, p.65, 1987 20. The Cambridge History of India, Vol.IV — The Mughul Period, by W.Haig & R.Burn, S.Chand & Co., New Delhi, pp. 98-99, 1963 21. Negationism in India, by Koenraad Elst, Voice of India Publ, 2nd Ed, pp.57-58, 1993 22. http://www.jihadwatch.org/dhimmiwatch/archives/015024.php http://www.hindunet.org/hindu_history/modern/hindu_kush.html

1.10 Additional info — Hindu Kush The Muslim conquests, down to the 16th century, were for the Hindus a pure struggle of life and death. Entire cities were burnt down and the populations massacred, with hundreds of thousands killed in every campaign, and similar numbers deported as slaves. Every new invader made (often literally) his hills of Hindus skulls. Thus, the conquest of Afghanistan in the year 1000 was followed by the annihilation of the Hindu population; the region is still called the Hindu Kush, i.e. Hindu slaughter. The Bahmani sultans (1347-1480) in central India made it a rule to kill 100,000 captives in a single day, and many more on other occasions. The conquest of the Vijayanagar Empire in 1564 left the capital plus large areas of Karnataka depopulated. And so on. As a contribution to research on the quantity of the Islamic crimes against humanity, we may mention Prof. K.S. Lal’s estimates about the population figures in medieval India (Growth of Muslim Population in India). According to his calculations, the Indian (subcontinent) population decreased by 80 million between 1000 (conquest of Afghanistan) and 1525 (end of Delhi Sultanate). But the Indian Pagans were far too numerous and never fully surrendered. What some call the Muslim period in Indian history, was in reality a continuous war of occupiers against resisters, in which the Muslim rulers were finally defeated in the 18th century. Against these rebellious Pagans the Muslim rulers preferred to avoid total confrontation, and to accept the compromise which the (in India dominant) Hanifite school of Islamic law made possible. Alone among the four Islamic law schools, the school of Hanifa gave Muslim rulers the right not to offer the Pagans the sole choice between death and conversion, but to allow them toleration as zimmis (protected ones) living under 20 humiliating conditions, and to collect the jizya (toleration tax) from them. Normally the zimmi status was only open to Jews and Christians (and even that concession was condemned by jurists of the Hanbalite school like lbn Taymiya), which explains why these communities have survived in Muslim countries while most other religions have not. On these conditions some of the higher Hindu castes could be found willing to collaborate, so that a more or less stable polity could be set up. Even then, the collaboration of the Rajputs with the Moghul rulers, or of the Kayasthas with the Nawab dynasty, one became a smooth arrangement when enlightened rulers like Akbar (whom orthodox Muslims consider an apostate) cancelled these humiliating conditions and the jizya tax. It is because of Hanifite law that many Muslim rulers in India considered themselves exempted from the duty to continue the genocide on the Hindus (self-exemption for which they were persistently reprimanded by their mullahs). Moreover, the Turkish and Afghan invaders also fought each other, so they often had to ally themselves with accursed unbelievers against fellow Muslims. After the conquests, Islamic occupation gradually lost its character of a total campaign to destroy the Pagans. Many Muslim rulers preferred to enjoy the revenue from stable and prosperous kingdoms, and were content to extract the jizya tax, and to limit their conversion effort to material incentives and

support to the missionary campaigns of sufis and mullahs (in fact, for less zealous rulers, the jizya was an incentive to discourage conversions, as these would mean a loss of revenue). The Moghul dynasty (from 1526 onwards) in effect limited its ambition to enjoying the zimma system, similar to the treatment of Jews and Christians in the Ottoman empire. Muslim violence would thenceforth be limited to some slave-taking, crushing the numerous rebellions, destruction of temples and killing or humiliation of Brahmins, and occasional acts of terror by small bands of raiders. A left-over from this period is the North-Indian custom of celebrating weddings at midnight: this was a safety measure against the Islamic sport of bride-catching. The last jihad against the Hindus before the full establishment of British rule was waged by Tipu Sultan at the end of the 18th century. In the rebellion of 1857, the near-defunct Muslim dynasties (Moghuls, Nawabs) tried to curry favour with their Hindu subjects and neighbours, in order to launch a joint effort to re-establish their rule. For instance, the Nawab promised to give the Hindus the Ram Janmabhoomi/Babri Masjid site back, in an effort to quench their anti-Muslim animosity and redirect their attention towards the new common enemy from Britain. This is the only instance in modern history when Muslims offered concessions to the Hindus; after that, all the concessions made for the sake of communal harmony were a one-way traffic from Hindu to Muslim.

Other sources to study: 1. Islam’s Indian slave trade Part I in Islam’s genocidal slavery I would strongly advise everyone to read this article which further documents brilliantly the millennium long Islamic genocide in India.

2. How ‘Gandhara’ became ‘Kandahar’:

1.11 What the Crusades Were Really Like

“A people not willing to embrace its past, ultimately forfeits its future.” Alexander Von Humboldt

The Crusaders were not unprovoked aggressors, greedy marauders or medieval colonialists, as portrayed in some history books. In fact, Thomas Madden, chair of St. Louis University’s history department and author of «A Concise History of the Crusades,» contests that the Crusaders were a defensive force that did not profit from their ventures by earthly riches or land. In fact, Thomas Madden, chair of St. Louis University’s history department and author of «A Concise History of the Crusades,» contests that the Crusaders were defensive wars,

not wars of conquest. Madden shared the most popular myths about the Crusades and the modern findings that prove them wrong. Q: What are some common misconceptions about the Crusades? the Crusaders? Madden: The following are some of the most common myths and why they are wrong.

Myth 1: The Crusades were wars of unprovoked aggression against a peaceful Muslim world. This is as wrong as wrong can be. From the time of Mohammed, Muslims had sought to conquer the Christian world. They did a pretty good job of it, too. After a few centuries of steady conquests, Muslim armies had taken all of North Africa, the Middle East, Asia Minor and most of Spain. In other words, by the end of the 11th century the forces of Islam had captured twothirds of the Christian world. Palestine, the home of Jesus Christ; Egypt, the birthplace of Christian monasticism; Asia Minor, where St. Paul planted the seeds of the first Christian communities — these were not the periphery of Christianity but it’s very core. And the Muslim empires were not finished yet. They continued to press westward toward Constantinople, ultimately passing it and entering Europe itself. As far as unprovoked aggression goes, it was all on the Muslim side. At some point what was left of the Christian world would have to defend itself or simply succumb to Islamic conquest.

Myth 2: The Crusaders wore crosses, but they were really only interested in capturing booty and land. Their pious platitudes were just a cover for rapacious greed. Historians used to believe that a rise in Europe’s population led to a crisis of too many noble «second sons,» those who were trained in chivalric warfare but who had no feudal lands to inherit. The Crusades, therefore, were seen as a safety valve, sending these belligerent men far from Europe where they could carve out lands for themselves at someone else’s expense. Modern scholarship, assisted by the advent of computer databases, has exploded this myth. We now know that it was the «first sons» of Europe that answered the Pope’s call in 1095, as well as in subsequent Crusades. Crusading was an enormously expensive operation. Lords were forced to sell off or mortgage their lands to gather the necessary funds. Most were also not interested in an overseas kingdom. Much like a soldier today, the medieval Crusader was proud to do his duty but longed to return home. After the spectacular successes of the First Crusade, with Jerusalem and much of Palestine in Crusader hands, virtually all of the Crusaders went home. Only a tiny handful remained behind to consolidate and govern the newly won territories. Booty was also scarce. In fact, although Crusaders no doubt dreamed of vast wealth in opulent Eastern cities, virtually none of them ever even recouped their expenses. But money and land were not the reasons that they went on Crusade in the first place. They

went to atone for their sins and to win salvation by doing good works in a faraway land. They underwent such expense and hardship because they believed that by coming to the aid of their Christian brothers and sisters in the East they were storing up treasure where rust and moth cannot corrupt. They were very mindful of Christ’s exhortation that he who will not take up his cross is not worthy of Christ. They also remembered that «Greater love hath no man than this, than to lay down his life for his friends.»

Myth 3: When the Crusaders captured Jerusalem in 1099 they massacred every man, woman and child in the city until the streets ran ankle deep with the blood. This is a favourite used to demonstrate the evil nature of the Crusades. It is certainly true that many people in Jerusalem were killed after the Crusaders captured the city. But this must be understood in historical context. The accepted moral standard in all pre-modern European and Asian civilisations was that a city that resisted capture and was taken by force belonged to the victorious forces. That included not just the buildings and goods, but the people as well. That is why every city or fortress had to weigh carefully whether it could hold out against besiegers. If not, it was wise to negotiate terms of surrender. In the case of Jerusalem, the defenders had resisted right up to the end. They calculated that the formidable walls of the city would keep the Crusaders at bay until a relief force from Egypt could arrive. They were wrong. When the city fell, therefore, it was put to the sack. Many were killed, yet many others were ransomed or allowed to go free. By modern standards this may seem brutal. Yet a medieval knight would point out that many more innocent men, women and children are killed in modern bombing warfare than could possibly be put to the sword in one or two days. It is worth noting that in those cities occupied by Muslims and that surrendered to the Crusaders the people were left unmolested, retained their property and were allowed to worship freely. As for those streets of blood, no historian accepts them as anything other than a literary convention. Jerusalem is a big town. The amount of blood necessary to fill the streets to a continuous and running three-inch depth would require many more people than lived in the region, let alone the city.

Myth 4: The Crusades were just medieval colonialism dressed up in religious finery. It is important to remember that in the Middle Ages the West was not a powerful, dominant culture venturing into a primitive or backward region. It was the Muslim East that was powerful, wealthy and opulent. Europe was the Third World. The Crusader States, founded in the wake of the First Crusade, were not new plantations of Catholics in a Muslim world akin to the British colonisation of America. Catholic presence in the Crusader states was always tiny, easily less than 10% of the population. These were the rulers and magistrates, as well as Italian merchants and members of the military orders. The overwhelming majority of the population in the Crusader states was Muslim.

They were not colonies, therefore, in the sense of plantations or even factories, as in the case of India. They were outposts. The ultimate purpose of the Crusader states was to defend the holy places in Palestine, especially Jerusalem, and to provide a safe environment for Christian pilgrims to visit those places. There was no mother country with which the Crusader states had an economic relationship, nor did Europeans economically benefit from them. Quite the contrary, the expense of Crusades to maintain the Latin East was a serious drain on European resources. As an outpost, the Crusader states kept a military focus. While the Muslims warred against each other the Crusader states were safe, but once the Muslims united, they were able to dismantle the strongholds, capture the cities, and in 1291 expel the Christians completely. Myth 5: The Crusades were also waged against the Jews. No pope ever called a Crusade against Jews. During the First Crusade a large band of riffraff, not associated with the main army, descended on the towns of the Rhineland and decided to rob and kill the Jews they found there. In part this was pure greed. In part it also stemmed from the incorrect belief that the Jews, as the crucifiers of Christ, were legitimate targets of the war. Pope Urban II and subsequent popes strongly condemned these attacks on Jews. Local bishops and other clergy and laity attempted to defend the Jews, although with limited success. Similarly, during the opening phase of the Second Crusade a group of renegades killed many Jews in Germany before St. Bernard was able to catch up to them and put a stop to it. These misfires of the movement were an unfortunate by-product of Crusade enthusiasm, but they were not the purpose of the Crusades. To use a modern analogy, during the Second World War some American soldiers committed crimes while overseas. They were arrested and punished for those crimes. But the purpose of the Second World War was not to commit crimes.

1.12 The Crusades and today Present-day tension between the West and Muslim countries has very little to do with the Crusades, says a historian. In fact, Thomas Madden, chair of the history department at St. Louis University and author of «A Concise History of the Crusades,» contends that, from the Muslim perspective, the Crusades were not worth noticing. That changed when 19th-century revisionists started to recast the Crusades as imperialist wars, he says. Q: Do you think the struggle between the West and the Muslim world is in any way a reaction to the Crusades? Madden: No. That may seem a strange answer when you consider that Osama bin Laden and other Islamists often refer to Americans as «Crusaders.» It’s important to remember, though, that during the Middle Ages — really up until the late 16th century — the superpower of the Western world was Islam. Muslim civilisations were

wealthy, sophisticated and immensely powerful. The West was backward and relatively weak. It is noteworthy that with the exception of the First Crusade virtually every other Crusade launched by the West — and there were hundreds — was unsuccessful. The Crusades may have slowed Muslim expansionism, but they in no way stopped it. Muslim empires would continue to expand into Christian territories, conquering the Balkans, much of Eastern Europe and even the greatest Christian city in the world, Constantinople. From the Muslim perspective the Crusades were not worth noticing. If you had asked someone in the Muslim world about the Crusades in the 18th century he or she would have known nothing about them. They were important to Europeans because they were massive efforts that failed. However, during the 19th century, when Europeans began conquering and colonising Middle Eastern countries, many historians — in particular nationalist or royalist French writers — began to cast the Crusades as Europe’s first attempt to bring the fruits of Western civilisation to the backward Muslim world. In other words, the Crusades were morphed into imperialist wars. Those histories were taught in the colonial schools and became the accepted view in the Middle East and beyond. In the 20th century, imperialism was discredited. Islamists and some Arab nationalists then seized on the colonial construction of the Crusades, claiming that the West was responsible for their woes because they had preyed on Muslims ever since the Crusades. It is often said that people in the Middle East have long memories; it is true. But in the case of the Crusades, they have a recovered memory: one that was manufactured for them by their European conquerors. Q: Are there any similarities between the Crusades and the war against terror today? Madden: Aside from the fact that soldiers in both wars want to serve something greater than themselves that they hold dear and long to return home when it is over, I see no other similarities between the medieval Crusades and the war against terror. Motivations in a post-Enlightenment secular society are very different from those in the medieval world. Q: How are the Crusades different from Islam’s Jihad, or other wars of religion? Madden: The fundamental purpose of Jihad is to expand the Dar al-Islam — the Abode of Islam — into the Dar al-Harb — the Abode of War. In other words, jihad is expansionistic, seeking to conquer non-Muslims and place them under Muslim rule. Those who are then conquered are given a simple choice. For those who are not People of the Book — in other words, those who are not Christians or Jews — the choice is convert to Islam or die. For those who are People of the Book, the choice is submit to Muslim rule, accept dhimmitude and Islamic law or die. The expansion of Islam, therefore, was directly linked to the military successes of Jihad. The Crusades were something very different. From its beginnings Christianity has always forbidden coerced conversion of any kind. Conversion by the sword, therefore, was not possible for Christianity. Unlike Jihad, the purpose of the Crusades was neither to expand the Christian world nor to expand Christianity through forced conversions.

Instead, the Crusades were a direct and belated response to centuries of Muslim conquests of Christian lands. The immediate event that sparked the First Crusade was the Turkish conquest of all of Asia Minor in the 1070s through 1090s. The First Crusade was called by Pope Urban II in 1095 in response to an urgent plea for help from the Byzantine emperor in Constantinople. Urban called the knights of Christendom to come to the aid of their Eastern brethren. Asia Minor was Christian. … Part of the Byzantine Empire, it had been first evangelised by St. Paul. St. Peter had been the first bishop of Antioch. Paul had written his famous letter to the Christians of Ephesus. The creed of the Church was penned at Nicaea. All of these were in Asia Minor. The Byzantine emperor begged the Christians of the West for aid in recapturing these lands and expelling the Turks. The Crusades were that aid. Their purpose, though, was not only to re-conquer Asia Minor but also to recapture other formerly Christian lands that had been lost due to Islamic Jihads. This included the Holy Land. In a nutshell, therefore, the major difference between Crusade and Jihad is that the former was a defence against the latter. The entire history of the Eastern Crusades is one of response to Muslim aggression. Q: Did the Crusaders have any success at converting the Muslim world? Madden: I would note that in the 13th century some Franciscans began a mission in the Middle East to seek to convert Muslims. It was not successful, largely because Islamic law makes conversion to another religion a capital offence. This attempt, though, was separate from the Crusades, which had nothing at all to do with conversion. And it was by peaceful persuasion. Q: How did Christendom rationalise its defeat in the Crusades? Were the Crusaders defeated? Madden: The same way that the Jews of the Old Testament did. God withheld victory from his people because they were sinful. This led to a large-scale piety movement in Europe, whose aim was to purify Christian society in every way. Q: Did Pope John Paul II in fact apologise for the Crusades? Has he actually condemned them? Madden: This is an odd myth, given that the Pope was so roundly criticised for failing to apologise directly for the Crusades when he asked forgiveness from all those that Christians had unjustly harmed. Our Holy Father did not condemn them, nor did he apologise for them. He apologised for the sins of Catholics. More recently it was widely reported that John Paul II apologised to the patriarch of Constantinople for the Crusader conquest of Constantinople in 1204. In truth, though, the Pope only reiterated what his predecessor Pope Innocent III [11981216] said. That too was a tragic misfire that Innocent had done everything he could to avoid. He apologised for the sins of Catholics who took part in the Crusades. Yet he did not apologise for the Crusades themselves or even the outcome of the Crusades.

Source: http://www.catholic.org/featured/headline.php?ID=1417 http://www.zenit.org/article-11237?l=english

1.13 The factors that led to the Crusades By Lucio Mascarenhas (formerly «Prakash»), Bombay, India It is a historical fact that Islam began as an overtly militant and aggressive cult in its fundamental and inherent nature of being & remains so. It was Islam that attacked, without any provocation whatsoever, its Christian neighbours, overran their lands and committed genocide and enslaved the remainder. Let me list the Christian lands and peoples that Islam encroached upon: Roman Arabia, Arabia Felix, Israel (Philistia), Jordan, Iraq (Chaldea, Assyria and Hadiabene), Syria (Aram), Lebanon (Phoenicia), Turkey (Bythinia, Cappadocia, Cilicia, Galatia, Caria, Pontus, etc.), Thrace, Egypt (the Copts), Sudan (Nubia and Axum), Libya (Lybia, Cyrenaica and Tripolitania), Tunisia (Roman Africa Nova et Vetera & Carthage), Algeria (Roman Africa, Numidia & G?tulia), Morocco(Roman Mauretania), Spain (Roman Iberia), Portugal (Lusitania), South France («The Muslims were at last defeated by Charles Martel at Tours, in 732, just one hundred years from the death of Mohammed»), Southern Italy (Sicilia & Neapolitania), Malta (Melita), Armenia (Hayastan), Georgia, Azerbaijan (Roman Albania, not modern Albania which was Roman Illyrica), etc. The many nations of Iran were Zorastrian, together with the Kurds, Sogdians (Tadjiks) and the peoples of Ariana. Some Zorastrians escaped the Islamic Conquest and Genocide to India, becoming the Parsees. Today, even the fanatically Muslim Iranians look back with horror and loathing on, and denounce that original Conquest and Genocide as the grossest barbarism (Naqba). The Turks, as the many Indophile nations of Central Asia and West India (Pakistan & Afghanistan), were Buddhists and Hindus. Again, we have that same story of unprovoked aggression, imperialism, colonialism, barbarism. The Turks were forced to become Muslim, and then went on to perpetrate those same misanthropies on others. All these lands were subject to Islamic Imperialism, Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing, Colonialism and Demographic Re-Engineering in order to create Islamic majorities. The Islamic Conquests — really a Naqba (Catastrophe), if there was ever one, began with the foundation of Islam in the sixth century. On the contrary, the Crusades began only in the eleventh century, under Pope Urban II (Otto von Lagery), who, at Clermont, France, in November, 1095 inaugurated it, proclaiming it ‘God’s Will.’ The Crusades, were thus, chronologically latter to the Islamic Aggressions and in response to them, and specifically to immediate and gross provocations. The immediate provocation for the first crusade was the Islamic mistreatment of Christian pilgrims to Israel — to Jerusalem and the sites connected to Lord Jesus Christ, together with attempts to deny Christians access to these sites.

Source: http://www.geocities.com/prakashjm45/crusades.html

1.14 Modern Aftermath of the Crusades By Robert Spencer

The Crusades may be causing more devastation today than they ever did in the three centuries when most of them were fought, according to one expert. Robert Spencer, author of «Politically Incorrect Guide to Islam (and the Crusades)», claims that the damage is not in terms of lives lost and property destroyed but is a more subtle destruction. Spencer shared how false ideas about the Crusades are being used by extremists to foment hostility to the West today. Q: The Crusades are often portrayed as a militarily offensive venture. Were they? Spencer: No. Pope Urban II, who called for the First Crusade at the Council of Clermont in 1095, was calling for a defensive action — one that was long overdue. As he explained, he was calling the Crusade because without any defensive action, «the faithful of God will be much more widely attacked» by the Turks and other Muslim forces. «For, as most of you have heard, the Turks and Arabs have attacked them and have conquered the territory of Romania [the Greek empire] as far west as the shore of the Mediterranean and the Hellespont, which is called the Arm of St. George,» Pope Urban II said in his address. «They have occupied more and more of the lands of those Christians, and have overcome them in seven battles. They have killed and captured many, and have destroyed the churches and devastated the empire. «If you permit them to continue thus for a while with impunity, the faithful of God will be much more widely attacked by them.» He was right. Jihad warfare had from the seventh century to the time of Pope Urban conquered and Islamised what had been over half of Christendom. There had been no response from the Christian world until the Crusades. Q: What are some popular misconceptions about the Crusades? Spencer: One of the most common is the idea that the Crusades were an unprovoked attack by Europe against the Islamic world. In fact, the conquest of Jerusalem in 638 stood at the beginning of centuries of Muslim aggression, and Christians in the Holy Land faced an escalating spiral of persecution. Early in the eighth century 60 Christian pilgrims from Amorium were crucified; around the same time the Muslim governor of Caesarea seized a group of pilgrims from Iconium

and had them all executed as spies — except for a small number who converted to Islam. Muslims also demanded money from pilgrims, threatening to ransack the Church of the Resurrection if they didn’t pay. Later in the eighth century, a Muslim ruler banned displays of the cross in Jerusalem. He also increased the tax on non-Muslims — jizya — that Christians had to pay and forbade Christians to engage in religious instruction of their own children and fellow believers. Early in the ninth century the persecutions grew so severe that large numbers of Christians fled for Constantinople and other Christian cities. In 937, Muslims went on a rampage in Jerusalem on Palm Sunday, plundering and destroying the Church of Calvary and the Church of the Resurrection. In 1004, the Fatimid Caliph, Abu ‘Ali al-Mansur al-Hakim, ordered the destruction of churches, the burning of crosses, and the seizure of church property. Over the next 10 years 30,000 churches were destroyed, and untold numbers of Christians converted to Islam simply to save their lives. In 1009, al-Hakim commanded that the Church of the Holy Sepulcher in Jerusalem be destroyed, along with several other churches, including the Church of the Resurrection. In 1056, the Muslims expelled 300 Christians from Jerusalem and forbade European Christians from entering the rebuilt Church of the Holy Sepulcher. When the Seljuk Turks took Jerusalem in 1077, the Seljuk Emir Atsiz bin Uwaq promised not to harm the inhabitants, but once his men had entered the city, they murdered 3,000 people. Another common misconception is that the Crusades were fought to convert Muslims to Christianity by force. Glaringly absent from every report about Pope Urban’s address at the Council of Claremont is any command to the Crusaders to convert Muslims. It was not until over 100 years after the First Crusade, in the 13th century, that European Christians made any organised attempt to convert Muslims to Christianity, when the Franciscans began missionary work among Muslims in lands held by the Crusaders. This effort was largely unsuccessful. Yet another misconception revolves around the Crusaders’ bloody sack of Jerusalem in 1099. The capture of Jerusalem is often portrayed as unique in medieval history, and as the cause of Muslim mistrust of the West. It might be more accurate to say that it was the start of a millennium of anti-Western grievance mongering and propaganda. The Crusaders’ sack of Jerusalem was a heinous crime — particularly in light of the religious and moral principles they professed to uphold. However, by the military standards of the day, it was not actually anything out of the ordinary. In those days, it was a generally accepted principle of warfare that if a city under siege resisted capture, it could be sacked, and while if it did not resist, mercy would be shown. It is a matter of record that Muslim armies frequently behaved in exactly the same way when entering a conquered city. This is not to excuse the Crusaders’ conduct by pointing to similar actions. One atrocity does not excuse another. But it does illustrate that the Crusaders’ behaviour in Jerusalem was consistent with that of other armies of the period — since all states subscribed to the

same notions of siege and resistance. In 1148, Muslim commander Nur ed-Din did not hesitate to order the killing of every Christian in Aleppo. In 1268, when the Jihad forces of the Mamluk Sultan Baybars took Antioch from the Crusaders, Baybars was annoyed to find that the Crusader ruler had already left the city — so he wrote to him bragging of his massacres of Christians. Most notorious of all may be the Jihadists’ entry into Constantinople on May 29, 1453, when they, according to historian Steven Runciman, «slew everyone that they met in the streets, men, women and children without discrimination.» Finally, it is a misconception that Pope John Paul II apologised for the Crusades. He did not. There is no doubt that the belief that Pope John Paul II apologised for the Crusades is widespread. When he died, the Washington Post reminded its readers «during his long reign, Pope John Paul II apologised to Muslims for the Crusades, to Jews for antiSemitism, to Orthodox Christians for the sacking of Constantinople, to Italians for the Vatican’s associations with the Mafia and to scientists for the persecution of Galileo.» However, John Paul II never actually apologised for the Crusades. The closest he came was on March 12, 2000, the «Day of Pardon.» During his homily he said: «We cannot fail to recognise the infidelities to the Gospel committed by some of our brethren, especially during the second millennium. Let us ask pardon for the divisions which have occurred among Christians, for the violence some have used in the service of the truth and for the distrustful and hostile attitudes sometimes taken toward the followers of other religions.» This is hardly a clear apology for the Crusades. Q: How have Muslims perceived the Crusades then and now? Spencer: For centuries, when the Ottoman Empire was thriving, the Crusades were not a pre-occupation of the Islamic world. They were, after all, failures from a Western standpoint. However, with the decline of the military power and unity of the Islamic world, and the concomitant rise of the West, they have become a focal point of Muslim resentment of perceived Western encroachment and exploitation. Q: To what extent are false ideas about the Crusades being used by extremists to foment hostility to the West today? Spencer: The Crusades may be causing more devastation today than they ever did in the three centuries when most of them were fought — but not in terms of lives lost and property destroyed. Today’s is a more subtle destruction. The Crusades have become a cardinal sin not only of the Catholic Church but also of the Western world in general. They are Exhibit A for the case that the current strife between the Muslim world and Western, post-Christian civilisation is ultimately the responsibility of the West, which has provoked, exploited, and brutalised Muslims ever since the first Frankish warriors entered Jerusalem. Osama bin Laden has spoken of his organisation not as al-Qaida but of a «World Islamic

Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders,» and called in a fatwa for «Jihad against Jews and Crusaders.» Such usage is widespread. On November 8, 2002 — shortly before the beginning of the Iraqi war that toppled Saddam Hussein — Sheikh Bakr Abed Al-Razzaq Al-Samaraai preached in Baghdad’s Mother of All Battles mosque about «this difficult hour in which the Islamic nation [is] experiencing, an hour in which it faces the challenge of [forces] of disbelief of infidels, Jews, crusaders, Americans and Britons.» Similarly, when Islamic Jihadists bombed the U.S. Consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in December 2004, they explained that the attack was part of larger plan to strike back at «Crusaders»: «This operation comes as part of several operations that are organised and planned by al-Qaida as part of the battle against the crusaders and the Jews, as well as part of the plan to force the unbelievers to leave the Arabian Peninsula,» the Jihadists said in a statement. They also said that Jihad warriors «managed to enter one of the crusaders’ big castles in the Arabian Peninsula and managed to enter the American consulate in Jeddah, in which they control and run the country.» In the face of this, Westerners should not be embarrassed by the Crusades. It’s time to say, «enough,» and teach our children to take pride in their own heritage. They should know that they have a culture and a history of which they can and should be grateful; that they are not the children and grandchildren of oppressors and villains; and that their homes and families are worth defending against those who want to take them away, and are willing to kill to do so.
Source: http://www.ewtn.com/library/CHISTORY/zaftcrus.HTM

1.15 History of the Islamic Ottoman Turkish Empire I (1299-1876)

1. Rise of the Ottomans By the year 1300, a weakened Byzantium had seen most of its Anatolian provinces lost among some ten Seljuk Ghazi principalities. Ertugrul’s son Osman becomes Bey in 1281, by 1299 declared himself a sovereign from the Seljuk’s, establishing the Ottoman Empire. Flag of the Ottoman Empire 1299-1453 Flag of the Osmanli 1326-1517 Capture of Bursa – 1326 Battle of Plocnik – 1386 Ottoman Battle Flag Battle of Kosovo — 1389 Constantinople — 1452 Capture of Constantinople — 1453 Ottoman Flag – 1453 – 1844 Battle of Chaldiran — 1514

Sultan Suleiman I – 1520-1566 Battle of Mohacs — 1526 Battle of Preveza – 1538 Battle of Lepanto — 1571 Capture of Yerevan – 1635 Capture of Baghdad – 1639 Second siege of Vienna — 1683

The Ottoman society comprised of many ethnicities: Greek, Armenian, Assyrian, Arab, Jew, Kurd, Persian, Georgian, Bulgarian, Serb, Hungarian, Croatian, Romanian, Albanian, etc. The Turk was the ruling and superior element to all others. The Sultanate, government sectors, viziers, pashas, judges, and the military establishment had to be Turkish and Muslim. The Janissary Corps was the backbone of the Military. Its members were forcefully taken from Christian families, converted and raised as Turks. The Ottoman traditionally got their wives and harem girls from Christian families. Non-Muslims had to wear a different colour, they could not ride horses, nor carry weapons. Christians and Jews were called “Kafir” or “Gyavur” (Infidel). The Law of the land was Islamic Sharia Law. 2. Era of Stagnation (1683-1808) After its defeat in 1983, the Ottoman Empire went through a stagnation period, during which many territories ceded. New forces appeared on the horizon, Austria, Britain, France and Russia. Peter the Great of Russia defeats the Ottomans in 1723 and takes Dorbent, Baku, and North Atrpatakan (Azerbaijan) from the Turks and Persians. In the decisive Russian-Turkish War of 1768-1774, Catherine II brings Southern Ukraine, the Northern Caucasus, and Crimea within the orbit of the Russian Empire. The Turks try to regain the lost territories, but a united Russian-Austrian force defeats them in 1791 and 1792, and takes Transylvania, Bessarabia and Hungary. Napoleon invades Egypt in 1798 and takes control over Christian Malta and Christian Palestine. However, Britain fights France defending the Ottomans. Napoleon withdraws, the Turks regain Egypt, and Britain is rewarded with Malta. Following a short battle in 1807 with Britain, the enraged Janissaries depose Sultan Selim III for his cousin Mustafa IV. Mustafa is deposed after one year for his brother Mahmud II. Each Sultan subsequently murders his brother. The Ottomans lose more lands from their crumbling Empire. During the series of wars between 1806 and 1812, the Russians crush the Ottomans, who sign the Treaty of Bucharest. One day after the Treaty, Napoleon attacks Russia. With the “Second Serbian Uprising” in 1815, Serbia gains independence from the Ottoman Empire with heroes like Karadorde Petrovic and Milos Obrenovic. Influenced by the writings and murder of Greek author Rigas Feraios, The Greek War of Independence begins in 1821 and lasts for almost ten years. The Greek people struggle to rid themselves of Ottoman Turkish tyranny and win their recognised independence in 1832. At the Battle of Navarino, the Sultan closes the Dardanelles for Russian ships and revokes the Akkerman Convention. After the Russian-Persian and Russian-Turkish Wars of 1828-1829, the Ottomans recognise Russian sovereignty over Georgia and Eastern Armenia.

Starting in the 1830’s, the Ottoman Empire became known as the “Sick man of Europe”. 3. Three Reformist Sultans (1808-1876) Despite the political and military fateful years, Sultan Mahmud II has the courage to introduce a series of fundamental reforms into the Ottoman Empire. His Vizier, Mustafa Pasha takes the initiative in resuming reforms but he is killed by the Janissaries. Mahmud abolishes the Janissary corps in 1826 and establishes a modern Ottoman Army, naming it Nizam-i Cedid, (New Order). In 1831 Sultan Mahmud opens the first Government Hospital, and in 1833 introduces a wide series of reforms in legal, educational, scientific and other policies in an edict called “Tanzimat” (Reforms). Sultan Mahmud forbids the abuses of the governors and vakifs, killing of people at will by pashas and agas, and places legal and property arbitrations under state administration. He dies in 1839. Sultan Abdulmejid continues his father’s reforms by replacing the Islamic Sharia Law by a European model Civil Code and Banking system. He establishes the first modern universities and academies, abolishes some unfair taxes on non-Muslims, and brings various provisions for the better administration of the public service. In 1854 Britain and France along with the Ottomans go to war against Russia in the Crimean Peninsula. The allied forces defeat Russia and impose heavy conditions in the Treaty of Paris, signed in 1856. At the closing of the Crimean War of 1856, Sultan Abdulmejid decrees the “Hatt-i Humayun” thus promising equality in education, government appointments, and administration of justice to all regardless of creed. The greatest change was the Ottoman State’s acceptation of the notion of “minorities”. Muslim government organisations (civil and military schools) begin to accept non-Muslim citizens. The official state language (in documentation) principle (Turkish) was broken, and the Empire becomes a multi-language system. Patriarchates begin to administer justice on the state level. Sultan Abdulmejid dies at the young age of 39 in 1861. Sultan Abdulaziz continues his brother’s reformist works. He authorises the Armenian National constitution in 1863, granting them rights in running educational, cultural, civic, social, charitable and religious matters. In 1871-76, Sultan Abdulaziz faces opposition from Islamic conservative and fanatic elements, demanding the return of the Sharia Law and the rule of Islam. His reformist Viziers, Fuad and Ali Pashas die in 1869 and 1871. The reaction from the conservatives was the rise of the liberal party, led by Midhat Pasha. As a result of the ensuing inner conflict, Sultan Abdulaziz was deposed and murdered in 1876. After the 1870-71 French-German War, Nationalism was on the rise across Europe. It was fanning the feelings of independence among its subjects, even among Turks. The Empires in Europe were heading towards war. The three reformist sultans, worked hard to gather all their subjects under the idea of “Ottomanism”, in order to keep the falling Empire. They rejected the notion of “Turkishness”, as historians E. Chelebi and I. M. D’Ohson testify. As a result of the Russian-Turkish wars and the rising local nationalism, the ruling Ottoman element began calling itself as the “Turk”. Abdulmejid’s son, Murad V rules for 93 days in 1876. He is deposed on the accusations of being mentally ill. He is placed under house arrest for the rest of his life, dying in 1904.

History of the Ottoman Turkish Empire II (1876-1909) 4. The Armenians in the Ottoman Empire The Armenians in the Ottoman Empire were mainly living on their millennial ancestral homeland, called the “Eastern Six Vilayets” under the millet system. They were also populous in Cilicia and the major cities of Ottoman Turkey, where many rose to prominent positions in finance and business. In accordance to the dhimmi system, Armenians, as Christians and Jews, living under the Islamic laws, were guaranteed limited freedoms such as the right to worship but were, in effect, treated as second-class citizens. They were forbidden to carry weapons and to ride horses, their children were subject to the Devshirmeh system (giving up boys to be forcefully converted to Muslims and raised as Turks), their houses could not overlook those of Muslims, and the ringing of church bells could not disturb Muslims. Testimony against Muslims by them was inadmissible in courts no matter the crime. Violating the dhimmi system, would result in punishment carried out by the authorities ranging from paying fines to the execution of the “offender”. In the nineteenth century, frustrations with these restrictions lead many of the minorities to protest for greater freedom. In 1839, the Ottomans implemented the Tanzimat reforms to help improve the situation, although they were mostly ineffective. When several ethnicities of the Balkans, frustrated with the prevailing conditions, had often revolted against Ottoman rule, Armenians remained dormant during these years, earning them the title of “millet-i sadika” or the “loyal millet.” In the mid-1860’s to early 1870’s under the reform laws of Sultan Abdulmejid, Armenians began to ask for better treatment from the Ottoman government, after amassing the signatures of peasants from eastern Anatolia. The Armenian Communal Council petitioned the government to relieve the situation of towns: Widespread forced land seizure, forced conversion of women and children, arson, protection extortion, rape and murder was common. Other problems were improprieties during tax collection, criminal behaviour by government officials and the refusal to accept Christians as witnesses in trial. Despite the set rules, local Turks, Kurds and other Muslims treated their Christian neighbours as before. 5. The Red Sultan (1876-1909) At this crucial time, Abdulhamid II accede the throne, becoming the 34th Sultan. He was tyrannical, debauched, mistrustful and ruthless. He takes over a country with an empty treasury and banking defaults. While power being in the hands of Midhat Pasha and the “New Ottomans” (a progressive movement), Abdulhamid promises Midhat a constitution on the European model. He passes the first constitution of Ottoman Turkey in 1876 on the eve of an international conference on the question of reforms in the Balkans. By January 1877 and at the end of the conference, he removes Midhat Pasha as Grand Vizier and dissolves the Parliament. Midhat Pasha is exiled and murdered on his orders in 1884. Abdulhamid considers that the political structures of western norms are not applicable with the centuries old Ottoman political culture. To build his treasury, he imposes a heavy tax burden over his subjects, especially the Christians. Bosnia revolts against the taxation in 1875 and Bulgaria follows in 1876 to become free from the Ottomans. The Turks ruthlessly massacre more than 12 000 men, women and children in Bulgaria, and thousands more all over the Balkans. The Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca of 1774 gave Russia the right to interfere in Ottoman affairs to protect the Sultan’s Christian subjects. The British Government defends the Ottoman actions, and a furious Russia declares war.

The war of 1877-78 takes place in the Balkans and on the Caucasus fronts. The Russians along with other volunteer ethnic armies deal the Ottomans a crushing defeat. Able generals from the Balkan and Armenian generals in the Tsar’s Army like Mikhail LorisMelikov and Ivan Lazarev among others bring victories to the Russian forces. In March of 1878 and under pressure from Britain, Russia enters into a settlement under the Treaty of San Stefano, in which the Ottoman Empire recognises the independence of Romania, Serbia, Montenegro, and autonomy of Bulgaria. Article 16 states that Russians would leave the Armenian provinces, once the Sultan implemented the improvements and reforms demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by Armenians, and to guarantee their security from Kurds and Circassians. For commercial and political interests in mind, Britain’s Disraeli and the Austrians insist that a new treaty be drawn up in June of that year, at a congress of powers in Berlin. At the Congress of Berlin, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro were recognised as independent. And autonomous Bulgaria was greatly reduced and the Austro-Hungarian Empire occupies Bosnia-Herzegovina. An Armenian delegation headed by Bishop Mkrtich Khrimian is sent with a formal request for implementation of the reforms for Armenians. Germany’s Bismarck dismisses the delegation and refuses them a place on the agenda. Britain secretly agrees with the Ottoman Empire that it would militarily protect it from Russia and receives Cyprus in exchange. Disraeli reverses article 16 to 61, which returns two Armenian provinces with no Russians or Europeans to protect the Armenians. It leaves the same abusing Sultan as the “guarantor” of their security from Muslim continuing abuses. After the Russo-Turkish War, the treatment of the more than 2,5 million Armenians by the Ottoman Government became an international issue. Despite the promises of reform by the Sublime Porte at the Congress of Berlin, the situation even grew worse. Not only Russia but the other European powers were to oversee the Armenian reforms. An angry Abdulhamid made sure that the conditions of the Armenians grew worse. Now it was dangerous to be identified as an Armenian across the Empire. As the Millet structure degraded and as a result of constant persecutions, Armenians begin to rethink their position in the world. In this analysis the Armenian subjects of the Empire influenced by the Armenian Diaspora and following the Balkan examples. Years passed, and the masses simply yearned for reforms, dreaming only for a normal administration under Ottoman rule… “The mere mention of the word “reform” irritated him (Abdul Hamit), inciting his criminal instincts” writes historian Osman Nuri. Armenian small organisations started printing newsletters and bulletins to enlighten the Armenian public about their rights and ways to protect them. Later the first major organisation was the Armenakan Party in 1885, and the Huntchak Party in 1887. In 1890 the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaksutyun) was formed in Tbilisi. Its members armed themselves into fedayee groups to protect the people from Ottoman oppression and massacres in the Armenian provinces. Armenians begin clamoring to obtain the reforms which were promised. They protest in 1892 and 1893 at Merzifon and Tokat and are met with violence and harsh methods. Abdulhamid declares that “Without Armenians there would be no Armenian problem” In 1894, systematic pogroms swept over every district of Turkish Armenia. The wholesale slaughter of Armenians, forced conversion of villages, the looting and burning of hundreds of settlements, taking away their possessions. Sultan Abdulhamid prepared special attacking force from Kurds calling them “Hamidieh”. Along with the Ottoman Army they attacked men women and children killing them without distinction. His First Secretary wrote in his memoirs about Abdulhamid that he decided to pursue a policy of severity and terror against the Armenians, and in order to succeed in this respect he elected the method of dealing them an economic blow. He ordered they absolutely avoid negotiating or discussing anything with the Armenians and inflict upon them a decisive strike to settle scores. More than 300 000 Armenians were massacred in 1894-1896. In

Sasun the Armenians resisted the massacres. But they eventually succumbed to superior numbers. A group of Dashnak volunteers stormed the “Ottoman Bank” in 1896 in order to alarm the Europeans. Hamid had 6000 Istanbul Armenians massacred. In 1897, Abdulhamid declared that the Armenian question was closed. All the Armenian revolutionaries had either been killed, or had escaped to Russia. The Ottoman government closed Armenian societies and restricted Armenian political movements. The formation of Armenian revolutionary groups began roughly around the end of the RussoTurkish War of 1878 and intensified with the first introduction of Article 166 of the Ottoman Penal code, and the raid of Erzerum Cathedral. Article 166 was meant to control the possession of arms, but it was used to target Armenians by restricting them to possess arms. Local Kurdish tribes were armed to attack the defenceless Armenian population. ARF member’s attempts to assassinate Abdulhamid in 1905, but he escapes death by luck. He eases the Armenian persecutions as a result. The “Young Turk” revolution of 1908 reverses the suspension of the Ottoman parliament in 1878, marking the onset of the Second Constitutional Era. Armenians hail the revolution. Hamid restores the Constitution in July. In April 1909 he and Islamist forces attempt a countercoup. It fails to restore him, but more than 30 000 Armenians are massacred in Adana by revolting army units, religious students and clerics asking for Sharia law. Hamid is finally deposed in April 1909 after 33 years of tyrannical rule. His 65 years old brother Resat Mehmet becomes Sultan Mehmed V, a mere rubberstamping figurehead for the new government. a. The Early Years (1923-1934) With the Treaty of Lausanne, an estimated 200 000 Greeks were to remain in Turkey following the 1923 population exchange. The Armenians were reduced from 2,5 million to around 150 000 after the Genocide. Turkey declared that no Armenian was ever allowed to return of the people that escaped (now Republic of Armenia). Mustafa Kemal becomes the republic’s first president and subsequently introduces many radical reforms in political, social, legal, educational, and economic sectors. Kemal urges his fellow Turks to look and act like Europeans. On October 28, 1927 the first population census counted the population at approximately 13,6 million, with a 9% literacy rate. A new Turkish alphabet based on the Latin alphabet was accepted on November 1, 1928. After 10 months, Kurdish, Arabic and Persian languages were banned, replaced by only the Turkish language. With the Liberal Republican Party, Jihadi groups joined the liberals. They were suppressed with widespread and bloody methods. The liberal party dissolved on 17 November 1930 and Turkey became a single party dictatorship until 1945. The Kurds declared independence in 1927. By September 17 1930, the Turks suppressed the rebellion with 66 000 troop and 100 planes. The most important Kurdish rebellion in modern Turkey was in 1937-1938, based around the Kizilbash heartland of Dersim. The Turkish Army mobilised 50 000 troops to suppress the rebellion. Turkish forces claimed at least 40 000 Dersimlis, who were deported and massacred following this defeat. Southeast Anatolia was put under martial law and was subject to military occupation. In addition to destruction of the villages and massive deportations, Turkish Government encouraged Albanians and Assyrians to settle in the Kurdish area to change the ethnic composition of the region.

During WW2, Turkey imposed Jizya, an increased property tax on all Christians and Jews in the country (Greeks and Armenians). The Jizya was even imposed on the Donmeh (converts to Islam). Those who did not pay were condemned to forced labour in the quarries of Askale, near Erzurum. They did this to “turkify” the economy. With the draconian Varlik Vergisi in 1942; anticipating the fall of Stalingrad, Turkey concentrates troops on the Caucasian border. Turkey quarantines all Christian men between 18-45 years old, and orders 3 large crematory ovens from Germany… The Turkish officer committee with the leadership of General Cemil Cahit Toydemir – invited by Hitler, visits the Eastern front and English Channel coasts on 25 June – 7 July 1943. Gen. H. Erkilet, Gen. Ali Fuat Erden and Hitler at Wolfsschanze discussed various strategies. With Germany nearing defeat, Turkey declares war on the side of the Allies on February 23, 1945 as a ceremonial gesture, to become a charter member of the United Nations in 1945. b. The West and NATO (1945-1954) After the war the Soviet Union attempts to annul the Treaty of Kars with Turkey and return parts of Northwestern Armenia. These efforts are halted by intervention from Winston Churchill and Harry S. Truman. The close relationship with the United States begins with the Second Cairo Conference in December 4-6, 1943 and the agreement of July 12, 1947 which implements the Truman Doctrine. After 1945, in light of the Soviet domination over Eastern Europe, the US supports Greece and Turkey with economic and military aid to prevent their falling into the Soviet sphere. The act grant Turkey more than 100 million USD in aid. On June 25, 1950 the Korean War starts. Despite being criticised inside Turkey, the Army along with other 16 nations goes to war against North Korea. Turkey participates in this campaign in order to gain membership in NATO, which Turkey joins in 1952. c. Pogroms, Coup and deportations of Christians (1955-1961) On September 6 and 7, 1955, a pogrom directed primarily at Istanbul’s 100 000 strong Greek minority takes place. Jews and Armenians living in the city and their businesses were also targeted in the pogrom. A Turkish mob, most of which was trucked into the city in advance, assaulted Istanbul’s Greek community for nine hours. Shovels, pickaxes, crowbars, ramming rods and petrol was used. 4000 private taxis were requisitioned to transport the perpetrators. Dozens of Greeks (two Orthodox priests) and at least one Armenian died during the pogrom as a result of beatings and arsons. Thirty-two Greeks were severely wounded. Many Greek women were raped, a number of men were forcibly circumcised by the mob. 4348 Greek-owned businesses, 110 hotels, 27 pharmacies, 23 schools, 21 factories, 73 churches and over a thousand Greek-owned homes were badly damaged or destroyed. The mob chanted “Death to the Gavours”, “Massacre the Greek traitors”, “Down with Europe [My emphasis]” The riot died down by midnight with the intervention of the Turkish Army and martial law was declared. Eyewitnesses reported, however, that army officers and policemen had earlier participated in the rampages and in many cases urged the rioters on. After a clash over the “separation of religion and state” between Inonu’s Republican People’s Party and his opponents, president Celal Bayar and prime minister Adnan Menderes; and due to the level of influence the Islamists had gained in the nation, on May 27, 1960 General Cemal Gursel led a military coup d’etat removing President Celal

Bayar and Prime Minister Adnan Menderes. They were charged with high treason, misuse of public funds and abrogation of the constitution. According to Zorlu’s lawyer at the Yassiada trial, a mob of 300 000 was marshaled in a radius of 40 miles (60 km) around the city for the pogrom. Menderes and two others were sentenced to death by hanging. Deported with two day’s notice, the Greek community of Istanbul shrunk from 100 000 persons in 1955 to only 48 000 in 1965. Armenians and Jews were also thrown out of Turkey. d. Divide and Conquer (1961-1974) The census of 1960 in Cyprus showed that Greek Cypriots comprised 77%, Turkish Cypriots 18%, and 5% were other ethnicities. Cyprus was declared an independent state on August 16, 1960 with Archbishop Makarios as President and a constitution with equal Turkish governance, (Turkish vice-president) despite their minority status on the Island. Turkish Cypriots saw themselves as Turks living in Cyprus rather than Turkish Cypriots. They developed the concept of Taksim, the partitioning of Cyprus into a Greek Cypriot-controlled region, and a Turkish Cypriotcontrolled region. The Zurich and London Agreements, drawn among Greece, Turkey and the UK became complex and atypical, granting the Turkish Cypriot community political rights disproportionate their numbers and containing permanent restrictions on Enosis and Taksim alike. In 1965, the Justice Party of Suleiman Demirel won an absolute majority, which it increased in 1969, with an increasing polarisation between the Justice Party on the right and the Republican People’s Party of Ismet Inonu and Bulent Ecevit on the left. In 1969, Alparslan Turkes, a member of the Turkish branch of NATO’s stay-behind army, known as Gladio, founded the right wing Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), whose youth organisations became known as the Grey Wolves (Fascists). On March 12, 1971 the Turkish military threatens intervention, forcing the Demirel government to resign. The 1971 coup leads to mounting violence between ultranationalists and communists in the cities of Turkey, killing more than 5000 at the hands of MIT. In July 1974, dissatisfaction among right-wing Greek nationalists favoring Enosis (unification) with Greece precipitated a coup d’etat against President Makarios. The coup was sponsored by the military government of Greece and led by Cypriot officers. On 20 July 1974, Turkey launches an air- and sea-based invasion of Cyprus. Large numbers of Greek Cypriots lost their lives in the areas overrun by Turkish forces, and 170 000 Greek Cypriots were evicted from their homes and forced to move to the south. Cities are attacked with napalms. Large numbers of Greek Cypriots lost their lives. Churches are destroyed, desecrated or converted into hotels. Turkey captures thousands of soldiers and executes them. As of today, there are 1534 Greek Cypriots unaccounted for, as well as over 150 000 Greek Cypriot refugees displaced persons. Turkey initiates a campaign and ships more than 150 000 Turks from mainland Turkey to Cypruss for the purpose of settlement. The Turkish Cypriots proclaim a separate state,

the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), under the leadership of Rauf Denktas, on November 15, 1983, recognised only by Turkey. Turkey now occupies 37% of Cyprus even though there were only 18% Turks in Cyprus in 1960. Half of the Capital Nicosia remains occupied. e. Minorities Disallowed (1975-1990) Kurdish nationalism began resurgence in the 1970’s when Turkey was racked with Leftright clashes. The Marxist PKK was formed demanding a Kurdish state, led by its chairman, Abdullah Ocalan. Kurds counted almost 20% of Turkey’s population. The Turkish Army violently suppressed the Kurds, killing thousands of Kurdish civilians indiscriminately. After the Kahramanmaras massacre of Alevis in 1978, martial law was declared. On September 12, 1980 another coup d’etat, headed by General Kenan Evren, Chief of the General Staff, was successful. The World being silent regarding the Armenian Genocide, Marxist-Leninist groups like ASALA, target Turkish diplomats, to bring Turkey to terms of its bloody past and to raise awareness to the denied Armenian issues. In 1983 the Justice Commandoes of the Arm. Genocide attempts to take over the Turkish Embassy in Lisbon but it fails. The five men avoid capture by blowing the building after releasing the staff. Kurdish music, dance and culture gets banned in Turkey between 1983 and 1991, it was forbidden to publicise, publish and/or broadcast in any language other than Turkish. Armenians in Turkey become target to daily harassment and persecution. The Turkish Army commits acts of extreme violence in order to fight “terrorism”. Hundreds of thousands of men, women and children are killed ore systematically tortured in prisons from the early 80’s to the early 90’s. However, in 1990-91 the World was to change forever. f. Fall of the Iron Curtain (1991-1994) With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Armenia breaks free. The Armenians in Karabakh who wanted to unite with Armenia for decades, decide to protest their case. Even before its independence, Soviet Azerbaijan (94% Muslim where majority are Turkic) suppresses the voice of the Armenians with street pogroms and massacres in Sumgait in 1988 and Baku in 1990. Faced with brutal Azeri methods to quell the Armenians, Karabakh Armenians vote to secede from Azerbaijan, to which the later responds with full scale war in 1992, backed and aided by Turkey. The Armenians fight back as they remember the past. Even with food and power shortage in Armenia and Azerbaijan often bombing civilian targets with military aeroplanes. Karabakh takes the offensive and scores vital victories in late 1992 and 1993. Azerbaijan recruits Afghan, Chechen and other voluntary Mujahedeen. In light of the Armenian successive victories, Turkey’s Prime Minister Tansu Ciller threatens to invade Armenia with thousands of Turkish troops. Russia warns Turkey and counters their movements to ward them off. Aliev tries with every method to win the lost territories, to no avail. After six years of fighting an exhausted Azerbaijan finally asks for a cease fire in 1994. Turkey and Azerbaijan subsequently blockade Armenia. In addition, Azerbaijan takes “revenge” by wiping out the Armenian Cemetery in Julfa, Naxichevan and desecrating Armenian churches.

Current situation of Armenia (2008, source CIA): Armenia is primarily a source country for women and girls trafficked to the UAE and Turkey for the purpose of commercial sexual exploitation; Armenian men and women are trafficked to Turkey and Russia for the purpose of forced labour. My comment: The EU and the US have showed little or no will at all to support Armenia in any way. They remain to be the last survivors of Byzantine Christianity, largely ignored by the Christian world. g. European Union? (1995-2007) On 14 April, 1987, Turkey submitted its application for formal membership into the European Community. It was refused, citing Turkey’s economic and political situation, poor relations with Greece and the conflict with Cyprus. The 1995 elections brought a short-lived coalition between Yilmaz and Ciller at the helm. In 1997, the military, committed the fourth coup by sending a memorandum to Erbakan government requesting that he resign and banning his religious Party. A series of economic shocks led to new elections in 2002, bringing into power the religious Justice and Development Party of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who introduced a series of new reforms. Status as of today: Turkey restricts religious rights of Christians and converts. Their murder is indirectly encouraged. Millions of Kurds, Assyrians, Alevies, Yezidies and other minorities have no status. Women in Turkey are often subjected to “honour” killings and employment discrimination. Turkey occupies 37% of Cyprus with half of its Capital Nicosia and refuses to recognise the Republic of Cyprus. Search Turkish history and compare… What is expected from a country that murders its intellectuals and journalists for uttering a word… “Genocide”… Not forgetting to honour those same murderers…. What is expected from a country that restricts speech, jails and fines its authors, pressmen, thinkers for daring to think and “insulting Turkishness”, and regards all minorities as “Turks”… With centuries of unrepentant murders and violations, is Turkey fit to enter the European Union? Or is it still “The sick man of Europe”. All EU and national level parliamentarians who supports EU membership for Turkey should travel to the Turkish countryside, wear a sweater with a cross, and see how long before it takes before they are beaten or gets murdered. Then he will bear witness himself how “tolerant” Turkish Muslims are… Current situation in Turkey will continue in another section.

Sources: Written by Hay Brountsk, 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Are the Turks European?: B. Munnich The Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire: Alan Palmer Abdul Hamid II, The Red Sultan: K. Yazejian A History of the Armenian People, Volume II: George A. Bournoutian Haykakan Harts Encyclopedia Seljuk, Tatar, Turkish History: P. Yeghyaian

7. The Burning Tigris: Peter Balakian 8. The Turks in World History: Findley, Carter Vaughn 9. Turkey: A Modern History, Revised Edition: Erik J. Zurcher

History of the Ottoman Turkish Empire I (1299-1876) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dj4OkZgxTPE&feature=related History of the Ottoman Turkish Empire II (1876-1909) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=95ff3hxzOHo History of the Turkish Republic – 1923-2007 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=76vor_I5RMk History of the Turkish Republic 1961-2007 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eVGxIECjJMs

1.16 Jus Primae Noctis — Institutionalised rape of Christians under the Ottoman Empire Jus primae noctis or droit du seigneur is the right to sleep with a nubile (young and sexually attractive) servant before turning her over to her servant husband (the right by which a landlord may sleep first night with the bride of a newly married serf), although the custom may be avoided by the payment of a fine. This law was imposed by the Ottoman rulers and widely practiced in countries under the Ottoman rule (provinces of the Ottoman Empire were: Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, Bosnia) until the very end of the 19th century. The picture, painted by Paja Jovanovic, shows a bride preparing for the wedding night. The first night she is going to spend with her landlord. Landlords (beg, aga) were usually Turks but there were many local nobles converting to Islam to save their privileges when the region was controlled by the Ottoman Empire. * The right was used on a braid of a feudal dependant or servant, any dhimmi. They were Christians and the right wasn’t used on Muslim brides. On the day before her wedding the young Christian bride will be visited by a representative of the landlord (beg, aga). The representative is usually accompanied by a file of soldiers. The representative takes the bride to the house of the landlord for a day and a night, raping her repeatedly, and returns her to her home at dawn on the wedding day. An interesting detail on the picture is that all women on the picture are dressed in traditional oriental (Turkish style) clothing. Under the Ottomans textile styles has influenced by Islamic tradition. Women on the picture except the one on the right have their hair covered with a shawl (also called shamija or mahram) according to the Islamic custom. Women wore «dimije» (it looks like baggy trousers) of thin, often gold-woven, silk brocade, emphasising the female figure. 1998 Yugoslav postal authorities issued 4 stamps dedicated to national customs. The motif on the stamp of 6,00 din. value is the painting «Dressing/Adornmnet of the Bride» by Paja Jovanovic
Source: http://www.geocities.com/Eureka/Park/7313/primae_noctis_jus.htm

Jus Primae Noctis — Details The historical acceptance of rape may have influenced the incidence of rape in the wars of the last decade in former Yugoslavia. However, there were other historical factors which tended to promote its use and lend themselves to propaganda promoting it, in Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as Serbia. Under Ottoman rule, within which much of Serbia gained autonomy in 1830 but Bosnia-Herzegovina was to remain until 1878, there had been a disadvantaged position of Serbs and Croats. The use or misuse of Serb and other Christian minority women by Muslim men, especially Ottoman officials and the landlord class, has been a major source of grievance. Polygamy and concubinage by Muslim men, especially Ottoman officials and landlords or begs, resulted in wives and concubines being taken from the Christian population as well as the Muslim one, and often abandoned when no longer wanted. The insecurity of these women resulted in their having relatively few children, and resorting to abortion, infanticide and other birth control measures (Stoianovich 1994, p. 159). The other ‘misuse’ was through ‘first night’ arrangements, more generally known as the jus primae noctis (right to the first night) or droit de seigneur (the right of the feudal lord), by which the janissary in charge of an estate or the local landlord had the right to the virginity of all brides among Serb and other serfs. These arrangements are a folk memory rather than attested by literary sources. They were mentioned by Bosnian Serb former politician Biljana Plavsic in 1993 in an attempt to assert that rape was the war strategy of the Muslims and Croats. She noted that it was ‘quite normal of Muslim notables to enjoy the jus primae noctis with Christian women’ during the Ottoman period (Cohen 1998, p. 222). Levinsohn (1994, p. 274) quotes Belgrade publisher Petar Zdazdic as saying that there was a tradition that the Serb serf or peasant would have to walk around the house with his shoes in his hands when an Ottoman official or landlord came to the house to have intercourse with his wife. In the early phase of Ottoman occupation the janissaries, who were in control of major agricultural estates as well as forming the core of the military, were forbidden to marry until they retired from the service of the empire. First night and similar arrangements may have been important substitutes for marriage. However, the landlords became an increasingly hereditary class. In Bosnia some three hundred years ago they had to persuade Serbs to come from Montenegro to work their land as serfs or sharecroppers. Muslim peasants had chosen increasingly to purchase their own land and work it as smallholders rather than be serfs, but this option was not open to Christians in Bosnia-Herzegovina until after 1830. Hence first night and concubinage arrangements for Serb and Croat kmet or serf women would have become less common in the later phases of Ottoman rule. Also, the landlord class accounted for no more than 5 to 10 per cent of the Muslim population – there were 4000 families who had land redistributed from them in the 1919 land reform. Hence only a small proportion of the Muslim population had access to Orthodox and Christian women where this was common, certainly not the majority. In Kosovo the majority of Serbs were in effect serfs working the land for Albanian clan leaders as well as Turkish landlords prior to the first Balkan War of 1912, but it is not known what impact this had on access to women. Arrangements whereby one community, or at least its privileged class, has access to the women of another are controversial. A Greek film shown on the Australian Special Broadcasting Service several years ago depicted such a use of Greek brides and wives who were serfs on an agricultural estate by the Ottoman landlord and a visiting relative of his a couple of decades before Greek independence in 1830. A film of the 1950s shown on SBS also indicates this, but the ‘misuse’ did not extend to breaking the prospective

bride’s virginity, and the land tenancy was seen as a form of dowry given in exchange for the sexual services rendered.
Source: http://auspsa.anu.edu.au/proceedings/2001/Politics_and_Gender_Papers.htm

1.17 Jihadi Genocides of Christians in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey — The Armenian, Greek and Assyrian Genocides On 7 June 2006 Stephen Pound, member of the British House of Commons linked the case of the Ottoman Greeks with the Armenians and Assyrians claiming that «3.5 million of the historic Christian population of Assyrians, Armenians and Greeks then living in the Ottoman empire had been murdered, starved to death or slaughtered — or exiled by 1923.» I will be covering these three Genocides briefly. Armenian Genocide — 1915-1918 — 1,500,000+ Deaths The genocide of the Armenians was a jihad. No rayas (non-Muslim dhimmis under Ottoman rule) took part in it. Despite the disapproval of many Muslim Turks and Arabs, and their refusal to collaborate in the crime, these massacres were perpetrated solely by Muslims and they alone profited from the booty: the victims’ property, houses, and lands granted to the muhajirun, and the allocation to them of women and child slaves. The elimination of male children over the age of twelve was in accordance with the commandments of the Jihad and conformed to the age fixed for the payment of the Jizya. The four stages of the liquidation- deportation, enslavement, forced conversion, and massacre- reproduced the historic conditions of the Jihad carried out in the dar-al-harb from the seventh century on. Chronicles from a variety of sources, by Muslim authors in particular, give detailed descriptions of the organised massacres or deportation of captives, whose sufferings in forced marches behind the armies paralleled the Armenian experience in the twentieth century. As in all Jihads the mosques were a central rallying point where the mullahs and government officials agitated for Jihad. The activity of mass murders, systematic rapes, plunders and enslavements therefore naturally peaked each Friday where everyone felt fully motivated after the weekly pep talk. The Armenian Genocide, the first genocide of the 20th Century, occurred when two million Armenians living in Turkey were eliminated from their historic homeland through forced deportations and massacres. For three thousand years, a thriving Armenian community had existed inside the vast region of the Middle East bordered by the Black, Mediterranean and Caspian Seas. The area, known as Asia Minor, stands at the crossroads of three continents; Europe, Asia and Africa. Great powers rose and fell over the many centuries and the Armenian homeland was at various times ruled by Persians, Greeks, Romans, Byzantines, Arabs and Mongols. Despite the repeated invasions and occupations, Armenian pride and cultural identity never wavered. The snow-capped peak of Mount Ararat became its focal point and by 600

BC Armenia as a nation sprang into being. Following the advent of Christianity, Armenia became the very first nation to accept it as the state religion. A golden era of peace and prosperity followed which saw the invention of a distinct alphabet, a flourishing of literature, art, commerce, and a unique style of architecture. By the 10th century, Armenians had established a new capital at Ani, affectionately called the ‘city of a thousand and one churches.’ In the eleventh century, the first Turkish invasion of the Armenian homeland occurred. Thus began several hundred years of rule by Muslim Turks. By the sixteenth century, Armenia had been absorbed into the vast and mighty Ottoman Empire. At its peak, this Turkish empire included much of Southeast Europe, North Africa, and almost all of the Middle East. But by the 1800s the once powerful Ottoman Empire was in serious decline. For centuries, it had spurned technological and economic progress, while the nations of Europe had embraced innovation and became industrial giants. Turkish armies had once been virtually invincible. Now, they lost battle after battle to modern European armies. As the empire gradually disintegrated, formerly subject peoples including the Greeks, Serbs and Romanians achieved their long-awaited independence. Only the Armenians and the Arabs of the Middle East remained stuck in the backward and nearly bankrupt empire, now under the autocratic rule of Sultan Abdul Hamid. By the 1890s, young Armenians began to press for political reforms, calling for a constitutional government, the right to vote and an end to discriminatory practices such as “Jizya” — special taxes levied solely against them because they were Christians. The despotic Sultan responded to their pleas with brutal persecutions. Between 1894 and 1896 over 100,000 inhabitants of Armenian villages were massacred during widespread pogroms conducted by the Sultan’s special regiments. But the Sultan’s days were numbered. In July 1908, reform-minded Turkish nationalists known as «Young Turks» forced the Sultan to allow a constitutional government and guarantee basic rights. The Young Turks were ambitious junior officers in the Turkish Army who hoped to halt their country’s steady decline. Armenians in Turkey were delighted with this sudden turn of events and its prospects for a brighter future. Both Turks and Armenians held jubilant public rallies attended with banners held high calling for freedom, equality and justice. However, their hopes were dashed when three of the Young Turks seized full control of the government via a coup in 1913. This triumvirate of Young Turks, consisting of Mehmed Talaat, Ismail Enver and Ahmed Djemal, came to wield dictatorial powers and concocted their own ambitious plans for the future of Turkey. They wanted to unite all of the Turkic peoples in the entire region while expanding the borders of Turkey eastward across the Caucasus all the way into Central Asia. This would create a new Turkish empire, a «great and eternal land» called Turan with one language and Islam as the only religion. Turkey 1913 – 2 million Armenians (10% of total population) Total population 20 million. But there was a big problem. The traditional historic homeland of Armenia lay right in the path of their plans to expand eastward. And on that land was a large population of Christian Armenians totalling some two million persons, making up about 10 percent of Turkey’s overall population.

Along with the Young Turk’s newfound «Turanism» there was a dramatic rise in Islamic fundamentalist agitation throughout Turkey. Christian Armenians were once again branded as infidels (non-believers in Islam). Young Islamic extremists, sometimes leading to violence, staged anti-Armenian demonstrations. During one such outbreak in 1909, two hundred villages were plundered and over 30,000 persons massacred in the Cilicia district on the Mediterranean coast. Throughout Turkey, sporadic local attacks against Armenians continued unchecked over the next several years. There were also big cultural differences between Armenians and Turks. The Armenians had always been one of the best-educated communities within the old Turkish Empire. Armenians were the professionals in society, the businessmen, lawyers, doctors and skilled craftsmen. And they were more open to new scientific, political and social ideas from the West (Europe and America). Children of wealthy Armenians went to Paris, Geneva or even to America to complete their education. By contrast, the majority of Turks were illiterate peasant farmers and small shopkeepers. Leaders of the Ottoman Empire had traditionally placed little value on education and not a single institute of higher learning could be found within their old empire. The various autocratic and despotic rulers throughout the empire’s history had valued loyalty and blind obedience above all. Their uneducated subjects had never heard of democracy or liberalism and thus had no inclination toward political reform. But this was not the case with the better-educated Armenians who sought political and social reforms that would improve life for themselves and Turkey’s other minorities. The Young Turks decided to glorify the virtues of simple Turkish peasantry at the expense of the Armenians in order to capture peasant loyalty. They exploited the religious, cultural, economic and political differences between Turks and Armenians so that the average Turk came to regard Armenians as strangers among them. When World War I broke out in 1914, leaders of the Young Turk regime sided with the Central Powers (Germany and Austria-Hungary). The outbreak of war would provide the perfect opportunity to solve the «Armenian question» once and for all. The world’s attention became fixed upon the battlegrounds of France and Belgium where the young men of Europe were soon falling dead by the hundreds of thousands. The Eastern Front eventually included the border between Turkey and Russia. With war at hand, unusual measures involving the civilian population would not seem too out of the ordinary. As a prelude to the coming action, Turks disarmed the entire Armenian population under the pretext that the people were naturally sympathetic toward Christian Russia. Every last rifle and pistol was forcibly seized, with severe penalties for anyone who failed to turn in a weapon. Quite a few Armenian men actually purchased a weapon from local Turks or Kurds (nomadic Muslim tribesmen) at very high prices so they would have something to turn in. At this time, about forty thousand Armenian men were serving in the Turkish Army. In the fall and winter of 1914, all of their weapons were confiscated and they were put into slave labour battalions building roads or were used as human pack animals. Under the brutal work conditions they suffered a very high death rate. Those who survived would soon be shot outright. For the time had come to move against the Armenians. The decision to annihilate the entire population came directly from the ruling triumvirate of ultra-nationalist Young Turks. The actual extermination orders were transmitted in coded telegrams to all provincial governors throughout Turkey. Armed roundups began on the evening of April 24, 1915, as 300 Armenian political leaders, educators, writers, clergy and dignitaries in Constantinople (present day Istanbul) were taken from their homes, briefly jailed and tortured, then hanged or shot.

Next, there were mass arrests of Armenian men throughout the country by Turkish soldiers, police agents and bands of Turkish volunteers. The men were tied together with ropes in small groups then taken to the outskirts of their town and shot dead or bayoneted by death squads. Local Turks and Kurds armed with knives and sticks often joined in on the killing. Then it was the turn of Armenian women, children, and the elderly. On very short notice, they were ordered to pack a few belongings and be ready to leave home, under the pretext that they were being relocated to a non-military zone for their own safety. They were actually being taken on death marches heading south toward the Syrian Desert. Muslim Turks who assumed instant ownership of everything quickly occupied most of the homes and villages left behind by the rousted Armenians. In many cases, local Turks who took them from their families spared young Armenian children from deportation. The children were coerced into denouncing Christianity and becoming Muslims, and were then given new Turkish names. For Armenian boys the forced conversion meant they each had to endure painful circumcision as required by Islamic custom. Turkish gendarmes escorted individual caravans consisting of thousands of deported Armenians. These guards allowed roving government units of hardened criminals known as the «Special Organisation» to attack the defenceless people, killing anyone they pleased. They also encouraged Kurdish bandits to raid the caravans and steal anything they wanted. In addition, an extraordinary amount of sexual abuse and rape of girls and young women occurred at the hands of the Special Organisation and Kurdish bandits. Most of the attractive young females were kidnapped for a life of involuntary servitude. The death marches during the Armenian Genocide, involving over a million Armenians, covered hundreds of miles and lasted months. Indirect routes through mountains and wilderness areas were deliberately chosen in order to prolong the ordeal and to keep the caravans away from Turkish villages. Food supplies being carried by the people quickly ran out and they were usually denied further food or water. Anyone stopping to rest or lagging behind the caravan was mercilessly beaten until they rejoined the march. If they couldn’t continue they were shot. A common practice was to force all of the people in the caravan to remove every stitch of clothing and have them resume the march in the nude under the scorching sun until they dropped dead by the roadside from exhaustion and dehydration. An estimated 75 percent of the Armenians on these marches perished, especially children and the elderly. Those who survived the ordeal were herded into the desert without a drop of water. Being thrown off cliffs, burned alive, or drowned in rivers. During the Armenian Genocide, the Turkish countryside became littered with decomposing corpses. At one point, Mehmed Talaat responded to the problem by sending a coded message to all provincial leaders: «I have been advised that in certain areas unburied corpses are still to be seen. I ask you to issue the strictest instructions so that the corpses and their debris in your vilayet are buried.» But his instructions were generally ignored. Those involved in the mass murder showed little interest in stopping to dig graves. The roadside corpses and emaciated deportees were a shocking sight to foreigners working in Turkey. Eyewitnesses included German government liaisons, American missionaries, and U.S. diplomats stationed in the country. During the Armenian Genocide, the Christian missionaries were often threatened with death and were unable to help the people. Diplomats from the still neutral United States communicated their blunt assessments of the ongoing government actions. U.S. ambassador to Turkey, Henry Morgenthau, reported to Washington: «When the Turkish

authorities gave the orders for these deportations, they were merely giving the death warrant to a whole race…» The Allied Powers (Great Britain, France and Russia) responded to news of the massacres by issuing a warning to Turkey: «…the Allied governments announce publicly…that they will hold all the members of the Ottoman Government, as well as such of their agents as are implicated, personally responsible for such matters.» The warning had no effect. Newspapers in the West including the New York Times published reports of the continuing deportations with the headlines: Armenians Are Sent to Perish in the Desert — Turks Accused of Plan to Exterminate Whole Population (August 18, 1915) — Million Armenians Killed or in Exile — American Committee on Relief Says Victims of Turks Are Steadily Increasing — Policy of Extermination (December 15, 1915). Temporary relief for some Armenians came as Russian troops attacked along the Eastern Front and made their way into central Turkey. But the troops withdrew in 1917 upon the Russian Revolution. Armenian survivors withdrew along with them and settled in among fellow Armenians already living in provinces of the former Russian Empire. There were in total about 500,000 Armenians gathered in this region. In May 1918, Turkish armies attacked the area to achieve the goal of expanding Turkey eastward into the Caucasus and also to resume the annihilation of the Armenians. As many as 100,000 Armenians may have fallen victim to the advancing Turkish troops. However, the Armenians managed to acquire weapons and they fought back, finally repelling the Turkish invasion at the battle of Sardarabad, thus saving the remaining population from total extermination with no help from the outside world. Following that victory, Armenian leaders declared the establishment of the independent Republic of Armenia. World War I ended in November 1918 with a defeat for Germany and the Central Powers including Turkey. Shortly before the war had ended, the Young Turk triumvirate; Talaat, Enver and Djemal, abruptly resigned their government posts and fled to Germany where they had been offered asylum. In the months that followed, repeated requests by Turkey’s new moderate government and the Allies were made asking Germany to send the Young Turks back home to stand trial. However all such requests were turned down. As a result, Armenian activists took matters into their own hands, located the Young Turks and assassinated them along with two other instigators of the mass murder. Meanwhile, representatives from the fledgling Republic of Armenia attended the Paris Peace Conference in the hope that the victorious Allies would give them back their historic lands seized by Turkey. The European Allies responded to their request by asked the United States to assume guardianship of the new Republic. However, President Woodrow Wilson’s attempt to make Armenia an official U.S. protectorate was rejected by the U.S. Congress in May 1920. But Wilson did not give up on Armenia. As a result of his efforts, the Treaty of Sevres was signed on August 10, 1920 by the Allied Powers, the Republic of Armenia, and the new moderate leaders of Turkey. The treaty recognised an independent Armenian state in an area comprising much of the former historic homeland. However, Turkish nationalism once again reared its head. The moderate Turkish leaders who signed the treaty were ousted in favour of a new nationalist leader, Mustafa Kemal, who simply refused to accept the treaty and even re-occupied the very lands in question then expelled any surviving Armenians, including thousands of orphans.

No Allied power came to the aid of the Armenian Republic and it collapsed. Only a tiny portion of the easternmost area of historic Armenia survived by being becoming part of the Soviet Union. After the successful obliteration of the people of historic Armenia during the Armenian Genocide, the Turks demolished any remnants of Armenian cultural heritage including priceless masterpieces of ancient architecture, old libraries and archives. The Turks even leveled entire cities such as the once thriving Kharpert, Van and the ancient capital at Ani, to remove all traces of the three thousand year old civilisation. Referring to the Armenian Genocide, the young German politician Adolf Hitler duly noted the half-hearted reaction of the world’s great powers to the plight of the Armenians. After achieving total power in Germany, Hitler decided to conquer Poland in 1939 and told his generals: «Thus for the time being I have sent to the East only my ‘Death’s Head Units’ with the orders to kill without pity or mercy all men, women, and children of Polish race or language. Only in such a way will we win the vital space that we need. Who still talks nowadays about the Armenians?»
Source: http://www.unitedhumanrights.org/Genocide/armenian_genocide.htm

Armenian Genocide — Quotes Talat Pasha: 6/1/1915 – “Turkey is taking advantage of the war in order to thoroughly liquidate (grundlich aufzaumen) its internal foes, i.e., the indigenous Christians, without being thereby disturbed by foreign intervention.” “What on earth do you want? The question is settled. There are no more Armenians.” Jemal Pasha: “800 000 Armenian deportees were actually killed… by holding the guilty accountable the government is intent on cleansing the bloody past.” I am ashamed of my nation” Enver Pasha: 5/19/1916 – “The Ottoman Empire should be cleaned up of the Armenians and the Lebanese. We have destroyed the former by the sword, we shall destroy the latter through starvation.” “You are greatly mistaken. We have this country absolutely under our control. I have no desire to shift the blame onto our underlings and I am entirely willing to accept the responsibility myself for everything that has taken place.” Prince Abdul Mecid: I refer to those awful massacres. They are the greatest stain that has ever disgraced our nation and race. They were entirely the work of Talat and Enver. I heard some days before they began that they were intended.. “I went to Istanbul and insisted on seeing Enver. I asked him if it was true that they intended to recommence the massacres which had been our shame and disgrace under Abdul Hamid. The only reply I could get from him was: It is decided: It is the program.” Damad Ferid Pasha: He described the treatment of the Armenians as; “A crime that drew the revulsion of the entire humankind.”

Mustafa Arif: 12/13/1918 – “Surely a few Armenians aided and abetted our enemy, and a few Armenian Deputies committed crimes against the Turkish nation… it is incumbent upon a government to pursue the guilty ones. Unfortunately, our wartime leaders, imbued with a spirit of brigandage, carried out the law of deportation in a manner that could surpass the proclivities of the most bloodthirsty bandits. They decided to exterminate the Armenians, and they did exterminate them.” Mustafa Kemal “Ataturk”: 8/1/1926 – “These left-over from the former Young Turk Party, who should have been made to account for the millions of our Christian subjects who were ruthlessly driven en masse, from their homes and massacred, have been restive under the Republican rule.” German Quotes: Hans Freiherr von Wangenheim: 6/17/1915 – Deportation of the Armenians from their homes in the vilayets of Eastern Anatolia, and their resettlement in other regions is implemented cruelly… it becomes obvious that deportation of the Armenians arises not only from military necessity, the internal minister Talat Bey told about it honestly to Doctor Mortsman, who is employed at the Empire Embassy now. Talat said: “The Sublime Porte intends to make use of the world war for cleaning the whole country from internal enemies, the local Christians, so that foreign countries won’t hinder doing it by their diplomatic interference. This measure will serve to the interests of all allies of Turkey, especially the Germans…” Count Wolff-Metternich: 7/10/1916 – “In its attempt to carry out its purpose to resolve the Armenian question by the destruction of the Armenian race, the Turkish government has refused to be deterred neither by our representations, nor by those of the American Embassy, nor by the delegate of the Pope, nor by the threats of the Allied Powers, nor in deference to the public opinion of the West representing one-half of the world.” Adolf Hitler: 8/2/1939 – “I have placed my death-head formations in readiness – for the present only in the East – with orders to them to send to death mercilessly and without compassion, men, women, and children of Polish derivation and language. Only thus shall we gain the living space (Lebensraum) which we need. Who, after all, speaks today of the annihilation of the Armenians?” British Quotes: Viscount James Bryce: 10/6/1915 – “The massacres are the result of a policy which, as far as can be ascertained, has been entertained for some considerable time by the gang of unscrupulous adventurers who are now in possession of the Government of the Turkish Empire. They hesitated to put it in practice until they thought the favourable moment had come, and that moment seems to have arrived about the month of April.” Viscount James Bryce: 5/11/1918 – “The Armenian massacre was the greatest crime of the war, and the failure to act against Turkey is to condone it… …the failure to deal radically with the Turkish horror means that all talk of guaranteeing the future peace of the world is mischievous nonsense.” Lord Robert Cecil: 11/16/1915 – “I think it may be said, without the least fear of exaggeration, that no more horrible crime has been committed in the history of the world. This is a premeditative crime determined on long ago. It was a long-considered, deliberate policy to destroy and wipe out of existence the Armenians in Turkey. It was systematically carried out. It was ordered from the above..”

Winston Chuchill: “In 1915 the Turkish Government began and ruthlessly carried out the infamous general massacre and deportation of Armenians in Asia Minor. There is no reasonable doubt that this crime was planned and executed for political reasons.”

American Quotes: Henry Morgenthau Sr.: 1/1/1919 – “When the Turkish authorities gave the orders for these deportations, they were merely giving the death warrant to a whole race; they understood this well, and, in their conversations with me, they made no particular attempt to conceal the fact. I am confident that the whole history of the human race contains no such horrible episode as this. The gr6eat massacres and persecutions of the past seem almost insignificant when compared to the sufferings of the Armenian race in 1915.” Ronald Reagan: 4/22/1981 – “Like the genocide of the Armenians before it, and the genocide of the Cambodians which followed it, … the lessons of the Holocaust must never be forgotten.” Russian Quotes: S. D. Sazonov: I had to refer to the unprecedented sufferings of this unfortunate nation before. Under the favourable control of the allied Germany, the Turks evidently intend to fulfil their long-standing dream to exterminate the Armenians which do not submit to the influence of the Muslims and the hinder the plans of Germany to subdue the Turkish Empire in economy and politics… Envoy Smirnov from Cairo: 6/25/1915 – “Cruelties committed against the Armenians in Syria and neighbouring vilayets, violations, massacres and very often mass slaughter of the population of the Armenian villages are constantly repeated; families are cruelly separated, wives are separated from husbands, children are separated from parents, and all of them are exiled in various directions. Especially the Armenian clergy are pursued cruelly; the priests are haunted, tortured, their nails are pulled out.”

Israeli Quotes: Yossi Beilin: 4/27/1994 – “It was not war. It was most certainly massacre and genocide, something the world must remember… We will always reject any attempt to erase its record, even for some political advantage.” Other Quotes: Valery Brusov: 1916 – “Turks continued their previous policy. They would not stop to commit massive and most awful massacres that even Leng Timur would not dare to do.” Prof. Stanley Cohen: 12/1/1995 – “The nearest successful example (of collective denial) in the modern era is the 80 years of official denial by successive Turkish governments of the 1915-17 genocide against the Armenians in which 1,5 million people

lost their lives. This denial has been sustained by deliberate propaganda, lying and coverups, forging documents, suppression of archives, and bribing scholars.” Prof. Colin Tatz: 1/1/1996 – “The Turkish denial (of the Armenian Genocide) is probably the foremost example of historical perversion. With a mix of academic sophistication and diplomatic thuggery of which we at Macquarie University have been targets, the Turks have put both memory and history into reverse gear.” Orhan Pamuk: Feb/2005 – “ one million Armenians were killed in these lands and nobody but me dares to talk about it.” Rep. Adam Schiff: 2007 – “The legacy of the Armenian Genocide is woven into the fabric of America. So let us call genocide, genocide. Let us not minimise the deliberate murder of 1,5 million people. Let us have a moral victory that can shine as a light to all nations.”

The Muslim world along with the US and UK does not recognise these atrocities as a Genocide Although there has been much academic recognition of the Armenian Genocide, this has far from always been followed by governments and media. Despite Turkish denials and blackmail, the Armenian Genocide is unanimously verified by the International Association of Genocide Scholars and accepted by any nation that upholds moral responsibility above political gain. Even today, the United States, Great Britain, Turkey and the rest of the Muslim World have refused to recognise the Armenian Genocide. Obviously, Muslim countries will rarely condemn state or small scale Jihad but it’s very apparent what kind of nobleness, loyalty and ethics the British and US government value and have done continuously throughout the 1900th century (only driven by self interest). It should be noted though that the American people through their representatives on state level have made a lot more effort in condemning this as Genocide (40 out of 50 states).
Source: Hay Brountsk http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tx1M82JsbbQ

Greek Jihadi Genocide 1914-23 During the years 1914-1923, whilst the attention of the international community focused on the turmoil and aftermath of the First World War, the indigenous Greek minority of the Ottoman Empire, the Republic of Turkey’s predecessor, was subjected to a centrallyorganised, premeditated and systematic policy of annihilation. This genocide, orchestrated to ensure an irreversible end to the collective existence of Turkey’s Greek population, was perpetrated by two consecutive governments; the Committee for Union and Progress, better known as the Young Turks, and the nationalist Kemalists led by Mustafa Kemal «Ataturk». A lethal combination of internal deportations involving death marches, forced conversions to Islam, torture, mutilation, rape, enslavement and massacres conducted throughout Ottoman Turkey resulted in the death of one million

Ottoman Greeks. The International Association of Genocide Scholars, an organisation of the world’s foremost experts on genocide, have affirmed the Ottoman Greek Genocide. Many of the victims were massacred in bulks as early as 1895 (much earlier than the World War I) and up to 1955 (much after the World War II). The present estimate is that some 1.400.000 Greek children, men and women of all ages were killed during that period. In the same places and often at the same time, the Turks tortured and massacred millions of Armenians and Assyrians of all ages. The fact that the three nations were victims of the same Jihadi extermination policy is another proof of each of the three Genocides. It was not a «war», it was not a «revolt». It was a planned effort of extermination.[1][2] Dr. William C. King’s article «1,500,000 Greek Christians Massacred or Deported by Turks», published in King’s Complete History of the World War (1922), covers the genocidal experiences of Ottoman Greeks up to 1918: The article[3]: 1,500,000 Greek Christians Massacred or Deported by Turks Systematic Attempt to Extinguish the Hellenic Race Inspired by Pagan Germany Section 19- 1918 Under the tuition of pagan Germany, the unspeakable Turks attempted to destroy the large and flourishing Greek Christian populations that, from time immemorial, have dwelt along the coast of Asia Minor and the Marmoran coast in Thrace. The Mahometans (Muslims) tore these Christians from their ancestral homes, confiscated all their property, and deported them variously into the interior of the Asia Minor, into the Turkish pale, or over the burning desert sands to far off Mesopotmaia. It is estimated that 1,500,000 Greeks were thus deported into desolate regions where they died off like flies of starvation of disease. On this dreadful journey 700,000 are known to have perished. The survivors found themselves without shelter or food in a strange land and subjected to every indignity and torture which the abominable Turks, and their pagan German allies, could devise. These among the Greeks who would agree to abjure Christianity and adopt the faith of Islam were spared [My emphasis]; the rest were left to starve. The wholesale deportation of the Greeks from Thrace had been under way since the close of the Balkan Wars in 1913. It accorded not at all with Germany’s ideas of Oriental conquest to permit these Greeks to remain in European Turkey. The Turks were consequently instructed to extirpate the Greeks in any way they might choose. In justification of these wholesale deportations, the Turks falsely alleged that the Hellenic populations of Thrace and the Asian coast were plotting revolution. The first deportations, numbering 250,000, were from Thrace into Greece proper. This persecution continued unabated up to the opening of the War. In this period the Greek Government did everything possible to protect their co-nationals, but after the World War had begun, King Constantine and his German wive (the sister of

Kaiser Wilhelm of Germany), impeded every attempt made to ameliorate the lot of the exiled Hellenes. The bishop of Pera, after journeying to Athens to implore the King to take some action against the Turkish atrocities, was warned by the Queen to return to his home, “as it is the will of the King that you live on good terms with the Turks.” All this time the German agencies in Turkey, especially the German Palestine Bank, were urging the Mussulmans to cultivate hatred for the Christians and to have no commercial dealings with them. The Bulgarian-Ottoman(Turkish) Plot Bulgaria, half Turkish itself, entered into the plot to exterminate the Greek Christian race, by signing a pact with the Ottoman Empire, at Adrianople in June, 1915. Under this agreement Bulgaria consented (1) to the establishment of a Turco-Bulgar commercial union as the complement of the political union, (2) the seizure of the commerce of the Orient from the hands of the Greeks, (3) the establishment in the Orient of Moslem agencies for the importation and exportation of goods for the exclusive use of Moslems, who were to break of all commercial relations with the Greeks, (4) a restriction of the privileges of the Greek Patriarch and his ecclesiastical jurisdiction, (5) the prohibition of the teaching of Greek in future, (6) the conversion by force of the people in the Christian settlements and the imposition of mixed marriages. [My emphasis] Germany the Author of the Massacres Herr Lepsius, a German Envoy who had been sent to Constantinople on a special mission in July, 1915, acknowledged that the Greek and Armenian massacres were two phases of a single progra66m of extermination of the Christian elements, intended to make Turkey a purely Moslem state. That Germany was the author and inspiration of these massacres of Christians became known in 1917. The Greek Minister at Constantinople, M. Kallerghis, had protested the Turkish Grand Vizier, Talaat Bey, against the deportations of the Greeks in the Aival district. Talaat Bey promised to telegraph to the German General Liman von Sanders, telling him to cease the deportations. Von Sanders, who was in fact Commander-in-Chief of all the Turkish forces, replied that if the deportations ceased, he would not guarantee the safety of the Turkish Army, adding that the had referred the matter to the German Grand Headquarters Staff, who entirely approved of his action. Greeks Drafted into the Turkish Army The persecution of the Greek Christians, under their German-Turkish master, was carried out with devilish ingenuity. All their privileges were abolished. After an enrollmment of Christians, there was a levy of “contributions”. Then the forcible conversion of Christians to Islamism was attempted. Deportations and massacres followed. Meanwhile the Turkish language supplanted the Greek language in all the schools; Turkish geography and history, instead of Greek, were taught; the Patriarchy was abolished. All property held by the Greek civil and religious communities were confiscated and became the property of the Turkish State.

On Turkey’s entry into the War, a decree was signed and promulgated which rendered all men up to the age of 48 liable for military service. The Christians ghus drafted into the armies of the Turks were for the most part formed into labour battalions and sent hundreds of miles into the interior, where they employed in road-making, building, tunnel excavating and in field work for the rich pashas. Their daily ration was half a loaf of black bread, eked out with a little dried fish or olives. Driven like slaves and under-nourished, they died by tens of thousands. Whole battalions succumbed to the ravages of typhus and cholera. Many thousands were massacred by their inhuman Turkish guards. Of these Greek battalions it is estimated 150,000 died. Fortunes of Christians Confiscated Some hundreds of thousands of Hellenes from Thrace and Asia Minor managed to escape into Greece, where they subsequently fought in the Greek armies. Their desertion was the signal for other Turkish atrocities. The property of all deserters was duly seized and families were deported to the interior. In the district of Kerassunda, from which 300 Greeks had escaped, the Turks in reprisal burned 88 villages to the ground. Thirty thousand inhabitants, mostly women and children, were obliged to march in mid-winter to Angora. On the way, 7,000 died of exposure. Meanwhile, the fortunes of many rich Christian were confiscated, and stores were completely pillaged. Christians were forced under threats of violence and imprisonment, to contribute large sums for the support of the Turkish Army and Navy, in addition to their usual heavy taxes. Finally, under a system of compulsory labour, the Christians were obliged to cultivate the lands of the Moslems, but no time was allowed them to cultivate their own fields. If discovered harvesting their own crops a cordon would be placed around the village, the water supply cut off and the people were deprived of food and drink. After a few days of such torture, a band of Bashi-Bazouks were sent into the villages to pillage and murder. The populations were given the choice of being deported over the mountains, to places hundreds of miles distant, or of suffering a lingering death from hunger and thirst. These deportations, begun in 1915, reached a total of 450,000 during the period of the War. During these tragic pilgrimages the poor barefooted Greeks, beaten by guards, attacked by brigands, never resting, lacking food and water, wandered on to their distant destinations. Thousands died by the wayside of fatigue and suffering. While in transit, many mothers gave birth to infants, but they were compelled to leave them by the road-side and rejoin the marching columns. En route they were forbidden to enter the villages to purchase food. Hundreds of young girls were detained by the Turks and forcibly “converted” to Islamism. At Panderma, the German General, Liman von Sanders, built an orphanage for all Christian girls who had been coerced into accepting Islam, and compelled the Christian population to contribute $50,000 toward its support. [My emphasis]

The Black Sea Colonies

The Greek colonists on the coast of the Black Sea were likewise deported. The scourge of the Greeks in this region was the later Governor of Bitlis, Rafet Pasha. More than 150,000 Greeks were deported in this district and in Trebizond, and upward of 100 Greek villages were destroyed. Hundreds of young Greek girls, rather than live as slaves in the harems, committed suicide by drowning. [My emphasis]

The Order for Greek Deportations The deporting orders to the Governor of Smyrna, signed by Ali Riga, the chief of the Turkish Bureau of Correspondence, read as follows:
“It is imperative for political reasons that the Greeks dwelling along the coast of Asia Minor be compelled to evacuate their villages in order to settle in the villages of Erzerum and Chaldea. If they refuse to emigrate to the places assigned to them, you should issue verbal instructions to our Mussulman brothers so that they may, by all kinds of excesses, compel the Greeks to leave their homes of their own accord. Do not, in this case, forget to obtain from these emigrants declarations to the effect that they are leaving their hearths and homes of their own free will, so that no political complications may later result therefrom.”

The Martyrdom of the Greeks Half of the deported Greek populations perished in consequence of ill treatment, disease and famine, and the survivors suffered continual martyrdom as slaves. The Turkish functionaries, with German approval, declared that no Christian should be left alive in Turkey unless he consented to embrace Mohammedanism. The confiscated fortunes of the deported Greeks surpass in the value $1,000,000,000.

Political Recognition Political recognition of the events as genocide is limited, the only countries officially acknowledging them as such being Greece and Cyprus.
Sources: 1. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pontic_Greek_genocide 2. http://www.hellenicgenocide.org/index.html 3. King, William C., King’s Complete History of the World War: Visualizing the Great Conflict in all Theaters of Aciton 1914-1918, The history Associates, Massachusetts, 1922 pp.436-438 http://www.greek-genocide.org/article_1500000_greek_christians.html

Assyrian Jihadi Genocide (1914-1920) The Assyrian Genocide (also known as Sayfo , Turkish: Suryani Soyk?r?m?) was committed against the Assyrian and Syriac Christians of the Ottoman Empire near the end of the First World War by the leadership of the Young Turks Party. The Assyrian population of

northern Mesopotamia (Tur Abdin, Hakkari, Van, Siirt region in modern-day southeastern Turkey and Urmia region in northwestern Iran) was forcibly relocated and massacred by Ottoman (Turkish and Kurdish) forces between 1914 and 1920 under the regime of the Young Turks. Scholars have placed the number of Assyrian victims at 500,000 to 750,000 (75% of the population)[1][2][3][4]

Massacre of Khoi (Eye witness description of one event) In early 1918, many Assyrians started to flee present-day Turkey. Mar Shimon Benyamin had arranged for some 3,500 Assyrians to reside in the district of Khoi. Not long after settling in, Kurdish troops of the Ottoman Army massacred the population almost entirely. One of the few that survived was Reverend John Eshoo. After escaping, he stated [7]:
You have undoubtedly heard of the Assyrian massacre of Khoi, but I am certain you do not know the details. These Assyrians were assembled into one caravansary, and shot to death by guns and revolvers. Blood literally flowed in little streams, and the entire open space within the caravansary became a pool of crimson liquid. The place was too small to hold all the living victims waiting for execution. They were brought in groups, and each new group was compelled to stand over the heap of the still bleeding bodies and shot to death. The fearful place became literally a human slaughter house, receiving its speechless victims, in groups of ten and twenty at a time, for execution. At the same time, the Assyrians, who were residing in the suburb of the city, were brought together and driven into the spacious courtyard of a house […] The Assyrian refugees were kept under guard for eight days, without anything to eat. At last they were removed from their place of confinement and taken to a spot prepared for their brutal killing. These helpless Assyrians marched like lambs to their slaughter, and they opened not their mouth, save by sayings «Lord, into thy hands we commit our spirits. […] The executioners began by cutting first the fingers of their victims, join by joint, till the two hands were entirely amputated. Then they were stretched on the ground, after the manner of the animals that are slain in the Fast, but these with their faces turned upward, and their heads resting upon the stones or blocks of wood Then their throats were half cut, so as to prolong their torture of dying, and while struggling in the agony of death, the victims were kicked and clubbed by heavy poles the murderers carried Many of them, while still labouring under the pain of death, were thrown into ditches and buried before their souls had expired. The young men and the able-bodied men were separated from among the very young and the old. They were taken some distance from the city and used as targets by the shooters. They all fell, a few not mortally wounded. One of the leaders went to the heaps of the fallen and shouted aloud, swearing by the names of Islam’s prophets that those who had not received mortal wounds should rise and depart, as they would not be harmed any more. A few, thus deceived, stood up, but only to fall this time killed by another volley from the guns of the murderers. Some of the younger and good looking women, together with a few little girls of attractive appearance, pleaded to be killed. Against their will were forced into Islam’s harems. Others were subjected to such fiendish insults that I cannot possibly describe. Death, however, came to their rescue and saved them from the vile passions of the demons. The death toll of Assyrians totalled 2,770 men, women and children.

Statement of German Missionaries on Urmia.
The latest news is that four thousand Assyrians and one hundred Armenians have died of disease alone, at the mission, within the last five months. All villages in the surrounding district with two or three exceptions have been plundered and burnt; twenty thousand Christians have been slaughtered in Armenia and its environs. In Haftewan, a village of Salmas, 750 corpses without heads have been recovered from the wells and cisterns alone. Why? Because the commanding officer had put a price on every Christian head… In Dilman crowds of Christians were thrown into prison and driven to accept Islam. [6]

Recognition The genocide of Assyrians has yet to be officially recognised by any country. The only logical reason is that most countries don’t want to risk jeopardising trade relations with Turkey. As an illustration; In June 2008, Yilmaz Kerimo and Ibrahim Baylan both from the Swedish Social Democratic Party, brought a bill to the Swedish parliament for the recognition of the genocide. The parliament resoundingly voted against it, 37 to 245.
Sources: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assyrian_Genocide 1. The Plight of Religious Minorities: Can Religious Pluralism Survive? — Page 51 by United States Congress 2. The Armenian Genocide: Wartime Radicalisation Or Premeditated Continuum — Page 272 edited by Richard Hovannisian 3. Not Even My Name: A True Story — Page 131 by Thea Halo 4. The Political Dictionary of Modern Middle East by Agnes G. Korbani 6. Abraham Yohannan The Death of a Nation: Or, The Ever Persecuted Nestorians Or Assyrian Christians ISBN 0524062358, pp. 126–127. 7. Joel Euel Werda. The Flickering Light of Asia: Or, the Assyrian Nation and Church, ch. 26

Assyrian Genocide in Iraq (1933) The massacre of Christian Assyrian villagers in the town of Simmele, North Iraq, and its surroundings was the second[9]. On August 8-11, 1933 the Iraqi army, under the leadership of Bakir Sidqi, a Kurd, killed 3000 men, women and children in the village of Simmele and its surroundings. This was one of the first acts of the new Iraq, having gained its independence from the British in 1932. It was this Simmele Massacre which inspired Raphael Lemkin, the author of the UN Convention on Genocide, to coin the term Genocide[10]. Assyrian Massacre (1829 Iraq and Syria) In October, 1829 the Kurdish leader Rwandez initiated a pogrom against Assyrians of the Syrian Orthodox Church in North Iraq and Syria. The first village that was attacked was Bit-Zabda, where 200 men were killed. Subsequently, the Kurds stormed the Asfas village, first slaying the leader, Deacon Rais Arabo, and then Reverend Aziz. Eighty children fleeing to a nearby valley were attacked and murdered by the pursuing Kurds. The young girls of the village were unclothed. The girls were enslaved while the others were shot on-site. The attackers then moved to Nisibin, on the border of Turkey and Syria, and repeated similar atrocities.[11]

Assyrian Massacre (1842 Turkey) In 1842 Badr Khan Beg, A Hakkari (southeast Turkey) Kurdish Amir, combined with other Kurdish forces led by Nurallah, attacked the Assyrians, intending to burn, kill, destroy, and, if possible, exterminate the Assyrians from the mountains. The Kurds destroyed and burned whatever came within their reach. An indiscriminate massacre took place. The women were brought before the Amir and murdered in cold blood. The aged mother of Mar Shimun, the Patriarch of the Church of the East, was seized by them, and after having practiced on her the most abominable atrocities, they cut her body into two parts and threw it into the river Zab, exclaiming, «go and carry to your accursed son the intelligence that the same fate awaits him.» Nearly ten thousand Assyrians were massacred, and as large a number of woman and children were taken captive, most of whom were sent to Jezirah to be sold as slaves, to be bestowed as presents upon the influential Muslims.[12] 30 documented Genocides of Christian Assyrians since year 630 A.D. Since 630 A.D., the coming of Islam, Assyrians have suffered 30 genocides at the hands of Muslims. Subtracting 661 (the first genocide) from 2007 and dividing by 30 yields 45 years — the frequency of Assyrian genocides. On average, every second Assyrian generation has suffered genocide. [14] In addition there are most likely hundreds of cases of mass murderings, hundreds of thousands of murders.
Sources: 9. The Simmele Massacre, http://www.aina.org/releases/20040805022140.htm 10. 1933 Assyrian Genocide in Iraq Inspired the Word ‘Genocide’, http://www.aina.org/news/20070115185021.htm 11. Deacon Asman Alkass Gorgis. Jirah Fi Tarikh Al-syrian, 1980, pp. 14. Translated by Subhi Younan 12. Abraham Yohannan. The Death of a Nation. G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1916, pp. 111-112 http://www.aina.org/reports/ig.pdf 14. Genocides Against the Assyrian Nation, http://www.aina.org/martyr.html

1.18 Turkey: Back to the Future? By Andrew G. Bostom Once again, Turks are storming the heart of Europe. This time, it is not by the sword, but rather in seeking to join the European Union (EU). Once inside the gates, they will gain access to the great cities, wealth, and power of their ancient rivals. Smoothing the way for incorporation of the former would-be conqueror into borderless Europe is an errant belief that Ottoman Turkey was a tolerant multi-cultural civilisation. Nothing could be further from the truth. Recently, security analyst Frank Gaffney wrote a courageous essay, featured in the Washington Times, urging that Turkey’s bid to join the EU be rejected. Gaffney highlighted the Islamic Shari’a-based religious revival under the current Erdogan regime as the keystone to his cogent argument. Despite Gaffney’s legitimate concerns regarding the current Erdogan government, he reiterates a common, politically-correct canard which ignores the direct nexus between Erdogan’s ideology, and the goals and behaviours of Erdogan’s Ottoman ancestors. It is ahistorical to speak of «Ottoman tolerance» as distinct from Erdogan’s «Islamism», because the Ottoman Empire expanded via three

centuries of devastating jihad campaigns, and the flimsy concept of Ottoman tolerance was, in reality, Ottoman-imposed dhimmitude, under the Shari’a. With formal discussions regarding Turkey’s potential EU accession currently underway, this three part essay will elaborate on several apposite historical phenomena: Jihad and dhimmitude under the Ottomans, focusing primarily on Asia Minor and Eastern Europe; the failure of the so-called Ottoman Tanzimat reforms to abrogate the system of dhimmitude; and the dissolution of this Shari’a state whose bloody, convulsive collapse during the first World War included a frank jihad genocide of the Ottoman dhimmi population, once considered most loyal to the Empire, i.e., the Armenians. I believe such an analysis is particularly timely, in light of a December 2004 United Nations Conference which lionised «Ottoman tolerance» as a role model, «… to be adapted even today…» [emphasis added], and Gaffney’s reiteration of this profoundly flawed conception, despite his own bold opposition to Turkey’s entry into the EU. Part 1 — Jihad Campaigns of the Seljuks and Ottomans The historian Michael the Syrian (Jacobite Patriarch of Antioch from 1166 to 1199 C.E.) in his Chronicle reproducing earlier contemporary sources, made important observations regarding events which occurred beginning in the third decade of the 11th century. He noted,
“…the commencement of the exodus of the Turks to…Syria and the coast of Palestine… [Where] They subdued all the countries by cruel devastation and plunder” [1] Subsequently, “Turks and Arabs were mixing together like a single people…Such was the rule of the Turks amidst the Arabs” [2]

Expanding upon this contemporary account, and the vast array of other primary sourcesArabic, Turkish, Greek, Latin, Serbian, Bulgarian, and Hungarian. [3] Bat Ye’or concludes, [4]
…the two waves of Muslim expansion, the Arab from the seventh century, and the Turkish four centuries later- are remarkably similar…The great Arab and Turkish conquerors used the same military tactics and the same policies of consolidating Islamic power. This continuity resulted from the fact that the conquests took place within the framework of the common ideology of jihad and the administrative and juridical apparatus of the shari’a- a uniformity that defies time, since it adapts itself to diverse lands and peoples, being integrated into the internal coherence of a political theology. In the course of their military operations, the Turks applied to the conquered populations the rules of jihad, which had been structured four centuries earlier by the Arabs and enshrined in Islamic religious law.

The Seljuk and Ottoman jihad campaigns were spearheaded by “Ghazi” (from the word ghazwa or “razzia”) movements, “Warriors of the Faith”, brought together under the banner of Islam to fight infidels, and obtain booty. Wittek [5] and Vryonis [6] have stressed the significance of this movement, in its Seljuk incarnation, at the most critical frontier of Islam during the 11th and 12th centuries, i.e., eastern Anatolia. Vryonis notes, [7]
When the Arab traveler al-Harawi passed through these border regions in the second half of the 12th century, he noted the existence of a shrine on the Byzantine-Turkish borders (near Afyon-Karahisar) which was reported to be the tomb of the Muslim martyr Abu Muhammd al-Battal, and at Amorium the tombs of those who fell in the celebrated siege of the city in 838. These constitute fascinating testimony to the fact that the ghazi-jihad tradition was

closely intertwined into the nomadic society of Phrygia. Not only was there evidence of a nomadic invasion but also of an epic society in its heroic age, and it is from this milieu that the Turkish epics were shaped: the Battalname, the Danishmendname, and the Dusturname.

Wittek, citing the oldest known Ottoman source, the versified chronicle of Ahmedi, maintains that the 14th century Ottomans believed they too,
“were a community of Ghazis, of champions of the Mohammedan religion; a community of the Moslem march- warriors, devoted to the struggle with the infidels in their neighbourhood” [8].

The contemporary Turkish scholar of Ottoman history, Halil Inalcik, has also emphasised the importance of Muslim religious zeal- expressed through jihad- as a primary motivation for the conquests of the Ottoman Turks: [9]
The ideal of gaza, Holy War, was an important factor in the foundation and development of the Ottoman state. Society in the frontier principalities conformed to a particular cultural pattern imbued with the ideal of continuous Holy War and continuous expansion of the Dar ul Islam-the realms of Islam- until they covered the whole world.

Incited by pious Muslim theologians, these ghazis were at the vanguard of both the Seljuk and Ottoman jihad conquests. Vacalopoulos highlights the role of the dervishes during the Ottoman campaigns: [10]
…fanatical dervishes and other devout Muslim leaders…constantly toiled for the dissemination of Islam. They had done so from the very beginning of the Ottoman state and had played an important part in the consolidation and extension of Islam. These dervishes were particularly active in the uninhabited frontier regions of the east. Here they settled down with their families, attracted other settlers, and thus became the virtual founders of whole new villages, whose inhabitants invariably exhibited the same qualities of deep religious fervor. From places such as these, the dervishes or their agents would emerge to take part in new military enterprises for the extension of the Islamic state. In return, the state granted them land and privileges under a generous prescription which required only that the land be cultivated and communications secured.

Brief overviews of the Seljuk and Ottoman jihad campaigns which ultimately Islamised Asia Minor, have been provided by Vryonis and Vacalopoulos. First, the schematic, clinical assessment of Vryonis: [11]
The conquest, or should I say the conquests of Asia Minor were in operation over a period of four centuries. Thus the Christian societies of Asia Minor were submitted to extensive periods of intense warfare, incursions, and destructions which undermined the existence of the Christian church. In the first century of Turkish conquests and invasions from the mideleventh to the late twelfth century, the sources reveal that some 63 towns and villages were destroyed. The inhabitants of other towns and villages were enslaved and taken off to the Muslim slave markets.

Vacalopoulos describes the conquests in more animated detail: [12]

At the beginning of the eleventh century, the Seljuk Turks forced their way into Armenia and there crushed the armies of several petty Armenian states. No fewer than forty thousand souls fled before the organised pillage of the Seljuk host to the western part of Asia Minor…From the middle of the eleventh century, and especially after the battle of Malazgirt [Manzikurt] (1071), the Seljuks spread throughout the whole Asia Minor peninsula, leaving terror, panic and destruction in their wake. Byzantine, Turkish and other contemporary sources are unanimous in their agreement on the extent of havoc wrought and the protracted anguish of the local population…evidence as we have proves that the Hellenic population of Asia Minor, whose very vigor had so long sustained the Empire and might indeed be said to have constituted its greatest strength, succumbed so rapidly to Turkish pressure that by the fourteenth century, it was confined to a few limited areas. By that time, Asia Minor was already being called Turkey…one after another, bishoprics and metropolitan sees which once throbbed with Christian vitality became vacant and ecclesiastical buildings fell into ruins. The metropolitan see of Chalcedon, for example, disappeared in the fourteenth century, and the sees of Laodicea, Kotyaeon (now Kutahya) and Synada in the fifteenth…With the extermination of local populations or their precipitate flight, entire villages, cities, and sometimes whole provinces fell into decay. There were some fertile districts like the valley of the Maeander River, once stocked with thousands of sheep and cattle, which were laid waste and thereafter ceased to be in any way productive. Other districts were literally transformed into wildernesses. Impenetrable thickets sprang up in places where once there had been luxuriant fields and pastures. This is what happened to the district of Sangarius, for example, which Michael VIII Palaeologus had known formerly as a prosperous, cultivated land, but whose utter desolation he afterwards surveyed in utmost despair…The mountainous region between Nicaea and Nicomedia, opposite Constantinople, once clustered with castles, cities, and villages, was depopulated. A few towns escaped total destruction- Laodicea, Iconium, Bursa (then Prusa), and Sinope, for example- but the extent of devastation elsewhere was such as to make a profound impression on visitors for may years to come. The fate of Antioch provides a graphic illustration of the kind of havoc wrought by the Turkish invaders: in 1432, only three hundred dwellings could be counted inside its walls, and its predominantly Turkish or Arab inhabitants subsisted by raising camels, goats, cattle, and sheep. Other cities in the southeastern part of Asia Minor fell into similar decay.

The Islamisation of Asia Minor was complemented by parallel and subsequent Ottoman jihad campaigns in the Balkans [13]. As of 1326 C.E., yearly razzias by the emirs of Asia Minor targeted southern Thrace, southern Macedonia, and the coastal areas of southern Greece. Around 1360 C.E., the Ottomans, under Suleiman (son of Sultan Orchan), and later Sultan Murad I (1359-1389), launched bona fide campaigns of jihad conquest, capturing and occupying a series of cities and towns in Byzantine and Bulgarian Thrace. Following the battle of Cernomen (September 26, 1371), the Ottomans penetrated westward, occupying within 15 years, a large number of towns in western Bulgaria, and in Macedonia. Ottoman invasions during this period also occurred in the Peloponnesus, central Greece, Epirus, Thessaly, Albania, and Montenegro. By 1388 most of northeast Bulgaria was conquered, and following the battle of Kosovo (1389), Serbia came under Ottoman suzerainty. Vacalopoulos argues that internecine warring, as well as social and political upheaval, prevented the Balkan populations- Greeks, Bulgarians, Albanians, and Serbians- from uniting against the common Ottoman enemy, thus sealing their doom. Indeed, he observes that, [14]
After the defeat of the Serbs at Cirmen (or Cernomen) near the Hebrus River in 1371, Serbia, Bulgaria, and the Byzantine Empire became tributaries of the Ottoman Empire and were obliged to render assistance in Ottoman campaigns.

Bayezid I (1389-1402) undertook devastating campaigns in Bosnia, Hungary, and Wallachia, in addition to turning south and again attacking central Greece and the Peloponnesus. After a hiatus during their struggle against the Mongol invaders, the Ottomans renewed their Balkan offensive in 1421. Successful Ottoman campaigns were waged in the Peloponnesus, Serbia, and Hungary, culminating with the victory at the

second Battle of Kosovo (1448). With the accession to power of Mehmed II, the Ottomans commenced their definitive conquest of the Balkan peninsula. Constantinople was captured on May 29, 1453, marking the end of the Byzantine Empire. By 1460, the Ottomans had completely vanquished both Serbia and the Peloponnesus. Bosnia and Trebizond fell in 1463, followed by Albania in 1468. With the conquest of Herzegovina in 1483, the Ottomans became rulers of the entire Balkan peninsula. Vacalopoulos, commenting on the initial Ottoman forays into Thrace during the mid 14th century, and Angelov, who provides an overall assessment highlighting the later campaigns of Murad II (1421-1451) and Mehmed II (1451-1481), elucidate the impact of the Ottoman jihad on the vanquished Balkan populations:
From the very beginning of the Turkish onslaught [in Thrace] under Suleiman [son of Sultan Orchan], the Turks tried to consolidate their position by the forcible imposition of Islam. If [the Ottoman historian] Sukrullah is to be believed, those who refused to accept the Moslem faith were slaughtered and their families enslaved. “Where there were bells”, writes the same author [i.e., Sukrullah], “Suleiman broke them up and cast them into fires. Where there were churches he destroyed them or converted them into mosques. Thus, in place of bells there were now muezzins. Wherever Christian infidels were still found, vassalage was imposed on their rulers. At least in public they could no longer say ‘kyrie eleison’ but rather ‘There is no God but Allah’; and where once their prayers had been addressed to Christ, they were now to “Muhammad, the prophet of Allah’.” [15] …the conquest of the Balkan Peninsula accomplished by the Turks over the course of about two centuries caused the incalculable ruin of material goods, countless massacres, the enslavement and exile of a great part of the population – in a word, a general and protracted decline of productivity, as was the case with Asia Minor after it was occupied by the same invaders. This decline in productivity is all the more striking when one recalls that in the mid-fourteenth century, as the Ottomans were gaining a foothold on the peninsula, the States that existed there – Byzantium, Bulgaria and Serbia – had already reached a rather high level of economic and cultural development….The campaigns of Mourad II (1421-1451) and especially those of his successor, Mahomet II (1451-1481) in Serbia, Bosnia, Albania and in the Byzantine princedom of the Peloponnesus, were of a particularly devastating character. During the campaign that the Turks launched in Serbia in 14551456, Belgrade, Novo-Bardo and other towns were to a great extent destroyed. The invasion of the Turks in Albania during the summer of 1459 caused enormous havoc. According to the account of it written by Kritobulos, the invaders destroyed the entire harvest and levelled the fortified towns that they had captured. The country was afflicted with further devastation in 1466 when the Albanians, after putting up heroic resistance, had to withdraw into the most inaccessible regions, from which they continued the struggle. Many cities were likewise ruined during the course of the campaign led by Mahomet II in 1463 against Bosnia – among them Yaytze, the capital of the Kingdom of Bosnia…But it was the Peloponnesus that suffered most from the Turkish invasions. It was invaded in 1446 by the armies of Murad II, which destroyed a great number of places and took thousands of prisoners. Twelve years later, during the summer of 1458, the Balkan Peninsula was invaded by an enormous Turkish army under the command of Mahomet II and his first lieutenant Mahmoud Pasha. After a siege that lasted four months, Corinth fell into enemy hands. Its walls were razed, and many places that the sultan considered useless were destroyed. The work by Kritobulos contains an account of the Ottoman campaigns, which clearly shows us the vast destruction caused by the invaders in these regions. Two years later another Turkish army burst into the Peloponnesus. This time Gardiki and several other places were ruined. Finally, in 1464, for the third time, the destructive rage of the invaders was aimed at the Peloponnesus. That was when the Ottomans battled the Venetians and levelled the city of Argos to its foundations. [16]

Ottoman Dhimmitude

In examining how the non-Muslim populations vanquished by the Ottoman jihad campaigns fared, it is useful to begin with the Jews, the least numerous population, who are also generally believed to have had quite a positive experience. Joseph Hacker studied the fate of Jews during their initial absorption into the Ottoman Empire in the 15th and 16th centuries. His research questions the uncritical view that from its outset the, “..Jewish experience” in the Ottoman Empire “..was a calm, peaceful, and fruitful one..”.Hacker notes: [17]
…It would seem to me that this accepted view of consistently good relations between the Ottomans and the Jews during the 15th century should be modified in light of new research and manuscript resources.

The Jews, like other inhabitants of the Byzantine Empire, suffered heavily from the Ottoman jihad conquests and policies of colonisation and population transfer (i.e., the surgun system). This explains the disappearance of several Jewish communities, including Salonica, and their founding anew by Spanish Jewish immigrants. Hacker observes, specifically: [18]
…We possess letters written about the fate of Jews who underwent one or another of the Ottoman conquests. In one of the letters which was written before 1470, there is a description of the fate of such a Jew and his community, according to which description, written in Rhodes and sent to Crete, the fate of the Jews was not different from that of Christians. Many were killed; others were taken captive, and children were [enslaved, forcibly converted to Islam, and] brought to devshirme…Some letters describe the carrying of the captive Jews to Istanbul and are filled with anti-Ottoman sentiments. Moreover, we have a description of the fate of a Jewish doctor and homilist from Veroia (Kara-Ferya) who fled to Negroponte when his community was driven into exile in 1455. He furnished us with a description of the exiles and their forced passage to Istanbul. Later on we find him at Istanbul itself, and in a homily delivered there in 1468 he expressed his anti-Ottoman feelings openly. We also have some evidence that the Jews of Constantinople suffered from the conquest of the city and that several were sold into slavery. Three summary conclusions are drawn by Hacker: (i) Strong anti-Ottoman feelings prevailed in some Byzantine Jewish circles in the first decades after the fall of Constantinople. These feelings were openly expressed by people living under Latin rule and to some extent even in Istanbul.; (ii) Mehmed II’s policies toward non-Muslims made possible the substantial economic and social development of the Jewish communities in the empire, and especially in the capital — Istanbul. These communities were protected by him against popular hatred, and especially from blood libels. However, this policy was not continued by Bayezid II and there is evidence that under his rule the Jews suffered severe restrictions in their religious life.; (iii) The friendly policies of Mehmed on the one hand, and the good reception by Bayezid II of Spanish Jewry on the other, cause the Jewish writers of the sixteenth century to overlook both the destruction which Byzantine Jewry suffered during the Ottoman conquests and the later outbursts of oppression under both Bayezid II and Selim I. Ivo Andric analysed [19] the “rayah” (meaning “herd”, and “to graze a herd”) or dhimmi condition imposed upon the indigenous Christian population of Bosnia, for four centuries. Those native Christian inhabitants who refused to apostatise to Islam lived under the Ottoman Kanun-i-Rayah, which merely reiterated [20] the essential regulations of dhimmitude originally formulated by Muslim jurists and theologians in the 7th and 8th centuries C.E. Andric’s presentation musters, [21] …a wealth of irrefutable evidence that the main points of the Kanun, just those that cut the deepest into the moral and economic life of Christians, remained in full force right up to the end of Turkish rule and as long as the Turks had the power to apply them…[thus] it was inevitable that the rayah decline to a status that was economically inferior and dependent.

Andric cites a Bosnian Muslim proverb, and a song honouring Sultan Bayezid II, whose shared perspectives reflect Muslim attitudes toward the Christian rayahs: [22]
[proverb] “The rayah is like the grass,/Mow it as much as you will, still it springs up anew” [song] “Once you’d broken Bosnia’s horns/You mowed down what would not be pruned/Leaving only the riffraff behind/So there’d be someone left to serve us and grieve before the cross”

These prevailing discriminatory conditions were exacerbated by Bosnia’s serving as either a battlefield or staging ground during two centuries of Ottoman razzias and formal jihad campaigns against Hungary. Overcome by excessive taxation and conscript labour:
Christians therefore began to abandon their houses and plots of land situated in level country and along the roads and to retreat back into the mountains. And as they did so, moving ever higher into inaccessible regions, Muslims took over their former sites. [23]

Moreover, those Christians living in towns suffered from the rayah system’s mandated impediments to commercial advancement by non-Muslims: [24]
Islam from the very outset, excluded such activities as making wine, breeding pigs, and selling pork products from commercial production and trade. But additionally Bosnian Christians were forbidden to be saddlers, tanners, or candle makers or to trade in honey, butter, and certain other items. Countrywide, the only legal market day was Sunday. Christians were thus deliberately faced with the choice between ignoring the precepts of their religion, keeping their shops open and working on Sundays, or alternatively, forgoing participation in the market and suffering material loss thereby. Even in 1850, in Jukic’s “Wishes and Entreaties” we find him beseeching “his Imperial grace” to put an end to the regulation that Sunday be market day.

Christians were also forced to pay disproportionately higher taxes than Muslims, including the intentionally degrading non-Muslim poll-tax.
This tax was paid by every non-Muslim male who had passed his fourteenth year, at the rate of a ducat per annum. But since Turkey had never known birth registers, the functionary whose job it was to exact the tax measured the head and neck of each boy with a piece of string and judged from that whether a person had arrived at a taxable age or not. Starting as an abuse that soon turned into an ingrained habit, then finally established custom, by the last century of Turkish rule every boy without distinction found himself summoned to pay the head tax. And it would seem this was not the only abuse…Of Ali-Pasa Stocevic, who during the first half of the nineteenth century was vizier and all but unlimited ruler of Herzegovina, his contemporary, the monk Prokopije Cokorilo, wrote that he “taxed the dead for six years after their demise” and that his tax collectors “ran their fingers over the bellies of pregnant women, saying ‘you will probably have a boy, so you have to pay the poll tax right away…The following folk saying from Bosnia reveals how taxes were exacted: “He’s as fat as if he’d been tax collecting in Bosnia” [25]

The specific Kanun-i-Rayah stipulations which prohibited the rayahs from riding a saddled horse, carrying a saber or any other weapon in or out of doors, selling wine, letting their

hair grow, or wearing wide sashes, were strictly enforced until the mid-19th century. Hussamudin-Pasa, in 1794 issued an ordinance which prescribed the exact colour and type of clothing the Bosnian rayah had to wear. Barbers were prohibited from shaving Muslims with the same razors used for Christians. Even in bathhouses, Christians were required to have specifically marked towels and aprons to avoid confusing their laundry with laundry designated for Muslims. Until at least 1850, and in some parts of Bosnia, well into the 1860s, a Christian upon encountering a Muslim, was required to jump down from his (unsaddled) horse, move to the side of the road, and wait for the latter to pass. [26] Christianity’s loud and most arresting symbol, church bells, Andric notes [27], always drew close, disapproving Turkish scrutiny, and, “Wherever there invasions would go, down came the bells, to be destroyed or melted into cannon”. Predictably:
Until the second half of the nineteenth century, “nobody in Bosnia could even think of bells or bell towers.” Only in 1860 did the Sarajevo priest Fra Grgo Martic manage to get permission from Topal Osman-Pasa to hang a bell at the church in Kresevo. Permission was granted, thought, only on condition that “at first the bell be rung softly to let the Turks get accustomed to it little by little”. And still the Muslim of Kresevo were complaining, even in 1875, to Sarajevo that “the Turkish ear and ringing bells cannot coexist in the same place at the same time”; and Muslim women would beat on their copper pots to drown out the noise…on 30 April 1872, the new Serbian Orthodox church also got a bell. But since the… Muslims had threatened to riot, the military had to be called in to ensure that the ceremony might proceed undisturbed. [28]

The imposition of such disabilities, Andric observes, [29] extended beyond church ceremonies, as reflected by a 1794 proclamation of the Serbian Orthodox church in Sarajevo warning Christians not to:
…sing during …outings, nor in their houses, nor in other places. The saying “Don’t sing too loud, this village is Turk” testifies eloquently to the fact that this item of the Kanun [- iRayah] was applied outside church life as well as within.

Andric concludes, [30]:
…for their Christian subjects, their [Ottoman Turkish] hegemony brutalised custom and meant a step to the rear in every respect.

Finally, Jovan Cvijic, the Serbian sociologist and geographer, observed,
There are regions where the [Serb] Christian population…lived under the regime of fear, from birth to death.

Despite the liberation of the Balkans in 1912, Cvijic further noted that the Serbs were not fully cognizant of their new status, and this fear could still be read, remaining etched on their faces. [31] Paul Ricaut, the British consul in Smyrna, journeyed extensively within the Ottoman Empire during the mid-17th century, becoming a keen observer of its socio-political milieu. In 1679 (i.e., prior to the Ottomans being repulsed at Vienna in September, 1683; see later discussion of Ottoman “tolerance”), Ricaut published these important findings

[32]: (i) many Christians were expelled from their churches, which the Ottoman Turks converted into mosques; (ii) the “Mysteries of the Altar” were hidden in subterranean vaults and sepulchers whose roofs were barely above the surface of the ground; (iii) fearing Turkish hostility and oppression, Christian priests, particularly in eastern Asia Minor, were compelled to live with great caution and officiate in private obscurity; (iv) not surprisingly, to escape these prevailing conditions, many Christians apostatised to Islam. Moreover, as Vryonis demonstrated convincingly for the earlier period between the 11th and 15th centuries [33], the existence of cryto-Christianity and neo-martyrs were not uncommon phenomena in the Christian territories of Asia Minor conquered by the waves of Seljuk and Ottoman jihad. He cites, for example, a pastoral letter from 1338 addressed to the residents of Nicaea indicating widespread, forcible conversion by the Turks: [34]
And they [Turks] having captured and enslaved many of our own and violently forced them and dragging them along alas! So that they took up their evil and godlessness.

The phenomenon of forcible conversion, including coercive en masse conversions, persisted throughout the 16th century, as discussed by Constantelos in his analysis of neo-martyrdom in the Ottoman Empire: [35]
…mass forced conversions were recorded during the caliphates of Selim I (1512-1520), Selim II (1566-1574), and Murat III (1574-1595). On the occasion of some anniversary, such as the capture of a city, or a national holiday, many rayahs were forced to apostatise. On the day of the circumcision of Mohammed III great numbers of Christians (Albanians, Greeks, Slavs) were forced to convert to Islam.

Reviewing the martyrology of Christians victimised by the Ottomans from the conquest of Constantinople (1453), through the final phases of the Greek War of Independence (1828), Constantelos indicates: [36]
…the Ottoman Turks condemned to death eleven Ecumenical Patriarchs of Constantinople, nearly one hundred bishops, and several thousand priests, deacons, and minks. It is impossible to say with certainty how many men of the cloth were forced to apostatise.

However, the more mundane cases illustrated by Constantelos are of equal significance in revealing the plight of Christians under Ottoman rule, through at least 1867: [37]
Some were accused of insulting the Muslim faith or of throwing something against the wall of a mosque. Others were accused of sexual advances toward a Turk; still others of making a public confession such as “I will become a Turk” without meaning it.

Constantelos concludes: [38]
The story of the neo-martyrs indicates that there was no liberty of conscience in the Ottoman Empire and that religious persecution was never absent from the state. Justice was subject to the passions of judges as well as of the crowds, and it was applied with a double standard, lenient for Muslims and harsh for Christians and others. The view that the Ottoman Turks pursued a policy of religious toleration in order to promote a fusion of the Turks with the conquered populations is not sustained by the facts.

Even the Turcophilic 19th century travel writer Ubicini acknowledged the oppressive burden of Ottoman dhimmitude in this moving depiction: [39]
The history of enslaved peoples is the same everywhere, or rather, they have no history. The years, the centuries pass without bringing any change to their situation. Generations come and go in silence. One might think they are afraid to awaken their masters, asleep alongside them. However, if you examine them closely you discover that this immobility is only superficial. A silent and constant agitation grips them. Life has entirely withdrawn into the heart. They resemble those rivers which have disappeared underground; if you put your ear to the earth, you can hear the muffled sound of their waters; then they re-emerge intact a few leagues away. Such is the state of the Christian populations of Turkey under Ottoman rule.

Vacalopoulos describes how jihad imposed dhimmitude under Ottoman rule provided critical motivation for the Greek Revolution: [40]
The Revolution of 1821 is no more than the last great phase of the resistance of the Greeks to Ottoman domination; it was a relentless, undeclared war, which had begun already in the first years of servitude. The brutality of an autocratic regime, which was characterised by economic spoliation, intellectual decay and cultural retrogression, was sure to provoke opposition. Restrictions of all kinds, unlawful taxation, forced labour, persecutions, violence, imprisonment, death, abductions of girls and boys and their confinement to Turkish harems, and various deeds of wantonness and lust, along with numerous less offensive excesses – all these were a constant challenge to the instinct of survival and they defied every sense of human decency. The Greeks bitterly resented all insults and humiliations, and their anguish and frustration pushed them into the arms of rebellion. There was no exaggeration in the statement made by one of the beys if Arta, when he sought to explain the ferocity of the struggle. He said: ‘We have wronged the rayas [dhimmis] (i.e. our Christian subjects) and destroyed both their wealth and honour; they became desperate and took up arms. This is just the beginning and will finally lead to the destruction of our empire.’ The sufferings of the Greeks under Ottoman rule were therefore the basic cause of the insurrection; a psychological incentive was provided by the very nature of the circumstances.

The Devshirme and Harem Slavery Those scholars [41] who continue to adhere to the roseate narrative of Ottoman “tolerance”, the notion that an “…easy-going tolerance, resting on an assumption not only of superior religion, but also of superior power”, which it is claimed, persisted in the Ottoman Empire until the end of the 17th century [42], must address certain basic questions. Why has the quite brutal Ottoman devshirme-janissary system, which, from the mid to late 14th, through early 18th centuries, enslaved and forcibly converted to Islam an estimated 500,000 to one million [43] non-Muslim (primarily Balkan Christian) adolescent males, been characterised, reductio ad absurdum, as a benign form of social advancement, jealously pined for by “ineligible” Ottoman Muslim families? For example:
The role played by the Balkan Christian boys recruited into the Ottoman service through the devshirme is well known. Great numbers of them entered the Ottoman military and bureaucratic apparatus, which for a while came to be dominated by these new recruits to the Ottoman state and the Muslim faith. This ascendancy of Balkan Europeans into the Ottoman power structure did not pass unnoticed, and there are many complaints from

other elements, sometimes from the Caucasian slaves who were their main competitors, and more vocally from the old and free Muslims, who felt slighted by the preference given to the newly converted slaves. [44]

Scholars, who have conducted serious, detailed studies of the devshirme-janissary system, do not share such hagiographic views of this Ottoman institution. Speros Vryonis, Jr. for example, makes these deliberately understated, but cogent observations, [45]
…in discussing the devshirme we are dealing with the large numbers of Christians who, in spite of the material advantages offered by conversion to Islam, chose to remain members of a religious society which was denied first class citizenship. Therefore the proposition advanced by some historians, that the Christians welcomed the devshirme as it opened up wonderful opportunities for their children, is inconsistent with the fact that these Christians had not chosen to become Muslims in the first instance but had remained Christians…there is abundant testimony to the very active dislike with which they viewed the taking of their children. One would expect such sentiments given the strong nature of the family bond and given also the strong attachment to Christianity of those who had not apostatised to Islam…First of all the Ottomans capitalised on the general Christian fear of losing their children and used offers of devshirme exemption in negotiations for surrender of Christian lands. Such exemptions were included in the surrender terms granted to Jannina, Galata, the Morea, Chios, etc…Christians who engaged in specialised activities which were important to the Ottoman state were likewise exempt from the tax on their children by way of recognition of the importance of their labours for the empire…Exemption from this tribute was considered a privilege and not a penalty… …there are other documents wherein their [i.e., the Christians] dislike is much more explicitly apparent. These include a series of Ottoman documents dealing with the specific situations wherein the devshirmes themselves have escaped from the officials responsible for collecting them…A firman…in 1601 [regarding the devshirme] provided the [Ottoman] officials with stern measures of enforcement, a fact which would seem to suggest that parents were not always disposed to part with their sons. “..to enforce the command of the known and holy fetva [fatwa] of Seyhul [Shaikh]Islam. In accordance with this whenever some one of the infidel parents or some other should oppose the giving up of his son for the Janissaries, he is immediately hanged from his door-sill, his blood being deemed unworthy.”

Vasiliki Papoulia highlights the continuous desperate, often violent struggle of the Christian populations against this forcefully imposed Ottoman levy: [46]
It is obvious that the population strongly resented…this measure [and the levy] could be carried out only by force. Those who refused to surrender their sons- the healthiest, the handsomest and the most intelligent- were on the spot put to death by hanging. Nevertheless we have examples of armed resistance. In 1565 a revolt took place in Epirus and Albania. The inhabitants killed the recruiting officers and the revolt was put down only after the sultan sent five hundred janissaries in support of the local sanjak-bey. We are better informed, thanks to the historic archives of Yerroia, about the uprising in Naousa in 1705 where the inhabitants killed the Silahdar Ahmed Celebi and his assistants and fled to the mountains as rebels. Some of them were later arrested and put to death.. Since there was no possibility of escaping [the levy] the population resorted to several subterfuges. Some left their villages and fled to certain cities which enjoyed exemption from the child levy or migrated to Venetian-held territories. The result was a depopulation of the countryside. Others had their children marry at an early age…Nicephorus Angelus… states that at times the children ran away on their own initiative, but when they heard that the authorities had arrested their parents and were torturing them to death, returned and

gave themselves up. La Giulletiere cites the case of a young Athenian who returned from hiding in order to save his father’s life and then chose to die himself rather than abjure his faith. According to the evidence in Turkish sources, some parents even succeeded in abducting their children after they had been recruited. The most successful way of escaping recruitment was through bribery. That the latter was very widespread is evident from the large amounts of money confiscated by the sultan from corrupt…officials. Finally, in their desperation the parents even appealed to the Pope and the Western powers for help.

Papoulia concludes: [47]
…there is no doubt that this heavy burden was one of the hardest tribulations of the Christian population.

Why was there never a significant “Shari’a-inspired” slavery abolition movement within the Ottoman states, comparable to the courageous and successful campaigns lead by Western Christian statesmen (such as the Evangelical Parliamentarian, William Wilberforce [48] ) in Europe and America, throughout the 19th century? Deliberately limited and ineffectual firmans issued by the Ottoman Porte failed to discourage East African slave trading [49], and even British naval power, so successful in the Atlantic and Indian oceans [50], was unable to suppress the Red Sea slave trade to the Ottoman Empire at the end of the 19th century. [51] Regardless, as Reuben Levy notes: [52]
At Constantinople, the sale of women slaves, both negresses and Circassians [likely for harem slavery and/or concubinage], continued to be openly practiced until…1908.

Turkey: From Failed Reforms to a Modern Jihad Genocide Why did the Tanzimat reforms, designed to abrogate the Ottoman version of the system of dhimmitude, need to be imposed by European powers through treaties, as so—called ‘capitulations’ following Ottoman military defeats, and why even then, were these reforms never implemented in any meaningful way from 1839, until the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I Edouard Engelhardt [53] made these observations from his detailed analysis of the Tanzimat period, noting that a quarter century after the Crimean War (1853—56), and the second iteration of Tanzimat reforms, the same problems persisted:
Muslim society has not yet broken with the prejudices which make the conquered peoples subordinate…the raya [dhimmis] remain inferior to the Osmanlis; in fact he is not rehabilitated; the fanaticism of the early days has not relented…[even liberal Muslims rejected]…civil and political equality, that is to say, the assimilation of the conquered with the conquerors.

A systematic examination of the condition of the Christian rayas was conducted in the 1860s by British consuls stationed throughout the Ottoman Empire, yielding extensive primary source documentary evidence. [54]. Britain was then Turkey’s most powerful ally, and it was in her strategic interest to see that oppression of the Christians was eliminated, to prevent direct, aggressive Russian or Austrian intervention. On July 22, 1860, Consul James Zohrab sent a lengthy report from Sarajevo to his ambassador in Constantinople, Sir Henry Bulwer, analysing the administration of the provinces of Bosnia

and Herzegovina, again, following the 1856 Tanzimat reforms. Referring to the reform efforts, Zohrab states: [55]
The Hatti—humayoun, I can safely say, practically remains a dead letter…while [this] does not extend to permitting the Christians to be treated as they formerly were treated, is so far unbearable and unjust in that it permits the Mussulmans to despoil them with heavy exactions. False imprisonments (imprisonment under false accusation) are of daily occurrence. A Christian has but a small chance of exculpating himself when his opponent is a Mussulman (…) Christian evidence, as a rule, is still refused (…) Christians are now permitted to possess real property, but the obstacles which they meet with when they attempt to acquire it are so many and vexatious that very few have as yet dared to brave them…Such being, generally speaking, the course pursued by the Government towards the Christians in the capital (Sarajevo) of the province where the Consular Agents of the different Powers reside and can exercise some degree of control, it may easily be guessed to what extend the Christians, in the remoter districts, suffer who are governed by Mudirs (governors) generally fanatical and unacquainted with the (new reforms of the) law..

In his comprehensive study of 19th century Palestinian Jewry under Ottoman rule Tudor Parfitt made these germane observations: [56]
Inside the towns, Jews and other dhimmis were frequently attacked, wounded, and even killed by local Muslims and Turkish soldiers. Such attacks were frequently for trivial reasons: Wilson [in British Foreign Office correspondence] recalled having met a Jew who had been badly wounded by a Turkish soldier for not having instantly dismounted when ordered to give up his donkey to a soldier of the Sultan. Many Jews were killed for less. On occasion the authorities attempted to get some form of redress but this was by no means always the case: the Turkish authorities themselves were sometimes responsible for beating Jews to death for some unproven charge. After one such occasion [British Consul] Young remarked: ‘I must say I am sorry and surprised that the Governor could have acted so savage a part— for certainly what I have seen of him I should have thought him superior to such wanton inhumanity— but it was a Jew— without friends or protection— it serves to show well that it is not without reason that the poor Jew, even in the nineteenth century, lives from day to day in terror of his life’.

…In fact, it took some time [i.e., at least a decade after the 1839 reforms] before these courts did accept dhimmi testimony in Palestine. The fact that Jews were represented on the meclis [provincial legal council] did not contribute a great deal to the amelioration of the legal position of the Jews: the Jewish representatives were tolerated grudgingly and were humiliated and intimidated to the point that they were afraid to offer any opposition to the Muslim representatives. In addition the constitution of the meclis was in no sense fairly representative of the population. In Jerusalem in the 1870s the meclis consisted of four Muslims, three Christians and only one Jew— at a time when Jews constituted over half the population of the city…Some years after the promulgation of the hatt—i—serif [Tanzimat reform edicts] Binyamin [in an eyewitness account from Eight Years in Asia and Africa from 1846 to 1855, p.44] was still able to write of the Jews— ‘they are entirely destitute of every legal protection’…Perhaps even more to the point, the courts were biased against the Jews and even when a case was heard in a properly assembled court where dhimmi testimony was admissible the court would still almost invariably rule against the Jews. It should be noted that a non—dhimmi [eg., foreign] Jew was still not permitted to appear and witness in either the mahkama [specific Muslim council] or the meclis.

The modern Ottomanist Roderick Davison acknowledges that the reforms failed, and offers an explanation based on Islamic beliefs intrinsic to the system of dhimmitude: [57]

No genuine equality was ever attained…there remained among the Turks an intense Muslim feeling which could sometimes burst into an open fanaticism…More important than the possibility of fanatic outbursts, however, was the innate attitude of superiority which the Muslim Turk possessed. Islam was for him the true religion. Christianity was only a partial revelation of the truth, which Muhammad finally revealed in full; therefore Christians were not equal to Muslims in possession of truth. Islam was not only a way of worship, it was a way of life as well. It prescribed man’s relations to man, as well as to God, and was the basis for society, for law, and for government. Christians were therefore inevitably considered second—class citizens in the light of religious revelation—as well as by reason of the plain fact that they had been conquered by the Ottomans. This whole Muslim outlook was often summed up in the common term gavur (or kafir), which means ‘unbeliever’ or ‘infidel’, with emotional and quite uncomplimentary overtones. To associate closely or on terms of equality with the gavur was dubious at best. ‘Familiar association with heathens and infidels is forbidden to the people of Islam,’ said Asim, an early nineteenth—century historian, ‘and friendly and intimate intercourse between two parties that are one to another as darkness and light is far from desirable’…The mere idea of equality, especially the anti—defamation clause of 1856, offended the Turks’ inherent sense of the rightness of things. ‘Now we can’t call a gavur a gavur’, it was said, sometimes bitterly, sometimes in matter—of—fact explanation that under the new dispensation the plain truth could no longer be spoken openly. Could reforms be acceptable which forbade calling a spade a spade?…The Turkish mind, conditioned by centuries of Muslim and Ottoman dominance, was not yet ready to accept any absolute equality…Ottoman equality was not attained in the Tanzimat period [i.e., mid to late 19th century, 1839—1876], nor yet after the Young Turk revolution of 1908…

Indeed, an influential member of the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress, Sheik Abd—ul—Hack, a ‘progressive’ Young Turk, made this revealing declaration writing in a Parisian Muslim review, (Le Mecherouttiete, edited by Sherif Pasha, Paris), in August, 1912: [58]
Yes! The Musulman religion is in open hostility to all your world of progress. Understand, you European observers, that a Christian, whatever his position may be, by the mere fact of his being a Christian is regarded by us as a blind man lost to all sense of human dignity. Our reasoning with regard to him is as simple as it is definitive. We say: the man whose judgment is so perverted as to deny the existence of a one and only God, and to make up gods of different sorts, can only be the meanest expression of human degradation; to speak to him would be a humiliation for our intelligence and an insult to the grandeur of the Master of the Universe. The presence of such miscreants among us is the bane of our existence; their doctrine is a direct insult to the purity of our faith; contact with them is a defilement of our bodies; any relation with them a torture to our souls. Though detesting you, we have condescended to study your political institutions and your military organisation. Over and above the new weapons that Providence procures for us through your agency, you have yourselves rekindled the inextinguishable faith of our heroic martyrs. Our Young Turks, our Babis, our new Brotherhoods, all our sects, under various forms, are inspired by the same idea; the same necessity of moving forward. Towards what end? Christian civilisation? Never! Islam is the one great international family. All true believers are brothers. A community of feeling and of faith binds them in mutual affection. It is for the Caliph to facilitate these relations and to rally the Faithful under the sacerdotal standard.

Throughout the Ottoman Empire, particularly within the Balkans, and later Anatolia itself, attempted emancipation of the dhimmi peoples provoked violent, bloody responses against those ‘infidels’ daring to claim equality with local Muslims. The massacres of the Bulgarians (in 1876) [59], and more extensive massacres of the Armenians (1894—96) [60], culminating in a frank jihad genocide against the Armenians during World War I [61], epitomise these trends. Enforced abrogation of the laws of dhimmitude required the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire. This finally occurred after the Balkan Wars of independence, and during the European Mandate period following World War I.

Conclusion Erdogan’s efforts to further re—Islamise Turkey are entirely consistent with a return to Turkey’s Ottoman past as the heartland of an Empire established by jihad, and governed by the Shari’a. Indeed, both the current Erdogan administration, and the regime headed by the overtly pious Muslim Erbakan, a decade ago, reflect the advanced state of Islam’s «socio-political reawakening» in Turkey since 1950—1960, when the Menderes government — pandering to Muslim religious sentiments for electoral support reestablished the dervish orders, and undertook an extensive campaign of mosque construction [62]. Despite Frank Gaffney’s apparent failure to understand this continuum of related historical phenomena, I share his acute concerns. And ultimately, we agree that Turkey’s bid to join the EU should be rejected.
Sources: 1. Michael the Syrian, Chronique de Michel Le Syrien, Paris, 1899-1906, Vol. 3 p. 176, French translation by Jean-Baptiste Chabot; English translation in Bat Ye’or, The Decline of Eastern Christianity Under Islam, pp. 170-171. 2. Michael the Syrian, Chronique, Vol. 3 p. 176; English translation in Bat Ye’or, The Decline of Eastern Christianity Under Islam, Cranbury, New Jersey: Associated University Presses, 1996, p. 55. 3. See the numerous primary sources cited in each of: Dimitar Angelov, “Certains Aspects de la Conquete Des Peuples Balkaniques par les Turcs” Byzantinoslavica, 1956, Vol. 17, pp. 220-275. English translation in, A.G. Bostom, The Legacy of Jihad, Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 2005, pp. 462-517; Apostolos E. Vacalopoulos. Origins of the Greek Nation- The Byzantine Period, 1204-1461. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1970.; Speros Vryonis. The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Elevemth through the Fifteenth Century, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1971 (Paperback, 1986). 4. Bat Ye’or, The Decline of Eastern Christianity Under Islam, p. 55-56. 5. Paul Wittek. The Rise of the Ottoman Empire. London, The Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, 1938 (reprinted 1966), p. 18. 6. Speros Vryonis. “Nomadization and Islamization in Asia Minor” , Dumbarton Oaks Papers, Vol.29, 1975, p. 49. 7. Vryonis, “Nomadization and Islamization in Asia Minor”, p. 49 8. Paul Wittek. The Rise of the Ottoman Empire. London, p. 14. Wittek (also p. 14) includes this discussion, with a block quote from Ahmedi’s text, The chapter Ahmedi devotes in his Iskender-name to the history of the Ottoman sultans, the ancestors of his protector Sulayman Tshelebi, son of Bayazid I, begins with an introduction in which the poet solemnly declares his intention of writing a Ghazawat-name, a book about the holy war of the Ghazis. He poses the question” “Why have the Ghazis appeared at last?” And he answers: “Because the best always comes at the end. Just as the definitive prophet Mohammed came after the others, just as the Koran came down from heaven after the Torah, the Psalms and the Gospels, so also the Ghazis appeared in the world at the last, “ those Ghazis the reign of whom is that of the Ottomans. The poet continues with this question: “Who is a Ghazi?”. And he explains: “A Ghazi is the instrument of the religion of Allah, a servant of God who purifies the earth from the filth of polytheism (remember that Islam regards the Trinity of the Christians as a polytheism); the Ghazi is the sword of God, he is the protector and refuge of the believers. If he becomes a martyr in the ways of God, do not believe that he has died- he lives in beatitude with Allah, he has eternal life”. 9. Halil Inalcik. The Ottoman Empire-The Classical Age, 1300-1600, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973, p. 6. 10. Vacalopoulos. Origins of the Greek Nation- The Byzantine Period, p.66. 11. Speros Vryonis. “The Experience of Christians under Seljuk and Ottoman Domination, Eleventh to Sixteenth Century”, in Conversion and Continuity: Indigenous Christian Communities in Islamic lands, Eighth to Eighteenth Centuries, edited by Michael Gervers and Ramzi Jibran Bikhazi, Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1990, p. 201 12. Vacalopoulos. Origins of the Greek Nation- The Byzantine Period, pp. 61-62. 13. Angelov, “Certains Aspects de la Conquete Des Peuples Balkaniques par les Turcs”, pp. 220-275; Vacalopoulos. Origins of the Greek Nation- The Byzantine Period, pp. 69-85. 14. Vacalopoulos. Origins of the Greek Nation- The Byzantine Period, p. 77. 15. Vacalopoulos. Origins of the Greek Nation- The Byzantine Period, p. 73. 16. Angelov, “Certains Aspects de la Conquete Des Peuples Balkaniques par les Turcs”, pp. 236, 238-239 17. Joseph Hacker, “Ottoman Policy Toward the Jews and Jewish Attitudes toward the Ottomans during the Fifteenth Century”, pp. 117-126, in, Christians and Jews in the Ottoman empire : the functioning of a plural society / edited by Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (New York : Holmes & Meier Publishers), 1982, p. 117. 18. Hacker, “Ottoman Policy”, p. 120. 19. Ivo Andric, The Development of Spiritual Life in Bosnia Under the Influence of Turkish Rule, (1924 doctoral dissertation), English translation, Durham, North Carolina, 1990, Chaps. 2 and 3, pp. 16-38. 19.ЧЗ 20. Andric, Bosnia Under the Influence of Turkish Rule, pp. 23-24 21. Andric, Bosnia Under the Influence of Turkish Rule, pp. 24-25 22. Andric, Bosnia Under the Influence of Turkish Rule, p.78 note 2 23. Andric, Bosnia Under the Influence of Turkish Rule, p. 25 24. Andric, Bosnia Under the Influence of Turkish Rule, pp. 25-26 25. Andric, Bosnia Under the Influence of Turkish Rule, pp. 26, 80 note 11 26. Andric, Bosnia Under the Influence of Turkish Rule, pp. 26-27 27. Andric, Bosnia Under the Influence of Turkish Rule, p. 30 28. Andric, Bosnia Under the Influence of Turkish Rule, p.30 29. Andric, Bosnia Under the Influence of Turkish Rule, pp. 30-31. 30. Andric, Bosnia Under the Influence of Turkish Rule, p.38. 31. Jovan Cvijic, La Peninsule Balkanique, Paris, 1918, p. 389; Translated excerpt in Bat Ye’or, Islam and Dhimmitude-Where

Civilzations Collide, Cranbury, New Jersey: Associated University Presses, 2001, p. 108. 32. Paul Ricaut. The Present State of the Greek and Armenian Churches, Anno Christi 1678, London, 1679 (reprinted, New York, 1970), pp. 1-30. 33. Vryonis, The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor, pp. 340-43, 351-402. 34. Vryonis, The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor, p. 342. 35. Demetrios Constantelos. “The ‘Neomartyrs’ as Evidence for Methods and Motives Leading to Conversion and Martyrdom in the Ottoman Empire” The Greek Orthodox Theological Review, 1978, Vol. 23, p. 228. 36. Constantelos. “The ‘Neomartyrs’ ”, pp. 217-218. 37. Constantelos. “The ‘Neomartyrs’ ”, p. 226. 38. Constantelos. “The ‘Neomartyrs’ ”, p. 227. 39. Abdolonyme Ubicini, Lettres Sur La Turque, Vol. 2, Paris, 1854, p. 32; English translation in Bat Ye’or, The Decline of Eastern Christianity, p. 181 40. A.E. Vacalopoulos. “Background and Causes of the Greek Revolution”, Neo-Hellenika, 1975, pp.54-55. 41. Stanford Shaw. History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, 2 Vols, Cambridge, 1976. See for example, Vol.1, pp. 19, 24. 42. Bernard Lewis. What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response. Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 114115. 43. A.E. Vacalopoulos. The Greek Nation, 1453-1669, New Brunswick, New Jersey, Rutgers University Press, 1976, p.41; Vasiliki Papoulia, “The Impact of Devshirme on Greek Society”, in War and Society in East Central Europe, Editor-in-Chief, Bela K. Kiraly, 1982, Vol. II, pp. 561-562. 44. Bernard Lewis, The Muslim Discovery of Europe, pp.190-191. Lewis also describes the devshirme solely as a form of social advancement for Balkan Christians in both the 1968 (p.5) and 2002 (also p. 5) editions of The Emergence of Modern Turkey (Oxford University Press): …the Balkan peoples had an enormous influence on the Ottoman ruling class. One of the most important channels was the devshirme, the levy of boys, by means of which countless Balkan Christians entered the military and political elites of the Empire. 45. Speros Vryonis, Jr. “Seljuk Gulams and Ottoman Devshirmes”, Der Islam Vol. 41, 1965, pp. 245-247. 46. Vasiliki Papoulia, “The Impact of Devshirme on Greek Society”, pp. 554-555. 47. Vasiliki Papoulia, “The Impact of Devshirme on Greek Society”, p. 557. 48. Oliver Warner, William Wilberforce and His Times, London, 1962. 49. J.B. Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, Oxford, 1968, pp. 588-589. 50. Christopher Lloyd, The Navy and The Slave Trade, London, 1949. 51. http://51.927.4.463subf18:EFlqxma713369592384ПЏ 52. http://51.517.-0.083plusf95:QEopjnn365893154526ЗН 53. Edouard Engelhardt, La Turquie et La Tanzimat, 2 Vols., 1882, Paris, Vol. p.111, Vol. 2 p. 171; English translation in, Bat Ye’or. Islam and Dhimmitude— Where Civilizations Collide, Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2001, pp. 431—342. 54. Reports from Her Majesty’s Consuls Relating to the Condition of the Christians in Turkey, 1867 volume, pp. 5,29. See also related other reports by various consuls and vice—consuls, in the 1860 vol., p.58; the 1867 vol, pp. 4,5,6,14,15; and the 1867 vol., part 2, p.3 [All cited in, Vahakn Dadrian. Chapter 2, ‘The Clash Between Democratic Norms and Theocratic Dogmas’, Warrant for Genocide, New Brunswick, New Jersey, Transaction Publishers, pp. 26—27, n. 4]; See also, extensive excerpts from these reports in, Bat Ye’or, The Decline of Eastern Christianity, pp. 409—433. 55. Excerpts from Bulwer’s report reproduced in, Bat Ye’or, The Decline of Eastern Christianity, pp. 423—426 56. Tudor Parfitt, The Jews of Palestine, Suffolk (UK), 1987, Boydell Press, pp. 168, 172—73. 57. Roderick Davison. ‘Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian—Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth Century’ American Historical Review, Vol. 59, pp. 848, 855, 859, 864. 58. Quoted in, Andre Servier. Islam and the Psychology of the Musulman, translated by A. S. Moss—Blundell, London, 1924, pp. 241—42. 59. Januarius A. MacGahan. The Turkish atrocities in Bulgaria. (reprinted) Geneva, 1976; Yono Mitev. The April Uprising and European Public Opinion, Sofia Press, 1978; Philip Shashko. ‘The Bulgarian massacres of 1876 reconsidered: reaction to the April uprising or premeditated attack?’ Etudes Balkaniques, 1986, Vol. 22, pp. 18—25. 60. Vahakn Dadrian. The History of the Armenian Genocide, Providence, Rhode Island: Bergahn Books, 1995, pp. 113—172. 61. Dadrian, History of the Armenian Genocide, pp. 219—234. 62. Speros Vryonis, Jr. The Mechanism of Catastrophe—The Turkish Pogrom of September 6—7, 1955, and The Destruction of the Greek Community of Istanbul, New York, Greekworks.com, 2005, p. 555.

1.19 The fall of the Christian state of Lebanon Lebanon, a fake state, a fake democracy which we pretend exists while in fact it is a Jihadist battleground, administered by terrorised dhimmi notables in the service of their Muslim masters. Only around 25% are now Christian, down from 79% in 1911. How did it come to this? And more importantly, how could France, the rest of the EU and the United States let Christian Lebanon fall? Preface Christians in the Middle East are fast disappearing from the area. The Lebanese Christians, who constitute the only influential Christian community in the Middle East, are fast declining in numbers and power. This paper discusses the history of the Christian minority in Lebanon, and the decline of their hold on political power, in favour of the Muslim majority. It will focus on the Christian contribution to the cause of the civil war and the Ta’if accord which brought an end to that war. The paper will be divided into eight chapters. The paper will start by giving a brief overview of the special influential Christian position in the 19th century and its survival during the 1860 civil war with the Muslim Druzes. Then it will discuss the role of Christians in the formation of the Lebanese Republic and Lebanese independence. Christian nationalism is looked at in depth, in order to discover the roots of the civil war with the Muslims. Moreover, it was the existence of many different ideological Christian parties that incited the civil war. This paper will concentrate on the role of Christians in the civil war of 1975-1990. The main focus will also be on the causes of the decay of Christian status in Lebanon. In 1990, the civil war ‘is said to have’ ended* following the Christian Army’s General Michel Aoun defeated by the Syrian military. The paper will show how at the end of the civil war, Christians were perceived as losers and Muslims as winners of the civil war. It will demonstrate that the role of the Lebanese Christians has became negligible and it is a matter of time when the Christians will surrender their remaining powers to their Muslims counterparts.
*The claim that there was an end to the civil war is vigorously rejected by many because 60,000 Syrian soldier and their secret service continue to occupy Lebanon together with 5,000 Iranian Revolutionary Guards, and thousands of Palestinian from Fatah, Popular Front «Jabha el Sha’beyyeh» and other terrorists organisations operate and have a freehand in Lebanon.

Chapter 1: Christian Status prior to 1945 The birth of Christianity in Lebanon and the advent of Islam

Despite the fact that Islam prevailed 600 years after Christianity, the Middle East is now overwhelmingly populated with Muslims, with the Christian minority comprising about 14 million Christians or 10% of the population. The Christians, mainly Maronite, have existed in the area, of what is known today as Lebanon since the fourth century, and moved in large numbers to Mount Lebanon(Jabal Loubnan) in the eighth and ninth centuries. The Maronites[44] took their name from John Maron, a learned monk who was Patriach of Antioch in the 8th century. The Muslim (Shiite, Sunni and the Druze sects) community emerged in Mount Lebanon at a later stage. Marguerite Johnson traces the heritage of the Lebanese Christians directly to Jesus. By the 5th century, Christianity became the dominant religion in the area of Lebanon. After the forceful advent of Islam beginning in the 7th Century, many Christian communities along the coast of Lebanon converted to Islam. However, the mountains of Lebanon remained a Christian haven. Peter Kolvenbach saw that the history of Lebanon’s Christians and the history of Lebanon were so intertwined that without the Christians, and especially its Maronite sect, there would not have been a Lebanon and without Lebanon the destiny of Christians in the Middle East would have been different. The 1860 civil war between the Maronites and the Druze[45] erupted when Maronite peasants revolted against their landlords who were given land ownership by the Ottoman Empire. The Druze launched a pre-emptive strike against villages in the north with the help of Turkish officials. Engine Akarli mentioned that few Shiites and Sunnites, joined the Druze against the Maronites and the Greek Orthodox Christians (even though the Greek Orthodox had been friendly with the Druze before this incident). Akarli said that the Ottoman troops themselves failed to stop the Druze attacks due to their unwillingness to fight fellow Muslims. The 1860 civil war left more than 15,000 Christians dead and more than ten thousand homeless. Later, however, the Ottoman foreign ministry imprisoned the Druze leaders involved in the war, and even punished a number of Ottoman officers and officials for having failed to prevent the 1860 civil war. This was the first Lebanese civil war between Christians and Muslims. It is important to note that the Maronites had been subject to persecution by the Turkish rulers over centuries. However, the 1860 war was the first of its kind between the Lebanese people themselves. It is hard to ignore the role of the Maronite Church in Lebanon in any study of the Christian political status in Lebanon. The role of the Maronite Church in Lebanon focused on strengthening the status of Christians during the Ottoman rule. Following the purge of the Druze leadership by the Turkish authorities, the Maronite Church emerged as the only significant institution in the Lebanese Mountains. The Church’s special position encouraged it to aspire to greater influence. It was very conscious not only of the overwhelming numerical superiority of the Christians over the Druze in the Mountains, but also of the greater educational and material advances of the Maronites. The 1860 events had created uproar in Europe, particularly in France. Although the Turkish Empire took swift action against the Druze, a large French force landed in Beirut for the purpose of protecting the Maronites and other Christians. Foreign intervention by the French persuaded the Ottoman Empire to form a small force in Mount Lebanon, which comprised of 160 men, 97 Maronites, 40 Druzes, 16 Greek Orthodox, 5 Greeks Catholics and 2 Muslims. Later on, Mount Lebanon was able to mount a military force of 10,000

men where Arabic replaced Turkish as the language of command and instruction. This development helped to strengthen the Christians who were the main core of the force. Moreover Christians were happy to be given a sort of autonomy by the Muslim Turkish Empire. John Spagnolo wrote that in this particular period of 1860, international communities were looking after the interests of communities within Lebanon of a similar faith. For example, Russia wanted three seats to be reserved for the Greek Orthodox. In its turn, France wanted the Maronite representation to be increased on the administrative council of the mutasarrifiyya. The protection of Christianity by the international community helped increase its survival chances in the midst of the Muslim conquest in the Middle East region. Marguerite Johnson noted that from the Byzantines and the Crusades in the Middle Ages to the French and Americans in 1984, the Christians have repeatedly relied on foreign powers to guarantee their survival and political power. Because this section does not give sufficient information on the subject, the following material is inserted from another article in this site entitled «Phoenician Christians[46]:» Advent of Islam and Christians of the East By Dr. George Khoury, Catholic Information Network (CIN) The Arab Prophet During his lifetime, Muhammad reacted differently at different times to Jews and Christians depending on the reception they accorded him and also on his dealings with Christian states. At first, Muhammad favoured the Christians and condemned the Jews because they acted as his political opponents. This is reflected in Sura 5:85 : Thou wilt surely find the most hostile of men to the believers are the Jews and the idolaters; and thou wilt surely find the nearest of them in love to the believers are those who say, «We are nasara»; that, because some of them are priests and monks, and they wax not proud. (Sura 5:85; see also Sura 2:62; 5:69; 12:17). Later he turned against them and attacked their belief that Jesus was God’s son (Sura 9:30), denounced the dogma of the Trinity (4:17), and pointed to the division of the Christians amongst themselves (5:14). Most often though, Muhammad adopted an intermediate position: the Christians are mentioned together with the Jews as «People of the Book,» while their claim of possessing the true religion is refuted. (See Sura :114; 3:135, 140; 9:29). And they will be punished by God. Fight those who believe not in God and the Last Day and do not forbid what God and His Messenger have forbidden—such men as practice not the religion of truth, being of those who have been given the Book until they pay the tribute out of hand…That is the utterance of their mouths, conforming with the unbelievers before God. God assail them! How they are perverted! They have taken their rabbis and their monks as lords apart from God, and the Messiah’s, Mary’s son, and they were commanded to serve but One God; there is no God but He (Suras 29-31). During his lifetime Muhammad settled his relations with Christian political entities by treaties whereby they were allowed to keep their churches and priests, and also had to pay tribute and render some services to Muslims.

During the period of two hundred years following Muhammad’s death, the attitude of Islam to Christianity remained generally similar to what it had been during the closing years of the prophet’s life; Christianity was regarded as parallel to Islam, but corrupt. To this extent, Islam was superior. The outstanding consequence of this period, however, was the impressing on the masses of ordinary Muslims the view that Christianity was corrupt and unreliable. This, together with the death penalty for apostasy, kept the Muslims in lands ruled by the scimitar effectively insulated from Christian propaganda. Let us view this more closely, considering first the period immediately following the death of the prophet in 633 A.D. The Covenant of Umar I (634-644) The year after the death of the prophet in Arabia, the stage was set for a full-dress invasion of neighbouring lands. In 634 the Arab forces won a decisive victory at Ajnadayn, and Damascus surrendered to Khalid ibn-al-Waleed in September 635. Jerusalem capitulated in 638 and Caesarea fell in 640, and between 639 and 646 all Mesopotamia and Egypt were subjugated. The last links connecting these Christian lands with Rome and Byzantium were severed; new ones with Mecca and Medina were forged. In about a decade the Muslim conquests changed the face of the Near East; in about a century they changed the face of the civilised world. Far from being peripheral, the victories of Islam proved to be a decisive factor in pruning life and growth of Eastern Christianity. After the Arab invasions have stopped, there arose the problem of administering these new lands. Umar ibn-al-Khattab (634-644) was the first man to address himself to this problem. Despite the fact that later additions were made to it, it is agreed that the surviving covenant represents Umar’s own policy. The conquered peoples were given a new status, that of dhimmis (or ahl-al-Dhimmi). As dhimmis they were subject to tribute which comprised both a land-tax (later kharaj) and a poll-tax (later jizyah) while they enjoyed the protection of Islam and were exempt from military duty, because only a Muslim could draw his sword in defence of Islam. How Greek Science Passed to the Arabs The Christian community, educated and civilised in the multicultural Byzantine east, was the catalyst that brought modern education and learning to the invading Arab tribes. By translating the works of the Greeks and other early thinkers and by their own contribution, the Christian community played a vital rule in transmitting knowledge. Later on, that flourished in the major Arab contribution to the fields of science and art. Some names of Eastern non-Arab Christians that should be remember for this often forgotten and unappreciated fact are:
Yusuf al-Khuri al-Qass, who translated Archemides lost work on triangles from a Syriac version. He also made an Arabic of Galen’s De Simplicibus temperamentis et facultatibus. Qusta Ibn Luqa al-Ba’lbakki, a Syriac Christian, who translated Hypsicles, Theodosius’ Sphaerica, Heron’s Mechanics, Autolycus Theophrastus’ Meteora, Galen’s catalog of his books, John Philoponus on the Phsyics of Aristotle and several other works. He also revised the existing translation of Euclid. Abu Bishr Matta Ibn Yunus al-Qanna’i, who translated Aristotle’s Poetica. Abu Zakariya Yahya Ibn ‘Adi al-Mantiqi, a monophysite, who translated medical and logical works, including the Prolegomena of Ammonius, an introduction to Porphyry’s Isagoge. Al-Hunayn Ibn Ipahim Ibn al-Hasan Ibn Khurshid at-Tabari an-Natili, and the monophysite Abu ‘Ali ‘Isa Ibn Ishaq Ibn Zer’a. Yuhanna Ibn Batriq, an Assyrian, who produced the Sirr al-asrar. ‘Abd al-Masih Ibn ‘Aballah Wa’ima al-Himse, also an Assyrian, who translated the Theology of Aristotle (but this was an apidged paraphrase of the Enneads by Plotinus). Abu Yahya al-Batriq, another Assyrian, who translated Ptolemy’s Tetrabiblos. Jipa’il II, son of Bukhtyishu’ II, of the prominent Assyrian medical family mentioned above, Abu Zakariah Yahya Ibn Masawaih, an Assyrian Nestorian. He authored a textbook on Ophthalmology, Daghal al-‘ayn (The Disease of the eye). Hunayn Ibn Ishaq, an

Assyrian. Sergius of Rashayn, «a celepated physician and philosopher, skilled in Greek and translator into Syriac of various works on medicine, philosophy, astronomy, and theology». Other Monopysite translators were Ya’qub of Surug, Aksenaya (Philoxenos), an alumnus of the school of Edessa, Mara, bishop of Amid.

For further details, see book review: How Greek Science Passed to the Arabs[47] The Ummayads The Ummayad caliphs (661-750) lived as Arabs first and Muslim second. As a consequence, their era was liberal in both political and religious matters. However, during the rule of the Ummayad caliph Umar II (717-720) there arose the concern to summon conquered peoples to Islam and to create favorable conditions allowing an equitable or better participation of all Muslims in the social and political life of the community. Umar was shocked that non-Muslims should exercise authority over Muslims, and tried to prevent it. In Egypt he removed some of the Coptic officials from their positions and replaced them by Muslims, and it seems that he applied this policy throughout the whole empire. He wrote to the governor of Egypt: «I do not know a secretary or official in any part of your government who was not a Muslim but I dismissed him and appointed in his stead a Muslim.» This policy of Umar II was translated during the later Abbasid era into a major program due to the discontent of many Muslims with the excesses and corruption of the liberal Ummayad caliphs and the frustration that non-Arabian Muslims, especially Persian Muslims, felt on being treated as second-class citizens. Also due to external political circumstances and to the unruly and socially disruptive conduct of some Christian groups, Umar II reacted with some vehemence against the Christians. He abrogated the jizyah for any Christian who converted, and imposed other demeaning restrictions: Christians may not be witnesses against Muslims. They may not hold public office. They may not pray aloud or sound their clappers. They may not wear the qaba’, nor ride on a saddle. A Muslim who would kill a Christian would be liable to a fine, not death. He abolished the financial arrangements whereby churches, convents and the charities were maintained. Despite these exceptions, Ummayd rule was characterised on the whole by political as well as religious and intellectual liberalism. That is why Ummayad caliphs, with the exception of Umar II, did not press for or even favour, conversion to the Islamic faith. The Abbasid Era (750-1258) With the Umayyad’s fall in 750 the hegemony of Syria in the world of Islam ended and the glory of the country passed away. The coming to power of the Abbasid dynasty marked a radical change in the balance of power within the caliphate. In a vast and complex body such as the caliphate had now become, there was an intricate network of party interests, sometimes conflicting and sometimes coinciding. The recovery of the equilibrium was thus no simple matter; and for the whole of this century, (i.e., the 8th century) the caliphs had as a prominent aim the framing of a policy which would rally the majority of the inhabitants behind it. In an Islamic environment, it was inevitable that such a political struggle should have religious implications. First, and vis-a-vis other Muslim groups, the Abbasid caliphate touched a number of risings of Kharajites who refused to submit to the new rule. There were also other opponents who questioned the legitimacy of the Abbasids’ claim to the caliphate. As for the Christians as well as for the rest of ahl-al-Dhimmi, the Abbasid era would prove to be less tolerant of non-Muslims and would either re-enact old anti- Christian legislation or create new restrictions.

The Abbasids chose Baghdad for headquarters, though for a short period of time alMutawakkil (847-861) transferred his his seat back from Iraq to Damascus (885). As the Melkites[48] were few in numbers in Mesopotamia it was the Nestorians and the Jacobites who under Abbasid rule shared more strongly in the literary life of the country and brought greater contributions.The beginning of the Abbasid caliphate until the reign of al-Mutawakkil (847-861) marked the zenith of the Nestorian Church from mid 8th century to mid 9th century. This prodigious success was made possible by the great number of zealous and educated monks, formed by the many schools existing at the time. In Baghdad itself, there were apparently many important monasteries, groups of professors, and students. There were, for example, the school of Deir Kalilisu and Deir Mar Fatyun and the school of Karh. In the last two schools medicine and philosophy were taught along with the sacred disciplines. Christian physicians and especially scribes exerted some kind of tutelage within the Nestorian Church, and tried their best to obtain for their community a more benevolent legislation from Muslim rulers. Though the Abbasids showed tolerance towards the other religious, non-Muslim groups, still their tolerance was displayed mostly vis-a-vis some of their coreligionists who lived on the margins of traditional Islam. The Christians, especially the Melkites who lived in the eastern provinces of the empire, had much to endure. Before, al-Mutawakkil Abu Gafar al-Mansur (754-775) imposed many vexing measures upon the Christians. In 756, he forbade Christians to build new churches, to display the cross in public, or to speak about religions with Muslims. In 757, he imposed taxes on monks, even on those who lived as hermits, and he used Jews to strip sacristies for the treasury. In 759, he removed all Christians from positions in the treasury. In 766 he had the crosses on top of the churches brought down, forbade every nocturnal liturgical celebration and forbade the study of any language other than Arabic. In 722, he required both Jews and Christians to exhibit an external sign to distinguish them from other believers. Abu Gafar al-Mansur also put in prison, for different reasons, the Melkite Patriarch Theodoret, the Patriarch Georges, and the Nestorian Catholicos James. Al-Mahdi (775-785) intensified the persecution and had all the churches built since the Arab conquest destroyed. The Christian tribes of Banu Tanuh, which counted 5000 fighters, were forced to embrace Islam. Angered by the defeats he incurred at the hands of the Byzantines, al-Mahdi sent troops to Homs in Syria, to have all the Christians abjure their faith. However, many of these laws were not enforced. For example, when Umar II tried to dismiss all dhimmis from government services, such confusion resulted that the order was ignored. The Barmakid viziers, of Turkish origin, who were the strong arm of the Abbasid caliphs, seem to have manifested a certain measure of benevolence towards ahl-al-Dhimmi (the tributaries) and especially towards the Christians. It is only at the end of the rule of Harun al-Rahid (786-809), i.e., after the disgrace of the Barmakids, that some measures were taken against the Christians. Harun al-Rashid re-enacted some of the anti-Christian and anti-Jewish measures introduced by Umar II (717-720). In 807, he ordered all churches erected since the Muslim conquest demolished. He also decreed that members of tolerated sects should wear a prescribed garb. But evidently much of this legislation was not enforced. Under his son al-Ma’mun (813-833) there was in 814 a general persecution in Syria and in Palestine. Many Christians and church dignitaries escaped into Cyprus and into Byzantine territories. Conditions under al-Watheq (842-847) did not improve and were sad indeed for the Christians. Under al-Mutawwakil (847-861) there was intensification of discontent on the part of Christians due to harsh conditions imposed on them. In 850 and 854 al-Mutawwakil revived the discriminatroy legislation and supplemented it by new features, which were the most stringent ever issued against the minorities. Christians and Jews were enjoined to affix wooden images of devils to their houses, level their graves even with the ground, wear outer garments of yellow colour, and ride only on mules and asses with wooden saddles marked by two pomegranates-like balls on the cantle. Basing their contention on a Qur’anic charge that

the Jews and the Christians had corrupted the text of their scriptures (Surs. 2:70; 5:1618), the contemporary jurists ruled that no testimony of a Jew or Christian was admissible against a Muslim. Legally speaking, the law put the male dhimmi below the male Muslim in nearly every way. It protected his life and property but did not accept his evidence. Eight acts put the dhimmi outside the law: conspiring to fight the Muslims, copulation with a Muslim woman, an attempt to marry one, an attempt to turn Muslim from his religion, robbery of a Muslim on the highway, acting as a spy or a guide to unbelievers, or the killing of a Muslim. However, despite these stringent laws, the social status of Christians was not that bleak. The consequences of this anti-Christian legislation were mitigated to a certain degree by the number and influence of some Christians in prestigious and vital professions, such as in medicine and high positions of government; e.g., Abu l-Hasan Sa’id ibn Amr-ibn-Sangala, who occupied the position of secretary under the Caliph alRadi (934-40), and who was as well appointed as special secretary for the two sons of the Caliph in 935, and also Minister of Expenditure, and who rendered inestimable services to the Christians. Because Islam prohibits the practice of usury to Muslims, Christians exercised a certain monopoly on the trades of goldsmith, jeweller, and moneylender. Consequently, many Christians were rich and this stirred further feelings of jealousy against them. On the whole, relations between Muslims and Christians were peaceful and unfair laws were not always enforced. However, the Christians could not help but feel and endure the stigma of inferiority. Even the literature of Islamo-Christian controversy should not mislead us on their true condition in the land of Islam. The tolerance they enjoyed was not the result of a state policy consistently upheld by all the caliphs. On the part of the caliphs, it was mostly motivated by their concern to protect and advance the sciences and the arts. The Islamisation of Syria and Iraq and other lands no doubt facilitated Arabisation. After the Arab military victory, there was the conquest and victory of Islam as a religion when many Christians in Syria and other lands converted to Islam to escape their oppressive and humiliating conditions. Finally there was the linguistic victory as Arabic supplanted Greek and Syriac.

Addendum: Persecution of the Coptic Church The Christian Coptic Orthodox Church Of Egypt[49] Perhaps the greatest glory of the Coptic Church is its Cross. Copts take pride in the persecution they have sustained as early as May 8, 68 A.D., when their Patron Saint Mark was slain on Easter Monday after being dragged from his feet by Roman soldiers all over Alexandria’s streets and alleys. The Copts have been persecuted by almost every ruler of Egypt. Their Clergymen have been tortured and exiled even by their Christian brothers after the schism of Chalcedon in 451 A.D. and until the Arab’s conquest of Egypt in 641 A.D. To emphasise their pride in their cross, Copts adopted a calendar, called the Calendar of the Martyrs, which begins its era on August 29, 284 A.D., in commemoration of those who died for their faith during the rule of Diocletian the Roman Emperor. This calendar is still in use all over Egypt by farmers to keep track of the various agricultural seasons and in the Coptic Church Lectionary. For the four centuries that followed the Arab’s conquest of Egypt, the Coptic Church generally flourished and Egypt remained basically Christian. This is due to a large extent to the fortunate position that the Copts enjoyed, for the Prophet of Islam, who had an Egyptian wife (the only one of his wives to bear a child), preached especial kindness

towards Copts: «When you conquer Egypt, be kind to the Copts for they are your proteges and kith and kin». Copts, thus, were allowed to freely practice their religion and were to a large degree autonomous, provided they continued to pay a special tax, called «Gezya», that qualifies them as «Ahl Zemma» proteges (protected). Individuals who cannot afford to pay this tax were faced with the choice of either converting to Islam or losing their civil right to be «protected», which in some instances meant being killed. Copts, despite additional sumptuary laws that were imposed on them in 750-868 A.D. and 905-935 A.D. under the Abbasid Dynasties, prospered and their Church enjoyed one of its most peaceful era. Surviving literature from monastic centers, dating back from the 8th to the 11th century, shows no drastic break in the activities of Coptic craftsmen, such as weavers, leather-binders, painters, and wood-workers. Throughout that period, the Coptic language remained the language of the land, and it was not until the second half of the 11th century that the first bi-lingual Coptic-Arabic liturgical manuscripts started to appear. One of the first complete Arabic texts is the 13th century text by Awlaad El-Assal (children of the Honey Maker), in which the laws, cultural norms and traditions of the Copts at this pivotal time, 500 years after the Islamic conquest of Egypt were detailed. The adoption of the Arabic language as the language used in Egyptians’ every-day’s life was so slow that even in the 15th century al-Makrizi implied that the Coptic Language was still largely in use. Up to this day, the Coptic Language continues to be the liturgical language of the Church. The Christian face of Egypt started to change by the beginning of the second millennium A.D., when Copts, in addition to the «Gezya» tax, suffered from specific disabilities, some of which were serious and interfered with their freedom of worship. For example, there were restrictions on repairing old Churches and building new ones, on testifying in court, on public behaviour, on adoption, on inheritance, on public religious activities, and on dress codes. Slowly but steadily, by the end of the 12th century, the face of Egypt changed from a predominantly Christian to a predominantly Muslim country and the Coptic community occupied an inferior position and lived in some expectation of Muslim hostility, which periodically flared into violence. It is remarkable that the well-being of Copts was more or less related to the well-being of their rulers. In particular, the Copts suffered most in those periods when Arab dynasties were at their low. The position of the Copts began to improve early in the 19th century under the stability and tolerance of Muhammad Ali’s dynasty. The Coptic community ceased to be regarded by the state as an administrative unit and, by 1855 A.D., the main mark of Copts’ inferiority, the «Gezya» tax was lifted, and shortly thereafter Copts started to serve in the Egyptian army. The 1919 A.D. revolution in Egypt, the first grassroots display of Egyptian identity in centuries, stands as a witness to the homogeneity of Egypt’s modern society with both its Muslim and Coptic sects. Today, this homogeneity is what keeps the Egyptian society united against the religious intolerance of extremist groups, who occasionally subject the Copts to persecution and terror. Modern day martyrs, like Father Marcos Khalil, serve as reminders of the miracle of Coptic survival. Despite persecution, the Coptic Church as a religious institution has never been controlled or allowed itself to control the governments in Egypt. This long-held position of the Church concerning the separation between State and Religion stems from the words of the Lord Jesus Christ himself, when he asked his followers to submit to their rulers: ‘‘Render therefore to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and to God the things that are God’s.» [Mathew 22:21]. The Coptic Church has never forcefully resisted authorities or invaders and was never allied with any powers, for the words of the Lord Jesus Christ are clear: ‘‘Put your sword in its place, for all who take the sword will perish by the sword.» (Mathew 26:52). The miraculous survival of the Coptic Church till this day and age is a living proof of the validity and wisdom of these teachings.

Autonomous government and birth of sectarian power sharing following the 1860 civil war. The origin of the Christian hold of power in Lebanon can be dated back to 1861. In 1861 foreign powers imposed what is known as the «Reglement Organique» in which the Ottoman government designated Mount Lebanon as an autonomous Ottoman province to be ruled by a non-Lebanese Ottoman Christian governor, selected by the Sultan, and approved by the great powers Of Europe. The autonomous province was to become a special Ottoman governornate or mutasarrifiyya. A new 12-member council whose seats were allocated on a sectarian basis aided the governor. Aziz Abu Hamad said that this system increased the Maronites power at the expense of the Druze and other sects. In the opinion of one historian, Aziz Abu Hamad, Christians from 1861 were able to be autonomous during the Ottoman rule. This was very crucial for the development of their nationalism and their aim of forming a Christian state. Many Maronites conceived the mutasarrifiyya as the basis for an independent Lebanon that would be a Christian bastion and an out-post of Western Europe in the Middle East. The Christian Druze confrontation spilled into the beginning of the twentieth century. For instance, in September 1903, Christian and Muslim clashes resulted in the death of 7 Christians and 15 Muslims. An estimated 20,000 Christians, mainly Maronites, took refuge in the mountains until sectarian tempers cooled. The French mandate and the increase of the Christian political influence Christian power in Lebanon increased in September 1920 with the establishment of the state of Lebanon under the French mandate. The creation of Grand Liban (Greater Lebanon) by general Gouraud, High Commissioner for Syria and Lebanon, was the first step taken by France to fulfil its pledges to its traditional Lebanese Christians, especially the Maronites for the establishment of a Christian state. The establishment of an independent Christian state, with extended borders, and under French protection was the realisation of a centuries old dream of Christians especially the Maronites. For the Muslims in Syria and the areas newly attached to Lebanon (Akkar, Tripoli, Beirut, Bekaa and the South), however, it was the final blow in a series of demoralising events which had began six weeks earlier, with the defeat of the Arab army at Maisalun, and the subsequent occupation of Damascus by the French and the expulsion of Faisal the Syrian king from Syria. The Lebanese Muslims were disappointed about not being able to unite with the Muslim dominated Syria. Christians welcomed the French mandate power that sided with them. The governance system, which the French designed for Lebanon, favoured Christians over Muslims. The establishment of a pro Christian system strengthened the status of the Christians in Lebanon and in the Middle East. Abbot Paul Naaman adjudged the establishment of the republic of Greater Lebanon to the efforts of the Maronite Church, and considered it as the Church’s greatest accomplishment. Following the creation of Greater Lebanon in 1920, the relations between Muslims and Christians in Lebanon deteriorated rapidly; Muslims attacked Christian villages in Lebanon. The creation of Greater Lebanon set a time bomb by forcing Muslims, whose allegiance was to Syria and to the Arab nation, to be citizens of the new state. Eyal Zisser explained that the Christian population in Lebanon dropped from 85 per cent to 54 per cent once the new areas were added to the new region of Lebanon’s Mountain.

The creation of Greater Lebanon would contribute to their fall 70 years later, with the addition of those Muslim populated areas. Sami Ofeish elaborated that the sectarian system was at work as early as 1920s:
Seats in the first parliament, initiated in 1926s were allocated on a sectarian basis. The sectarian allocation of top state offices also started to take shape during this period, although the Christian elite predominantly filled them.

The 1943 pact It is very important to look carefully at the structure of the Lebanese political sectarian regime. That structure has ensured Christian political dominance until 1990. The sectarian system was reinforced with the declaration of independence in 1943 following the collapse of the French mandate. President Bishara Al-Khouri (a Christian) and Prime minister Riad Soleh (a Muslim) joined in an unwritten agreement, which was called the National Pact. The National Pact set a new political system for Lebanon. It resolved to preserve the position of the presidency for the Maronites, the premiership for the Sunnis, and the parliament speakership for the Shiites. Moreover, the Pact agreed to distribute parliamentary seats, cabinet posts, and administrative and army positions at all levels on a sectarian basis. Sami Ofeish said that the National Pact favoured Christians and in particular the Maronite elite. The 1943 Pact cemented the Christian political power, which was given to them in the 1920s by the French Mandate. It enabled Christians to rule Muslims for the next 32 years until it started to crack in 1975. Certainly, Christians enjoyed overwhelming control of the political system, despite the allocation of the next two top political office positions to Muslims. Similarly Mark Tomass noted that the Christians acquired the lion’s share of sectarian jobs:
This pervasive sectarianism was reflected in the constitution of 1943 drawn under the French Mandate (1920-1945). It allocated specific government posts to sect leaders. Because of their greatest and specific ties to France, Maronite-Christians acquired the lion’s share of posts.

All the above may give the indication that the Christians were given the edge over the Muslims, and, therefore, they dominated the country until the start of civil war. Chapter 2: Christians maintained hold on power from 1943-1975 This chapter argues that the Christians managed to hold on to power despite the Muslims attempt to demand a far more share of power from the Christians. According to Brenda Seaver, the Lebanese political situation between 1943-1975 endured periods of severe internal strain. The major causes of this strain were the 1958 civil war, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the influx of Palestinian refugees and the PLO’s arrival in Lebanon[1]. These above-mentioned events would serve as a catalyst for the civil war of 1975 and the fall of the 1943 political system in 1990.

The establishment of the new state of Israel and its effects on Christians and Muslims in Lebanon The creation of Israel in 1948 greatly affected the cordial harmony between the Lebanese Christians and Muslims. The reason for this is that some Christian leaders publicly met with Israel. However, Muslims saw Israel as the main enemy to the Arab world and that any cooperation with it would be considered treason. Patriarch Antoine Arida was the first Christian leader to sign a Zionist-Maronite treaty of 1946[2]. The treaty laid down the guidelines for the establishment of close ties and cooperation between the Maronites in Lebanon and the Jewish Yishuv in Palestine, on the basis of mutual recognition of rights and national desires[3]. The Christians made no secret of the fact that they believed that they could benefit from the ties and experience of the Jewish Yishuv[4]. Eyal Zisser explained the reason for the Maronites seeking ties with Israel:
The only thing the Maronites wanted was to recruit discreetly Israel support for their struggles in the Lebanese domestic arena, keeping these connections as tightly under wraps as possible[5].

Despite the fact that the parties involved did not execute the treaty, it shows how Christians were looking for an ally to protect them from the enemy within namely «the Muslims» who started to gradually distance themselves from the National pact of 1943. According to Eyal Zisser, there were other Christian leaders who voiced their sympathy to the Zionist movement publicly, namely the archbishop of Beirut, Ignatius Mubarak[6]. Since the Muslims saw Israel as an obstacle for a mightier Muslim Arabic world, they sought support from outsiders such as the Palestinians in the early stages of the Lebanese civil war and Syria in the later stages. The civil unrest of 1958 The political power of the Christian political elite was challenged in 1958. The country was shaken during this period. In 1958 Syria and Egypt came together in the United Arab Republic (U.A.R) under full Egyptian command. The union received support among the majority of the Lebanese Shiites and Sunnis[7]. The Lebanese government dominated by Christians was fearful of the supporters of the pro Arab unity who were trying to topple the government. President Camille Chamoun backed by the bulk of Christians was absolutely determined to preserve Lebanon. As a consequence, only a small spark was needed to ignite widespread violence[8]. Therefore on 8th May, unknown assailants killed an anti-regime Maronite journalist in Tripoli (the Second largest Lebanese city). Public order instantly collapsed in Tripoli and the Muslim sections of Beirut, as riots extended into the mobilisation of gangs and small militias by radical parties Nasirites and Ba’th[9]. President Chamoun, a Christian, asked the Eisenhower administration to curb the civil unrest of 1958. The Eisenhower administration quickly responded by sending 10,000 Marines, in order to shore up the government’s forces. Aziz Abu-Hamad cited that the Maronite-led government troops and the Maronite militia battled an alliance of Muslim militias and their leftists and Nasirist allies in Tripoli, Beirut, Sidon and Tyre[10]. Aziz added that the 1958 crisis was defused when President Chamoun dropped his plans for a

second term[11]. Christians and Muslims were finally content with the election of the army commander Fouad Shihab as the new president, and, consequently, the US withdrew from Lebanon. During the 1958 civil war, the Christian dominated government fought alongside the Maronite militia against Muslims and leftists. Even though the 1958 war was caused by the clash of pro Lebanese sovereignty and pro Arab unity groups, it reinforced the belief that the Lebanese community was divided along sectarian lines. Thus, the Christians favoured Lebanese sovereignty while the Muslims favoured Lebanon joining a more desired unified Arabic league nation. The 1967 Muslim-Jewish war and the Palestinian increased involvement in Lebanon The 1967 Arab-Israel war further strained the relationship between Christians and Muslims. This was due to the fact that the Lebanese political leadership refused to commit its troops to the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war. The non-commitment enraged many Lebanese Muslims[12]. After the defeat of the Arabs in the 1967 war, the Palestinians started to launch attacks against Israel from Lebanon. Israel retaliated by shelling Lebanese towns and villages. Aziz Abu-Hamad showed that the Palestinian military action against Israel divided Christians and Muslims again:
Muslim leaders proclaimed support for the Palestinian cause, Christian leaders expressed their opposition to dragging Lebanon into the Middle East conflict[13].

Although Lebanese Muslims had only minority representation in the Lebanese Parliament, they outnumbered Christians in 1968. This was largely due to the higher rates of Christian emigration and higher Muslim birth rates. Aziz Abu-Hamad explained that in 1968, Muslims demanded several government changes including an end to the accord that reserved key positions for Maronites, such as the Commander of the army and the Governor of the central Bank[14]. The Cairo agreement of 1969 gave Palestinians the right of autonomous administrative control over their refugee camps in Lebanon. Christians objected to the agreement arguing that it was a betrayal of Lebanese sovereignty[15]. The Christians’ anger compelled Christian parties such as Phalanges( Kata’ib) and Camille Chamoun’s National Liberal parties to establish military camps for their militias[16]. These newly trained Christian militias assisted the Lebanese army in their clashes with Palestinians in 1970. Although that crisis was temporarily resolved by reaffirming the Cairo Agreement, the Christian leadership, girded for the next round, determined to uphold Lebanese sovereignty and the Christian character of Lebanon[17]. The Jordanian army expelled Palestinian fighters in September 1970 from Jordan. The move was aimed to stop the Palestinians from attacking Israel who used to militarily retaliate by bombing Jordan[18]. Many newly arrived expelled Palestinian fighters entered Lebanon taking advantage of the 1969 Cairo agreement, which granted Palestinian relative autonomy in Lebanon. Aziz Abu-Hamad said that several Lebanese factions, mostly Muslim and leftist groups, used the PLO’s autonomy and political and military power to press for greater participation in decision-making[19]. During the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, differences between Christians and Muslims deepened. The Christians were upset to see South Lebanon a battlefield between Israel and the

Palestinians, while the Muslims took the opportunity in return to show dissatisfaction with their economic and political status in a Christian dominated political system[20].

Chapter 3: Christian Nationalism vs. Muslim Nationalism This chapter explores nationalism in Lebanon. Nationalism can be considered as one cause of the rise and fall of Christianity in Lebanon. Meir Zamir described the spread of Christian nationalism in Lebanon as one of the three nationalistic movements that emerged simultaneously in the Middle East. The other two being the Muslim and Jewish movements[1]. It is very hard for people with different nationalistic persuasions in the same country to stay unified. I will limit my study to the Christian and Arabic/Muslim nationalism, due to the fact that Lebanon housed only few a hundred Jews. Theodor Hanf stated that the Lebanese nationalists, mainly Christians, tried to prove that Lebanon had existed since time immemorial and stressed its independence and uniqueness. He added that Arab nationalists, usually Muslims, tended to present the history of what is now known as Lebanon as a provincial chapter in the history of ArabIslamic empires[2]. He added that there had been disputes about when which part of the country was first called Lebanon, and whether one or other of the contemporary communities was already a nation in the past[3]. Marguerite Johnson identified Christian nationalism in terms of their distinctive cultural identity in the Middle East[4]. The cultural character of the Christian community was rooted in their religious separateness from the rest of the Near East and was nourished by centuries of long cultural ties with Western Europe. Christian nationalism helped increase their survival chances in Lebanon. However, it also contributed to their own downfall. Their nationalism clashed with Muslim and Arabic nationalism. The Muslims showed an equal resolve to claim Lebanon and tried to remove the Lebanese Christians from political power. In Lebanon, until recently, most Christian children were taught that Lebanon is a Phoenician and a western oriented nation, while most Muslim children students are taught that Lebanon is an Arabic country and an integral part of its Islamic World. Many Christians believe that they are Lebanese and not Arabs. Ghassan Hage reasoned that the Muslim Shari’a’s differentiation of people on the basis of their religious identity led Christians to become acutely conscious of their status as a religious minority[5].
The biggest fear Christians have had is how to survive in such a Muslim dominated region. This has prompted them to deny Muslims the opportunity to turn Lebanon into an Arabic and Muslim nation. This was done by spreading their notion of nationalism, which they associated with Lebanese sovereignty away from Arabic and Islamic influences.

Christian nationalism made the Christians reluctant to share their power with Muslims until the commencement of the 1975 Lebanese civil war. They were worried about their future as a minority, surrounded by a majority Muslim population that was hungry to

claim its fair share of power due to their superiority of numbers. Lebanese Christians were always keenly mindful of past atrocities inflicted on their brethren in the Middle East at the hands of the Muslims- namely the demise of Armenians in Turkey and the persecution of Coptic Christians in Sudan and Egypt. The majority of Christians associate themselves with Phoenician roots and not to the Arab Bedouin (Originally Arab). Antoine Najm did not agree that nationalism ran along strict religious lines. He saw that Arabists, be Christian or Muslim, aspired to either annex Lebanon to the «Greater Arab Nation» or to establish an Islamic or quasi-Islamic state. Lebanese nationalists rejected this political stand[6]. The clash of nationalism between Christians and Muslims in Lebanon may be illustrated by a recent incident surrounding the celebrated poet Khalil Gebran. Recently, the American Maronite Union wrote to the American Secretary of State, General Colin Powell, clarifying that the famous Lebanese poet Khalil Gebran is Lebanese and not an Arab[7]. Their protest was to the Middle East Descent Association in America, honouring Khalil Gebran as an Arabic American in the presence of Powell[8]. Tom Harb the chairman of the American Maronite union explained: While we certainly would not be opposed to any party that would honour Khalil Gibran, we express our concerns as the identification of this great Lebanese-American as an «Arab-American»[9]. David Gordon discussed the view of Muslims and Christians about each other. He outlined Muslim opinion about Christians as follows:

Firstly, Muslims rejected the maintenance of a Christian state. They objected to the way power was distributed so that it enabled Christians, particularly Maronites, to dominate a nation whose majority were Muslims. Moreover, Muslims believed that power should be based not upon sectarian distribution but upon the principle of one vote per person. Secondly, Muslims claimed that the Christian establishment has repeatedly sought to split Lebanon, politically and culturally, from the Arab world. They argued that the Maronites supported the crusaders and that the Maronite Patriach Ignatius Mubarak had explicitly supported Israel. Thirdly, Muslims argued that the Christian establishment had favoured and promoted private and foreign education, in order to erode the position of the Arabic language. Typically, Muslims believed that many textbooks had belittled Arab accomplishments and promoted the image of Lebanon as once a Phoenician and now a Christian state[10].

The Christians’ view of Muslim nationalism was put succinctly also by David Gordon. He explained that Christians believed that Arab nationalism was inevitably «Muslim». He added that they further claimed that Muslims were hypocritical in calling for a secular state, while at the time never abandoning their «personal status»(according to which matters of inheritance and marriage are determined by Koranic prescription). Lastly, Christians believed that integration of Lebanon politically or economically into the Arab world with its authoritarian and socialist tendencies, would only jeopardise the freedom and prosperity that both Muslims and Christians enjoyed in Lebanon. Christians further saw that the realisation of Muslim demands would be killing the goose that laid the golden egg[11]. The Christians’ belief was that Arab nationalism was inevitably Muslim. This is true, owing to the fact that the ordinary Arabic citizens and government stressed the Islamic nature of the Arab world.

This chapter explored how Lebanese Christians and Muslims espoused different nationalistic views. The spread of this divided nationalism was made easier by the existence of political and religious political parties, which I will discuss in the next chapter.

Chapter 4: Christian Political Parties and Organisations This chapter explores Christian political parties, and their role in the rise and fall of Christians in Lebanon. These parties have used nationalism as a vehicle to promote their political platforms. These political parties were involved in the 1975 civil war. Moreover, despite the end of the civil war in 1990, the Lebanese Christian parties still try to influence politics in Lebanon. These parties’ aim has been to be recognised as the ones who safeguarded the Christians’ rights in Lebanon. The Phalanges Party (Kataib) It was clearly the single most important actor among Lebanese Christians in the events leading to the 1975 crisis. In the early 1950s, the Phalanges became a parliamentary party and a participant in the traditional game of Lebanese politics[1]. It recruited nonChristian and non-Maronite members. Yet, the Phalanges remained essentially a Maronite party and according to Rabinovich, the Lebanese entity it envisaged was in reality Christian[2]. In the summer of 1975, when it appeared that the preservation of Christian control over the traditional political system in Greater Lebanon was no longer feasible, the party, or at least its radical wing, opted for the less desirable goal of a smaller Christian Lebanon based in East Beirut, the Northern part of Mount Lebanon, and the coastal area north of Beirut3. This sentiment was expressed through the publication of an interesting pamphlet by the Maronite Intellectual Centre in Kaslik, under the title Greater Lebanon a half century’s tragedy. The pamphlet stated that the creation of Greater Lebanon in 1920 by the French mandate was not in favour of the Christians. The Christians knew very clearly that their political dominance, which was safeguarded by the creation of Greater Lebanon in 1920 by the French mandate and the 1943 pact, was no longer possible. It was a sound strategy to opt for a smaller country in which they could control and preserve their culture. However, as events later showed, Muslims were not just interested in taking power in Lebanon but also to prevent Christians from ever forming a small or larger Christian Lebanese nation. As a result, the party was very interested in protecting Christian interest in a country, which started to slip away from them in favour of the Muslim majority. The Phalanges party was divided between two schools of thoughts-the school of thought represented by Pierre Gemayel’s elder son Amin and that of Karim Pakandouni. They believed that Lebanon’s Christians could only survive by coming to terms with their environment. It sought accommodation with Syria, with Lebanese Muslims and with the larger Arab world. The second school of thought was represented by Amin’s younger brother Bashir, who, in the summer of 1976, became the Commander of the party’s armed forces. This school according to Itamar Rabinovich is sceptical of Arab and Muslim willingness to tolerate a Lebanese Christian entity in their midst, and believed in the need to develop that entity’s resources, the establishment of an alliance with Israel, the mobilisation of the Lebanese Christian Diaspora, and the obtainment of American support[4].

The second school of thought prevailed over the first one. When Bashir sidelined his older brother, many believed that Bashir ignited strong nationalistic support among Christians. He later became the President of the country for twenty-one days, until his assassination. His brother succeeded him but was much weaker than he.

The Lebanese Forces The Phalangist army called itself the Lebanese Forces (LF). It mustered up to 20,000 troops, of which a core of 3,000 was a full-time soldier. Under the leadership of William Hawi, and later of Bashir Gemayel, it evolved into a formidable and highly organised fighting force. The Phalangist party practised conscription in the area it controlled, drafting eligible young men to swell its ranks. In internal fighting throughout the Civil War and up to 1982, the Lebanese Forces consolidated its leadership of the Lebanese Christian Front by assimilating other Christian militia, often by force[5]. The National Liberal party The Phalanges principal ally in the Lebanese front, Camille Chamoun’s national Liberal party, was a markedly dissimilar political formation6. A small party organised around the person and personality of its leaders, it lacked the coherent doctrine, elaborate structure, and large membership of its senior partner, the Phalanges. Camille Chamoun presided over Lebanon from 1952 until 1958. He was a bitter opponent and critic of Pan-Arab nationalism, and the only Arab ruler who accepted the US president Dwight Eisenhower’s doctrine, which was aimed to help the Middle East nations fend off armed aggression from any communist nation. It even offered to protect the political independence of such nations[7]. The party is currently heading the opposition against Syria’s presence in Lebanon. Al Marade Party This 3,500-strong unit, also called the Marada (Giants) Brigade, was named after a Byzantine border guard in ancient Lebanon. They represented the interests of Sulayman Franjiyah, President of Lebanon at the outbreak of the Civil War. It was also called the Zhagartan Liberation Army after Zgharta, Franjiyah’s hometown. It operated out of Tripoli and other areas of northern Lebanon, but it also fought in Beirut. The military alliance between the Phalanges and the Marada, which was evident at the start of the 1975 civil war, ended on June 13, 1978, with a surprise Lebanese Forces (LF) attack on Ihdin, the Marada headquarters, during which the Marada commander, Tony Franjiyah was killed[8]. The Order of Maronite Monks The Maronite church has played a big role in Lebanese politics. It has sought to safeguard the right of Christians. During the 1975 Lebanese Civil War, Patriarch Bulus Khureysh, the head of the Maronite Church, did not have any political impact9. On the other hand, the head of the order of Maronite monks Father Charbel Qassis took the activist and militant line within the Maronite church. The Maronite Monastic order, the owners of a sizable portion of Lebanon’s agricultural land, provided financial and political support to the Maronite militias[10].

The Order of Maronite Monks militia consisted of 200 priests[11]. Father Bulus Na’aman, another powerful militant cleric, later replaced Quassis[12]. Rabinovich explained that Maronite monasteries were storing weapons, ammunition, and food for Christian militias[13]. Priests saw the need to protect Christians against Palestinians and Muslims who were threatening the status quo of Christians.

Maronite League The Maronite League was a militant militia headed by Shaker Abu Suleiman, an ardent supporter of Qassis. Like the Guardians of the Cedar (see below), it was a purely Maronite militia without the inhibitions of the politically sophisticated Phalanges and National Liberals. It, therefore, chose to fight alongside these groups rather than to merge with them[14]. The Guardians of the Cedars The Guardians of the Cedars consisted of about 500 men[15]. Although they advocated a non-confrontational confessional ideology, the Guardians have in practice been among the fiercest fighters for the Christian cause. The political and military leader of the Guardians of the Cedar, Etienne Saqr (nicknamed Abu Arz), worked for the Faranjiyya administration in the early 1970s. But ideologically, Sa’id Aql who sought to draw a clear distinction between Lebanonism and Arabism inspired the Guardians. Aql’s conception of Lebanon, originating in and inspired by a remote Phoenician past, and contributing to the development of civilisation, minimises the role of Islam and Arabism[16]. The Guardians of the Cedars were frank about their relationship with Israel, unlike the Phalanges and the National Liberals, who sought to conceal their relations with Israel. The Guardians argued publicly in 1976 that the Christians should turn to Israel to ask it to save what was left of Lebanon. Like the Maronite League, they maintained their separate organisation that fought alongside the larger militias[17]. At Tanzim Arabic for «the organisation». At Tanzim was originally a small secret society of Christian officers within the Lebanese army who supported the Phalanges. At Tanzim accepted members from outside the army, mostly from the upper and professional classes. It fielded its own militia of about 200[18]. The Lebanese Front In December 1975, when major changes in the Lebanese political system were being discussed seriously and a Muslim summit was convened to formulate a joint position, a comparable Maronite summit was called for. The major Maronite leaders Pierre Gemayel, Camille Chamoun, Charbel Quassis, and Shaker Chaker Abu Sleiman met in the presidential palace[19]. In the spring of 1976, the Maronite summit was renamed the Kafur summit. Camille Chamoun was chosen President of the newly formed Lebanese Front. Its leadership included Pierre and Bashir Gemayel, Bulus Na’aman, Edward Hunayian (who had previously worked with Raymond Edde), and two noted Christian intellectuals, Charles

Malek and Fouad Ephrem Al Boustani. A joint military command was formed for the various militias, whose new collective name was the Lebanese forces. The Lebanese forces were made up of four militias, the Phalanges, Chamoun’s Numur, the Guardians of the Cedars, and the At Tanzim. Two members represented each. Despite the nominal parity, it was clear that the Lebanese Forces were dominated and controlled by Bashir Gemayel. Nevertheless, the formation of an apparently non-partisan, all Maronite forums proved very useful for the further development of the status quo coalition of Christian leaders mentioned above[20]. Halim Barakat said that the Christian rightists of the Lebanese Front have continued to resist the elimination of political sectarianism[21]. The Army’s Christian Leadership The Christian leadership within the army can be considered an important component of the status quo coalition, which consists of Christian groups, which refused to relent their power to Muslims. The Lebanese army’s refusal to take sides during the crises of 1952 and 1958 was a rare phenomenon in post-world war II Middle East, where political history has been largely shaped by military intervention and domination. The higher echelon of the professional officer corps was predominantly Christian, and the army was seen as one that was predominantly Christian. The army was seen as one of the ultimate guarantors of both the Lebanese political system and the Christian character. In the 1950 and 1960s, Muslim politicians repeatedly demanded a national service law that would transform the army into a predominantly Muslim force[22]. The bulk of the army was positioned in Beirut and the centre of the country. Accommodationist Christian leaders The Christian community had also moderate Christian politicians and public figures such as the former president Elias Sarkis and Raymond Edde (the son of President Emille Edde). They sought accommodation policies with the opponents of the (namely the Muslims). However they did not possess the coherence of an actual political school or bloc. Moreover, these leaders were willing to concede a large share of power in the political system to the Muslim community. They strongly opposed the notion of partition. Chapter 5: The Christian role in the Lebanese Civil War of 1975-1990 The Lebanese Civil war and its outcome changed the status of Christians in Lebanon and helped their political decline. The Civil War started in 1975 and many historians still do not agree on its immediate causes. However, Brenda Seaver cited two events, which marked the beginning of the Lebanese Civil War. The first event occurred in February 1975, where Lebanese fishermen’s unions in Sidon, Tyre, and Tripoli jointly protested the establishment of the Protein Company, a modern high-technology monopolistic fishing company owned in large part by former president Camille Chamoun, a Maronite Christian[1]. Brenda Seaver added that the army began firing upon protesters mortally wounding Ma’ruf Saad, the Sunni Muslim leader of the popular Nasserite Organisation of Sidon[2]. Following Sidon’s events, street demonstrations erupted virtually in all of Lebanon’s major cities and intense fighting occurred between Christian troops and gunmen aided by Palestinian commandos.

While the second event, according to Seaver, took place on 13 April 1975, when unknown assailants attempted to assassinate Pierre Gemayel, the leader of the Phalanges, while he was attending the consecration of a new church in the Christian Beirut suburb of Ain Rumana. Gemayel survived, but three of his bodyguards died[3]. Seaver added that a group of Maronite militiamen at Ayn Al-Rumana retaliated by ambushing a bus containing mostly Palestinians on their way to the Tel-Al Za’atar refugee camp, killing twenty-seven passengers[4]. The incident incited heavy fighting throughout the country between the Phalangists on the one hand and Palestinian militiamen and leftist Muslims on the other hand, resulting in over 300 deaths in three days. The first incident highlighted the Muslims’ uneasiness about the privileges that the Christian elite were enjoying. The protest was not just a protest against the opening of the company, but because it was owned by one of the Christian power brokers. Moreover, it followed a constant outcry of Muslim leaders against the privileges and wealth of the Christians. After the Cairo Agreement in 1969, which sanctioned the arming of Palestinians in Lebanon, the Christians perceived the continuing presence of the Palestinians in Lebanon as a serious threat. These above incidents are not the only factors, which led to the eruption of the Civil War. The nature of nationalism in Lebanon has played a crucial role in making the Civil war inevitable. Twefik Khalaf noted that the Christians had a hidden agenda when fighting broke out between the Phalanges and the Palestinians. The Phalanges wanted to hold on for a few days and then engage the Lebanese Army in a Jordanian style campaign against the Palestinians[5]. The Christians may be indirectly blamed for the eruption of the civil war, due to the fact that the demands of Muslims for more equality fell on deaf ears. As a result of a fifteenyear Muslim boycott of the Lebanese state during the French mandate, there was always considerable disequilibrium in the civil service, which was made up largely by Christians. The disequilibrium continued well into the independent republic: young civil servants appointed in the 1930s reached retiring age only in the 1960s[6]. This ably explained the reason behind the Christian control of the civil service. In the fifties, Maronites and Greek Catholics Melkites and Sunni Muslims were over represented at the expense of the Shi’ites. As Muslim communities lagged in university education, Muslim deputies, parties and institutions were among the zealous champions of the principle of proportionality or quota citing Article 95 of the constitution which stipulated an adequate distribution of civil service posts among the communities[7]. Christians, with their educational advantages, rejected the Muslim demand, citing that Article 12 of the constitution, stipulated that all citizens should have equal access to the civil service and that the only criteria of selection was merit and ability[8]. The above example effectively explains that the different interpretation of the constitution by Christians and Muslims had made them in conflict with each other. Brenda Seaver criticised the Christian militias, as they often seemed to act in defiance of the Lebanese Front’s leadership[9]. Ghassan Hage cited Christian notorious atrocities on 6 December 1975. The day was to be known later as «black Saturday», where more than two hundred Muslims were brutally massacred by Christians. This event was usually explained as an act of revenge for the killing of Christians in Muslim areas[10]. Simon Haddad recorded that Palestinian refugees were slaughtered in Tal Al Za’atar in 1976 and in Sabra and Shatila camps in 1982[11]. Rex Brynen estimated that Christians killed about one thousand Palestinians and Lebanese Muslims and evicted twenty

thousand from the Palestinian protected areas of the Al-Karantina and Al-Maslakh slum districts[12]. The years between 1975-1990 were the darkest time for Christians. This was due to the atrocities committed by the Christian militia and by the atrocities committed on Christians by Muslims and Palestinians. Charles Sennott recalled the war memory of one Christian villager Michael Abu Abdella from Damour. Abu Abdella remembered the attacks that devastated his village Christian community and had caused thousands to flee[13]. During the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, a Phalange faction led by Elie Hobaiqa attacked the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila and massacred about one thousand unarmed refugees, including women, children, and old men[14]. Israel was blamed widely for not intervening to stop it once it had began[15]. However, the Lebanese forces denied its involvement and the victims’ relatives have recently launched criminal proceeding at a the Belgium supreme court against the current Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, who was the Defence Minister during the 1982 invasion. Chapter 6: Causes of the Decline of the Christian status in Lebanon The decline of the Christian role in Lebanon was caused by four factors. Firstly, the typical strife with the Muslim foes, secondly by internal Christian division and fighting, thirdly by foreign intervention and fourthly by voluntary and forced emigration of many Christians. The political and social Christian decline can be traced to their struggle with the Muslim majority. Christians were exhausted by their war with the Muslims. Fawaz Gerges noted that Latif Abul-Husn believed that the 1975 war revolved around three main issues: Reform of the political system, the national identity of Lebanon and Lebanon’s sovereignty[1]. According to Abul-Husn, the Christians could have been in conflict with the Muslims over the three above issues. The Muslims wanted to reform the political system, which favoured Christians. They wanted to translate their numerical superiority into political power. They wanted a system, which they could control. Moreover, they saw Christians as an obstacle to the formation of an Islamic state similar to the rest of the Middle Eastern states. The Muslims chose war instead of dialogue, due to the fact that the Christians continued to ignore their grievances. The war was more destructive to the Christians than to the Muslims. In 1983, a civil war erupted in the mountains between the Phalanges and the Druze on a large scale. The Druze defeated the Christians. They drew no distinction between their Christian supporters and opponents. Around sixty villages were devastated, thousands of civilians were murdered, and tens of thousands were driven out or had fled. The spiritual leader of the Druze, Sheikh Abu Shakra, summed up the brutality of this phase of the civil war stating that the Christians would never again live in the Druze Mountain[2]. For the Christians, the episode was a disaster of a similar magnitude as in the Chouf, where about fifty Christian villages were razed to the ground in 1983[3]. Theodore Hanf noted that there had been radical changes in the southern section of Mount Lebanon, the upper Metn, the Aley region and the Chouf. In 1975, the Christians comprised a good half of the population, a decade later about 1 per cent. The Christians were expelled from the coastal strip in the first two years of the war[4]. They were eradicated from certain areas and replaced by Muslims. There were several wars between Christians and Muslims but the 1983 Mountain war stands as the most significant war,

which caused the death of thousands of Christians and expelled them from the Mountain area. At the end of the civil war in 1990, as Christian-Muslim relations improved, many Christians started to return to their villages. The government even started to financially aid them to renovate or build new houses. The struggle with the Muslims caused the Christians to slowly surrender their traditional hold of power and opted to emigrate seeking a better future. The decline of the Christian power in Lebanon can be also traced to internal divisions and infighting among the Christians themselves. The Phalanges saw that the Maronite political pluralism ought perhaps to be tolerated, but the community’s military power had to be under one authority, and that authority had to be theirs[5]. For this reason the Phalanges sought to break the independent power of their two principal partners, the Franjiyya and the Liberal National Party. The relations with Franjiyya worsened after they disagreed over relations with Syria. The Phalanges sought to expand their party organisation into Northern Lebanon and to undermine the Franjiyya family’s economic base by disputing Franjiyya’s right to raise levies in the heavily industrialised region around Chekka, South of Tripoli[6]. Franjiyya responded to the challenge by killing the chief Phalanges organiser, Jud Bayeh. The Phalanges retaliated by shelling Tony Franjiyya’s home in the village of Ehden, killing him and his immediate family in June 1978[7]. Itamar Rabinovich questioned whether or not his assassination had been planned; it is obvious that excessive brutality divided the Christian camp[8]. Franjiyya accused Lebanese Forces of collaboration with Israel and opted to side with Syria[9]. In 1980, Bashir Gemayel’s militia destroyed the military infrastructure of the Tigers, the National Liberal Party’s militia, in the Beirut area. The Phalanges sought to expand their mandate and their demographic and territorial bases by becoming the representative authority for all Lebanese Christians not just the Maronites[10]. On 31 January 1990, after the Lebanese forces announced its reluctant endorsement of the Ta’if Accord, Michel Aoun had to consolidate his position with his Christian constituency. He attempted to wrest control of the small Christian area between Beirut and Jebail, but in the process inaugurated a Christian civil war in January 1990[11]. Kail Ellis commented that the conflict lasted until July of that year and ended without a clearcut victory for Aoun[12]. Before the fighting stopped in mid-March, nearly 750 civilians had been killed and 3,000 wounded, but the Lebanese Forces continued to support the new accord[13]. Ellis noted that the war had negative political consequences for the Christian community and that it was estimated that the war had caused $1.2 billion in property damage[14]. Another reason for the decline of Christian influence in Lebanon is that not all Christians shared the dream of a Christian state. For example, Christian members of both Lebanese communists and the national progressive parties aimed for a non-secular political system and called for the abolition of the religious based political system. Theodore Hanf noted that the civil war between the Christian communities had weakened them more than all the previous attacks of Lebanese and foreign foes[15]. Christian relations with foreign powers have also contributed to their decline. In the words of Lebanon’s premier columnist, Ghassan Tueni, it was the others’ war. Lebanon was used as a battlefield for the ongoing clashes in the Middle East and the superpower rivalries resulting from the cold war[16].

Eyal Zisser commented that stronger relations between Israel and the Lebanese Maronite community inevitably led to the civil war in Lebanon in 1975[17]. Eyal added that such relations were founded on the common belief that Jews and Maronites must forge a strong alliance to ward off hostile Muslim-Arab attacks[18]. Brenda Seaver outlined that without Palestinians; the Lebanese system might have persisted:
At the very least, if the Palestinian problem had never existed, there would have been more time for strong elites to emerge who could have dealt with the difficulties of modernisation by carrying on the Shihab tradition of social reforms and instituting moderate political reforms[19]

Brenda Seaver gave an accurate analysis of the Palestinians contribution to the collapse of the Lebanese political system. The Palestinians might have tried to turn Lebanon into an alternative permanent state, as compensation for their homeland. The Palestinians’ interference worsened the already tense relations between Christians and Muslims. Despite the several episodic civil wars between Muslims and Christians, the whole population had co-operated together for many centuries. Syria has also played a big role in the decline of the Christian’s role in Lebanon, despite its initial intervention militarily in their favour in 1976. When in 1976, the Lebanese National Movement LMN that was fighting Christian forces was about to gain victory over the Christian; the Syrians intervened, explicitly stating that their reason for doing so was to help the Christians[20]. Ghassan Hage explored the reasons behind Syria’s help for the Christians in 1976:
Undoubtedly, however, it aimed to avoid the creation of a mini Christian state that the Christians would have proclaimed in all likelihood in the areas that remained under their control[21].

It is important to note that Syria helped the Christians to secure a foothold in Lebanon. However, the Christian leaders, who governed Lebanon at the start of the civil war, failed to predict the implication of Syria’s initial friendly intervention in Lebanon. Rex Brynen noted that the massive Syrian military intervention in Lebanon served to Arabise the Lebanese civil war, substantially shifting the conflict from its initial Lebanese social and political bases to the broader regional arena[22]. The honeymoon between the Christians and the Syrians was short lived. Ghassan Hage said that following Egyptian president Anwar Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem, an Israeli conceived peace plan (what became known as the Begin plan’) emerged allowing for a role of the Christian Right, namely the Phalanges. They did not hesitate to grab the opportunity and quickly turned against Syria[23]. On February 7, 1978 a limited armed confrontation between the Syrians and some Christian elements of the Lebanese army took place. Soon after, this confrontation developed into a full-scale war[24]. The Begin plan allowed Israel to invade and stay in South Lebanon until a permanent solution prevented the Palestinian guerrilla from returning[25]. Here, the Christians represented by the Lebanese Front, took its most extremist stand on the Palestinian presence in Lebanon and called for the elimination of the Palestinians armed presence[26]. Syria was furious at the Christians’ apparent siding with Israel and so began bombardment of the Christian quarters of Beirut[27].

Ghassan Hage presented the reasons for the Syrian aggression against the Christians:
It was a reflection of the frustration of Syrian President Assad to see the Christian rightists, whom he had basically saved, and whom he had attempted to handle with the utmost care, move away from him with ease[28].

There was some notion in 1978 that Syria and the Muslims wanted to eradicate the uniqueness of Lebanon and the Christian presence in it. This led Camille Chamoun to call on the ”civilised world” to stop the Syrian bombardment of the Christian area[29]. Christian civilians paid a high price for the political mistakes of their own leaders. Those leaders did not foresee that Syria would demand full support for its policies, which shifted again to support the Palestinian presence in the South, something that is against the Christian’s principle of a free Lebanon. The civilians were bombed every time their leaders disagreed with Syria or the Muslim militias, namely the Lebanese national movement. The conflict was between Christians and Muslims, more precisely between Christians in Libanon against Muslim Syria and and thousands of Iranian revolutionary guards[Hezbollah]:
— the struggle for Lebanon was conducted between Maronite leaders in East Beirut and Hafiz al-Asad in Damascus[30].

Following the end of the civil war in 1990, the political power of the Christians declined even further. Alan George described how the Maronites were marginalised:
— Their selective representation in the political hierarchy and the exile or imprisonment of leading political figures[31].

The Christians’ position declined even further, when a major ally of the past, the United States, refrained from urging Syria to withdraw. In 1958, the United States rushed to help president Camille Chamoun to quell a rebellion, which was staged, by Muslims and followers of former Egyptian president Abdel Nasser. Later, however, The United States abandoned its role in Lebanon, owing to the fact that in 1983 the American embassy in Ain al-Mreisse was demolished by a suicide bomb attack that killed more than 60 people[32]. Six months later, suicide bombers made simultaneous attacks on the multinational force that arrived a year earlier at the request of President Amin Gemayel. The results of the attacks were devastating when 58 French paratroopers and 241 Americans marines were killed. Finally the Americans pulled out of Lebanon. The Christians in Lebanon felt uneasy about the United States failure to demand Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon. Jose Navalpotro wrote that the United States believed that the timetable for the Syrian withdrawal was a matter that should be resolved between Damascus and Beirut[33]. He added that Washington does not regard this question as an important issue in the overall stability of the Middle East, or a pivotal matter to be resolved in the Arab-Israeli peace process[34]. Christian Emigration from Lebanon, in large numbers, also contributed to the decline of the Christian influence in Lebanon. Both Muslims and Christians fled Lebanon, but far more Christians left. From a pre-war Lebanese population of roughly 4 million, 500,000 of the 700,000 who emigrated were Christian. Just how many Christians remain in

Lebanon is in dispute. There are no official population figures for Lebanon. Some estimate that about 1 million residents or 25 percent of the country are Christians. This figure is less than half of the nearly 60 per cent majority of the early 1970s.

William Harris saw that Christian numbers declined in Lebanon as the years went by[35].
1911 79% Christian 1921 55% 1932 51% 1943 52% 1970 42% 1990 35% (2008 25%)

It is hard to see the Christians current decline in status to be reversed in the view of Harris’s statistics. It is very plausible that the number of Christians will become negligible in 50 years and thus their presence in the Middle East will be in jeopardy. Christians need to have the numbers in order to have a legitimate claim to sharing power with the Muslims. Charles M.Sennott quoted a Christian lawyer Nehmatalla Abi Nasr talking about the effect of Christian migration:
«The Christians leave for opportunity in the West or to get away from the war,’he says,’Then they lose more and more influence here, and then they are increasingly afraid to return. This process feeds on itself.»[36].

The migration of many Christians from Lebanon has indeed contributed to their political decline in a nation, where they used to be the majority. The voluntary migration adds to the fact that thousands and thousands of Christians died in a war or faced expulsion from their own houses and lands. The Maronite patriarch, Cardinal Nsrallah Boutrous Sfeir, complains stridently that an upsurge in non-Christian immigration to Lebanon, coupled with the government’s recent decision to grant citizenship to a large number of Muslims, is weakening the Christian voice in Lebanon,[37] Chapter 7 — The End of the Lebanese Civil War and the Ta’if Agreement the ”last straw”. The Lebanese Civil war ended in 1990 following the defeat of the Lebanese Army leader Aoun by Syria’s intervened military. William Harris saw the collapse of the autonomous Christian enclave of East Beirut as a blow to Christian power in Lebanon[1]. The Christians had not just faced a traumatic end to their autonomy on 13 April, but they had to face the consequences of the implementation of the Ta’if agreement, which reduced their power in favour of the Muslims. On the 30th of September 1989, the Arab League plan, hereafter referred to as the Ta’if Accord, was signed in the resort city of Ta’if. The 62 Lebanese members of Parliament, 85 percent of the surviving 73 members who met in Saudi Arabia, included 31 Christian and 31 Muslim deputies[2]. Many Christians considered that this agreement as the single

event that sealed their downfall. The agreement united the nation but failed to give the Christians the necessary guarantee for their survival. Following the Ta’if agreement, more ambitious Islamic leaders found an opportunity to consolidate their political gains, and gradually eliminated the Christian presence from the national government[3]. Catholic leaders were against the new agreement. Jose Navalpotro wrote:
Cardinal Sfeir put the question in sharp relief. Without a strong Christian presence in government, he asked, what would be the incentive to maintain an independent Lebanon? And without a clear agreement with their Muslim neighbours, how could a Christian minority in one small country expect to survive in an»Islamic ocean?».

The Ta’if agreement emphasised three factors: Firstly, that the new preamble to the constitution unequivocally stressed Lebanon’s Arab identity and affiliation. Secondly, that the new preamble should state that Lebanon’s system should be based on social justice and equality between all citizens in rights and duties without any differentiation and preference. Thirdly it called for the abolition of political sectarianism. Sami Ofeish asserted that Ta’if addressed the causes of the Lebanese Civil War[5]. Article 24 of the Ta’if accord presents the guidelines for the sectarian distribution of seats in parliament. This article affirms that, until parliament enacts non-sectarian electoral laws, parliamentary seats should be distributed equally between Christians and Muslims[6]. Sami Ofeish commented that the principles of sectarian «proportional representation» were not implemented accurately in the past and they did not accommodate the demographic changes showing Muslims as the numerical majority beginning in the 1960s[7]. The Ta’if ‘s agreement improved the position of the prime minister at the expense of the President’s traditional functions. According to article 64, the Prime Minister is now the one who heads the government and acts as its representative. The Parliamentary Speaker (A Shiite)’s term is extended to four years instead of one as in the past according to article 44. The Maronite-exclusive Presidency was rendered to be more symbolic. Sami Ofeish wrote that despite the fact that the President is still the head of the state (Article 49), his executive power lies mainly with the council of ministers (Article 17), and the president shares the decision-making with the Prime Minister and the council[8]. As we can clearly see, three Presidents rule Lebanon equally, the President of the Republic, the President of Council of Ministers and the President of the Chamber of Deputies. It is important to see that Ta’if reduced the Christian political power in Lebanon in favour of the Muslims. Christine Asmar saw that the Ta’if agreement did not provide any solutions to the Lebanese political power:
Ta’if was also to have signalled a thaw in inter-confessional hostilities, but instead it may have simply frozen animosities while facilitating the restoration of a central government, leaving unresolved the vital issue of inter-confessional relations, especially at the level of the «street[9].

One of the consequences of the Ta’if agreement was the signing of a treaty of brotherhood, cooperation and coordination between Syria and Lebanon[10]. A majority of

Christians voiced their concern about the treaty. William Harris commented on the Christian opposition to Ta’if:
Most Christians rejected the Ta’if regime, as they felt alienated both from Christian participants in the government and from other Christian parties, principally the Kata’ib and the LF, which had accepted the new order but dissented on details[11]. Christians boycotted the first post Ta’if’s agreement election in 1992. Judith Harik noted that the Lebanese Maronite community feared that a new parliament would enact laws to end its privileged position in Lebanese society and politics[12]. The Maronites wanted the Syrians out of Lebanon, and believed that elections held before the Syrians departure might be unduly influenced by Syria at their expense[13]. Judith Harik stated that the Christians boycotted the 1992 election, because they felt that the new parliament would not represent their interests[14].

The Christians’ fears were to become a reality when a pro Syrian President was elected in 1993. The new parliaments after 1990 did not contain strong nationalist Christians as before. In the last election of 2000, only a few Christian nationalists were elected, in contrast to 1972 where most Christian members of parliament were Christian nationalists. The decline of the Christian political influence coincided with the economic rise of the Muslims. Jose Navalpotro wrote:
Under Hariri’s regime, the financial aid which is flowing into the country from other Arabic nations is being directed toward institutions controlled by Muslims[15].

The Christians long time financial superiority over Muslims has finally come to an end. Other Arabic countries are financially aiding Muslim institutions. Muslim wealth has doubled since the end of the civil war in 1990. It is no secret that the current Prime Minister Rafic Hariri’s private company Solidaire owns the central business district of Beirut. Moreover, it tenders all government major construction work. Muslim new wealth is channelling new financial and political power for the Muslims. Moreover, the poor Shi’ite area of the South is attracting more government and overseas developments. Among the Christian leaders who remain active in Lebanon, there is a fervent desire for new negotiations. That desire is based on the recognition that they are rapidly losing their political influence. The principal institutions that could offer them access to power are now closed to Christians, or at least offer only the hope of a minor role. Jose Navalpotro noted that there is an absence of strong Christian leadership. He observed that the former Lebanese army commander Michel Aoun is in exile in France, the former president Amin Gemayel was residing in the United States for several years after the end of his presidency in 1988, and Dory Chamoun, who succeeded his assassinated brother Danny, has been unable to mount the sort of sustained and strategic action that would give a sense of new hope to his followers[16]. The Gemayel family finally returned in 2000 and Amin Gemayel’s son Pierre was elected to the parliament in late 2000. The absence of strong Christian leaders impedes the Christian community of exercising a powerful influence as in the past. The decline of Christian influence will even increase if there continues to be an absence of a strong Christian leader who mobilises his community and enables it to survive. Another important Christian leader, Samir Geagea, the leader of the Lebanese forces militia, is currently in prison. Navalpotro wrote that in March 1994 the government outlawed his Lebanese forces party, and arrested him. He

was accused of engineering the bombing of a Catholic church in Beirut and the assassination of Danny Chamoun. The Catholic bishops pointed out in their public denunciation of Geagea’s imprisonment that the government had produced no evidence to sustain the charges[17]. Since the formal conclusion of the Lebanese civil war on October 13, 1990, many episodes have borne testimony to the steadily diminishing influence of the Christians in Lebanon. 1990 October — Danny Chamoun, the key leader among Maronite Christians, is assassinated, along with his family. 1991 May — Patriarch Sfeir denounces the Syria-Lebanon pact, saying that it compromises the nation’s sovereignty and undermines the «national pact» of 1943. August-General Michel Aoun, the latest Christian leader to emerge as a national power broker, is sent into exile in France, and prohibited from returning to Lebanon for five years. 1992 September — Catholics organise a boycott of legislative elections; between 70 and 85 percent of all Catholics refuse to participate. One Christian deputy was elected by just winning forty votes[18]. 1993 May — Anti-Catholic rioting breaks out in the region of Chouf. The bishops of Lebanon speak out against the purchase of lands in Christian neighbourhoods, which they point out is changing the demographic face of the nation. June — Three terrorists die in the premature explosion of a bomb they were preparing at the site of a meeting of Orthodox and Catholic bishops October — Christian political leaders are the targets in a series of arrests; several are taken to Damascus and held there. December — A Christian cemetery is desecrated in Mansourieh, an apparent warning to Christians that they should not celebrate Christmas. 1994 February — A bomb placed in a Catholic Church explodes during Mass, killing eight worshippers; the terrorist act following several days after the massacre of Muslims by an Israeli extremist in Hebron. June — Prime minister Hariri ordered the shut down of ICN television and the Nida’al Watan daily newspaper after they expressed concerns by Christians over the prime minister’s land purchases in traditionally Christian areas[19]. July — The Maronite bishops issued a new warning about the loss of equilibrium between Christians and Muslims in the nation’s government. 2000 January — A group of Islamic militants stormed a Christian village killing one resident, while engaging in fighting with the Lebanese Army. September — The Maronite Bishops’ council called for the withdrawal of Syria from Lebanon, thus voicing a Christian protest to such presence. December — Syria freed about 50 mostly Lebanese Christians political prisoners. However, human rights groups have put the number of Lebanese political prisoners in Syrian jails at anywhere between several hundred and several thousand[20]. 2001 August — The arrest of 200 Christian youths following their demands at a rally for a Syrian withdrawal. The former advisor to Samir Geagea, Twefic Hindi, was arrested as

well as Aoun’s representative Nadim Lteif. They were accused of collaboration with Israel and treason. September — The Maronite Bishops’Council renewed its call for the withdrawal and asked Christians not to leave the country. October — Two churches in Sidon and Tripoli were attacked, reinforcing the fact that Christians are still finding it very hard to be optimistic about their safety in their homeland. 2002 January — The former commander of the Phalangist army (Lebanese Forces) and a former minister Elie Hobaiqua was assassinated in Beirut along with his three bodyguards. Chapter 8 — Implication of the Christian’s decline in Lebanon The lessons of war had taught Christians that the Muslim power brokers in the area .e.g Syria would not accept an establishment of a small Christian country. Christians now hope that the Muslims will not take the opportunity and attack them in a final assault to take total control of Lebanon. The survival of the Christians will depend on their internal unity and on the will of Muslims to allow the existence of a Christian minority in Lebanon. As Christian numbers are falling in Lebanon, Muslims will always control the destiny of Lebanon and its inhabitants, especially the Christians. One option left for the Christians is to resist giving their remaining power to Muslims and to increase the birth rate and remain in Lebanon. Marguerite Johnson was optimistic of Christian survival:
The Christians may lose their predominant position, but whether in Beirut or among the cedars of Mount Lebanon, they will undoubtedly retain the stubborn will to survive that has made them both an asset and a menace to their Muslim neighbours for twelve centuries[1].

There is evidence that Christians, still have the resolve to remain influential in Lebanon. Charles Sennott said that the Maronite Patriarchate filed a suit against the Hariri government’s 1995 program that naturalised some 300,000 Muslims from Syria, Iraq and other countries[2]. The Patriarchate thought that the move would further marginalise Christians in Lebanon[3]. Charles Sennott considered that the death of George Saade, leader of Lebanon’s Phalanges party, the largest Maronite political entity, symbolised the end of the dominant role Christians have played in government[4]. This is an accurate description of the current Christian status in Lebanon. A majority of Christians are not optimistic of their survival in Lebanon-they simply wonder about what sort of future they will have in Lebanon. Epilogue These are anxious days for Lebanon’s Christian community, now less powerful and privileged than at any time since the country was created. The Christian’s privileged status in Lebanon was challenged due to the demographic shift that increasingly favoured the Muslims over them. Moreover, their status was challenged by the rise of a radicalised Muslim intellectual class who were supportive of a socio-political change and panArabism[1].

Abbott Paul Naaman said that the Maronites today must follow in the footsteps of all those who came before and worked for centuries to accomplish this mission[2]. The remaining Christians in Lebanon ought to remember that they must preserve Lebanon for their children. They just ought not to give more concessions to Muslims without written guarantees. Christians need to be represented by powerful Christian leaders. Christians are now worried that Muslims, with their numerical advantage, will persist in demanding more power. However, Antoine Najm noted that a Christian scholar Reverend Jean Ducruet offers a solution for Christian problems[3]. Ducruet said that a new political system ought to be established in which all confessions share in the making of national decisions and in which not one confession can impose on the nation what is not acceptable to the tradition of the other confession[4]. He added that a numerical majority is not compatible with consensual democracy, which necessitates a coalition government and a mutual veto on decisions that are seen as contrary to the vital interests of any community5. It is a sensible proposal, which will protect Christians in Lebanon. However, it is not expected that the Muslim majority will agree. They hope for the abolishment of the sectarian system, so they can run the country completely. By now, the cause of Christians is all but defunct, where their survival is uncertain. — Fouad Abi-Esber BA MA Additional Resources: For additional reading on the status of persecution of Eastern Christians, please read detailed accounts in this site «Persecution of Maronites and other Eastern Christians[39],» «The Syriacs[40],» «The Palestinian Christian: Betrayed, Persecuted, Sacrificed[41],» and in the Assyrian site: «Genocides Against the Assyrian Nation[42]» or in the «CopticWeb dedicates to the persecuted Copts of Egypt[43]». By Fouad Abi-Esber
Sources: http://phoenicia.org/christiansmea.html 1. Abu-Hamad Aziz, Communal strife in Lebanon: Ancient animosities or state intervention? Journal of International Affairs; New York; summer 1995. 2. Akarli Engin Deniz, The Long Peace, Ottoman Lebanon, 1861-1920 , (University of California Press,Los Angeles, 1993) 3. Andrews John, A War with Many Losers, The Economist, London, Feb 24, 1996. 4. Asmar Christine, Maroun Kisirwani; Robert Springborg, Clash of politics or civilisations? Sectarianism among youth in Lebanon, Arab Studies Quarterly, Fall 1999 v21 i4 p 35. 5. Barakat Halim, Toward A Viable Lebanon, Croom Helm London and Sydney, Centre for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University Washington 1988. 6. Betts Robert Brenton, Lebanon Defied, Musa al-Sadr and the Shi’a community Middle East Policy, Washington, Jan 1998. 7. Brynen Rex, The Lebanese Civil War (1975-76). Sanctuary and survival: The PLO in Lebanon Boulder: Westview Press, 1990. 8. Ellis C Kail, Lebanon: The Struggle of a Small Country in a regional context, Arab Studies Quarterly, winter 1999 v21 i1 p 5, 1999 9. George Alan, Lebanon militia leader is easy scapegoat, Jane’s Intelligence Review; Coulsdon; Aug 1, 1997 10. Gerges A Fawaz, The Lebanese conflict:Looking Inward; Political Science Quarterly, New York, Fall,1999. 11. Gordon C David, The Republic of Lebanon, Nation in Jeopardy, boulder,Colo:London:Westview Press, Croom Helm 1983. 12. Haddad Simon, Sectarian attitudes as a function of the Palestinians presence in Lebanon, Arab Studies Quarterly, Summer 2000 v22 i3 p81 13. Hage Ghassan, Nationalist anxiety or the fear of losing your other, The Australian Journal of Anthropology, Sydney 1996. 14. Halsall Paul, Internet Modern History sourcebook http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1957eisenhowerdoctrine.html , 7/7/2001 15. Hanf Theodor, Coexistence in wartime Lebanon Decline of a State and Rise of a nation, translated from Germany by John Richardson, the centre for Lebanese Studies in association with LB Tauris and co Ltd publishers London, 1993. 16. Harb Tom, American Maronite union to Powell:Jebran is Lebanese not Arab, Lebanon Bulletin, Press Release, May 9th, 2001. 17. Harik P Judith, Khashan Hilal, Lebanon’s Divisive Democracy: the Parliamentary Elections of 1992, Arab Studies Quarterly, winter 1993 v15 n1 41.

18. Harris William Faces of Lebanon, Sects, Wars, and Global Extensions, Markus Wiener Publishers Princeton, 1997. 19. Irani Emile George, the Breakdown of the State in Lebanon. 1967-1976, book review, The Middle East Journal, Spring 2001 v55 i2 p 320, 2001. 20. Jehl Douglas, Troubled Christian Minority awaits the Pope in Lebanon, New York Times, New York, May 9, 1997. 21. Johnson Marguerite, Arabs who look to the West; with guns and crosses, Lebanon’s Christians try to survive, Time, March 5, v123 p 29, 1984 22. Khalaf Tewfik, The Phalanges and the Maronite community, in Essays on the Crisis in Lebanon edited by Roger Owen, 1976. 23. Khashan Hilal, Arab Christians as Symbols, Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2001 v 8 i1 p5, Transaction Publishers, Inc. 24. Kolvenbach Peter-Hans, Maronites between two worlds, http://www.stmaron.org/twoworld.html , 6/6/2001 25. Library of Congress, The opposing Forces in the Lebanese Civil war, Federal Research division http://rs6.loc.gov/frd/cs/lebanon/lb_appnb.html ,6/6/2001 26. Naaman Paul, Church and Politics in the Maronite Experience (1516-1943), The Journal of the Maronite Research Institute, The Journal of the Maronite Studies (JMS), January 1998 http://www.mari.org/JMS/january98/ , 6/6/2001 27. Najm Antoine, Envisioning A formula for living together in Lebanon in light of the Apostolic Exhortation, The Journal of Maronite Studies, the Maronite Research Institute April 1998. http://www.mari.org/JMS/april98/ ,8/6/2001 28. Navalpotro Jose, Destiny (In Danger of Extinction), Palabra magazine, Madrid July 2000. 29. Ofeish Sami, Lebanon’s Second Republic: Secular Talk, Sectarian Application. Arab Studies Quarterly, Winter v21 i1 p97, 1999 30. Rabinovich Itamar, The war for Lebanon 1970-1983-Ithaca And London, Cornell University press, 1984. 31. Sachs Susan, Syria Frees about 50 of Its Lebanese prisoners, New York, Times, New York, N.Y, Dec 12, 2000 32. Seaver M Brenda, The regional Sources of Power-sharing Failure: The case of Lebanon, Political Science Quarterly, Summer 2000, v115 i2 p247. 33. Sennott M Charles, Christians in Decline in Lebanon, The Boston Globe, City edition 1999. 34. Spagnolo P John, France and Ottoman 1861-1914 London:Ithaca Press, 1997. 35. Tomass Mark, Game theory with instrumentally irrational players: A Case Study of Civil War and Sectarian Cleansing, Journal of Economic Issues, Lincoln; June 1997. 36. Yeranian, Edward, Christians in Lebanon see hopes, numbers diminish, Christian Science Monitor, vol89 Issue 115, p7-10, 1997. 37. Zamir Meir, The formation of modern Lebanon, London, Dover, H, Groon Helm, 1985. 38. Zisser Eyal, The Maronites, Lebanon and the State of Israel: early contacts, Middle Eastern Studies, October 1995 v31 n4 p889. 39. http://phoenicia.org/persecution1860.html 40. http://phoenicia.org/syriacs.html#SyriacMassac 41. http://phoenicia.org/xtianpalestine.html 42. http://www.aina.org/martyr.htm 43. http://www.copticweb.com/ 44. http://phoenicia.org/maronites.html 45. http://phoenicia.org/persecution1860.html 46. http://phoenicia.org/xtian.html 47. http://phoenicia.org/xtiantranslateforarabs.html 48. http://phoenicia.org/melkites.html 49. http://www.coptic.net/EncyclopediaCoptica/ 50. http://53.415.-2.973plusf37:OHawrpc639174173148ГЋ

Also, see interview with Brigitte Gabriel – American Congress for Truth http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-3928169851397891989#

1.20 Battle of Poitiers (Battle of Tours) – First Islamic Wave – Year 732 The Battle of Tours (October 10, 732), also called the Battle of Poitiers and in Arabic: ”ma‘arakat Bala? ash-Shuhada’) Battle of Court of The Martyrs, was fought in an area between the cities of Poitiers and Tours, near the village of Moussais-la-Bataille (modern Vouneuil-sur-Vienne) about 20km north of Poitiers. The location of the battle was close to the border between the Frankish realm and then-independent Aquitaine. The battle pitted Frankish and Burgundian forces under Austrasian Mayor of the Palace Charles Martel against an army of the Umayyad Caliphate led by ‘Abdul Rahman Al Ghafiqi, Governorgeneral of al-Andalus. The Franks were victorious, ‘Abdul Rahman Al Ghafiqi was killed, and Charles subsequently extended his authority in the south. Ninth-century chroniclers, who interpreted the outcome of the battle as divine judgment in his favour, gave Charles the nickname Martellus («The Hammer»). Details of the battle, including its exact location and the exact number of combatants, cannot be determined from accounts that have survived. Notably, the Frankish troops won the battle without cavalry. As later chroniclers praised Charles Martel as the champion of Christianity, pre-20th century historians began to characterise this battle as being the decisive turning point in

the struggle against Islam, a struggle which preserved Christianity as the religion of Europe. «Most of the 18th and 19th century historians, like Gibbon, saw Poitiers (Tours), as a landmark battle that marked the high tide of the Muslim advance into Europe.» Leopold von Ranke felt that «Poitiers was the turning point of one of the most important epochs in the history of the world.» While modern historians are divided and there is considerable disagreement as to whether or not the victory was responsible — as Gibbon and his generation of historians claimed, and which is echoed by many modern historians — for saving Christianity and halting the conquest of Europe by Islam, there is little dispute that the battle helped lay the foundations of the Carolingian Empire and Frankish domination of Europe for the next century. «The establishment of Frankish power in western Europe shaped that continent’s destiny and the Battle of Tours confirmed that power.»

Background The Battle of Tours followed twenty years of Umayyad conquests in Europe which had begun with the invasion of the Visigothic Christian Kingdoms of the Iberian peninsula in 711. These were followed by military expeditions into the Frankish territories of Gaul, former provinces of the Roman Empire. Umayyad military campaigns had reached northward into Aquitaine and Burgundy, including a major engagement at Bordeaux and a raid on Autun. Charles’ victory is widely believed to have stopped the northward advance of Umayyad forces from the Iberian peninsula, and to have preserved Christianity in Europe during a period when Muslim rule was overrunning the remains of the old Roman and Persian Empires. Most historians assume that the two armies met where the rivers Clain and Vienne join between Tours and Poitiers. The number of troops in each army is not known. Drawing on non-contemporary Muslim sources, Creasy describes the Umayyad forces as 80,000 strong or more. Writing in 1999, Paul K. Davis estimates the Umayyad forces at 80,000 and the Franks at about 30,000, while noting that modern historians have estimated the strength of the Umayyad army at Tours at between 20–80,000. Edward J. Schoenfeld (rejecting the older figures of 60–400,000 Umayyad and 75,000 Franks) contends that «estimates that the Umayyads had over fifty thousand troops (and the Franks even more) are logistically impossible.» Another modern military historian, Modern historians may be more accurate than the medieval sources as the modern figures are based on estimates of the logistical ability of the countryside to support these numbers of men and animals. Both Davis and Hanson point out that both armies had to live off the countryside, neither having a commissary system sufficient to provide supplies for a campaign. Losses during

the battle are unknown but chroniclers later claimed that Charles Martel’s force lost about 1,500 while the Umayyad force was said to have suffered massive casualties of up to 375,000 men. However, these same casualty figures were recorded in the Liber pontificalis for Duke Odo of Aquitaine’s victory at the Battle of Toulouse (721). Paul the Deacon reported correctly in his Historia Langobardorum (written around the year 785) that the Liber pontificalis mentioned these casualty figures in relation to Odo’s victory at Toulouse (though he claimed that Charles Martel fought in the battle alongside Odo), but later writers, probably «influenced by the Continuations of Fredegar, attributed the Saracen casualties solely to Charles Martel, and the battle in which they fell became unequivocally that of Poitiers.» The Vita Pardulfi, written in the middle of the eighth century, reports that after the battle ‘Abd-al-Ra?man’s forces burned and looted their way through the Limousin on their way back to Al-Andalus, which implies that they were not destroyed to the extent imagined in the Continuations of Fredegar. The opponents The invasion of Hispania, and then Gaul, was led by the Umayyad Dynasty, the first dynasty of caliphs of the Islamic empire after the reign of the Four Rightly Guided Caliphs (Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, and Ali) ended. The Umayyad Caliphate, at the time of the Battle of Tours, was perhaps the world’s foremost military power. Great expansion of the Caliphate occurred under the reign of the Umayyads. Muslim armies pushed across North Africa and Persia through the late 600s; forces led by Tariq ibn-Ziyad crossed Gibraltar and established Muslim power in the Iberian peninsula, while other armies established power far away in Sind, in what is now the modern state of Pakistan. The Muslim empire under the Umayyads was now a vast domain that ruled a diverse array of peoples. It had destroyed what were the two former foremost military powers, the Sassanid Empire, which it absorbed completely, and the Byzantine Empire, most of which it had absorbed, including Syria, Armenia and North Africa, although Leo the Isaurian successfully defended Anatolia at the Battle of Akroinon (739) in the final campaign of the Umayyad dynasty. The Frankish realm under Charles Martel was the foremost military power of Western Europe. It consisted of what is today most of France (Austrasia, Neustria and Burgundy), most of Western Germany, and the low countries. The Frankish realm had begun to progress towards becoming the first real imperial power in Western Europe since the fall of Rome, as it struggled against external forces such as the Saxons, Frisians, and internal opponents such as Odo the Great (Old French: Eudes), the Duke of Aquitaine. Muslim conquests from Hispania The Umayyad troops, under Al-Samh ibn Malik al-Khawlani, the governor-general of alAndalus, overran Septimania by 719, following their sweep up the Iberian peninsula. AlSamh set up his capital from 720 at Narbonne, which the Moors called Arbuna. With the port of Narbonne secure, the Umayyads swiftly subdued the largely unresisting cities of Alet, Beziers, Agde, Lodeve, Maguelonne, and Nimes, still controlled by their Visigothic counts. The Umayyad campaign into Aquitaine suffered a temporary setback at the Battle of Toulouse (721), when Duke Odo of Aquitaine (also known as Eudes the Great) broke the siege of Toulouse, taking Al-Samh ibn Malik’s forces by surprise and mortally wounding the governor-general Al-Samh ibn Malik himself. This defeat did not stop incursions into old Roman Gaul, as Muslim forces, soundly based in Narbonne and easily resupplied by sea, struck eastwards in the 720s, penetrating as far as Autun in Burgundy in 725.

Threatened by both the Umayyads in the south and by the Franks in the north, in 730 Eudes allied himself with the Berber emir Uthman ibn Naissa, called «Munuza» by the Franks, the deputy governor of what would later become Catalonia. As a gage, and to seal the alliance, Uthman was given Eudes’s daughter Lampade in marriage, and Arab raids across the Pyrenees, Eudes’s southern border, ceased. However, the next year, Uthman rebelled against the governor of al-Andalus, ‘Abd-al-Ra?man, who quickly crushed the revolt and directed his attention against Eudes. ‘Abd-al-Ra?man had brought a huge force of Arab heavy cavalry and Berber light cavalry, plus troops from all provinces of the Caliphate, in the Umayyad attempt at a conquest of Europe north of the Pyrenees. According to one unidentified Arab, «That army went through all places like a desolating storm.» Duke Eudes (called King by some), collected his army at Bordeaux, but was defeated, and Bordeaux was plundered. The slaughter of Christians at the Battle of the River Garonne was evidently horrific; the Mozarabic Chronicle of 754 commented, «solus Deus numerum morientium vel pereuntium recognoscat», («God alone knows the number of the slain»). The Umayyad horsemen then utterly devastated that portion of Gaul, their own histories saying the «faithful pierced through the mountains, trampled over rough and level ground, plundered far into the country of the Franks, and smote all with the sword, insomuch that when Eudo came to battle with them at the River Garonne, he fled.» Eudes’ appeal to the Franks Eudes appealed to the Franks for assistance, which Charles Martel only granted after Eudes agreed to submit to Frankish authority. It appears as if the Umayyads were not aware of the true strength of the Franks. The Umayyad forces were not particularly concerned about any of the Germanic tribes, including the Franks, and the Arab Chronicles, the history of that age, show that awareness of the Franks as a growing military power only came after the Battle of Tours. Further, the Umayyads appear not to have scouted northward for potential foes, for if they had, they surely would have noted Charles Martel as a force to be reckoned with in his own account, due to his thorough domination of Europe from 717: this might have alerted the Umayyads that a real power led by a gifted general was rising in the ashes of the Western Roman Empire. Advance toward the Loire In 732, the Umayyad advance force was proceeding north toward the River Loire having outpaced their supply train and a large part of their army. Essentially, having easily destroyed all resistance in that part of Gaul, the invading army had split off into several raiding parties, while the main body advanced more slowly. The Umayyad attack was likely so late in the year because many men and horses needed to live off the land as they advanced; thus they had to wait until the area’s wheat harvest was ready and then until a reasonable amount of the harvest was threshed (slowly by hand with flails) and stored. The further north, the later the harvest is, and while the men could kill farm livestock for food, horses cannot eat meat and needed grain as food. Letting them graze each day would take too long, and interrogating natives to find where food stores were kept would not work where the two sides had no common language. A military explanation for why Eudes was defeated so easily at Bordeaux and at the Battle of the River Garonne after having won 11 years earlier at the Battle of Toulouse is simple. At Toulouse, Eudes managed a basic surprise attack against an overconfident and unprepared foe, all of whose defensive works were aimed inward, while he attacked from

the outside. The Umayyad forces were mostly infantry, and what cavalry they had never got a chance to mobilise and meet him in open battle. As Herman de Carinthia wrote in one of his translations of a history of al-Andalus, Eudes managed a highly successful encircling envelopment which took the attackers totally by surprise — and the result was a chaotic slaughter of the Muslim forces. At Bordeaux, and again at the Battle of the River Garonne, the Umayyad forces were cavalry, not infantry, and were not taken by surprise, and given a chance to mass for battle, this led to the devastation of Eudes’s army, almost all of whom were killed with minimal losses to the Muslims. Eudes’s forces, like other European troops of that era, lacked stirrups, and therefore had no heavy cavalry. Virtually all of their troops were infantry. The Umayyad heavy cavalry broke the Christian infantry in their first charge, and then slaughtered them at will as they broke and ran. The invading force went on to devastate southern Gaul. A possible motive, according to the second continuator of Fredegar, was the riches of the Abbey of Saint Martin of Tours, the most prestigious and holiest shrine in Western Europe at the time. Upon hearing this, Austrasia’s Mayor of the Palace, Charles Martel, collected his army and marched south, avoiding the old Roman roads and hoping to take the Muslims by surprise. Because he intended to use a phalanx, it was essential for him to choose the battlefield. His plan — to find a high wooded plain, form his men and force the Muslims to come to him — depended on the element of surprise. Battle Preparations and maneuver From all accounts, the invading forces were caught entirely off guard to find a large force, well disposed and prepared for battle, with high ground, directly opposing their attack on Tours. Charles had achieved the total surprise he hoped for. He then chose to begin the battle in a defensive, phalanx-like formation. According to the Arabian sources, the Franks drew up in a large square, with the trees and upward slope to break any cavalry charge. For seven days, the two armies watched each other with minor skirmishes. The Umayyads waited for their full strength to arrive, which it did, but they were still uneasy. ‘Abd-al-Ra?man, despite being a good commander, had managed to let Charles bring his army to full strength and pick the location of the battle. Furthermore, it was difficult for the Umayyads to judge the size of the army opposing them, since Charles had used the trees and forest to make his force appear larger than it probably was. Thus, ‘Abd-alRa?man recalled all his troops, which did give him an even larger army — but it also gave Charles time for more of his veteran infantry to arrive from the outposts of his Empire. These infantry were all the hope for victory he had. Seasoned and battle hardened, most of them had fought with him for years, some as far back as 717. Further, he also had levies of militia arrive, but the militia was virtually worthless except for gathering food, and harassing the Muslims. Unlike his infantry, which was both experienced and disciplined, the levies were neither, and Charles had no intention of depending on them to stand firm against cavalry charges (Most historians through the centuries have believed the Franks were badly outnumbered at the onset of battle by at least 2-1.). Charles gambled everything that ‘Abd-al-Ra?man would in the end feel compelled to battle, and to go on and loot Tours. Neither of them wanted to attack — but Abd-alRa?man felt in the end obligated to sack Tours, which meant literally going through the Frankish army on the hill in front of him. Charles’s decision to wait in the end proved crucial, as it forced the Umayyads to rush uphill, against the grade and the woods, which in and of themselves negated a large part of the natural advantages of a cavalry charge.

Charles had been preparing for this confrontation since Toulouse a decade before. He was well aware that if he failed, no other Christian force remained able to defend western Christianity. But Gibbon believes, as do most pre and modern historians, that Charles had made the best of a bad situation. Though outnumbered and depending on infantry, without heavy cavalry, Charles had a tough, battle-hardened heavy infantry who believed in him implicitly. Morever, as Davis points out, this infantry was heavily armed, each man carrying up to perhaps 75 pounds of wood and iron armour into battle. Formed in a phalanx, they were better able to resist a cavalry charge than might be conventionally thought, especially as Charles had been able to secure them the high ground and trees to further aid breaking such charges. Charles also had the element of surprise, in addition to being allowed to pick the ground. The Franks in their wolf and bear pelts were well dressed for the cold, and had the terrain advantage. The Arabs were not as prepared for the intense cold of an oncoming northern European winter, despite having tents, which the Franks did not, but did not want to attack a Frankish army they believed may have been numerically superior. Essentially, the Umayyads wanted the Franks to come out in the open, while the Franks, formed in a tightly packed defensive formation, wanted them to come uphill, into the trees, diminishing at once the advantages of their cavalry. It was a waiting game which Charles won: the fight began on the seventh day, as ‘Abd-al-Ra?man did not want to postpone the battle indefinitely with winter approaching. Engagement ‘Abd-al-Ra?man trusted the tactical superiority of his cavalry, and had them charge repeatedly. This time the faith the Umayyads had in their cavalry, armed with their long lances and swords which had brought them victory in previous battles, was not justified. In one of the instances where medieval infantry stood up against cavalry charges, the disciplined Frankish soldiers withstood the assaults, though according to Arab sources, the Arab cavalry several times broke into the interior of the Frankish square. «The Muslim horsemen dashed fierce and frequent forward against the battalions of the Franks, who resisted manfully, and many fell dead on either side.» Despite this, the Franks did not break. It appears that the years of year-round training that Charles had bought with Church funds, paid off. His hard-trained soldiery accomplished what was not thought possible at that time: infantry withstood the Umayyad heavy cavalry. Paul Davis says the core of Charles’s army was a professional infantry which was both highly disciplined and well motivated, «having campaigned with him all over Europe,» buttressed by levies that Charles basically used to raid and disrupt his enemy, and gather food for his infantry. The Mozarabic Chronicle of 754 says:
«And in the shock of the battle the men of the North seemed like a sea that cannot be moved. Firmly they stood, one close to another, forming as it were a bulwark of ice; and with great blows of their swords they hewed down the Arabs. Drawn up in a band around their chief, the people of the Austrasians carried all before them. Their tireless hands drove their swords down to the breasts of the foe.»

The battle turns Those Umayyad troops who had broken into the square had tried to kill Charles, but his liege men surrounded him and would not be broken. The battle was still in flux when Frankish histories claim that a rumour went through the Umayyad army that Frankish scouts threatened the booty that they had taken from Bordeaux. Some of the Umayyad troops at once broke off the battle and returned to camp to secure their loot. According

to Muslim accounts of the battle, in the midst of the fighting on the second day (Frankish accounts have the battle lasting one day only), scouts from the Franks sent by Charles began to raid the camp and supply train (including slaves and other plunder). Charles supposedly had sent scouts to cause chaos in the Umayyad base camp, and free as many of the slaves as possible, hoping to draw off part of his foe. This succeeded, as many of the Umayyad cavalry returned to their camp. To the rest of the Muslim army, this appeared to be a full-scale retreat, and soon it became one. Both Western and Muslim histories agree that while trying to stop the retreat, ‘Abd-al-Ra?man became surrounded, which led to his death, and the Umayyad troops then withdrew altogether to their camp. «All the host fled before the enemy», candidly wrote one Arabic source, «and many died in the flight». The Franks resumed their phalanx, and rested in place through the night, believing the battle would resume at dawn the following morning. Following day The next day, when the Umayyad forces did not renew the battle, the Franks feared an ambush. Charles at first believed that the Umayyad forces were trying to lure him down the hill and into the open. This tactic he knew he had to resist at all costs; he had in fact disciplined his troops for years to under no circumstances break formation and come out in the open. (See the Battle of Hastings for the results of infantry being lured into the open by armoured cavalry.) Only after extensive reconnaissance of the Umayyad camp by Frankish soldiers — which by both historical accounts had been so hastily abandoned that even the tents remained, as the Umayyad forces headed back to Iberia with what loot remained that they could carry — was it discovered that the Muslims had retreated during the night. Given the disparity between the armies, in that the Franks were mostly infantry, against Berber cavalry and armoured or mailed Arab horsemen (the Berbers were less heavily protected), Charles Martel fought a brilliant defensive battle. In a place and time of his choosing, he met a far superior force, and defeated it. Contemporary accounts The Mozarabic Chronicle of 754 «describes the battle in greater detail than any other Latin or Arabic source». It says of the encounter that, While Abd ar-Rahman was pursuing Eudes, he decided to despoil Tours by destroying its palaces and burning its churches. There he confronted the consul of Austrasia by the name of Charles, a man who, having proved himself to be a warrior from his youth and an expert in things military, had been summoned by Eudes. After each side had tormented the other with raids for almost seven days, they finally prepared their battle lines and fought fiercely. The northern peoples remained as immobile as a wall, holding together like a glacier in the cold regions. In the blink of an eye, they annihilated the Arabs with the sword. The people of Austrasia, greater in number of soldiers and formidably armed, killed the king, Abd ar-Rahman, when they found him, striking him on the chest. But suddenly, within sight of the countless tents of the Arabs, the Franks despicably sheathed their swords postponing the fight until the next day since night had fallen during the battle. Rising from their own camp at dawn, the Europeans saw the tents and canopies of the Arabs all arranged just as they had appeared the day before. Not knowing that they were empty and thinking that inside them there were Saracen forces ready for battle, they sent officers to reconnoitre and discovered that all the Ishmaelite troops had left. They had indeed fled silently by night in tight formation, returning to their own country.

Wolf (trans), Chronicle of 754, p. 145 Charles Martel’s family composed, for the fourth book of the Continuations of Fredegar’s Chronicle, a stylised summary of the battle: Prince Charles boldly drew up his battle lines against them [the Arabs] and the warrior rushed in against them. With Christ’s help he overturned their tents, and hastened to battle to grind them small in slaughter. The king Abdirama having been killed, he destroyed [them], driving forth the army, he fought and won. Thus did the victor triumph over his enemies. Fouracre,Continuations of Fredegar, p. 149 This source details further that «he (Charles Martel) came down upon them like a great man of battle». It goes on to say Charles «scattered them like the stubble». The references to «rushing in» and «overturning their tents» may allude to the phraseology of the Book of Numbers, chapter 24, «where the Spirit of God ‘rushed in’ to the tents of Israel.» The Latin word used for «warrior», belligerator, «is also biblical, from the Book of Maccabees, chapters 15 and 16, which describe huge battles.

It is thought that Bede’s Historiam Ecclesiasticam Gentis Anglorum (Chapter XXIII) includes a reference to the Battle of Poitiers: «…a dreadful plague of Saracens ravaged France with miserable slaughter, but they not long after in that country received the punishment due to their wickedness». Strategic analysis ‘Abd-al-Ra?man was a good general and should have done two things he failed to do. Gibbon makes the point that he did not move at once against Charles Martel, was surprised by him at Tours as Charles had marched over the mountains avoiding the roads to surprise the Muslim invaders, and thus the wily Charles selected the time and place they would collide:
— ‘Abd-al-Ra?man either assumed that the Franks would not come to the aid of their Aquitanian rivals, or did not care, and he thus failed to assess their strength before invasion. — He failed to scout the movements of the Frankish army, and Charles Martel.

Having done either, he would have curtailed his lighthorse ravaging throughout lower Gaul, and marched at once with his full power against the Franks. This strategy would have nullified every advantage Charles had at Tours:
The invaders would have not been burdened with booty that played such a huge role in the battle. They would have not lost one warrior in the battles they fought before Tours. (Though they lost relatively few men in overrunning Aquitaine, they suffered some casualties, losses that may have been pivotal at Tours). They would have bypassed weaker opponents such as Eudes, whom they could have picked off at will later, while moving at once to force battle with the real power in Europe, and at least partially picked the battlefield.

While some military historians point out that leaving enemies in your rear is not generally wise, the Mongols proved that indirect attack, and bypassing weaker foes to eliminate the strongest first, is a devastatingly effective mode of invasion. In this case, those enemies were virtually no danger, given the ease with which the Muslims destroyed them. The real danger was Charles, and the failure to scout Gaul adequately was disastrous. According to Creasy, the Muslims’ best strategic choice would have been to simply decline battle, depart with their loot, garrisoning the captured towns in southern Gaul, and return when they could force Charles to a battleground more to their liking, one that maximised the huge advantage they had in their mailed and armoured horsemen. It might have been different, however, had the Muslim forces remained under control. Both western and Muslim histories agree the battle was hard fought, and that the Umayyad heavy cavalry had broken into the square, but agreed that the Franks were in formation still strongly resisting. Charles could not afford to stand idly by while Frankish territories were threatened. He would have to face the Umayyad armies sooner or later, and his men were enraged by the utter devastation of the Aquitanians and wanted to fight. But Sir Edward Creasy noted that:
when we remember that Charles had no standing army, and the independent spirit of the Frank warriors who followed his standard, it seems most probable that it was not in his power to adopt the cautious policy of watching the invaders, and wearing out their strength by delay. So dreadful and so widespread were the ravages of the Saracenic light cavalry throughout Gaul, that it must have been impossible to restrain for any length of time the indignant ardor of the Franks. And, even, if Charles could have persuaded his men to look tamely on while the Arabs stormed more towns and desolated more districts, he could not have kept an army together when the usual period of a military expedition had expired.

Both Hallam and Watson argue that had Charles failed, there was no remaining force to protect Western Europe. Hallam perhaps said it best: «It may justly be reckoned among those few battles of which a contrary event would have essentially varied the drama of the world in all its subsequent scenes: with Marathon, Arbela, the Metaurus, Chalons and Leipzig.» Strategically, and tactically, Charles probably made the best decision he could in waiting until his enemies least expected him to intervene, and then marching by stealth to catch them by surprise at a battlefield of his choosing. Probably he and his own men did not realise the seriousness of the battle they had fought, as Matthew Bennett and his coauthors, in Fighting Techniques of the Medieval World (2005) says: «few battles are remembered 1,000 years after they are fought […] but the Battle of Tours is an exception […] Charles Martel turned back a Muslim raid that had it been allowed to continue, might have conquered Gaul.» Aftermath Umayyad retreat and second invasion The Umayyad army retreated south over the Pyrenees. Charles continued to drive the Umayyad forces from France in subsequent years. After the death (c. 735) of Eudes, who had reluctantly acknowledged Charles’ suzerainty in 719, Charles wished to unite Eudes’s Duchy to himself, and went there to elicit the proper homage of the Aquitainians. But the nobility proclaimed Hunold, Eudes’ son, as the Duke, and Charles recognised his

legitimacy when the Umayyads entered Provence as part of an alliance with Duke Maurontus the next year. Hunold, who originally resisted acknowledging Charles as overlord, soon had little choice. He acknowledged Charles at once as his overlord, and Charles confirmed his Duchy, and the two prepared to confront the invaders. Charles believed it was vital to confine the Umayyad forces to Iberia and deny them any foothold in Gaul, a view many historians share. Therefore he marched at once against the invaders, defeating one army outside Arles, which he took by storm and razed the city, and defeated the primary invasion force at the Battle of the River Berre, outside Narbonne. Advance to Narbonne Despite this, the Umayyads remained in control of Narbonne and Septimania for another 27 years, though they could not expand further. The treaties reached earlier with the local population stood firm and were further consolidated in 734 when the governor of Narbonne, Yusuf ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Fihri, concluded agreements with several towns on common defence arrangements against the encroachments of Charles Martel, who had systematically brought the south to heel as he extended his domains. He destroyed Umayyad armies and fortresses at the Battle of Avignon and the Battle of Nimes. The army attempting to relieve Narbonne met him in open battle at the Battle of the River Berre and was destroyed, but Charles failed in his attempt to take Narbonne by siege in 737, when the city was jointly defended by its Muslim Arab and Berber, and its Christian Visigothic citizens. Carolingian dynasty Reluctant to tie down his army for a siege that could last years, and believing he could not afford the losses of an all-out frontal assault such as he had used at Arles, Charles was content to isolate the few remaining invaders in Narbonne and Septimania. The threat of invasion was diminished after the Umayyad defeat at Narbonne, and the unified Caliphate would collapse into civil war in 750 at the Battle of the Zab. It was left to Charles’ son, Pippin the Short, to force Narbonne’s surrender in 759, thus bringing Narbonne into the Frankish domains. The Umayyad dynasty was expelled, driven back to Al-Andalus where Abd ar-Rahman I established an emirate in Cordoba in opposition to the Abbasid Caliph in Baghdad. The threat posed by the Arab heavy cavalry also receded as the Christians copied the Arab model in developing similar forces of their own, giving rise to the familiar figure of the western European medieval armoured knight. Charles’s grandson, Charlemagne, became the first Christian ruler to begin what would be called the Reconquista from Europe. In the northeast of Spain the Frankish emperors established the Marca Hispanica across the Pyrenees in part of what today is Catalonia, reconquering Girona in 785 and Barcelona in 801. This formed a buffer zone against Muslim lands across the Pyrenees. Historian J.M. Roberts said in 1993 of the Carolingian Dynasty:
«It produced Charles Martel, the soldier who turned the Arabs back at Tours, and the supporter of Saint Boniface the Evangeliser of Germany. This is a considerable double mark to have left on the history of Europe.»

The last Umayyad invasions of Gaul

In 735, the new governor of al-Andalus again invaded Gaul. Antonio Santosuosso and other historians detail how the new governor of Al-Andalus, ‘Uqba b. Al-Hajjaj, again moved into France to avenge the defeat at Poitiers and to spread Islam. Santosuosso notes that ‘Uqba b. Al-Hajjaj converted about 2,000 Christians he captured over his career. In the last major attempt at forcible invasion of Gaul through Iberia, a sizable invasion force was assembled at Saragossa and entered what is now French territory in 735, crossed the River Rhone and captured and looted Arles. From there, he struck into the heart of Provence, ending with the capture of Avignon, despite strong resistance. Uqba b. Al-Hajjaj’s forces remained in French territory for about four years, carrying raids to Lyons, Burgundy, and Piedmont. Again Charles Martel came to the rescue, reconquering most of the lost territories in two campaigns in 736 and 739, except for the city of Narbonne, which finally fell in 759. Alessandro Santosuosso strongly argues that the second (Umayyad) expedition was probably more dangerous than the first. The second expedition’s failure put an end to any serious Muslim expedition across the Pyrenees, although raids continued. Plans for further large-scale attempts were hindered by internal turmoil in the Umayyad lands which often made enemies out of their own kind. Historical and macrohistorical views The historical views of this battle fall into three great phases, both in the East and especially in the West. Western historians, beginning with the Mozarabic Chronicle of 754, stressed the macrohistorical impact of the battle, as did the Continuations of Fredegar. This became a claim that Charles had literally saved Christianity, as Gibbon and his generation of historians agreed that the Battle of Tours was unquestionably decisive in world history. Modern historians have essentially fallen into two camps on the issue. The first camp essentially agrees with Gibbon, and the other argues that the Battle has been massively overstated, turned from a raid in force to an invasion, and from a mere annoyance to the Caliph to a shattering defeat that helped end the Islamic Expansion Era. It is essential however, to note that within the first group, those who agree the Battle was of macrohistorical importance, there are a number of historians who take a more moderate and nuanced approach to supporting the battle’s importance, rather than the more dramatic rhetoric of Gibbon. The best example of this school is William E. Watson, who does believe the battle has such importance, as will be specifically discussed below, but analyzes it militarily, culturally and politically, rather than seeing it as a classic «Muslim versus Christian» confrontation. In the East, Arab histories followed a similar path. First, the battle was regarded as a disastrous defeat, then it faded essentially from Arab histories, leading to a modern dispute which regards it as either a secondary loss to the great defeat of the Second Siege of Constantinople or a part of a series of great macrohistorical defeats which together brought about the fall of the first Caliphate. Essentially, many modern Muslim scholars argue that the first Caliphate was a jihadist state which could not withstand an end to its constant expansion. With the Byzantines and Franks both successfully blocking further expansion, internal social troubles came to a head, starting with the Great Berber Revolt of 740, and ending with the Battle of the Zab, and the destruction of the Umayyad Caliphate.

In Western history

The first wave of real «modern» historians, especially scholars on Rome and the medieval period, such as Edward Gibbon, contended that had Charles fallen, the Umayyad Caliphate would have easily conquered a divided Europe. Gibbon famously observed:
A victorious line of march had been prolonged above a thousand miles from the rock of Gibraltar to the banks of the Loire; the repetition of an equal space would have carried the Saracens to the confines of Poland and the Highlands of Scotland; the Rhine is not more impassable than the Nile or Euphrates, and the Arabian fleet might have sailed without a naval combat into the mouth of the Thames. Perhaps the interpretation of the Koran would now be taught in the schools of Oxford, and her pulpits might demonstrate to a circumcised people the sanctity and truth of the revelation of Mahomet.

Nor was Gibbon alone in lavishing praise on Charles as the savior of Christiandom and western civilisation. H.G. Wells in his A Short History of the World said in Chapter XLV «The Development of Latin Christendom:»
The Moslim when they crossed the Pyrenees in 720 found this Frankish kingdom under the practical rule of Charles Martel, the Mayor of the Palace of a degenerate descendant of Clovis, and experienced the decisive defeat of Poitiers (732) at his hands. This Charles Martel was practically overlord of Europe north of the Alps from the Pyrenees to Hungary. He ruled over a multitude of subordinate lords speaking French-Latin, and High and Low German languages.

Gibbon was echoed a century later by the Belgian historian Godefroid Kurth, who wrote that the Battle of Poitiers «must ever remain one of the great events in the history of the world, as upon its issue depended whether Christian Civilisation should continue or Islam prevail throughout Europe.» German historians were especially ardent in their praise of Charles Martel; Schlegel speaks of this «mighty victory», and tells how «the arm of Charles Martel saved and delivered the Christian nations of the West from the deadly grasp of all-destroying Islam.» Creasy quotes Leopold von Ranke’s opinion that this period was:
One of the most important epochs in the history of the world, the commencement of the eighth century, when on the one side Mohammedanism threatened to overspread Italy and Gaul, and on the other the ancient idolatry of Saxony and Friesland once more forced its way across the Rhine. In this peril of Christian institutions, a youthful prince of Germanic race, Karl Martell, arose as their champion, maintained them with all the energy which the necessity for self-defence calls forth, and finally extended them into new regions.

The German military historian Hans Delbruck said of this battle «there was no more important battle in the history of the world.» (The Barbarian Invasions, page 441.) Had Charles Martel failed, Henry Hallam argued, there would have been no Charlemagne, no Holy Roman Empire or Papal States; all these depended upon Charles’s containment of Islam from expanding into Europe while the Caliphate was unified and able to mount such a conquest. Another great mid era historian, Thomas Arnold, ranked the victory of Charles Martel even higher than the victory of Arminius in its impact on all of modern history: «Charles Martel’s victory at Tours was among those signal deliverances which have affected for centuries the happiness of mankind.» Louis Gustave and Charles Strauss in Moslem and Frank; or, Charles Martel and the rescue of Europe said «The victory gained was decisive and final, The torrent of Arab conquest was rolled back and Europe was rescued from the threatened yoke of the Saracens.» (page 122)

Charles Oman, in his History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages, concludes that:
At Poitiers the Franks fought as they had done two hundred years before at Casilinum, in one solid mass, without breaking rank or attempting to maneuver. Their victory was won by the purely defensive tactics of the infantry square; the fanatical Arabs, dashing against them time after time, were shattered to pieces, and at last fled under shelter of night. But there was no pursuit, for Charles had determined not to allow his men to stir a step from the line to chase the broken foe. [I, 58]

Adolf Hitler says in Hitler’s Table Talk (August 28, 1942, midday):
Had Charles Martel not been victorious at Poitiers -already, you see, the world had already fallen into the hands of the Jews, so gutless a thing Christianity! -then we should in all probability have been converted to Mohammedanism, that cult which glorifies the heroism and which opens up the seventh Heaven to the bold warrior alone. Then the Germanic races would have conquered the world. Christianity alone prevented them from doing so.»

John H. Haaren says in Famous Men of the Middle Ages:
The battle of Tours, or Poitiers, as it should be called, is regarded as one of the decisive battles of the world. It decided that Christians, and not Moslems, should be the ruling power in Europe. Charles Martel is especially celebrated as the hero of this battle.” John Bagnell Bury, writing at the beginning of the 20th century, said «The Battle of Tours… has often been represented as an event of the first magnitude for the world’s history, because after this, the penetration of Islam into Europe was finally brought to a standstill.

But, as will be seen below, today’s historians are very clearly divided on the importance of the battle, and where it should rank in the signal moments of military history. In Muslim history Eastern historians, like their Western counterparts, have not always agreed on the importance of the battle. According to Bernard Lewis, «The Arab historians, if they mention this engagement [the Battle of Tours] at all, present it as a minor skirmish,» and Gustave von Grunebaum writes: «This setback may have been important from the European point of view, but for Muslims at the time, who saw no master plan imperilled thereby, it had no further significance.» Contemporary Arab and Muslim historians and chroniclers were much more interested in the second Umayyad siege of Constantinople in 718, which ended in a disastrous defeat. However, Creasy has claimed: «The enduring importance of the battle of Tours in the eyes of the Moslems is attested not only by the expressions of ‘the deadly battle’ and ‘the disgraceful overthrow’ which their writers constantly employ when referring to it, but also by the fact that no more serious attempts at conquest beyond the Pyrenees were made by the Saracens.» Thirteenth-century Moroccan author Ibn Idhari al-Marrakushi, mentioned the battle in his history of the Maghrib, «al-Bayan al-Mughrib fi Akhbar al-Maghrib.» According to Ibn Idhari, «Abd ar-Rahman and many of his men found martyrdom on the balat ashShuhada’i («the path of the martyrs).» Antonio Santosuosso points out in his book Barbarians, Marauders and Infidels: The Ways of Medieval Warfare, on p. 126 «they (the Muslims) called the battle’s location, the road between Poitiers and Tours, «the pavement

of Martyrs.» However, as Henry Coppee has explained, «The same name was given to the battle of Toulouse and is applied to many other fields on which the Moslemah were defeated: they were always martyrs for the faith» Khalid Yahya Blankinship has argued that the military defeat at Tours was amongst one of the failures that contributed to the decline of the Umayyad caliphate: «Stretching from Morocco to China, the Umayyad caliphate based its expansion and success on the doctrine of jihad—armed struggle to claim the whole earth for God’s rule, a struggle that had brought much material success for a century but suddenly ground to a halt followed by the collapse of the ruling Umayyad dynasty in 750 AD. The End of the Jihad State demonstrates for the first time that the cause of this collapse came not just from internal conflict, as has been claimed, but from a number of external and concurrent factors that exceeded the caliphate’s capacity to respond. These external factors began with crushing military defeats at Byzantium, Toulouse and Tours, which led to the Great Berber Revolt of 740 in Iberia and Northern Africa.» Current historical debate on macrohistorical impact of Battle of Tours Some modern historians argue that the Battle of Tours was of no great historical significance while others continue to contend that Charles Martel’s victory was important in European or even world history. Supporting the significance of Tours as a world-altering event William E. Watson, strongly supports Tours as a macrohistorical event, but distances himself from the rhetoric of Gibbons and Drubeck, writing, for example, of the battle’s importance in Frankish, and world, history in 1993:
There is clearly some justification for ranking Tours-Poitiers among the most significant events in Frankish history when one considers the result of the battle in light of the remarkable record of the successful establishment by Muslims of Islamic political and cultural dominance along the entire eastern and southern rim of the former Christian, Roman world. The rapid Muslim conquest of Palestine, Syria, Egypt and the North African coast all the way to Morocco in the seventh century resulted in the permanent imposition by force of Islamic culture onto a previously Christian and largely non-Arab base. The Visigothic kingdom fell to Muslim conquerors in a single battle on the Rio Barbate in 711, and the Hispanic Christian population took seven long centuries to regain control of the Iberian peninsula. The Reconquista, of course, was completed in 1492, only months before Columbus received official backing for his fateful voyage across the Atlantic Ocean. Had Charles Martel suffered at Tours-Poitiers the fate of King Roderick at the Rio Barbate, it is doubtful that a «do-nothing» sovereign of the Merovingian realm could have later succeeded where his talented major domus had failed. Indeed, as Charles was the progenitor of the Carolingian line of Frankish rulers and grandfather of Charlemagne, one can even say with a degree of certainty that the subsequent history of the West would have proceeded along vastly different currents had ‘Abd ar-Rahman been victorious at Tours-Poitiers in 732.

Watson adds, «After examining the motives for the Muslim drive north of the Pyrenees, one can attach a macrohistorical significance to the encounter between the Franks and Andalusi Muslims at Tours-Poitiers, especially when one considers the attention paid to the Franks in Arabic literature and the successful expansion of Muslims elsewhere in the medieval period.» Victorian writer John Henry Haaren says in Famous Men of the Middle Ages, «The battle of Tours, or Poitiers, as it should be called, is regarded as one of the decisive battles of the world. It decided that Christians, and not Moslems, should be the ruling power in Europe.» Bernard Grun delivers this assessment in his «Timetables of History,» reissued in

2004: «In 732 Charles Martel’s victory over the Arabs at the Battle of Tours stems the tide of their westward advance.” Historian and humanist Michael Grant lists the battle of Tours in the macrohistorical dates of the Roman era. Historian Norman Cantor who specialised in the medieval period, teaching and writing at Columbia and New York University, says in 1993: «It may be true that the Arabs had now fully extended their resources and they would not have conquered France, but their defeat (at Tours) in 732 put a stop to their advance to the north.» Military historian Robert W. Martin considers Tours «one of the most decisive battles in all of history.» Additionally, historian Hugh Kennedy says «it was clearly significant in establishing the power of Charles Martel and the Carolingians in France, but it also had profound consequences in Muslim Spain. It signaled the end of the ghanima (booty) economy.» Military Historian Paul Davis argued in 1999, «had the Muslims been victorious at Tours, it is difficult to suppose what population in Europe could have organised to resist them.» Likewise, George Bruce in his update of Harbottle’s classic military history Dictionary of Battles maintains that «Charles Martel defeated the Moslem army effectively ending Moslem attempts to conquer western Europe.» Antonio Santosuosso puts forth an interesting modern opinion on Charles, Tours, and the subsequent campaigns against Rahman’s son in 736-737. Santosuosso presents a compelling case that these later defeats of invading Muslim armies were at least as important as Tours in their defence of Western Christendom and the preservation of Western monasticism, the monasteries of which were the centers of learning which ultimately led Europe out of her Middle Ages. He also makes a compelling argument, after studying the Arab histories of the period, that these were clearly armies of invasion, sent by the Caliph not just to avenge Tours, but to begin the conquest of Christian Europe and bring it into the Caliphate. Objecting to the significance of Tours as a world-altering event Other historians disagree with this assessment. Alessandro Barbero writes, «Today, historians tend to play down the significance of the battle of Poitiers, pointing out that the purpose of the Arab force defeated by Charles Martel was not to conquer the Frankish kingdom, but simply to pillage the wealthy monastery of St-Martin of Tours». Similarly, Tomaz Mastnak writes:
Modern historians have constructed a myth presenting this victory as having saved Christian Europe from the Muslims. Edward Gibbon, for example, called Charles Martel the savior of Christendom and the battle near Poitiers an encounter that changed the history of the world… This myth has survived well into our own times… Contemporaries of the battle, however, did not overstate its significance. The continuators of Fredegar’s chronicle, who probably wrote in the mid-eighth century, pictured the battle as just one of many military encounters between Christians and Saracens — moreover, as only one in a series of wars fought by Frankish princes for booty and territory… One of Fredegar’s continuators presented the battle of Poitiers as what it really was: an episode in the struggle between Christian princes as the Carolingians strove to bring Aquitaine under their rule.

The Christian Lebanese-American historian Philip Hitti believes that «In reality nothing was decided on the battlefield of Tours. The Moslem wave, already a thousand miles from its starting point in Gibraltar — to say nothing about its base in al-Qayrawan — had already spent itself and reached a natural limit.»

The view that the battle has no great significance is perhaps best summarised by Franco Cardini says in Europe and Islam:
Although prudence needs to be exercised in minimising or ‘demythologising’ the significance of the event, it is no longer thought by anyone to have been crucial. The ‘myth’ of that particular military engagement survives today as a media cliche, than which nothing is harder to eradicate. It is well known how the propaganda put about by the Franks and the papacy glorified the victory that took place on the road between Tours and Poitiers…

In their introduction to The Reader’s Companion to Military History Robert Cowley and Geoffrey Parker summarise this side of the modern view of the Battle of Tours by saying “The study of military history has undergone drastic changes in recent years. The old drums-and-bugles approach will no longer do. Factors such as economics, logistics, intelligence, and technology receive the attention once accorded solely to battles and campaigns and casualty counts. Words like «strategy» and «operations» have acquired meanings that might not have been recognizable a generation ago. Changing attitudes and new research have altered our views of what once seemed to matter most. For example, several of the battles that Edward Shepherd Creasy listed in his famous 1851 book The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World rate hardly a mention here, and the confrontation between Muslims and Christians at Poitiers-Tours in 732, once considered a watershed event, has been downgraded to a raid in force.» Conclusion A number of modern historians and writers in other fields agree with Watson, and continue to maintain that this Battle was one of history’s pivotal events. Professor of religion Huston Smith says in The World’s Religions: Our Great Wisdom Traditions «But for their defeat by Charles Martel in the Battle of Tours in 733, the entire Western world might today be Muslim.» Historian Robert Payne on page 142 in «The History of Islam» said «The more powerful Muslims and the spread of Islam were knocking on Europe’s door. And the spread of Islam was stopped along the road between the towns of Tours and Poitiers, France, with just its head in Europe.» Popular conservative military historian Victor Davis Hanson shares his view about the battle’s macrohistorical placement:
Recent scholars have suggested Poitiers, so poorly recorded in contemporary sources, was a mere raid and thus a construct of western mythmaking or that a Muslim victory might have been preferable to continued Frankish dominance. What is clear is that Poitiers marked a general continuance of the successful defence of Europe, (from the Muslims). Flush from the victory at Tours, Charles Martel went on to clear southern France from Islamic attackers for decades, unify the warring kingdoms into the foundations of the Carolingian Empire, and ensure ready and reliable troops from local estates.»

Paul Davis, another modern historian who addresses both sides in the debate over whether or not this Battle truly determined the direction of history, as Watson claims, or merely was a relatively minor raid, as Cardini writes, says «whether Charles Martel saved Europe for Christianity is a matter of some debate. What is sure, however, is that his victory ensured that the Franks would dominate Gaul for more than a century.»

1.21 Battle of Vienna – Second Islamic wave – Year 1683

The Battle of Vienna, Turkish: Ikinci Viyana Kusatmas?), took place on 11 and 12 September, 1683 after Vienna had been besieged by the Ottoman Empire for two months. The battle broke the advance of the Ottoman Empire into Europe, and marked the political hegemony of the Habsburg dynasty in Central Europe. The large-scale battle was won by Polish-Austrian-German forces led by King of Poland John III Sobieski against the Ottoman Empire army commanded by Grand Vizier Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Pasha. The siege itself began on 14 July 1683, by the Ottoman Empire army of approximately 90,000 men. The sieging force was composed by 60 ortas of Jannisaries (12,000 men paper strength) with an observation army of c.70,000 men watching the countryside. The decisive battle took place on 12 September, after the united relief army of 84,450 men had arrived, pitted against the Ottoman army. The battle marked the turning point in the 300-year struggle between the forces of the Central European kingdoms and the Ottoman Empire. Over the sixteen years following the battle, the Habsburgs of Austria gradually occupied and dominated southern Hungary and Transylvania, which had been largely cleared of the Turkish forces. The capture of the city of Vienna had long been a strategic aspiration of the Ottoman Empire, due to its inter-locking control over Danubean (Black Sea-to-Western Europe) southern Europe, and the overland (Eastern Mediterranean-to-Germany) trade routes. During the years preceding the second siege (the first one was in 1529), under the auspices of grand viziers from the influential Koprulu family, the Ottoman Empire undertook extensive logistical preparations this time, including the repair and establishment of roads and bridges leading into Austria and logistical centers, as well as the forwarding of ammunition, cannon and other resources from all over the Empire to these logistical centers and into the Balkans. On the political front, the Ottoman Empire had been providing military assistance to the Hungarians and to non-Catholic minorities in Habsburg-occupied portions of Hungary.

There, in the years preceding the siege, widespread unrest had become open rebellion upon Leopold I’s pursuit of Counter-Reformation principles and his desire to crush Protestantism. In 1681, Protestants and other anti-Habsburg Kuruc forces, led by Imre Thokoly, were reinforced with a significant force from the Ottomans, who recognised Imre as King of «Upper Hungary» (eastern Slovakia and parts of northeastern presentday Hungary, which he had earlier taken by force of arms from the Habsburgs). This support went so far as explicitly promising the «Kingdom of Vienna» to the Hungarians if it fell into Ottoman hands. Yet, before the siege, a state of peace had existed for twenty years between the Habsburgs and the Ottoman Empire, as a result of the Peace of Vasvar. In 1681 and 1682, clashes between the forces of Imre Thokoly and the Habsburgs’ military frontier (which was then northern Hungary) forces intensified, and the incursions of Habsburg forces into Central Hungary provided the crucial argument of Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa Pasha in convincing the Sultan, Mehmet IV and his Divan, to allow the movement of the Ottoman Army. Mehmet IV authorised Kara Mustafa Pasha to operate as far as Gyor and Komarom castles, both in northwestern Hungary, and to besiege them. The Ottoman Army was mobilised on January 21, 1682, and war was declared on August 6, 1682. The logistics of the time meant that it would have been risky or impossible to launch an invasion in August or September 1682 (a three month campaign would have got the Turks to Vienna just as winter set in). However this 15 month gap between mobilisation and the launch of a full-scale invasion allowed ample time for the Habsburg forces to prepare their defence and set up alliances with other Central European rulers, and undoubtedly contributed to the failure of the campaign. It proved most decisive that the Habsburgs and Poland concluded a treaty during this winter in which Leopold would support Sobieski if the Turks attacked Krakow; in return, the Polish Army would come to the relief of Vienna, if attacked. On March 31, 1683 another declaration, sent by Kara Mustafa on behalf of Mehmet IV, arrived at the Imperial Court in Vienna. On the next day the forward march of Ottoman army elements began from Edirne in Thracia. The troops reached Belgrade by early May, then moved toward the city of Vienna. About 40,000 Crimean Tatar forces arrived 40km east of Vienna on 7 July, twice as many as the Austrian forces in that area. After initial fights, Leopold retreated to Linz with 80,000 inhabitants of Vienna. The King of Poland prepared a relief expedition to Vienna during the summer of 1683, honouring his obligations to the treaty. He went so far as to leave his own nation virtually undefended when departing from Krakow on 15 August. Sobieski covered this with a stern warning to Imre Thokoly, the leader of Hungary, whom he threatened with destruction if he tried to take advantage of the situation — which Thokoly did. Events during the siege The main Turkish army finally invested Vienna on July 14. On the same day, Kara Mustafa sent the traditional demand for surrender to the city. Ernst Rudiger Graf von Starhemberg, leader of the remaining 11,000 troops and 5,000 citizens and volunteers with 370 cannons, refused to capitulate. Only days before, he had received news of the mass slaughter at Perchtoldsdorf, a town south of Vienna whose citizens had handed over the keys of the city after having been given a similar choice. The Viennese had demolished many of the houses around the city walls and cleared the debris, leaving an empty plain that would expose the Turks to defensive fire if they tried

to rush the city. Kara Mustafa Pasha solved that problem by ordering his forces to dig long lines of trenches directly toward the city, to help protect them from the defenders as they advanced steadily toward the city. Although the Turks had 300 good cannons, the fortifications of Vienna were very strong and up to date, and the Turks had to invent a more effective use for their gunpowder: mining. Tunnels were dug under the massive city walls to blow them up with explosives. The Ottomans had essentially two options to take the city: the first, an all-out assault, was virtually guaranteed success since they outnumbered the defenders almost 20-1. The second was to lay siege to the city, and this was the option they chose. This seems against military logic, but assaulting properly defended fortifications has always resulted in very heavy casualties for the attackers. A siege was a reasonable course of action to minimise casualties and capture the city intact, and in fact it nearly succeeded. What the Ottomans did not take into account however was that time was not on their side. Their lack of urgency at this point, combined with the delay in advancing their army after declaring war, eventually allowed a relief force to arrive. Historians have speculated that Kara Mustafa wanted to take the city intact for its riches, and declined an all-out attack in order to prevent the right of plunder which would accompany such an assault. The Ottoman siege cut virtually every means of food supply into Vienna, and the garrison and civilian volunteers suffered extreme casualties. Fatigue became such a problem that Graf Ernst Rudiger von Starhemberg ordered any soldier found asleep on watch to be shot. Increasingly desperate, the forces holding Vienna were on their last legs when in August, Imperial forces under Charles V, Duke of Lorraine beat Imre Thokoly of Hungary at Bisamberg, 5km northeast of Vienna. On 6 September, the Poles crossed the Danube 30km north west of Vienna at Tulln, to unite with the Imperial forces and additional troops from Saxony, Bavaria, Baden, Franconia and Swabia who had answered the call for a Holy League that was supported by Pope Innocent XI. Only Louis XIV of France, Habsburg’s rival, not only declined to help, but used the opportunity to attack cities in Alsace and other parts of southern Germany, as in the Thirty Years’ War decades earlier. During early September, the experienced 5,000 Turkish sappers repeatedly blew up large portions of the walls, the Burg bastion, the Lobel bastion and the Burg ravelin in between, creating gaps of about 12m in width. The Austrians tried to counter by digging their own tunnels, to intercept the depositing of large amounts of gunpowder in subterranean caverns. The Turks finally managed to occupy the Burg ravelin and the Nieder wall in that area on 8 September. Anticipating a breach in the city walls, the remaining Austrians prepared to fight in Vienna itself. Staging the battle The relief army had to act quickly to save the city from the Turks, and to prevent another long siege in which they might take it. Despite the international composition and the short time of only six days, an effective leadership structure was established, indisputably centered on the King of Poland and his heavy cavalry. The motivation was high, as this war was not as usual for the interests of kings, but for Christian faith. And, unlike the Crusades, the battleground was in the heart of Europe. Kara Mustafa Pasha, on the other hand, was less effective, despite having months of time to organise his forces, ensure their motivation and loyalty, and prepare for the expected

relief army attack. He had entrusted defence of the rear to the Khan of Crimea and his cavalry force, which numbered about 30 — 40,000. There are serious questions as to how much the Tatar forces participated in the final battle at Vienna. Their Khan felt humiliated by repeated snubs by Kara Mustafa. He reportedly refused to attack the Polish relief force as it crossed the mountains, where the Tatar light horse would have that advantage over the Polish heavy cavalry. Nor were they the only component of the Ottoman army to defy Mustafa openly or refuse assignments. This left vital bridges undefended and allowed passage of the combined Habsburg-Polish army, which arrived to relieve the siege. Critics of this account say that it was Kara Mustafa Pasha, and not the Crimean Khan, who was held responsible for the failure of the siege. Also, the Ottomans could not rely on their Wallachian and Moldavian allies. These peoples resented the Ottomans, who extracted heavy tributes from their countries. The Ottomans also intervened in the internal politics of these countries, seeking to replace their ruling princes with men who would be mere Turkish puppets. When George Ducas, Prince of Moldavia and Serban Cantacuzino, Prince of Wallachia learned of the Turkish plans, they tried to warn the Habsburgs. They also tried to avoid participating in the campaign, but the Ottomans insisted that they send troops. There are a great number of popular legends about the Wallachian and Moldavian forces in the siege. Almost invariably, these legends describe them loading their cannons with straw balls, so as to make no impact upon the walls of the besieged city. The Holy League forces arrived on the «Kahlen Berg» (bare hill) above Vienna, signaling their arrival with bonfires. In the early morning hours of 12 September, before the battle, a Mass was held for the King of Poland and his nobles. The battle The Turks lost at least 15,000 men dead and wounded in the fighting + at least 5,000 men captured and all cannons; compared to approximately 4,500 dead and wounded for the Habsburg-Polish forces. The loot that fell into the hands of the Holy League troops and the Viennese was as huge as their relief, as King Sobieski vividly described in a letter to his wife a few days after the battle:
«Ours are treasures unheard of … tents, sheep, cattle and no small number of camels … it is victory as nobody ever knew of, the enemy now completely ruined, everything lost for them. They must run for their sheer lives … Commander Starhemberg hugged and kissed me and called me his savior.”

This emotional expression of gratitude did not distract Starhemberg from ordering the immediate repair of Vienna’s severely damaged fortifications, guarding against a possible Turkish counter-strike. However, this proved unnecessary. The victory at Vienna set the stage for Prince Eugene of Savoy’s re-conquering of Hungary and (temporarily) some of the Balkan countries within the following years. Austria signed a peace treaty with the Ottoman Empire in 1697. Long before that, the Turks had disposed of their defeated commander. On 25 December 1683, Kara Mustafa Pasha was executed in Belgrade (in the approved manner, by strangulation with a silk rope pulled by several men on each end) by order of the commander of the Janissaries.

Significance Although no one realised it at the time, the battle shaped the outcome of the entire war as well. The Ottomans fought on for another 16 years, losing control of Hungary and Transylvania in the process, before finally giving up. The end of the conflict was finalised by the Treaty of Karlowitz. The battle marked the historic end of the expansion into Europe of the declining Ottoman Empire. The behaviour of Louis XIV of France also set the stage for centuries to come: Germanspeaking countries had to fight wars simultaneously in the West and the East. While German troops were fighting for the Holy League, Louis ruthlessly used the occasion, before and after the battle of Vienna, to annex territories in western Europe, such as Luxembourg, Alsace with Strasbourg, etc. Due to the ongoing war against the Turks, Austria could not support the interest of German allies in the West. The biography of Ezechiel du Mas, Comte de Melac illustrates the devastations of large parts of Southern Germany by France. In honour of Sobieski, the Austrians erected a church atop a hill of Kahlenberg, north of Vienna. The train route from Vienna to Warsaw is also named in Sobieski’s honour. The constellation Scutum Sobieskii (Sobieski’s Shield) was named to memorialise the battle. Because Sobieski had entrusted his kingdom to the protection of the Blessed Virgin (Our Lady of Czestochowa) before the battle, Pope Innocent XI commemorated his victory by extending the feast of the Holy Name of Mary, which until then had been celebrated solely in Spain and the Kingdom of Naples, to the universal Church; it is celebrated on September 12. The period of Polish-Austrian friendship did not last long, as Charles V of Lorraine began downplaying the role of John III Sobieski and his troops in the battle. Neither Sobieski nor the Commonwealth profited significantly from saving Austria; on the contrary, the battle of Vienna cleared the path towards the forming of the future Austrian Empire (1804 to 1867) and the destruction of the Commonwealth. In 1772 and 1795 the Habsburg Monarchy took part in the first and third partitions of Poland, which wiped the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth off the maps of Europe. In contrast, the Ottoman Empire never recognised the partitions and provided a safe haven for many Poles. Religious significance The feast of the Holy Name of Mary is celebrated on September 12 on the liturgical calendar of the Catholic Church in commemoration of the victory in this battle of Christian Europe over the Muslim forces of the Ottoman Empire. Before the battle King John had placed his troops under the protection of the Blessed Virgin Mary. After the battle Pope Innocent XI, wishing to honour Mary, extended the feast to the entire Church.

1.22 European Crusader heroes, champions, legends

The Twelfth Viking By Baron Bodissey At the Battle of Poitiers in 732, the Frankish king Charles Martel defeated the Saracens and pushed the forces of Islam back into the Iberian Peninsula. It was not until 1492 that the Moors were finally thrown out of Europe, but in the meantime the Islamic virus was contained in Spain and Portugal, and thus kept out of the heart of Western Europe. One of Charles Martel’s comrades-in-arms at Poitiers was a warrior of the North known as Ogier le Danois, later Holger Danske, or Holger the Dane. Although Holger was a historical figure, little is known of him, and most of the written material about him is drawn from legend. According to the chroniclers, Holger had previously done battle with the Franks over their incursions into Danish territory. But in 732 the menace of the Saracens forced him to set aside his differences with Charles Martel and journey southwards to fight side-by-side with the Frankish forces against the common enemy. At the end of his days, Holger, like King Arthur, retired to a secluded keep to enter a twilight sleep from which he will awake in the hour of his country’s need. The location most frequently cited for Holger’s rest is Kronborg castle at Helsingor (or “Elsinore”, per Shakespeare). Hans Christian Andersen has distilled the popular form of the ancient tale into one of his stories: Translation from Danish:
But the fairest sight of all is the old castle of Kronborg, and under it sits Holger Danske in the deep, dark cellar which no one enters; he is clad in iron and steel and rests his head on his stalwart arm; his long beard hangs down upon the marble table where it has become stuck fast; he sleeps and dreams, but in his dreams he sees everything that comes to pass in Denmark. Every Christmas Eve an angel of God comes to tell him that all he has dreamed is true, and that he may go to back to sleep again, for Denmark is not yet in any danger! but if it should ever come, then old Holger Danske will rouse himself, and the table will break apart as he pulls out his beard! Then he will come forth, and strike a blow that shall be heard throughout all the countries of the world.

Now, if even a trace of the blood of the Men of the North runs in your veins, or if you have lived long enough among them to have acquired some of their spirit, the hair on the back of your neck will rise when you read these words, and you will say, “Yes! This is the hero, the man who will defend us during the troubles that are surely coming.” Holger Danske has put me in mind of my favourite English poet, Ted Hughes.

Hughes was a Yorkshireman, and the blood of the Danes runs thick in the veins of Yorkshire. Especially in the North Riding — the closer one gets to Whitby, the more natural blond hair in evidence, and the more obvious the Danish place names. Ted Hughes wrote a number of poems that touched on the Men of the North, and I’ve collected some samples below. Warning to our Danish readers: this is modern poetic English! It may try your skills a bit, but your efforts will be rewarded. I made my way through the Holger story in Danish, so fair is fair; now it’s your turn. First sample:
The Warriors of the North Bringing their frozen swords, their salt-bleached eyes, their salt-bleached hair, The snow’s stupefied anvils in rows, Bringing their envy, The slow ships feelered Southward, snails over the steep sheen of the water-globe. Thawed at the red and black disgorging of abbeys, The bountiful, cleft casks, The fluttering bowels of the women of dead burghers, And the elaborate, patient gold of the Gaels. To no end But this timely expenditure of themselves, A cash-down, beforehand revenge, with extra, For the gruelling relapse and prolongueur of their blood Into the iron arteries of Calvin.

And another one:
Thistles Against the rubber tongues of cows and the hoeing hands of men Thistles spike the summer air And crackle open under a blue-black pressure. Every one a revengeful burst Of resurrection, a grasped fistful Of splintered weapons and Icelandic frost thrust up From the underground stain of a decayed Viking. They are like pale hair and the gutturals of dialects. Every one manages a plume of blood. Then they grow grey, like men. Mown down, it is a feud. Their sons appear, Stiff with weapons, fighting back over the same ground.

The third section of Ted Hughes’ “Gog” evokes Holger the most strongly. This is a deep, dark, and difficult poem, and parts of it are not suitable for family reading. It deals with the lifelong and ultimately futile efforts of Everyman to escape from the softness and

weakness of his mother and establish his own manhood without being sucked in and corrupted by the softness and weakness of his wife.

This is the opening stanza:
Gog (Part III) Out through the dark archway of earth, under the ancient lintel overwritten with roots, Out between the granite jambs, gallops the hooded horseman of iron. Out of the wound-gash in the earth, the horseman mounts, shaking his plumes clear of dark soil. Out of the blooddark womb, gallops bowed the horseman of iron, The blood-crossed Knight, the Holy Warrior, hooded with iron, the seraph of the bleak edge, Gallops along the world’s ridge in moonlight.

We all know about the Twelfth Imam, the super-bad Muslim guy at the bottom of the well in Persia. When Armageddon arrives, when Gog grapples with Magog and battle rages across the plain at Megiddo, the Twelfth Imam will awaken and lead the armies of Islam to their final victory, establishing the kingdom of Allah here on Earth. Forget the Twelfth Imam. We’ve got our own dude sitting on the bench. Call him the Twelfth Viking. He’s suited up, ready to join the contest as soon as he’s required. The Men of the North form the core of the Counterjihad. They are already in action, clearing the back alleys of Anbar Province, riding point in Kabul, and forming up in selforganised groups to defend our borders. As I’ve said before, it’s not race that’s the issue here, it’s culture. The culture of the Danes, the Norsemen, the English, and the Celts. The culture of the hardy and selfreliant Men of the North, always ready to defend their ancient liberties with a ferocity that their enemies can scarcely imagine. The culture of productive enterprise and armed self-determination that has spread to all corners of the globe. Holger Danske is the man who best represents us. He’ll be there in the hour of our greatest need. The Twelfth Viking — I can see his eyelids fluttering even now…
Source: http://gatesofvienna.blogspot.com/2006/12/twelfth-viking.html

European Odinist and Crusader heroes resisting and fighting Islamisation: France, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg Charles Martel: Hero and Protector of Europe, more specifically France and Benelux: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Martel

France Pope Urban II: French born Pope and Crusader hero on behalf of Europe and Christendom. Pope Urban II is a relatively unknown hero in France but he was one of the greatest Crusader heroes of all times. He was born Otho de Lagery (ca.1035 – 29 July 1099) in Lagery, County of Champagne, France. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pope_Urban_II Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania John III Sobieski: Crusader and Hero of Poland and the Baltics http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_III_Sobieski Britain — England Richard I of England (Richard the Lion Hearted/Lionheart): Crusader and Hero of England http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_I_of_England Serbia Stefan Lazar Hrebeljanovic: Crusader and Hero of the Serbs http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lazar_of_Serbia Serbia, Bulgaria, Macedonia Marko Kraljevic: Crusader and Hero of the Serbs, Bulgarians and Macedonians: http://markokraljevic.uzice.net/index.htm Spain, Portugal St. James the Moorslayer: Crusader and Hero of the Spaniards and Portuguese: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_the_Greater Spain Rodrigo Diaz de Vivar (El Cid Campeador): Crusader and Hero of the Spaniards: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/El_Cid_Campeador Denmark Holger Danske (Ogier the Dane): Mythical Odinist Hero of the Scandinavians http://gatesofvienna.blogspot.com/2006/12/twelfth-viking.html http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ogier_the_Dane Norway, Sweden, Iceland Sigurd the Crusader (Sigurd Jorsalfare/Sigurd I Magnusson): Sigurd I Magnusson is not a widely celebrated figure in Scandinavia and therefore a rather unknown hero. He was however the greatest and most important Crusader heroe in the region and participated

in the liberation of a few Christian cities in Spain and the Middle East from Muslim occupation. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sigurd_Jorsalfare http://omacl.org/Heimskringla/crusaders.html

Romania Vlad Tepes/Vlad III the Impaler: Crusader and Hero of the Romanians: Vlad the Impaler was a genius of psychological warfare. His legacy deserve to be studied in modern-days schools of PR, political sciences, military, social psychology etc . Like any other ruler, he had two enemies: internal disorder or treason and external Islamic agressors threatening his country. He managed to defeat his external enemies, using same level of cruelty like any other ruler of his times, but he was a real master of STAGING the cruelty to obtain maximum effect. He was the greatest master of imagology, hundreds of years before this science to be discovered and theorised. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vlad_III_Dracula Italy Lottario dei Conti di Segni (Pope Innocent III): Italian Pope and Crusader hero for Italy, Europe and Christendom. Pope Innocent III is not a widely celebrated figure in Italy and therefore a rather unknown hero. He was however one of the greatest and most important Crusader heroes of all times. He was born Lottario dei Conti di Segni in 1160 or 1161 — 16 July 1216 in Gavignano near Anagni in Italy. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pope_Innocent_III Christian Albania George Castriota (Skanderbeg) — Crusader and Hero of the Christian Albanians: http://www.heraldica.org/topics/national/albania.htm Often referred to under his Islamic name Skanderbeg by PC sources. Overview needed of national crusader heroes from the rest of the European nations.

1.23 Western vs. Islamic Science and Religion By Fjordman I’ve read quite a few books on the history of science. One of them is The Beginnings of Western Science by David C. Lindberg, who has also written the book Theories of vision – From al-Kindi to Kepler, which I will quote more extensively from later this fall when publishing a multipart essay on the history of optics. Lindberg is a good scholar and well worth reading, but has a few minor flaws. Chapter eight in the second edition of his book about the history of science is titled «Islamic science.» Mr. Lindberg is not alone in employing this term, but I am not

personally in favor of it. Nobody talks about «Buddhist science» or «Christian science,» so I so no reason why we should use the term «Islamic science,» either. It is misleading, since whatever existed of science in countries under Islamic rule relied heavily on contributions of non-Muslims and pre-Islamic knowledge. Some use the term «Arab science» instead, but this is hardly much better, since among those who were at least nominally Muslims, a disproportionate amount were Persians, not Arabs. Which term should we use, then? «Middle Eastern science» could be one possibility, as it puts emphasis on the region but not on the religion. I don’t think David C. Lindberg provides a full explanation of why the scientific tradition in the Islamic world stagnated, despite some promising beginnings. Those who want a better understanding of this can check out The Rise of Early Modern Science: Islam, China and the West by Toby E. Huff. This can be supplemented with the work of Edward Grant, for instance chapter eight «Relations between science and religion» in Science and Religion, 400 B.C. to A.D. 1550: From Aristotle to Copernicus. I will quote this book by Grant, and to a lesser extent Huff’s book, extensively in this essay, and will include page references to each quote so that others can use the material if they want to. By the end of eleventh century, Western Europeans were aware that both Muslims and Byzantines had access to philosophical and scientific texts that they did not have. After the capture of Toledo, Spain and Sicily from the Muslims in 1085 and 1091, respectively, a number of scholars translated Greek and Arabic texts, but tended to prefer the Greek ones because Greek was a related Indo-European language, which Arabic was not. A large number of the works which existed in Arabic were originally translations from Greek themselves, and it would obviously make more sense to copy directly from the Greek in Constantinople since a more precise rendering could be made, with fewer misinterpretations than from Arabic. The result was a major movement of translations from the twelfth century until the second half of the thirteenth century. Many works in optics, astronomy, medicine and mathematics were translated, but it was Aristotle’s work on natural philosophy that had the greatest impact. The two greatest translators from Greek to Latin were James of Venice (d. after AD 1147), the first major translator of Aristotle’s works from Greek to Latin, and the Flemish scholar William of Moerbeke (c. AD 1215-c. 1286), who was the last. According to Edward Grant, page 166:
«William of Moerbeke translated at least forty-eight treatises, including seven on mathematics and mechanics by Archimedes, translated for the first time into Latin (Grant 1974, 39-41; Minio-Paluello 1974, 436-438). His Aristotelian translations are truly impressive. He was the first to translate Aristotle’s biological works from Greek into Latin. In translating the rest of Aristotle’s natural philosophy, Moerbeke found it useful to revise, expand, and even complete some earlier translations, including revisions of at least three treatises previously translated by James of Venice. In addition, Moerbeke translated Greek commentaries on Aristotle’s works from late antiquity. Thus, he translated John Philoponus’ Commentary on the Soul, and Simplicius’ Commentary on the Heavens. One of the earliest beneficiaries of Moerbeke’s translations was Thomas Aquinas.»

Grant continues on page 167:
«With Moerbeke’s monumental contributions, all of Aristotle’s natural philosophy was available by the last quarter of the thirteenth century in translations from Greek and Arabic. Although many scientific works were translated from Arabic to Latin in the first half of the twelfth century by such translators as Plato of Tivoli, Adelard of Bath, Robert of Chester, Hermann of Carinthia, Dominicus Gundissalinus, Peter Alfonso, John of Seville, and others, the earliest translations of Aristotle’s works on natural philosophy appear to have occurred in Spain in the latter half of the twelfth century. By far the most prominent translator of Aristotle’s works on natural philosophy was Gerard of Cremona (c. A.D. 1114-1187), the

most prolific translator from Arabic to Latin of works on science, medicine, and natural philosophy.»

Gerard of Cremona and those associated with him translated dozens of works from Arabic to Latin, among them probably Alhazen’s book on Optics, which could not have been translated from Greek since it did not exist in Greek. It is thus true that there were translations from Arabic and that some of these did have some impact in Europe. It would be historically inaccurate to claim otherwise. But although this translation movement was significant, we should focus at least as much on how these different civilisations used this information. In this case, we are dealing with an example where three different civilisations, the Islamic world, the Christian East (the Byzantine Empire) and the Christian West had access to much of the same material, yet where the end results were quite different. I have read a lot about the history of mechanical clocks and eyeglasses, both of which were invented in Europe in the second half of the thirteenth century AD. These inventions had no counterparts in any other civilisation and were important for later scientific and technological advances, which often benefited from more accurate timekeeping. The creation of microscopes and telescopes was to some degree an extension of the invention of eyeglasses and the use of glass lenses. I cannot point out any significant piece of information that Europeans had access to at this time which Muslims didn’t also have access to. If anything, Middle Easterners had more knowledge at their disposal since they had regular contacts with the major Asian civilisations and could supplement Greek natural philosophy with Indian and Chinese inventions. Europeans were prevented from having extensive direct contacts with these civilisations because they were geographically isolated from them by a large bloc of hostile Muslims. The only possible conclusion why Europeans invented mechanical clocks is that they were more efficient and creative than Muslims in using the body of information they had at their disposal. Muslims could have done the same, but they didn’t. They failed, pure and simple. The case of the Byzantine Empire is even more puzzling, as Byzantine scholars appear not to have taken advantage of the readily available treasure house of science and natural philosophy in their native Greek language. The Byzantine Empire was essentially a theocracy as the Emperor was regarded as the head of both church and state. According to Edward Grant in Science and Religion, page 228:
«[U]ntil the end of the sixth century, important contributions to natural philosophy were made in the Byzantine Empire by a number of commentators on the works of Aristotle, such as Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. 2nd-3rd century A.D.), Themistius (c. A.D. 317-c. 388), Simplicius, and most important of all, the Christian neo-Platonist John Philoponus, whose ideas were destined to have a large impact on both Islamic and Latin natural philosophy. But the level of achievement was seriously affected in A.D. 529, when, on religious grounds, the emperor Justinian ordered the closing of Plato’s Academy in Athens, forcing a number of philosophers to depart the Byzantine Empire and move to the East. After that natural philosophy and science played a minor role in Byzantine intellectual life. This is surprising when we realise that, as compared to their contemporary counterparts in Islam and the Latin West, Byzantine scholars were truly fortunate, because their native language was Greek. They could read, study, and interpret, without problems of translation, all the works available in the Greek language that had accumulated in the Byzantine Empire, especially in Constantinople, since the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. Indeed, most of our Greek manuscripts come from Byzantium.»

Alhazen, when he made his work on optics, relied heavily on Greek mathematics, philosophy and medicine, most of which had initially been translated to Arabic from

Byzantine manuscripts. Yet there was no Alhazen in Byzantium itself. Grant again, page 229:
«It is a paradox of history that the civilisations of Islam and Western Europe contributed significantly to the store of human knowledge, using translated works and often lacking important earlier texts, while the Byzantines, who had command of the Greek language and easy access to the manuscript sources of their great Greek predecessors, failed to capitalise on their good fortune.»

There were some brief Byzantine «renaissances.» The Empire wasn’t static and did an invaluable job in preserving older knowledge, but few works of lasting significance were produced there during the Middle Ages. I still believe that my conclusion in the online essay The Legacy of Byzantium[1], inspired by Timothy Gregory’s fascinating book A History of Byzantium, was largely correct: It is true that the Byzantine Empire has received some bad press. However, scholars James E. McClellan III and Harold Dorn sum up the established wisdom in their book Science and Technology in World History, second edition, when they state that ‘Byzantium never became a center of significant original science.’ It is surely one of history’s great ironies that the Greco-Roman knowledge that was preserved by the Byzantines had a greater impact in the West than it did in the Byzantine Empire itself. Although being for centuries at the front lines of Islamic Jihad certainly didn’t help, this doesn’t suffice to explain fully the failure of Byzantium to develop modern science. When studying the Byzantine Empire, one cannot help but notice that the separation of church and state which took place in the West after the papal revolution never happened there. Byzantium remained a somewhat autocratic state, thus in some ways resembling China – and perhaps later on Russia — more than Western Europe. The development of parliaments, autonomous cities and numerous universities that took place in the Christian West did not happen in the Christian East. However, also in the Islamic world, Greek logic and natural philosophy was never fully accepted, and what initial acceptance there had been was largely nullified by the extremely influential Muslim theologian al-Ghazali (1058-1111). Al-Ghazali regarded theology and natural philosophy as dangerous to the Islamic faith and was skeptical of the concept of mathematical proof. As Edward Grant says, page 238:
«[Al-Ghazali] included the mathematical sciences within the class of philosophical sciences (i.e., mathematics, logic, natural science, theology or metaphysics, politics, and ethics) and concluded that a student who studied these sciences would be ‘infected with the evil and corruption of the philosophers. Few there are who devote themselves to this study without being stripped of religion and having the bridle of godly fear removed from their heads’ (Watt 1953, 34). In his great philosophical work, The Incoherence of the Philosophers, alGhazali attacks ancient philosophy, especially the views of Aristotle. He does so by describing and criticising the ideas of al-Farabi and Avicenna, two of the most important Islamic philosophical commentators on Aristotle. After criticising their opinions on twenty philosophical problems, including the eternality of the world, that God knows only universals and not particulars, and that bodies will not be resurrected after death, alGhazali declares: ‘All these three theories are in violent opposition to Islam. To believe in them is to accuse the prophets of falsehood, and to consider their teachings as a hypocritical misrepresentation designed to appeal to the masses. And this is blatant blasphemy to which no Muslim sect would subscribe’ (al-Ghazali 1963, 249).»

As Ibn Warraq sums up in his modern classic Why I Am Not a Muslim, «orthodox Islam emerged victorious from the encounter with Greek philosophy. Islam rejected the idea that one could attain truth with unaided human reason and settled for the unreflective

comforts of the putatively superior truth of divine revelation. Wherever one decides to place the date of this victory of orthodox Islam (perhaps in the ninth century with the conversion of al-Ashari, or in the eleventh century with the works of al-Ghazali), it has been, I believe, an unmitigated disaster for all Muslims, indeed all mankind.» Al-Ghazali, whose influence cannot be overstated, was a highly orthodox Muslim on matters regarding the use of violence against non-Muslims. Here is al-Ghazali on the importance of Jihad against the unbelievers, as quoted by Robert Spencer in his excellent book Religion of Peace?: Why Christianity Is and Islam Isn’t:
«[O]ne must go on jihad [i.e., warlike razzias or raids] at least once a year…One may use a catapult against them [non-Muslims] when they are in a fortress, even if among them are women and children. One may set fire to them and/or drown them…If a person of the ahl al-kitab [People of the Book] is enslaved, his marriage is [automatically] revoked…One may cut down their trees…One must destroy their useless books. Jihadists may take as booty whatever they decide…They may steal as much food as they need.»

Another Muslim thinker, the thirteenth century North African Ibn Khaldun, had a traditional view of Jihad and shared the deep suspicion of philosophy. Edward Grant, page 242:
«Even so enlightened an author as Ibn Khaldun (A.D. 1332-1406) was hostile to philosophy and philosophers. On the basis of his great Introduction to History (Muqaddimah), Ibn Khaldun is regarded as the first historian to write a world history. According to Franz Rosenthal: ‘The Muqaddimah was indeed the first large-scale attempt to analyze the group relationships that govern human political and social organisation on the basis of environmental and psychological factors’ (Rosenthal 1973, 321). Despite his brilliance as an historian, Ibn Khaldun included a chapter in the Muqaddimah titled ‘A refutation of philosophy. The corruption of the students of philosophy’ (Ibn Khaldun 1958, 3:246-258). In this chapter, Ibn Khaldun condemns the opinions of philosophers as wrong and proclaims to his fellow Muslims that ‘the problems of physics are of no importance for us in our religious affairs or our livelihoods. Therefore, we must leave them alone’ (Ibn Khaldun 1958, 3:251-252). He regarded the study of logic as dangerous to the faithful unless they were deeply immersed in the Qur’an and the Muslim religious sciences to fortify themselves against its methods.»

In my online essay The West, Japan, and Cultural Secondarity[2], I discuss the ideas of French thinker Remi Brague as outlined in his book Eccentric Culture: A Theory of Western Civilisation. Brague claims that Muslims largely lacked the European instinct for self-criticism and appreciation of «the other.» They did translate works from Greek and other languages like Sanskrit and Persian, but they usually didn’t preserve the originals. This made «renaissances,» the act of going back to the sources to reinterpret them, impossible in the Islamic world. He quotes Ibn Khaldun as saying the following in the Muqaddimah:
«(The Muslims) desired to learn the sciences of the (foreign) nations. They made them their own through translations. They pressed them into the mold of their own views. They peeled off these strange tongues [and made them pass] into their [own] idiom, and surpassed the achievements of (the non-Arabs) in them. The manuscripts in the non-Arabic languages were forgotten, abandoned, and scattered. All the sciences came to exist in Arabic. The systematic works on them were written in (Arabic) writing. Thus, students of the sciences needed a knowledge of the meaning of (Arabic) words and (Arabic) writing. They could dispense with all other languages, because they had been wiped out and there was no longer any interest in them.»

Logic continued to be used as an ancillary subject in scholastic theology (kalam) and in many Islamic religious schools, but there was enough hostility toward philosophy to prompt philosophers to keep a low profile. Those who taught it often did so privately, not within the established institutions. Here is Edward Grant in Science and Religion, page 239:
«Following the translations in the early centuries of Islam, Greek philosophy, primarily Aristotle’s, received its strongest support from a number of individuals scattered about the Islamic world. As we have already mentioned, al-Kindi, al-Razi, Ibn Sina, and Ibn Rushd were among the greatest Islamic philosophers. All were persecuted to some extent. AlKindi’s case reveals important aspects of intellectual life in Islam. The first of the Islamic commentators on Aristotle, al-Kindi was at first favorably received by two caliphs (alMamun and al-Mutassim), but his luck ran out with al-Mutawwakil, the Sunni caliph mentioned earlier. According to Pervez Hoodbhoy, ‘It was not hard for the ulema [religious scholars] to convince the ruler that the philosopher had very dangerous beliefs. Mutawwakil soon ordered the confiscation of the scholar’s personal library….But that was not enough. The sixty-year-old Muslim philosopher also received fifty lashes before a large crowd which had assembled. Observers who recorded the event say the crowd roared approval with each stroke’ (Hoodbhoy 1991, 111). The other four scholars were also subjected to some degree of persecution, and a number of them had to flee for their safety.»

This situation was radically different in the Latin West. There was sporadic opposition to the use of reason and one attempt to ban the works of Aristotle at the University of Paris in the thirteenth century, but this was of brief duration and eventually failed. There were no later attempts to ban the use of logic and natural philosophy per se, although there could of course be criticism against specific interpretations. «After the 1240s and for the rest of the Middle Ages, attacks on reason would have been regarded as bizarre and unacceptable.» In contrast, Islam is in principle a theocracy in which religion and state form a single entity. Islamic schools, or madrasas, generally taught «Islamic science,» that is theology, Arabic grammar, the Koran and the hadith etc. Greek and other non-Muslim philosophy was called «foreign sciences» and was never integrated into the core curriculum. Grant again, page 243:
«[The madrasas] had as their primary mission the teaching of the Islamic religion, and paid little attention to the foreign sciences, which, as we saw, were comprised of the science and natural philosophy derived ultimately from the Greeks. The analytical subjects derived from the Greeks certainly did not have equal status with religious and theological subjects. Indeed, the foreign sciences played a rather marginal role in the madrasas, which formed the core of Islamic higher education. Only those subjects that illuminated the Qur’an or the religious law were taught. One such subject was logic, which was found useful not only in semantics but was also regarded as helpful in avoiding simple errors of inference. The primary function of the madrasas, however, was ‘to preserve learning and defend orthodoxy’ (Mottahedeh 1985, 91). In Islam, most theologians did not regard natural philosophy as a subject helpful to a better understanding of religion. On the contrary, it was usually viewed as a subject capable of subverting the Islamic religion and, therefore, as potentially dangerous to the faith. Natural philosophy always remained a peripheral discipline in the lands of Islam and was never institutionalised within the educational system, as it was in Latin Christendom.»

Greek natural philosophy, however, became fully integrated into the university curriculum in Europe. As Grant explains, page 244-245:

«It is important to point out that not only did university-trained theologians fully accept and embrace the discipline of natural philosophy, but many, if not most, of them were eager and active contributors to the literature of natural philosophy. It is for that reason that it is wholly appropriate to call them ‘theologian-natural philosophers.’ They were equally at home in both disciplines and were keen to import as much natural philosophy as they could into the resolution of theological problems, while avoiding any temptations to theologise natural philosophy. This explains why some medieval theologians can be equated with the best of the secular natural philosophers, such as John Buridan and Albert of Saxony. Some theologians, such as Albertus Magnus and Nicole Oresme, were clearly superior to them. By their actions, theologians in the West were full participants in the development and dissemination of natural philosophy. They made it possible for the institutionalisation of natural philosophy in the universities of the late Middle Ages, and therefore its extensive dissemination. Nothing like this occurred in the Byzantine Empire or in Islam.»

One of the most important advantages Catholic Europe enjoyed during this period was the separation between church and state. Edward Grant, page 246-247:
«[Byzantines and Muslims] paid a heavy price for failing to separate church and state. In both societies, Aristotle’s natural philosophy was regarded as potentially dangerous because it encompassed ideas and concepts that were hostile to both religions, and because it was often felt that scholars who focused too much on natural philosophy would either neglect religion or come to regard it as inferior to natural philosophy. Islam’s failure to separate church and state nullified an institutional advantage it had over Western Christendom. Where the latter was organised as a centralised, hierarchical religion with a single individual – the Pope – holding ultimate power, Islam was a decentralised religion with no hierarchical structure. What power there was derived from local religious leaders who drew on the support of their fellow Muslims. Under these circumstances, we might expect that freedom of inquiry and the cultivation of a vibrant, sustained natural philosophy would have been more likely to occur within the decentralised Muslim religion than within the highly centralised Catholic Church of Western Europe. As we now know, the reverse occurred: the West developed a lively natural philosophy, whereas in Islam natural philosophy became a peripheral and suspect discipline, whose study could even prove dangerous.»

The European university system had no real equivalent in any other major civilisation in the world at the time. As Toby Huff says in his book, page 234:
«We should also not underestimate the magnitude of the step taken when it was decided (in part, following ancient tradition) to make the study of philosophy and all aspects of the natural world an official and public enterprise. If this seems a mundane achievement, it is due to our Eurocentrism which forgets that the study of the natural sciences and philosophy was shunned in the Islamic colleges of the Middle East and that all such inquiries were undertaken in carefully guarded private settings. Likewise, in China, there were no autonomous institutions of learning independent of the official bureaucracy; the ones that existed were completely at the mercy of the centralised state. Nor were philosophers given the liberty to define for themselves the realms of learning as occurred in the West.»

Edward Grant has been important in bringing to light this role played by the university system in preparing the ground for the later Scientific Revolution. As he concludes on page 248:
«Without the separation of church and state, and the developments that proceeded as a consequence, the West would not have produced a deeply rooted natural philosophy that was disseminated through Europe by virtue of an extensive network of universities, which

laid the foundation for the great scientific advances made in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, advances that have continued to the present day.» For further developments in the Western (but not so much in other) scientific traditions from the sixteenth century onward, The Scientists: A History of Science Told Through the Lives of Its Greatest Inventors by John Gribbin is fascinating and easy to read. Toby E. Huff in his excellent The Rise of Early Modern Science: Islam, China and the West, agrees with Grant’s assessment of the importance of the university system. Here is Huff, page 344: «For a dispassionate examination of the educational backgrounds of major scientists from the fifteenth to the seventeenth century shows that the vast majority of them were in fact university educated. As John Gascoigne has shown, ‘Something like 87% of the European scientists born between 1450 and 1650 [who were] thought worthy of inclusion in the Dictionary of Scientific Biography were university educated.’ More importantly, ‘A large proportion of this group was not only university educated but held career posts at a university.’ For the period 1450-1650 this was 45 percent, and for 1450-1550, it was 51 percent. If one speaks of particular scientists, then one must immediately acknowledge that Copernicus, Galileo, Tycho Brahe, Kepler, and Newton were all extraordinary products of the apparently procrustean and allegedly Scholastic universities of Europe. In short, sociological and historical accounts of the role of the university as an institutional locus for science and as an incubator of scientific thought and argument have been vastly understated.»

Nothing like this existed in the Islamic world. Universities could only be established in Spain and Portugal after these countries had been re-conquered by the Christians. Huff, page 212:
«If Spain had persisted as an Islamic land into the later centuries — say, until the time of Napoleon — it would have retained all the ideological, legal, and institutional defects of Islamic civilisation. A Spain dominated by Islamic law would have been unable to found new universities based on the European model of legally autonomous corporate governance, as corporations do not exist in Islamic law. Furthermore, the Islamic model of education rested on the absolute primacy of fiqh, of legal studies, and the standard of preserving the great traditions of the past. This was symbolically reflected in the ijaza, the personal authorisation to transmit knowledge from the past given by a learned man, a tradition quite different from the West’s group-administered certification (through examination) of demonstrated learning. In the actual event, the founding of Spanish universities in the thirteenth century, first in Palencia (1208-9), Valladolid, Salamanca (1227-8), and so on, occurred in long-established Christian areas, and the universities were modeled after the constitutions of Paris and Bologna.»

There is also an important theological aspect here in that Muslims generally viewed God as unpredictable, whereas both Christians and Jews could more easily view God as predictable, having created the world according to logical natural laws which could be uncovered and understood by humans. Toby E. Huff, page 116:
«In short, the European medievals had fashioned an image of man that was so imbued with reason and rationality that philosophical and theological speculation became breathtaking spheres of inquiry whose outcomes were far from predictable, or orthodox — to the consternation of all. Furthermore, this theological and philosophical speculation was taking place within the citadels of Western learning, that is, in the universities. Christian theology had indeed clothed man with a new set of methods and motivations, but it had also attributed to him a new set of rational capacities that knew no bounds.»

Sadly, at the beginning of the 21st century, this university system arguably no longer works as well as it once did. As Ibn Warraq puts it in his great book Defending the West:
«The West, in giving in to political correctness and in being corrupted by Saudi and other Arab money, is ceasing to honour the original intent of the university. In recent years, Saudi Arabia and other Islamic countries (e.g., Brunei) have established chairs of Islamic studies in prestigious Western universities, which are then encouraged to present a favorable image of Islam. Scientific research leading to objective truth no longer seems to be the goal. Critical examination of the sources or the Koran is discouraged. Scholars such as Daniel Easterman have even lost their posts for not teaching about Islam in the way approved by Saudi Arabia. In December 2005, Georgetown and Harvard universities each accepted $ 20 million from Saudi prince Alwaleed bin Talal for programs in Islamic studies. The Carter Center, founded by former president Jimmy Carter, is funded in part by bin Talal. Such money can only corrupt the original intent of all higher institutions of education, that is, the search for truth. Now, we shall have only «Islamic truth» that is acceptable to the royal Saudi family, a family that has financed terrorism, anti-Westernism, and antiSemitism for more than thirty years.»

This is financial corruption and intimidation, but even before this, Western universities seemed to be increasingly preoccupied with deconstructing their own civilisation and praising the most barbaric cultures and regimes on earth. This is by no means universally true, of course. There is still much great work done at Western universities, as Mr. Grant himself is living proof of. But it is difficult to deny the fact that there has been a decline in free inquiry and good scholarship. Exactly how this happened, how the Western university system went from being a great comparative advantage to being something resembling a problem is an interesting question, but one that will have to be dealt with in a separate essay. Meanwhile, Edward Grant has done an excellent job at reminding us of how unique it once was.

Source: http://www.jihadwatch.org/dhimmiwatch/archives/022433.php 1. http://www.jihadwatch.org/dhimmiwatch/archives/019529.php 2. http://gatesofvienna.blogspot.com/2008/02/west-japan-and-cultural-secondarity.html

1.24 Historically — Bosnia is Serbian Land It is well known fact that South Slavs settled in the Balkans in 7th century. The two largest tribes were Serbs and Croats. There was not much distinction between the two then and to this day the «two people» speak one and the same language. Till recently the language was known in world literature as Serbo-Croatian. The only outwardly difference between Serbs and Croats today is that the former are Orthodox while the later are Catholic Christians. Geographical regions of Bosnia and Herzegovina were settled by the Serbs. There is no dispute about this in Western pre-1991 (pre-Bosnia-war) literature. From: «Encyclopedia Britannica» Edition 1971, Volume 3, page 983, Entry: Bosnia, history
Serbian settlement in Bosnia-Herzegovina began in the seventh century A.D.

From: «Encyclopedia Britannica» Edition 1943, Vol 20, Page 341, Entry: Serbia, History
According to the emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus, the emperor Heraclius (610-640) invited the Serbs to settle in the devastated north-western provinces of the Byzantine empire and to defend them against the incursions of the Avars. Toward the end of 9th century the political centre of the Serbs was transferred to Zeta (or: Zenta: see Montenegro) and the Primorye (sea-coast)… [Serbian] Prince Voislav of Travuniya (today: Trebinje [Herzegovina]) …united under his own rule Travuniya, Zahumlye (the modern Herzegovina) and Zeta. His son Michael Voislavich annexed the important Zhupania of Rashka (Rascia or Rassia) [Central Serbia], and in 1077 was addressed as king (rex) in a letter from Pope Gregory VII. His son Bodin enlarged the first Serb kingdom by annexing territories…

From: «Encyclopedia Britannica» Edition 1971, Vol 3, p 983, Entry: Bosnia-Herzegovina
[Serbian] King Bodin (1081-1101) united Bosnia with the other two Serbian principalities – Rashka [Central Serbia] and Zeta [Montenegro]…

From: «Encyclopedia Britannica» Edition 1990, Volume 29, Macropedia, page 1098, Entry: Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina
The emperor Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus (reigned 913-957) referred to Bosnia as part of “the land of the Serbs”.

From: «Yugoslavia, a Country Study»

Serbian groups settled the region of present-day Bosnia and Hercegovina during the seventh century… Bosnia or Bosna (from Bosna river) appears to have originated as a small principality in the mountainous region of the upper reaches of the Bosna and Vrbas rivers. The name Herzegovina originated in the fifteenth century when a powerful Bosnian noble, Stephen Vuksic, gained control of lands in the southern part of Bosnia and took the title of Herzog, the German equivalent of duke, from which came the name of the region.

Turkish conquest That is it: Bosnia was Serbian only. There were no «Muslims» — not even a single family — for at least FIVE HUNDRED years! The Islamic onslaught on Europe started centuries later. For the Turks who wanted to conquer Europe for Allah, Balkans was the shortest route. Their immense armies were first stopped by heroic Serb resistance in a gigantic battle at Kosovo field in 1389. Some 70 years later the Turks recovered and took now defenceless Bosnia. Centuries of peace the Serbs enjoyed in Bosnia were to be substituted with centuries long struggle to survive brutal tyranny by foreign oppressor. In order to govern this, 100% Christian land, the Turks needed to find (in today’s terms) local quislings. In those ancient times, when religion was one’s alpha and omega of existence, the conquering Turks could not hope to convert Christians to Islam over night. Despite that, it turns out, Bosnia was somewhat fertile ground. The Turkish conquest left substantial portion of the population converted to Islam — more so than in other, vast Christian lands, governed by the Ottoman Empire. There are few theories how it happened. The most prevalent theory present in Western literature claims that the Turks found an easy prey in Christian cult of Bogumilism. This is one of many theories, though. The opposing ones claim that Bogumilism, while quite present in Bosnia for some time, was extinct centuries before Turkish arrival. As it was question of honour, not to abandon ones religion for the religion of the enemy, the process of conversion was a slow one. It took centuries. No-one disputes that. Also the process took many different forms, many of which were forms of forceful conversion. For sure those who converted to the religion of the oppressor immediately reaped benefits. Over night they would cease to be oppressed. They would not be hungry any more. The record of individual conversions for the last few centuries of the Ottoman rule was kept in the main archive in Sarajevo, which was in Muslim hands in the recent civil war. It burned to the ground with all the documents. The incident, as everything else, was blamed on the besieging Serbs even though it was in Muslim Serb, and certainly not in Christian Serb, interest for that to happen… The slow process of betraying Christianity From: «Yugoslavia, a Country Study»
Situated on the dividing line between the areas of Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox religious influence, Bosnia and Herzegovina suffered from constant internal turmoil from the tenth through the fifteenth centuries. This situation was complicated by the introduction from Bulgaria of an ascetic heretical Christian cult — Bogumilism — during the twelfth century… Many Bosnian nobles and a large portion of the peasantry persisted in the heresy despite repeated attempts by both the Catholic and Eastern Orthodox churches to crush the

cult. The chaos caused by this religious struggle laid the country open to the Ottoman Turks after they again defeated the [remaining, unconquered] Serbs in 1459. By 1463 the Turks controlled Bosnia and twenty years later gained control of Herzegovina; many Bogumil nobles and peasants accepted the Islamic religion of their conquerors.

From: «A History of the Balkans» by Professor Ferdinand Schevill, Barnes & Noble, New York, 1995, pp 202, 203
To the west of Serbia lay Bosnia,… a mountain region, like Serbia and racially homogeneous with it… [W]hole sections of the Bosnians did not scruple to see in Islam a deliverer. Numerous castles treacherously opened their gates to the enemy, and when the wretched Bosnian king, despairing of his cause, surrendered, he was, in spite of a solemn promise made in writing, cruelly decapitated under the eyes of the sultan (1462)… Mohamed held the convenient doctrine that a pledge made to a dog of an infidel possessed no binding character. Thus Bosnia, sharp on the heel of Serbia, perished, and throughout Balkania the land of the Serbs with the single exception of the Zeta [future Montenegro], passed under the heel of the oppressor.

From: «A Short History of the Yugoslav Peoples» by Professor Fred Singleton, Cambridge University Press, Edition 1985, page 20
The absorption of the heretic Bosnian (Bogumil) Church into the Islamic world did not come about as a result of a dramatic act of mass conversion, but, if Ottoman statistics is to be believed, it was a relatively rapid process. According to a census of 1489… 18.4 per cent of the population of Bosnia practised the Islamic faith… [T]he greatest increases were recorded… especially in the towns… Slav-speaking Muslim aristocracy came into existence. The 1.5 million Muslims in modern Bosnia, who are listed in the Yugoslav census [of 1981]… are descendents of those ealy converts.

From: «Yugoslavia, a Country Study»
The Islamised nobles were allowed to retain their lands and their feudal privileges, and the peasants who accepted Islam were granted land free from feudal obligations. The Christian nobles were killed and Christian peasants subjected to oppressive rule.

For more than four centuries, from the time of conquest in 1463 to 1878 when Western powers ordered them to relinquish Bosnia and Herzegovina and hand it over to the Austro-Hungarian empire control, the Turks ruled Bosnia. Their devoted quislings, the Serbs who betrayed Christianity in order to serve the Asiatic conqueror, identified with the foreign oppressor so much that Encyclopedia Britannica of 1910, finds Bosnian Muslims, now after more than 20 years under Christian rule still wanting everyone to call them — Turks! These «Turks,» though can speak only one language — the same language that Serbs and Croats speak: Serbo-Croatian. Let us take a closer look into the origin of the terms «Bosnian,» «Bosniak,» «Bosnitch.» Do Bosnian Muslims have an exclusive right, as exercised by the Western press in these days, to call themselves «Bosnians?»
Source: http://srpska-mreza.com/History/pre-wwOne/Bosnia-conquered.html

1.25 Who are the “Bosniaks”? Encyclopedia Britannica, eleventh edition (year: 1910 (!)), Volume IV, page 281, entry «Bosnia and Herzegovina», subentry (#10), Population and National Characteristics (quote:)
In 1895 the population, which tends to increase slowly… numbered 1,568,092. The alien element is small, consisting chiefly of Austro-Hungarians, gipsies, Italians and Jews. Spanish is a common language of the Jews, whose ancestors fled Hither, during the 16th century, to escape the Inquisition. The natives are officially described as Bosniaks, but classify themselves according to religion. Thus the Roman Catholics prefer the name of Croats, Hrvats or Latins; the Orthodox, of Serbs; the Moslems, of Turks. All alike belong to the Serbo-Croatian branch of the Slavonic race; and all speak a language almost identical to Serbian, though written by the Roman Catholics in Latin instead of Cyrillic letters. To avoid offending either “Serbs” or “Croats”, it is officially designated “Bosnitch”…. The Bosnians or Bosniaks resemble their Serbian kindfolk in both appearance and character. They have the same love for poetry, music and romance; the same *intense* pride in their race and history; many of the same superstitions and customs. The Christians retain the Serbian costume, modified in detail, as the occasional use of the turban or fez. The «Turkish» women have in some districts abandoned the veil; but in others they even cover the eyes when they leave home.

This clearly tells explains «tolerance» — in 1910 — between those who call themselves «Serbs», «Croats» and «Turks». The three ethnic groups of Bosnia would rather be called Bosnians (English), Bosnitch (German) or Bosanci (in Serbo-Croatian) because a Croat would be *offended* to be called a «Turk», «Turk» a Serb etc. It is surprising to read that Muslims liked to be called «Turks» during the government of Austro-Hungaria. Muslims are Serbs or Croats, but mostly Serbs, who, through centuries converted to Islam). We have to remind you that the above text was written in 1910, i.e. before Muslims (the «Turks») and Croats committed unspeakable atrocities on their Serbian neighbours (in World War I and World War II). We have seen, once again, how Muslims have showed unbelievable chauvinism and intolerance toward the Serbs. (They did it for the third time in this, twentieth century alone). The Muslims demanded to separate from the Serbs, even though the “only” difference is the religion (The language and everything else is the same). It is a dangerous precedent to declare a group of people a new nation just because they are of different religion. Many countries would over-night become «multi-ethnic». On the other hand, let it be clear, if the Muslims insist to have their own state then noone should deny them their right for self-determination. And no Serb was denying them that right. Serbs were not denying the Muslims right to form a state in a portion of Bosnia where they, the Muslims, are majority population. But if there is to be any peace or justice then the Serbs should have exactly the same right. Wherever the Muslims were majority before the war — they can govern that

territory any way they like it. But wherever the Serbs were majority, according to the U.N. Charter — they have right for self-determination the same way. The Serbs have right to exist. They have right to form their own state. And No Communist design should have precedent over the rights of the living human beings. Today, the Muslims, with backing of the Western powers, want to usurp the right for the entire Bosnia — even though they are MINORITY there. Muslims want to usurp the right for themselves to be the only people called Bosnians. In other words they want to be the only ones to rule the entire Bosnia. Thus, let us remind you, once again, the Serbs are also the indigenous people of Bosnia. Actually they were the *first* Slav tribe to settle there.
Source: http://srpska-mreza.com/History/pre-wwOne/Mus_who.html

Muslims oppressed Christians in Bosnia From: «The Balkans,» pp 43 – 45, Time-Life World Library, by Edmund Stillman and the Editors of Life, Time Inc., New York, 1967
From mid-15th century for the next four centuries(!) the Serbian and Croatian Christians of Bosnia suffered tyrannical rule. Four (4) centuries of Islamic tyranny in Bosnia If any single factor made the Balkans what they were in history — and what they still are today — it was the ordeal of the Turk… For the 18th and 19th Centuries, the image of Turkey was that of a rotting empire, of a corrupt, incompetent and sadistic national elite preying on the subject Balkan peoples — of a cynical government whose very method of rule was atrocity. [T]hey forbade the building of all but the meanest churches, and likewise outlawed the ringing of church bells. What was damaging to the Balkan peoples was [that]… they had been stripped of pride and freedom. As Christians, they were now despised… [T]he Turkish over-lordship created a Balkan mosaic of legal, social and economic relations… What was uniform to all [subdued Christians] was the experience of alien overlordship and the legacy of violence as the cohesion and power of the Empire declined. When the Empire passed its apex of power in the 17th and 18th Centuries, the conditions of the subject peoples took a catastrophic turn for the worse… It was in these… years that the proverb came into vogue: «Where the Turk trod, no grass grows.» Within the Empire, the 17th and 18th Century military officials, the beys and dahis, savagely oppressed the people; they were scarcely to be distinguished from the robber bands… On the frontiers, [which is where Bosnia was] war — and with it the parallel evils of yearly murder, rape and arson — became as regular as the cycle of season.

The above quote is from: «Origin of the Myth of a Tolerant Pluralistic Islamic Society» Bat Ye’Or, Chicago, August 31, 1995

In the Serbian regions, the most fanatical opponents of Christian emancipation were the Muslims Bosniacs… A systematic enquiry into the condition of the Christians was conducted by British consuls in the Ottoman Empire in the 1860s. Britain was then Turkey’s strongest ally. It was in its own interest to see that the oppression of the Christians would be eliminated in order to prevent any Russian or Austrian interference. Consul James Zohrab sent from Bosna-Serai (Sarajevo) a lengthy report, dated July 22, 1860, to his ambassador in Constantinople, Sir Henry Bulwer, in which he analyzed the administration of the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He stated that from 1463 to 1850 the Bosniac Muslims enjoyed all the privileges of feudalism. During a period of nearly 400 years Christians were subjected to much oppression and cruelty. For them no other law but the caprice of their masters existed… Under false accusations imprisonments are of daily occurrence. A Christian has but a small chance of exculpating himself when his opponent is a Muslim.»

The above quote is from: «The Serbian People» by P. Lazarovich-Hrebelianovich & Eleanor Calhoun New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1910, The excerpt is from Chapter VII: «The Serbians under Turkish rule from about 1470 to about 1800»
In the year 1413 the southern Serbian provinces were unable longer to hold out against the Turks. Serbia in 1459, Bosnia in 1463, and Herzegovina in 1481 were all finally conquered and became Turkish provinces. The basis of Ottoman power was the sword and the Ottoman State was and is an organised theocracy. The Mohammedan religion is not a religion in the Christian sense of involving principally the problems of morality, spiritual growth, and immortality. Mohammedanism is a state of society founded on a collection of laws and legal principles dealing with and ruling every event of individual and public life. The vast community of believers in various countries of the world basing the entire political, social, and religious fabric on that collection of laws, and the mystical, ethical, and philosophical tenets given by Mahomet in the Koran, afterward developed by the masters of the «Four Schools» of Mohammedan teaching, forms «Islam.» For that reason where Islam is master no other civil status is recognised except in tolerance and in subordination to Islam. There can be no assimilation with people of other creeds or civilisation. The perception of that fact was vividly set forth in the arguments of that Sultan, in the seventeenth century, who urged that as Moslem victor and Christian vanquished could never make one people, Ottoman domination could become secure only by the universal slaughter of all Christians in conquered territories. Up to our own time that conclusion has haunted Stamboul [Istanbul] like an evil dream. The conquered Christian populations were disarmed and dispossessed of all property, and were soon pressed into a condition of serfdom under Turkish masters. They were called «giours» and in the mass the «rayah,» «the herd.» Whoever renounced his faith and became a Mohammedan was thereby instantly naturalised into Islam, receiving the status and all the life-chances of a born Osmanili [Turk]. That was the sole means in his power of escaping from the subjected masses or of opening a door of opportunity. The Serbians in general refused to accept that door of escape from durancevile, and remained true to their Christian and national faith, even though the long night of practical extinction, hoping for a dawn though long deferred. Many of the Serbian nobles and numbers of the common people fled to Serb lands under Venice or those under Hungary [i.e. to Krajina]. Certain ones among the nobles and others became Moslems, thereby preserving their lands and castles, and authority was given to them under the Turks as Pashas, Beys, Agas, and Spahis. They became ranged, in the eyes of the general populations, on the side of the conquerors, and were looked upon by the people as Turks.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the inhabitants had not only been subject to Turkish attack, but had been obliged as well to stand, ever beating back Hungarian invasions, the greater part of the nobles, mostly Bogomils, went over in body to Mohammedanism. Large numbers of Serbs, loyal to their faith and home traditions, escaped to the mountain fastnesses from which they were able to harass the Turks of the plains and so maintain a relative independence. The Serbians of the Rayah lived under great oppression and humiliation, their only means of protection being through the Serbian Patriarch so long as one existed. In case of acts of injustice or violence suffered at the hands of individual Turks, there was no possible redress. The Christians were forbidden the use of horses or camels, only mules and asses being allowed them. They were forbidden to ride even a mule or an ass in the presence of a Turk. It was not permitted that their houses should have a better appearance than Turkish houses. For their faith they had much to suffer. The clergy, few in number, were kept in miserable conditions, and churches which had been destroyed were not allowed to be rebuilt, the building of new churches being strictly forbidden. The sound of church bells was forbidden as was also the reading aloud of the Holy Scriptures or the pronunciation of the name of Jesus Christ. It was not lawful to make the sign of the cross, to show a cross, or to eat pork in sight of a Turk. The Rayah were not allowed openly to bury their dead; Christian burials tookplace at night or in secret; mourning for the dead was strictly prohibited either by costume or by symbol or in any other way. Church services were often held in some secluded spot in forest or glen, sometimes under a chosen tree marked with a cross; or ordinary houses were built as if for a family, with a central hearth, and sometimes with surrounding storehouse and stable to avoid suspicion, and were consecrated and used secretly as churches. Such houses still exist in Macedonia.

From: «The Balkans,» page 44, Time-Life World Library by Edmund Stillman and the Editors of LIFE, Time Inc., New York, 1967
Tax in blood In Ottoman Empire Christians were but slaves at nonexistent mercy of their Muslim lords. Many, many Western books write about different horrors the Christians endured. One form of oppression was that Muslims gave themselves «right of the first night». In practice it meant that Turkish (or local Muslim Slav) lord would spend the first night with the new Christian bride. The groom had to take shoes off and silently circle the house while the Turk makes love to his wife. Still, by far the worst horror the Christians had to endure was the Turkish Janissary system. Western schollars frequently downplay the importance of this «Tax in Blood» as Christian subjects nicknamed it: Conversion to Islam — through kidnapping While any subject boy might aspire to the highest rank in the Turkish Empire, he had to convert to Islam to do so; when the security of the Ottoman state demanded, there were forced conversions. Every four years the most vigorous boys were taken from the towns and villages, willingly or not, to be trained as Janissaries (a word from the Turkish yeni cheri, or new troops).

From: «Origin of the Myth of a Tolerant Pluralistic Islamic Society» Bat Ye’Or, Chicago, August 31, 1995

The Devshirme system is well known. Begun by the Sultan Orkhan (1326-1359), it existed for about 300 years. It consisted of a regular levy of Christian children from the Christian population of the Balkans. These youngsters, aged from fourteen to twenty, were Islamised and enslaved for their army. The periodic levies, which took place in contingents of a thousand, subsequently became annual. To discourage runaways, children were transferred to remote provinces and entrusted to Muslim soldiers who treated them harshly as slaves. Another parallel recruitment system operated. It provided for the levy of Christian children aged six to ten (Ichoghlani), reserved for the sultans’ palace. Entrusted to eunuchs, they underwent a tyrannical training for fourteen years.

The first presentation above sounds almost idyllic: A boy dreams of obtaining «high rank in the Empire» or some boys «were taken» from their parents in order to achieve glorious carrier in Turkish Army. What it actually meant was that the hated Turks would kidnap your child and — even worse — return it, now as a Muslim and your worse enemy! How can anyone put it in words? Dr. Ivo Andrich, who was born in Bosnia was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1961 for his novels about Bosnian Christian suffering. Encyclopedia Britannica (Micropedia, Edition 1986, Vol 1, Page 393, entry: Andric, Ivo) said (quote): Andric’s work reveals his deterministic philosophy and his sense of compassion and is written objectively and soberly, in language of great beauty and purity. The Nobel Prize committee commented particularly on the «ephic force» with which he handled his material, especially in «The Bridge on the Drina». Let the master of literature talk. Here is an excerpt from the above mentioned Nobel Prize book «Bridge on the Drina,» which describes how this «tax in blood» felt, as it is told and retold chilling blood of generations of surviving Christians of Bosnia. On that November day a long convoy of laden horses arrived on the left bank of the river and halted there to spend the night. The Aga of the janissaries, with armed escort, was returning to Stambul after collecting from the villages of eastern Bosnia the appointed number of Christian children for the blood tribute. …the necessary number of healthy, bright and good looking lads between ten and fifteen years old had been found without difficulty, even though many parents had hidden their children in the forests, taught them how to appear half witted, clothed them in rags and let them get filthy, to avoid the Aga’s choice. Some even went so far as to maim their own children, cutting off one of their fingers with an axe. …a little way behind the last horses in that strange convoy straggled, dishevelled and exhausted, many parents and relatives of those children who were being carried away forever to a foreign world where they would be circumcised, become Turkish and, forgetting their faith, their country and their origin, would pass their lives in the service of the Empire. They were for the most part women, mothers, grandmothers and sisters of the stolen children. [The women would get driven away but…] ….gather again a little later behind the convoy and strive with tear-filled eyes to see once again over the panniers the heads of the children who were being taken from them. The mothers were especially persistent and hard to restrain. Some would rush forward not looking where they were going, with bare breasts and dishevelled hair, forgetting everything about them, wailing and lamenting as if at a burial, while others almost out of their minds moaned as if their wombs were being

torn by birthpangs and blinded with tears ran right onto the horsemen’s whips and replied to every blow with the fruitless question: «Where are you taking him? Why are you taking him from me?» Some tried to speak clearly to their children and give them some last part of themselves, as much as might be said in a couple of words, some recommendation or advice for the way… «Rade, my son, don’t forget your mother…’ «Ilija, Ilija, Ilija!» screamed another woman, searching desperately with her glances for the dear well-known head and repeating this incessantly as if she wished to carve into the child’s memory that name which would in a day or two be taken from him forever. Mother’s cries must still be echoing Bosnian mountains. It should not pass without mention that once Westerners conquered Bosnia, recently, one of the first thing they did in the course of «engineering democracy» (and while trying to impose Muslim rule on Bosnian Serbs) was to ban use of Dr. Andrich’s works from school books for the Serbian children. It is as if one was to ban Shakespeare in England! Andrich’s books were translated in all languages of the West. His, above cited book «The Bridge on the Drina» can be found in any decent size library in the West. It tells volumes about total collapse of Western culture and morality that the same Western nations which praized Bosnian author in 1961 — banned his works few decades later.

Bosnian Muslims outdid Turks in atrocity From: «A Short History of the Yugoslav Peoples» by Professor Fred Singleton, Cambridge University Press, Edition 1985, pp 20-21
Again, the Serbian grief was amplified by the fact that these returning children, now Janissaries were the most intolerant, most militant Muslims. As the time was passing and the central rule in the Empire was dying out, it was Janissaries who actually governed Bosnia. They were the ones who were the most oppressive and cruel. When Great Britain (in trying to repel Russia from the Balkans, in its self-imposed, everlasting «Great Game») insisted that Turkish sultan should give equal rights to his Christian subjects, Janissaries of Bosnia were the ones who started a rebellion to topple the sultan. Worse «Turks» than Turks During the heyday of the Ottoman rule in Europe the Bosnian Muslims played an important part in administration of the empire, one of them, Mehmet Sokolovic, rising to be grand vizier to the sultan, Suleiman the Magnificent, in the sixteenth century. Bosnian Muslims also provided the Ottoman bureaucracy in Hungary after the battle of Mohacs in 1526. At lower level of administration, the Orthodox and Roman Catholic Christian peasants of the raya were governed by Slav Muslim landowners, who, whilst retaining their Slavonic speech, adopted the manners and dress of the Turkish court. Like many converts, they often ‘out-Ottomaned the Ottomans in their religious zeal’.

The above quote is from: «A Short History of the Yugoslav Peoples» by Professor Fred Singleton, Cambridge University Press, Edition 1985, page 75
The janissaries, who were once the elite corps of the sultan army, had degenerated by the end of the eighteenth century into an unrully and lawless rabble, who were at best an embarrassment and at worst threat to their rulers… Sultan Mahmud I (1730-54) attempted to disband the janissaries and to put in their place a modern force, modelled on the standing armies of his European enemies. Unfortunately for the Serbs, he was only partly successful. In an attempt to remove the influence of the janissaries from Istanbul, where they naturally formed a powerful opposition to his reforms, Mahmud tried to buy them off

by offering them a virtually free hand in garrisoning the remote provinces of the empire [like Bosnia and Hercegovina]. There they could plunder and abuse the local peasantry with impunity, even dispossessing them from their lands. … Mahmud may have bought time for himself, but he stored up trouble for his successors.

From: Encyclopedia Britannica, Edition 1910, Volume 4, page 284
The reform of the Ottoman government contemplated by the sultan Mahmud II (18081839) was BITTERLY RESENTED in Bosnia… Many of the janissaries had married and settled on the land, forming a strongly conservative and FANATICAL caste, friendly to the Moslem nobles, who now dreaded the curtailment of their own privileges. Their opportunity came in 1820, when the Porte [the Turkish government] was striving to repress the insurrection in Moldavia, Albania and Greece. A first Bosnian revolt was crushed in 1821, a second, due principally to the massacres of the jannissaries, was quelled with much bloodshed in 1827. After Russo-Turkish War of 1828-29, a further attempt at reform was initiated by the sultan and his grand vizier, Reshid Pasha. Two years later came a most formidable outbreak: the sultan was denounced as false to Islam, and the Bosnian nobles gathered in Banjaluka (Bosnia), determined to march to Constantinople, and reconquer the Ottoman Empire for the true [Islam] faith. A Jihad was preached by their leader, Hussein Aga Berberi, a brilliant soldier and orator, who called himself “Zmaj Bosanski” [dragon of Bosnia], and was regarded by his followers as a saint. The Moslems of Herzegovina, under Ali Pasha Rizvanbegovic, remained loyal to the Porte, but in Bosnia Hussein Aga encountered little resistance. At Kossovo he was reinforced by 20,000 Albanians, led by Mustapha Pasha, and within a few weeks the united armies occupied the whole of Bulgaria, and large part of Macedonia. Their career was checked by Reshid Pasha, who persuaded the two victorious commanders to intrigue against one another, secured the division of their forces, and then fell upon each in turn. The rout of the Albanians at Prilipe and the capture of Mustapha at Scutari were followed by an invasion of Bosnia. After a desperate defence, Hussein Aga fled to Esseg in CroatiaSlavonia, his appeal for pardon was rejected, and in 1832 he was banished for life in Tribizond. The power of the Bosnian nobles, though shaken by their defeat, remained unbroken, and they resisted vigorously when their kapetanates were abolished in 1837, and again when a measure of equality before the law was conceded to the Christians in 1839. In Herzegovina, Ali Pasha Rizvanbegovic reaped the reward of his fidelity. He was left free to tyrannise over his Christian subjects, a king in all but name.

Is this not exactly opposite of the current claim the Western media repeatedly promotes? Are they not telling us that «Islam is a tolerant religion?» Since when!? Are we all from Mars? How can anyone delete the horror of Muslim oppression over Christians and Jews which lasted for centuries and stretched over continents? Where are the roots of the above myth wondered author Bat Ye’Or. She then spent decades studying the issue. Finally she wrote a few books on the subject.

1.26 Historical Islamic demographic warfare in Kosovo In the early 7th century, Serbs settled in Balkans (including Kosovo). In the 12th century, according to the Byzantine Empress Anna Angelina Komnenos, the Serbs were the main inhabitants of Kosovo (Eastern Dalmatia and former Moesia Superior). Archaeological findings from the 7th century onwards show a Serb (Slavic) cultural domination in case of glagolithic letters, pottery, cemeteries, churches and monasteries. 14th century The Decani Charter from 1330 contained a detailed list of households and chartered villages in Metohija and north-western Albania: 3 of 89 settlements were Albanian, the other being Serb. 15th century The ethnic composition of Kosovo’s population during this period included Serbs, Albanians, and Vlachs along with a token number of Greeks, Armenians, Saxons, and Bulgarians, according to Serbian monastic charters or chrysobulls (Hristovulja). A majority of the given names in the charters are overwhelmingly Serbian (Of 24,795 names, 23,774 were ethnic Serb names, 470 of Roman origin, 65 of Albanian origin and 61 of Greek origin). This claim is supported by the Turkish cadastral tax-census (defter) of 1455 which took into account religion and language and found an overwhelming Serb majority. 1455: Turkish cadastral tax census (defter) of the Brankovic dynasty lands (covering 80% of present-day Kosovo) recorded 480 villages, 13,693 adult males, 12,985 dwellings, 14,087 household heads (480 widows and 13,607 adult males). Totally there were around 75,000 inhabitants in 590 villages comprising modern-day Kosovo. By ethnicity:
13,000 Serb dwellings present in all 480 villages and towns 75 Vlach dwellings in 34 villages 46 Albanian dwellings in 23 villages 17 Bulgarian dwellings in 10 villages 5 Greek dwellings in Lausa, Vucitrn 1 Jewish dwelling in Vucitrn 1 Croat dwelling

1487: A census of the House of Brankovic Vucitrn district:
16,729 Christian housing (412 in Pristina and Vucitrn) 117 Moslem households (94 in Pristina and 83 in rural areas)

Ipek (Pec) district:

City of Ipek — 68% Serbs 121 Christian household 33 Moslem households

Suho Grlo and Metohija:
131 Christian household of which 52% in Suho Grlo were Serbs

Kline e Poshtme/Donja Klina — 50% Serbs Decani — 64% Serbs Rural areas:
6,124 Christian housings (99%) 55 Moslem houses (1%)

17th — 18th century The Great Turkish War of 1683–1699 between the Ottomans and the Habsburgs led to the flight of a substantial part of Kosovan Serbian population to Austrian held Vojvodina and the Military Frontier — about 60-70,000 Serb refugees total settled in the Habsburg Monarchy in that time of whom many were from Kosovo. Following this an influx of Muslim Albanian[14] from the highlands (Malesi) occurred, mostly into Metohija. The process continued in 18th century. Noel Malcolm suggests that the Great Migration of the Serbs from Kosovo is only a myth created by Serbian nationalism to justify the Albanian majority already in Kosovo[15], but a number of historians who reviewed his work, including Mile Bjelajac, Istvan Deak, Thomas Emerat and Tim Judah refute this[16]. A study done in 1871 by Austrian colonel Peter Kukulj for the internal use of the AustroHungarian army showed that the mutesarifluk of Prizren (corresponding largely to present-day Kosovo) had some 500,000 inhabitants, of which:
318,000 Serbs (64%), 161,000 Albanians (32%), 10,000 Roma (Gypsies) and Circassians 2,000 Turks

Milos S. Milojevic travelled the region in 1871–1877 and left accounts which testify that Serbs were majority population, and were predominant in all cities, while Albanians were minority and lived mostly in villages. According to his data, Albanians were majority population in southern Drenica (Muslim Albanians), and in region around Djakovica (Catholic Albanians), while the city was majorly Serbian. He also recorded several settlements of Turks, Romas and Circassians.
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographic_history_of_Kosovo

Islamic Demographic Warfare in Kosovo By M. Bozinovich One of the Albanian claims for independence of Kosovo is the ethnic makeup of the region. The argument points that Kosovo was majority Albanian populated hence it should be, at the most, given to Albania or at least granted international recognition as an independent state.

Table 1: Kosovo Population Albanian 1948 1953 1961 1971 1981 498,242 68.46% 524,559 64.93% 646,148 67.06% 916,168 73.67% 1,226,736 77.42% Serbian 199,961 27.47% 221,212 27.38% 264,604 27.46% 259,819 20.89% 236,525 14.93%

The initial 1948 Albanian majority was a result of the Yugoslav government’s prohibition on refugee returns, mostly Serbs that have been deported by Albanian Nazis in WWII. The increasing homogenisation of Kosovo’s population in favour of Albanians has been achieved by means of systematic and institutionalised political and economic repression of Kosovo Serbs. The repression was institutionalised with increased autonomy powers granted to Kosovo in the 1960s and especially in 1974. The increased homogenisation of Kosovo in the Muslim Albanian favour is also a result of the birth rate (also known as demographic warfare): Albanians simply have more children then the Serbs. Given that a parabola appropriately models Kosovo Serb population trend, the analysis strongly suggests that Kosovo Serbs have also been exposed to ethnic animosity and/or genocidal policies. Serb vs Jewish demographic trend 1900-1941 A similar, but not so peculiar population trend is the Jewish experience under Nazi Germany. While the pre-Hitlerian cultural anti-Semitism in Germany was institutionalised, by 1941 hate of Jews was turned into an exterminatory policy. Out of 615,000 Jews in Germany in 1910, virtually none were left by 1945.

Both Jews under Nazis and Serbs under Albanian-dominated Kosovo exhibit the same downward depopulation trend. To the extent that Kosovo Serb population trend line is a parabola, there is a strong evidence to suggest then that Kosovo Serbs have been exposed to a level of ethnic duress sufficient enough to induce them to migrate out of Kosovo.
Source: http://www.serbianna.com/columns/mb/004.shtml

Material to study: 1. Enver Hoxha — http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enver_Hoxha 2. Albanian nationalism — http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albanian_nationalism 3. Greek Christians vs Albanian Muslims — Chameria issue http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chameria_issue

4. Code of Leke (Code of Leke/Kanun) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_of_Lek%C3%AB (Local Sharia equivalency used by Muslim Albanians when it comes to regulating womens rights) This law in tandem with Sharia was instrumental when implementing the past and current Albanian Muslim demographic warfare (“Breed the non-Muslims out” strategy before and after WW2).

1.27 Myths and Politics — Origin or the Myth of a Tolerant Pluralistic Islamic Society

Yugoslavia: Past and present BAT YE’OR speech: My subject this evening is: Myths and Politics: Origin of the Myth of a Tolerant Pluralistic Islamic Society. I stress the world «Tolerant», which was omitted from the program. Ten years ago, when I came to America for the launching of my book: THE DHIMMI, JEWS AND CHRISTIANS UNDER ISLAM, I was struck by the inscription on the Archives Building in Washington: «Past is Prologue». I had thought — at least at the beginning of my research — that my subject related to a remote past, but I realised that contemporary events were rapidly modernising this past. Muslim countries where Islamic law — the Shari’a — had been replaced by modern juridic (imposed by the European colonising powers,) were abandoning the secularising trend, replacing it with Islamisation in numerous sectors of life. This impression of the return of the past became even more acute when I was working on my next book, published in 1991, the English edition which will appear in a few months under the title: THE DECLINE OF EASTERN CHRISTIANITY UNDER ISLAM — 7th TO 20th CENTURY: FROM JIHAD TO DHIMMITUDE (Associated University Presses). In this study, I tried to analyze the numerous processes that had transformed rich, powerful Christian civilisations into Islamic lands and their long-term effects, which had reduced native Christian majorities into scattered small religious minorities, now slowly

disappearing. This complex Islamisation process of Christian lands and civilisations on both shores of the Mediterranean — and in Irak and Armenia — I have called: the process of «dhimmitude» and the civilisation of those peoples who underwent such transformation, I have named the civilisation of «dhimmitude». The indigenous native peoples were Jews and Christians: Orthodox, Catholics, or from other Eastern Christian Churches. They are all referred to by Muslim jurists as the «Peoples of the Book» — the Book being the Bible — and are subjected to the same condition according to Islamic law. They are called dhimmis: protected peoples, because Islamic law protects their life and goods on condition that they submit to Islamic rule. I will not go into details here for this is a very long and complex subject, but in order to understand the Serbian situation one should know that the Serbs were treated during half a millennium just like the other Christian and Jewish dhimmis. They participated in this civilisation of dhimmitude. It is important to understand that the civilisation of dhimmitude grows from two religious institutions: Jihad and SHARI’A, which establish a particular ideological system that makes it mandatory — during the jihad operation — to use terror, mass killings, deportation and slavery. And the Serbs — because I am speaking of them tonight — did not escape from this fate, which was the same for all the populations around the Mediterranean basin, vanquished by Jihad. For centuries, the Serbs fought to liberate their land from the laws of Jihad and of Shari’a, which had legalised their condition of oppression. So while I was analyzing and writing about the processes of dhimmitude and the civilisation of dhimmitude, while listening to the radio, watching television, reading the newspapers, I had the uncomfortable feeling that the clock was being turned back. Modern politicians, sophisticated writers — using phones, planes, computers and all the modern techniques — seemed to be returning several centuries back, with WIGS or STIFF COLLARS, using exactly the same CORRUPTING ARGUMENTS, the same tortuous shortterm politics that had previously contributed to the gradual Islamisation of numerous non-Muslim peoples. I had to shake myself in an effort to distinguish the past from the present. So, is the past always prologue? Are we doomed to remain always prisoners of the same errors? Certainly, if we do not know the past; and this past — the long and agonising process of Christian annihilation by the laws of Jihad and dhimmitude — is a taboo history, not only in Islamic lands, but above all in the West. It has been buried beneath a myth, fabricated by Western politicians and religious leaders, in order to promote their own national strategic and economic interests. Curiously, this myth started in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 19th century. It alleges that Turkish rule over Christians in its European provinces was just and lawful. That the Ottoman regime, being Islamic, was naturally «tolerant» and well disposed toward its Christian subjects; that its justice was fair, and that safety for life and goods was guaranteed to Christians by Islamic laws. Ottoman rule was brandished as the most suitable regime to rule Christians of the Balkans. This theory was advanced by European politicians in order to safeguard the balance of power in Europe, and in order to block the Russian advance towards the Mediterranean. To justify the maintenance of the Turkish yoke on the Slavs it was portrayed as a model for a multi-ethnical and multi-religious empire. Of course, the reality was totally different! First the Ottoman Empire was created by centuries of Jihad against Christian populations; consequently the rules of Jihad, elaborated by Arab-Muslim theologians from the 8th to the 10th centuries, applied to the subjected Christian and Jewish populations of the Turkish Islamic dominions. Those regulations are integrated into the Islamic legislation concerning the non-Muslim vanquished peoples and consequently they present a certain homogeneity throughout the Arab and Turkish empires.

The civilisation of dhimmitude in which the Serbs participated had many aspects that evolved with changing political situations. In the 1830s, forced by the European powers, the Ottomans adopted a series of reforms aiming at ending the oppression of the Christians. In the Serbian regions, the most fanatical opponents of Christian emancipation were the Muslims Bosniacs. They fought against the Christian right to possess lands and, in legal matters, to have equal rights as themselves. They pretended that under the old system that gave them full domination over the Christians, Muslims and Christians had lived for centuries in a convivial fraternity. And this argument is still used today by President Izetbegovic and others. He repeatedly affirms that the 500 years of Christian dhimmitude was a period of peace and religious harmony. Let us now confront the myth with reality. A systematic enquiry into the condition of the Christians was conducted by British consuls in the Ottoman Empire in the 1860s. Britain was then Turkey’s strongest ally. It was in its own interest to see that the oppression of the Christians would be eliminated in order to prevent any Russian or Austrian interference. Consul James Zohrab sent from Bosna-Serai (Sarajevo) a lengthy report, dated July 22, 1860, to his ambassador in Constantinople, Sir Henry Bulwer, in which he analyzed the administration of the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He stated that from 1463 to 1850 the Bosniac Muslims enjoyed all the privileges of feudalism. During a period of nearly 400 years Christians were subjected to much oppression and cruelty. For them no other law but the caprice of their masters existed. The DEVSHIRME system is well known. Begun by the Sultan Orkhan (1326-1359), it existed for about 300 years. It consisted of a regular levy of Christian children from the Christian population of the Balkans. These youngsters, aged from fourteen to twenty, were Islamised and enslaved for their army. The periodic levies, which took place in contingents of a thousand, subsequently became annual. To discourage runaways, children were transferred to remote provinces and entrusted to Muslim soldiers who treated them harshly as slaves. Another parallel recruitment system operated. It provided for the levy of Christian children aged six to ten (ICHOGHLANI), reserved for the sultans’ palace. Entrusted to eunuchs, they underwent a tyrannical training for fourteen years. (A system of enslaving Black Christian and Animist children, similar to the DEVSHIRME existed in Sudan as is shown from documents to be published in my book. A sort of DEVSHIRME system still exists today in Sudan and has been described and denounced by the United Nations Special Report on Sudan and in a recent article last Friday’s TIMES OF LONDON.) In 1850, the Bosniac Muslims opposed the authority of the Sultan and the reforms, but were defeated by the Sultan’s army aided by the Christians who hoped that their position would thereby improve, «but they hardly benefited.» Moreover, despite their assistance to the sultan’s army, Christians were disarmed, while the Muslims who fought the sultan could retain weapons. Christians remained oppressed as before, Consul Zobrab writes about the reforms: «I can safely say, they practically remain a dead letter». Discussing the impunity granted to the Muslims by the sultan, Zohrab wrote: «This impunity, while it does not extend to permitting the Christians to be treated as they formerly were treated, is so far unbearable and unjust in that it permits the Muslims to despoil them with heavy exactions. Under false accusations imprisonments are of daily occurrence. A Christian has but a small chance of exculpating himself when his opponent is a Muslim.» «Christians are now permitted to possess real property, but the obstacles which they meet with when they attempt to acquire it are so many and vexatious that very few have as yet dared to brave them. Although a Christian can buy land and take possession it is when he has got his land into order […] that the Christian feels the helplessness of his position and the insincerity of the Government. [Under any pretext] «the Christian is in nineteen cases out of twenty dispossessed, and he may then deem himself fortunate if he gets back the price he gave.»

Commenting on this situation, the consul writes:
«Such being, generally speaking, the course pursued by the Government towards the Christians in the capital of the province Sarajevo where the Consular Agents of the different Powers reside and can exercise some degree of control, it may easily be guessed to what extend the Christians, in the remoter districts, suffer who are governed by Mudirs generally fanatical.»

He continues:
«Christian evidence in the Medjlises (tribunal) as a rule is refused. Knowing this, the Christians generally come forward prepared with Mussulman witnesses (…), twenty years ago, it is true, and they had no laws beyond the caprice of their landlords.» «Cases of oppression are frequently the result of Mussulman fanaticism, but for these the Government must be held responsible, for if offenders were punished, oppression would of necessity become rare.»

In the spring of 1861 the sultan announced new reforms in Herzegovina, promising among other things freedom to build churches, the use of church bells and the opportunity for Christians to acquire land. Commenting on this, Consul William Holmes in Bosna-Serai writes to Ambassador Sir Henry Bulwer that those promises rarely applied. He mentions that the Serbs, the biggest community were refused the right to build a church in Bosna-Serai. Concerning the right to buy land, he writes; «Every possible obstacle is still thrown in the way of the purchase of lands by Christians, and very often after they have succeeded in purchasing and improving land, it is no secret that on one unjust pretext or another, it has been taken from them.» Consul Longworth writes, from Belgrade on 1860 that by its Edicts the «Government may hasten such a reform but I question very much whether more evil than good will not arise from proclaiming a social equality which is, in the present stage of things and relations of society, morally impossible.» The biggest problem, in fact, was the refusal to accept either Christian or Jewish testimony in Islamic tribunals. Consul Longworth comments on «the lax and vicious principle acted upon in the Mussulman Courts, where, as the only means of securing justice to Christians, Mussulman false witnesses are permitted to give evidence on their behalf.» The situation didn’t change, and in 1875 the Grand Vizier Mahmud Pasha admitted to the British Ambassador in Constantinople, Sir Henry Elliot, the «impossibility of allowing Christian testimony at courts of justice in Bosnia.» Thus, the Ambassador noted: «The professed equality of Christians and Mussulmans is, however, so illusory so long as this distinction is maintained.» This juridical situation had serious consequences due to the system of justice, as he explained: «This is a point [the refusal of testimony] of much importance to the Christians, for, as the religious courts neither admit documentary nor written evidence, nor receive Christian evidence, they could hope for little justice from them.»

The difficulty of imposing reforms in such a vast empire provoked this disillusioned comment, from Sir Francis, consul-general, judge at the British Consular Court in 1875 Constantinople: «Indeed, the modern perversion of the Oriental idea of justice is a concession to a suitor through grace and favour, and not the declaration of a right, on principles of law, and in pursuance of equity.» From Consul Blunt writing from Pristina on 14 July 1860 to Ambassador Bulwer, we learn about the situation in the province of Macedonia: «[…] For a long time the province of Uscup [Skopje, Macedonia] has been a prey to brigandage: […] Christian churches and monasteries, towns and inhabitants, are now pillaged, massacred, and burnt by Albanian hordes as used to be done ten years ago.» «The Christians are not allowed to carry arms. This, considering the want of a good police, exposes them the more to attacks from brigands.» «Christian evidence in law suits between a Mussulman and a non-Mussulman is not admitted in the Local Courts.» Ten years before he said: «Churches were not allowed to be built; and one can judge of the measure of toleration practiced at that time by having had to creep under doors scarcely four feet high. It was an offence to smoke and ride before a Turk; to cross his path, or not stand up before him, was equally wrong.» […] Fifteen years later, in another report from Bosna-Serai, dated December 30, 1875, from consul Edward Freeman, we learn that the Bosnian Muslims had sent a petition to the sultan stating that before the reforms, «they lived as brother with the Christian population. In fact, wrote the Consul, «their aim appears to reduce the Christians to their former ancient state of serfdom.» So once again we go back to the myth. When reading the literature of the time, we see that the obstruction to Serbian, Greek and other Christian liberation movement was rooted in two main arguments:
1. Christian Dhimmis are congenitally unfitted for independence and self-government. They should therefore remain under the Islamic rule. 2. The Ottoman rule is a perfect model for a multi-religious and multi-ethnical society.

Indeed these are theological Islamic arguments that justify the JIHAD since all nonMuslim people should not retain political independence because their laws are evil and must be eventually replaced by the Islamic rule. We find the same reasoning in the Palestinian 1988 Covenant of the Hamas. Those arguments are very common in the theological and legal literature and are exposed by modern Islamists. Collusion The myth didn’t die with the collapse of the Turkish Empire after World War I. Rather it took another form: that of the National Arab Movement, which promoted an Arab society where Christians and Muslims would live in perfect harmony. Once again, this was the fabrication of European politicians, writers and clergyman. And in the same way as the myth of the Ottoman political paradise was created to block the independence of the Balkan nations, so the Arab multi-religious fraternity was an argument to destroy the national liberation of non-Arab peoples of the Middle East (Kurds, Armenians, Assyrians, Maronites and Zionists.) And although from the beginning of this century until the 1930s, a stream of Christian refugees were fleeing massacres and genocide on the roads of Turkey, Irak and Syria, the myth continued to flourish, sustained mostly by Arab writers and clergyman. After the Israelis had succeeded in liberating their land from the laws of JIHAD and DHIMMITUDE,

the myth reappeared in the form of a multi-cultural and multi-religious fraternal Palestine which had to replace the State of Israel (Cf. Arafat’s 1975 UN speech). Its pernicious effects led to the destruction of the Christians in Lebanon. One might have thought that the myth would end there. But suddenly the recent crisis in Yugoslavia offered a new chance for its reincarnation in a multi-religious Muslim Bosnian state. What a chance! A Muslim state again in the heartland of Europe. And we know the rest, the sufferings, the miseries, the trials of the war that this myth once again brought in its wake. To conclude, I would like to say a few last words. The civilisation of dhimmitude does not develop all at once. It is a long process that involves many elements and a specific conditioning. It happens when peoples replace history by myths, when they fight to uphold these destructive myths, more then their own values because they are confused by having transformed lies into truth. They hold to those myths as if they were the only guarantee of their survival, when, in fact, they are the path to destruction. Terrorised by the evidence and teaching of history, those peoples preferred to destroy it rather than to face it. They replace history with childish tales, thus living in amnesia.

Excerpt from author’s interview for daily Politika…. Politika: What is your experience in relation to Dhimmitude having in mind the fact that your are a Jew born in Egypt? Madam Bat Ye’Or: «I was witness of expulsion of the Jewish community from Egypt (85,000 persons). It was done in the ambient of hatred, terrorism, pillage and robbery. It started in 1945 and had its peak in 1948 and 1956. Anyhow, this is common experience of Jews in the entire Arab world. There used to be some 1,000,000 Jews there. Today only 10,000 remained. I wrote about it in one of my books. Contacts with Arab Christians helped me a lot in my strive to widen the understanding of the problem…»
Source: http://srpska-mreza.com/History/pre-wwOne/Ye_Or.html

Kosovo – Islamic Demographic Warfare from 1900 to present The new situation arising from the unilateral Kosovo declaration of independence shapes a new reality that will have multitude and mostly negative consequences for countless nations across the globe. It is important also to illuminate around the existence of the Kosovo issue as a demographic one, shaped by the expansion of one group of people (Albanian Muslims) versus the other one (Serbian Christians). Moreover the existence of facts on the ground as resulting from the population growth of the former, signify a real precedent for other regions in the world.[1] In 1913 when Kosovo & Metojia became a part of the Serbian state the population of Christians exceeded 50% , whilst the Albanians counted around 350,000 souls, approximately 40%, the rest being occupied by Roma, Bosniaks, Turks and people of mixed origin. A generation later in 1948, after WW2 that resulted in the killings of 20,000 Serbs and the expulsion of some other 150,000 by the Nazi Albanian collaborators, the balance tilted in favour of the Albanians. In addition, the Tito administration willingly opened up the border up to 1949 and accepted 150,000 illegal immigrants in order to deliberately change the population makeup of the province as a counter-measure against

the Serbs. Tito’s motto was “For a strong Yugoslavia we need a weak Serbia”. Thus, in 1961 the Albanians numbered 650,000 people, and the analogy was 65% Albanians, 28% Serbians. From that period onwards a dramatic –And basically unexplained- population expansion derived from the Albanian community. In the mid-60’s the Albanian population had a 6.5 children per woman ratio, whilst the Serbians around 2.5. Although the second number is enough to replace the previous generation, it was much less and that resulted in a virtual takeover of the land by the Albanians. In 1981 just after Tito’s death and the start of the first rebellions in Pristina, the Albanians numbered 1.2 million, a 100% increase in less than 20 years. The pressure exercised by them against the Serbian farmers that took the form of homicides, arsons, rapes and vandalism obliged to an exodus a considerable part of the Christian populous. [1] Since 13/06/1999, 350,000 Serbians, Roma, Gorani and other were forced to flee from Kosovo. It was a flight of survival, considering the 1,500 homicides against Serbs in the coming months, up to early 2000. Around 80 UNESCO “protected” Christian monuments were blown up by the Albanians in front of the eyes of 40,000 KFOR personnel. It has to be stressed once more that even during the days of the Ottoman Empire and the numerous battles in the eparchy, nowhere close did the destruction of shrines came that close. Another 1,300 Serbs were killed up to 2003, 80,000 houses and estates were grabbed by the Albanians along with 20,000 automobiles and 15,000 shops, barns and commercial property. Some other 30,000 houses were burned to the ground in wellorganised arson a campaigns another method regularly exercised by Kosovo-Albanians over the 20th century. It is also interesting to point out the situation in Pristina, the capital of Kosovo. Until 1999, Serbians constituted some 20% of the population. Nowadays there is a mere 0.1% having being entirely wiped out. In 2004 the last phase of the most recent genocide in a European soil (By Muslims against Christians) took place. In a space of 2 days, 27 Churches were burned to the ground, 7 Serbian villages, 40 people dead, 1,000 wounded and 4,000 refugees on their way to Serbia. Destruction of monasteries and churches in Kosovo[2] According to the data from the Serbian Orthodox Church, nearly 150 churches and monasteries have been destroyed for the last five years in Kosovo and Metochia, the cradle of Serbian Orthodoxy. Wahabism in Kosovo[3] In 2002, soon after the invasion of Albanian terrorists in Macedonia, the local government presented a 79 page report to the CIA, which highlighted the collaboration of Albanians and Al Qaida on the Balkans. Since 1999, in Kosovo, there have been built 24 Wahhabi mosques, 14 orphanages, and 24 elementary schools all sponsored by the Wahhabi network. The situation in Albania is similar where the religious leader is a disciple of the Wahhabi’s of Saudi Arabia.
Source: 1. http://bnp.org.uk/category/news/serbia-kosovo/ a. Images depicting destroyed Churches in Kosovo: http://www.interfax-religion.com/kosovo/#kosovo b. RADIO FREE EUROPE Research, RAD Background Report/186 (Yugoslavia), 4 August 1983 EMIGRATION AND DEMOGRAPHY IN KOSOVO, By Steve Reiquam: http://files.osa.ceu.hu/holdings/300/8/3/text/118-280.shtml c. Counter Punch Magazine, March 4, 2008. Kosovo and the Press, By MIKE AVERKO: http://www.counterpunch.org/averko03042008.html d. The Hamilton Spectator, February 25, 2008

Kosovo — A dangerous precedent, By Michael Biljetina: http://www.thespec.com/Opinions/article/329935 e. Arutz Sheva -Israel National News.com-, February 25 2008 Kosovo and Us, By Atty. Elyakim Haetzni: http://www.israelnationalnews.com/Articles/Article.aspx/7790 f. University of California, Berkeley-Departments of Anthropology and DemographyAnthropology Today 9 (1): 4-9, Feb 1993 Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland Demography and the Origins of the Yugoslav Civil War, By E. A. Hammel: http://www.demog.berkeley.edu/~gene/migr.html g. Videos of cultural genocide in Kosovo www.youtube.com/ Excerpts from “Albanian Nazi troops in WW2 Launched a Wide Spread Terror Against Kosovo Serbs” By Carl Kosta Savich: http://www.michaelsavage.com/kosovo-genocide.html Supplement: Demographic indicators for Kosovo I. EMIGRATION AND DEMOGRAPHY IN KOSOVO, By Steve Reiquam http://files.osa.ceu.hu/holdings/300/8/3/text/118-2-80.shtml “498,000 (68.5%) in 1948; 647,000 (67.2%) in 1961; 916,000 (73.7%) in 1971; and 1,227,000 (77.5%) in 1981. (Albanian population) The Serbian population of Kosovo, in contrast, increased in only absolute terms (171,000, 189,000, 227,000, and 228,000 in 1948, 1953, 1961, and 1971, respectively), while initially stagnating and then declining in relative terms (23.6%, 23.5%, 23.6%, and 18.4%). By 1981, however, there were 209,792 Serbs in Kosovo, comprising only 13.2% of the total population. Therefore, between 1971 and 1981, the number of Serbs in Kosovo decreased by 18,472 in absolute terms.” “The Montenegrin population of Kosovo increased during the first three censuses after World War II (28,000, 31,000, and 37,000 in 1948, 1951, and 1961, respectively), while in 1971 and 1981 their total population dropped first to 31,500 in 1971 and then to 26,000 in 1981. In 1981 the Montenegrins accounted for only 1.7% of the total Kosovo population. The pressure exerted on Serbs and Montenegrins by Albanians, including “many cases of physical attack, attempted rape, damage to crops, [and the] desecration of Serbian monuments and gravestones,” has created a tense atmosphere conducive to Slav emigration from the area.” II. http://www.vor.ru/Kosovo/history_eng.html “Kosovo was annexed to Serbia after the Balkan war of 1912-1913 when the number of Serbs and Albanians was nearly equal. Albanians began to arrive in Kosovo in great numbers during the Second World War after the province was occupied by the Nazis. Thousands of Serbs and Montenegrins were forced to leave Kosovo while Albanians came to settle there from Albania.”ХA III. http://www.eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/20/1132.html “Before WWII, there were approximately an equal number of Serbs and Albanians living in Kosovo” IV) http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/balkans/overview/kosovo.htm “By the time the Serbs reclaimed Kosovo in the Balkans Wars of 1912 to 1913, ethnic Albanians made up a significant portion of the population. They became a majority by the 1950s as their birth rate boomed and Serbs continued to migrate north” 2. http://www.interfax-religion.com/kosovo/#kosovo 3. http://iseef.net/latest/wahhabism-in-bih-1.html

1.28 Palestine for the Syrians? By Daniel Pipes The terms; Palestine and Palestinians are Islamic imperialist phenomenon. There is no such thing as a Palestinian people. Before 1948, they were referred to as Syrians. There was only Syria. The Palestinian phenomenon was created with the intention to justify Jihad. During a meeting with leaders of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) in 1976, Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad referred to Palestine as a region of Syria, as Southern Syria. He then went on to tell the Palestinians: «You do not represent Palestine as much as we do. Do not forget one thing: there is no Palestinian people, no Palestinian entity, there is only Syria! You are an integral part of the Syrian people and Palestine is an integral part of Syria. Therefore it is we, the Syrian authorities, who are the real representatives of the Palestinian people.» Although unusually candid, this outburst exemplifies a long tradition of Syrian politics, and one that has gained increasing importance in recent years. The Asad government presents itself as not just an Arab state protecting the rights of the Palestinians but as the rightful ruler of the land that Israel controls. According to this view, the existing republic of Syria is but a truncated part of the Syrian lands; accordingly, the government in Damascus has a duty to unite all Syrian regions, including Palestine, under its control. The growth in Syrian military capabilities in recent years makes these ambitions a major source of instability throughout the Levant. Indeed, the Syrian claim to «Southern Syria» has become central to the Arab-Israeli conflict; Syrian has become not only Israel’s principal opponent, but also the PLO’s. Damascus is likely to retain this role for many years, certainly as long as Hafiz al-Asad lives, and probably longer. When Asad uses the term Southern Syria, he implicitly harks back to the old meaning of the name «Syria.» Historically, «Syria» (Suriya or Sham in Arabic) refers to a region far larger than the Syrian Arab Republic of today. At a minimum, historic Syria stretches from Anatolia to Egypt, and from Iraq to the Mediterranean Sea. In terms of today’s political geography, it comprises all of four states-Syria, Jordan, Israel, and Lebanon-as well as the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and substantial portions of south-eastern Turkey. To distinguish this territory from the present Syrian state, it is known as Greater Syria. Until 1920, Syria meant Greater Syria to everyone, European and Middle Easterner alike; For example, an early nineteenth-century Egyptian historian, ‘Abd ar-Rahman al-Jabarti, referred to the inhabitants of El Arish in the Sinai Peninsula as Syrians. Palestine was called Southern Syria first in French, then in other languages, including Arabic. The 1840 Convention of London called the area around Akko «the southern part of Syria» and the 11th edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica (published in 1911) explains that Palestine «may be said generally to denote the southern third of the province of Syria.» These examples could be multiplied a thousand-fold. Creating a separate Palestinian state is as ridiculous as creating a separate state called Kosovo. There are only two rightful claimants of Kosovo. Albania and Serbia. Just like Syria and Israel in the Palestinian conflict.
Source: http://www.danielpipes.org/article/174

1.29 Overview – Historical acts of high treason by European Governments Self interest and treason It’s apparent that nations who act in accordance with their own short term goals alone show no consideration for historical perspectives. Where there should be a joint anti-Jihad action by the affected nations there is no action, no consultation, no planning, just short term self interest. Historical examples — Europe’s refusal to aid Christian protectorates in the Middle East. — Europe’s refusal to aid the Christian Byzantine Empire against the Jihadi invasions. — The Venetians refusal to side with the Serbians against the Ottoman invasions (Svemirko’s note). — Napoleon invades Egypt in 1798 and takes control over Christian Malta and Christian Palestine. However, Britain fights France defending the Ottomans. Napoleon withdraws, the Turks regain Egypt, and Britain is rewarded with Malta. — The Ottomans lose more lands from their crumbling Empire. During the series of wars between 1806 and 1812, the Russians crush the Ottomans, who sign the Treaty of Bucharest. One day after the Treaty, Napoleon attacks Russia. — In 1854 Britain and France along with the Ottomans go to war against Russia in the Crimean Peninsula. The allied forces defeat Russia and impose heavy conditions in the Treaty of Paris, signed in 1856. — Bosnia revolts against the taxation in 1875 and Bulgaria follows in 1876 to become free from the Ottomans. The Turks ruthlessly massacre more than 12 000 men, women and children in Bulgaria, and thousands more all over the Balkans. The Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca of 1774 gave Russia the right to interfere in Ottoman affairs to protect the Sultan’s Christian subjects. The British Government defends the Ottoman actions, and a furious Russia declares war. The war of 1877-78 takes place in the Balkans and on the Caucasus fronts. The Russians along with other volunteer ethnic armies deal the Ottomans a crushing defeat. — In March of 1878 and under pressure from Britain, Russia enters into a settlement under the Treaty of San Stefano, in which the Ottoman Empire recognises the independence of Romania, Serbia, Montenegro, and autonomy of Bulgaria. — For commercial and political interests in mind, Britain’s Disraeli and the Austrians insist that a new treaty be drawn up in June of that year, at a congress of powers in Berlin. At the Congress of Berlin, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro were recognised as independent. And autonomous Bulgaria was greatly reduced and the Austro-Hungarian Empire occupies Bosnia-Herzegovina. An Armenian delegation headed by Bishop Mkrtich Khrimian is sent with a formal request for implementation of the reforms for Armenians. Germany’s Bismarck dismisses the delegation and refuses them a place on the agenda. Britain secretly agrees with the Ottoman Empire that it would militarily protect it from Russia and receives Cyprus in exchange.

Disraeli reverses article 16 to 61, which returns two Armenian provinces with no Russians or Europeans to protect the Armenians. It leaves the same abusing Sultan as the “guarantor” of their security from Muslim continuing abuses. — After the Russo-Turkish War, the treatment of the more than 2,5 million Armenians by the Ottoman Government became an international issue. Despite the promises of reform by the Sublime Porte at the Congress of Berlin, the situation even grew worse. — 1945-> After the war the Soviet Union attempts to annul the Treaty of Kars with Turkey and return parts of Northwestern Armenia. These efforts are halted by intervention from Winston Churchill and Harry S. Truman. — The close relationship with the United States begins with the Second Cairo Conference in December 4-6, 1943 and the agreement of July 12, 1947 which implements the Truman Doctrine. After 1945, in light of the Soviet domination over Eastern Europe, the US supports Greece and Turkey with economic and military aid to prevent their falling into the Soviet sphere. The act grant Turkey more than 100 million USD in aid. — On June 25, 1950 the Korean War starts. Despite being criticised inside Turkey, the Army along with other 16 nations goes to war against North Korea. Turkey participates in this campaign in order to gain membership in NATO, which Turkey joins in 1952. The Bulgarian- Turkish Plot Bulgaria, half Turkish itself, entered into the plot to exterminate the Greek Christians, by signing a pact with Turkey, at Adrianople in June, 1915. Under this agreement Bulgaria consented to the establishment of a Turco-Bulgar commercial union as the complement of the political union, the seizure of the commerce of the Orient from the hands of the Greeks, (3) the establishment in the Orient of Moslem agencies for the importation and exportation of goods for the exclusive use of Moslems, who were to break of all commercial relations with the Greeks, a restriction of the privileges of the Greek Patriarch and his ecclesiastical jurisdiction, the prohibition of the teaching of Greek in future, (6) the conversion by force of the people in the Christian settlements and the imposition of mixed marriages. Germany the Author of the Massacres Herr Lepsius, a German Envoy who had been sent to Constantinople on a special mission in July, 1915, acknowledged that the Greek and Armenian massacres were two phases of a single program of extermination of the Christian elements, intended to make Turkey a purely Moslem state. That Germany was the author and inspiration of these massacres of Christians became known in 1917. The Greek Minister at Constantinople, M. Kallerghis, had protested the Turkish Grand Vizier, Talaat Bey, against the deportations of the Greeks in the Aival district. Talaat Bey promised to telegraph to the German General Liman von Sanders, telling him to cease the deportations. Von Sanders, who was in fact Commander-in-Chief of all the Turkish forces, replied that if the deportations ceased, he would not guarantee the safety of the Turkish Army, adding that they had referred the matter to the German Grand Headquarters Staff, who entirely approved of his action.

France supporting the Ottoman Empire France sided with Islam in the 16 and 17 centuries when they actively helped the Ottoman Empire against Spain and Austria. Examples of this: Kheir-ad-Din Barbarossa harboured his fleet in Marseilles. Most notably the French did not go to help Vienna against the Ottomans in 1683, but launched a military campaign of conquest in German lands. More recent and ongoing acts of treason

— Europe’s (especially Frances) refusal to aid Christian Lebanon militarily against — Europe’s refusal to aid Christian Sudan, Nigeria etc. militarily against African Jihad. Implementation of the EU’s Eurabia project (European multiculturalism) NATO bombing of Serb forces in 1999. Support to the Global Islamic Ummah (Palestinians) etc. Europe’s unwillingness to to assist their Christian cousins in a range of conflicts; Middle East, Asia, Africa. Europe’s unwillingness to to assist fellow Europeans in South Africa, Rhodesia and other ex-colonies 3060 (probably close to 10 000+) European South Africans have been massacred since the old regime fell. The US pressure for Turkeys EU membership. The granting of NATO membership to Albania in 2009. US and EU export of modern weapons to Muslim countries; Pakistan, SaudiArabia, Iraq, UAE, Kuwait, Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, Oman, Marocco, Yemen and Tunisia. Middle Eastern Jihad.

1.30 Further studies The Jihad and Islamisation of Sindh (Pakistan) Muhammad bin Qasim Al-Thaqafi (695–715), born Muhammad bin Qasim bin Yusuf Sakifi, was a Syrian general who conquered the Sindh and Punjab regions along the Indus river (now a part of Pakistan). The conquest of Sindh and Punjab began the Islamic era in South Asia and continues to lend the Sindh province of Pakistan the name Bab-eIslam (The Gateway of Islam)

Great database/resources/investigation into the crimes of communism: Original link (Spanish): www.alerta360.org English translation through Google translater:
http://translate.google.com/translate?js=y&prev=_t&hl=en&ie=UTF-8&layout=1&eotf=1&u=http%3A%2F %2Fwww.alerta360.org%2F&sl=es&tl=en

Knights Templar studies Resources There are a great number of books in print relating to the Templars, past Crusades and medieval history. A majority are historical publications are based on archaeological and chronicled evidence. Many of these publications are available through the Freemasons libraries worldwide while others can be acquired through Amazon.com. Although a majority of modern chivalric organisations function mostly as symbolic charities they are renowned for their thorough studies of historical works. Places of interest I would strongly advice all Justiciar Knights to visit Valetta, Malta and Jerusalem, Israel and to visit all the Knights Templar historical sites. There are various Templar buildings in several European countries; France the UK, Portugal, Spain, Italy etc.

2. Europe Burning (Book 2)
In this book we review and analyse Europe’s current problems. We will also look at possible solutions
“You shall know the truth and the truth shall make you mad.” Aldous Huxley

2.1 EU’s Eurabia Project (The Eurabia Code) — Documenting EU’s deliberate strategy to Islamise Europe EU’s Eurabia Project – Documenting the EU’s deliberate strategy to gradually Islamise Europe. The Eurabia Code is a developed work of what Bat Ye’or’ started in her groundbreaking book Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis. Eurabia: Arab League states, current and prospective European Union members and Israel. By Fjordman I decided to write this essay after a comment from a journalist, not a Leftist by my country’s standards, who dismissed Eurabia as merely a conspiracy theory, one on a par with The Protocols of the Elders of Zion. I do not disagree with the fact that conspiracy theories exist, nor that they can be dangerous. After all, the Protocols and the Dolchstosslegende, or «stab in the back myth» — the idea that Germany didn’t lose WW1 but was betrayed by Socialists, intellectuals and Jews helped pave the way for Adolf Hitler and the Nazis before WW2. However, what puzzles me is that it is a widely-held belief of many (not just in the Islamic world but in Europe and even in the United States) that the terror attacks that brought down the Twin Towers in New York City on September 11th 2001 were really a controlled demolition staged by the American government and then blamed on Muslims. I have seen this thesis talked about many times in Western media. While it is frequently (though not always) dismissed and mocked, it is least mentioned. In contrast, Eurabia — which asserts that the Islamisation of Europe didn’t happen merely by accident but with the active participation of European political leaders — is hardly ever referred to at all, despite the fact that it is easier to document. Does the notion of Eurabia hit too close to home? Perhaps it doesn’t fit with the anti-American disposition of many journalists? Curiously enough, even those left-leaning journalists who are otherwise critical of the European Union because of its free market elements never write about Eurabia.

Because of this, I am going to test whether the Eurabia thesis is correct, or at least plausible. I have called this project The Eurabia Code, alluding to author Dan Brown’s massive bestseller The Da Vinci Code. Brown’s fictional account «documents» a conspiracy by the Church to cover up the truth about Jesus. I’m not sure my work will become equally popular, but I’m pretty sure it’s closer to reality. The next time Mr. Brown wants to write about massive conspiracies in Europe, he would be well-advised to set his eyes at Brussels rather than Rome. It would be a whole lot more interesting. What follows is a brief outline of the thesis put forward by writer Bat Ye’or in her book Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis. My information is based on her book (which should be read in full). In addition I have drawn from some of her articles and interviews. I republish the information with her blessing, but this summary is completely my own. In an interview with Israeli newspaper Haaretz, Bat Ye’or explained how French President Charles de Gaulle, disappointed by the loss of the French colonies in Africa and the Middle East as well as with France’s waning influence in the international arena, decided in the 1960’s to create a strategic alliance with the Arab and Muslim world to compete with the dominance of the United States and the Soviet Union. «This is a matter of a total transformation of Europe, which is the result of an intentional policy,» said Bat Ye’or. «We are now heading towards a total change in Europe, which will be more and more Islamicised and will become a political satellite of the Arab and Muslim world. The European leaders have decided on an alliance with the Arab world, through which they have committed to accept the Arab and Muslim approach toward the United States and Israel. This is not only with respect to foreign policy, but also on issues engaging European society from within, such as immigration, the integration of the immigrants and the idea that Islam is part of Europe.» «Europe is under a constant threat of terror. Terror is a way of applying pressure on the European countries to surrender constantly to the Arab representatives’ demands. They demand, for example, that Europe always speak out for the Palestinians and against Israel.» Thus, the Eurabian project became an enlarged vision of the anti-American Gaullist policy dependent upon the formation of a Euro-Arab entity hostile to American influence. It facilitated European ambitions to maintain important spheres of influence in the former European colonies, while opening huge markets for European products in the Arab world, especially in oil-producing countries, in order to secure supplies of petroleum and natural gas to Europe. In addition, it would make the Mediterranean a Euro-Arab inland sea by favoring Muslim immigration and promoting multiculturalism with a strong Islamic presence in Europe. The use of the term «Eurabia» was first introduced in the mid-1970s, as the title of a journal edited by the President of the Association for Franco-Arab Solidarity, Lucien Bitterlein, and published collaboratively by the Groupe d’Etudes sur le Moyen-Orient (Geneva), France-Pays Arabes (Paris), and the Middle East International (London). Their articles called for common Euro-Arab positions at every level. These concrete proposals were not the musings of isolated theorists; instead they put forth concrete policy decisions conceived in conjunction with, and actualised by, European state leaders and European Parliamentarians. During a November 27, 1967 press conference, Charles de Gaulle stated openly that French cooperation with the Arab world had become «the fundamental basis of our foreign policy.» By January 1969, the Second International Conference in Support of the Arab Peoples, held in Cairo, in its resolution 15, decided «…to form special parliamentary groups, where they did not exist, and to use the parliamentary platform support of the Arab people and the Palestinian resistance.» Five years later in Paris, July 1974, the

Parliamentary Association for Euro-Arab Cooperation was created, under the Euro-Arab Dialogue rubric. Bat Ye’or has highlighted this shared Euro-Arab political agenda. The first step was the construction of a common foreign policy. France was the driving force in this unification, which had already been envisaged by General de Gaulle’s inner circle and Arab politicians. The Arab states demanded from Europe access to Western science and technology, European political independence from the United States, European pressure on the United States to align with their Arab policy and demonisation of Israel as a threat to world peace, as well as measures favorable to Arab immigration and dissemination of Islamic culture in Europe. This cooperation would also included recognition of the Palestinians as a distinct people and the PLO and its leader Arafat as their representative. Up to 1973 they had been known only as Arab refugees, even by other Arabs. The concept of a Palestinian «nation» simply did not exist. During the 1973 oil crisis, the Arab members of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries announced that, due to the ongoing Yom Kippur War between Israel and its Arab neighbours Egypt and Syria, OPEC would no longer ship petroleum to Western nations that supported Israel. The sudden increase in oil prices was had lasting effects. Not only did it create a strong influx of petrodollars to countries such as Saudi Arabia, which permitted the Saudis to fund a worldwide Islamic resurgence, but it also had an impact in the West, especially in Europe. However, Arab leaders had to sell their oil. Their people are very dependent on European economic and technological aid. The Americans made this point during the oil embargo in 1973. According to Ye’or, although the oil factor certainly helped cement the Euro-Arab Dialogue, it was primarily a pretext to cover up a policy that emerged in France before that crisis occurred. The policy, conceived in the 1960s, had strong antecedents in the French 19th-century dream of governing an Arab empire. This political agenda has been reinforced by the deliberate cultural transformation of Europe. Euro-Arab Dialogue Symposia conducted in Venice (1977) and Hamburg (1983) included recommendations that have been successfully implemented. These recommendations were accompanied by a deliberate, privileged influx of Arab and other Muslim immigrants into Europe in enormous numbers. The recommendations included:
1. Coordination of the efforts made by the Arab countries to spread the Arabic language and culture in Europe, 2. Creation of joint Euro-Arab Cultural Centers in European capitals, 3. The necessity of supplying European institutions and universities with Arab teachers specialised in teaching Arabic to Europeans, and 4. The necessity of cooperation between European and Arab specialists in order to present a positive picture of Arab-Islamic civilisation and contemporary Arab issues to the educated public in Europe.

These agreements could not be set forth in written documents and treaties due to their politically sensitive and fundamentally undemocratic nature. The European leaders thus carefully chose to call their ideas «dialogue.» All meetings, committees and working groups included representatives from European Community nations and the European

Council along with members from Arab countries and the Arab League. Proceedings and decisions took place in closed sessions. No official minutes were recorded. The Euro-Arab Dialogue (EAD) is a political, economic and cultural institution designed to ensure perfect cohesion between Europeans and Arabs. Its structure was set up at conferences in Copenhagen (15 December 1973), and Paris (31 July 1974). The principal agent of this policy is the European Parliamentary Association for Euro-Arab Cooperation, founded in 1974. The other principal organs of The Dialogue are the MEDEA Institute and the European Institute of Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperation, created in 1995 with the backing of the European Commission. In an interview with Jamie Glazov of Frontpage Magazine, Ye’or explained how «in domestic policy, the EAD established a close cooperation between the Arab and European media television, radio, journalists, publishing houses, academia, cultural centers, school textbooks, student and youth associations, tourism. Church interfaith dialogues were determinant in the development of this policy. Eurabia is therefore this strong Euro-Arab network of associations — a comprehensive symbiosis with cooperation and partnership on policy, economy, demography and culture.» Eurabia’s driving force, the Parliamentary Association for Euro-Arab Cooperation, was created in Paris in 1974. It now has over six hundred members — from all major European political parties — active in their own national parliaments, as well as in the European parliament. France continues to be the key protagonist of this association. A wide-ranging policy was sketched out. It entailed a symbiosis of Europe with the Muslim Arab countries that would endow Europe — and especially France, the project’s prime mover — with a weight and a prestige to rival that of the United States. This policy was undertaken quite discreetly, and well outside of official treaties, using the innocentsounding name of the Euro-Arab Dialogue. The organisation functioned under the auspices of European government ministers, working in close association with their Arab counterparts, and with the representatives of the European Commission and the Arab League. The goal was the creation of a pan-Mediterranean entity, permitting the free circulation both of men and of goods. On the cultural front there began a complete re-writing of history, which was first undertaken during the 1970s in European universities. This process was ratified by the parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe in September 1991, at its meeting devoted to «The Contribution of the Islamic Civilisation to European culture.» It was reaffirmed by French President Jacques Chirac in his address of April 8, 1996 in Cairo, and reinforced by Romano Prodi, president of the powerful European Commission, the EU’s «government,» and later Italian Prime Minister, through the creation of a Foundation on the Dialogue of Cultures and Civilisations. This foundation was to control everything said, written and taught about Islam in Europe. Over the past three decades, the EEC and the EU’s political and cultural organisations have invented a fantasy Islamic civilisation and history. The historical record of violations of basic human rights for all non- Muslims and women under sharia (Islamic Law) is either ignored or dismissed. In this worldview the only dangers come from the United States and Israel. The creators of Eurabia have conducted a successful propaganda campaign against these two countries in the European media. This fabrication was made easier by pre-existing currents of anti-Semitism and anti-Americanism in parts of Europe, although both sentiments have been greatly inflated by Eurabians and their collaborators. On January 31, 2001, with the recrudescence of Palestinian terrorist jihad, European Foreign Affairs Commissioner Chris Patten declared to the European Parliament that Europe’s foreign policy should give special attention to its southern flank (the Arab

countries, in EU jargon), adding that he was delighted by the general agreement to give greater visibility to the Mediterranean Partnership. Bat Ye’or thinks that «Our politicians are perfectly informed of Islamic history and current policies by their embassies, agents and specialists. There is no innocence there, but tremendous inflexibility in corruption, cynicism and the perversion of values.» In the preface to her book, she states that «This book describes Europe’s evolution from a Judeo-Christian civilisation, with important post-Enlightenment secular elements, into a post- Judeo-Christian civilisation that is subservient to the ideology of jihad and the Islamic powers.» The new European civilisation in the making can correctly be termed a »civilisation of dhimmitude.» The word dhimmitude comes from the Koranic word »dhimmi.» It refers to the subjugated, non-Muslim individuals who accept restrictive and humiliating subordination to Islamic power in order to avoid enslavement or death. The entire Muslim world as we know it today is a product of this 1,300 year-old jihad dynamic, whereby once thriving non-Muslim majority civilisations have been reduced to a state of dysfunction and dhimmitude. The dhimmis are inferior beings who endure humiliation and aggression in silence. This arrangement allows Muslims to enjoy an impunity that increases both their hatred and their feeling of superiority, under the protection of the law. Eurabia is a novel new entity. It possesses political, economic, religious, cultural, and media components, which are imposed on Europe by powerful governmental lobbies. While Europeans live within Eurabia’s constraints, outside of a somewhat confused awareness, few are really conscious of them on a daily basis. This Eurabian policy, expressed in obscure wording, is conducted at the highest political levels and coordinated over the whole of the European Union. It spreads an antiAmerican and anti-Semitic Euro-Arab sub-culture into the fiber of every social, media and cultural sector. Dissidents are silenced or boycotted. Sometimes they are fired from their jobs, victims of a totalitarian «correctness» imposed mainly by the academic, media and political sectors. According to Ye’or, France and the rest of Western Europe can no longer change their policy: «It is a project that was conceived, planned and pursued consistently through immigration policy, propaganda, church support, economic associations and aid, cultural, media and academic collaboration. Generations grew up within this political framework; they were educated and conditioned to support it and go along with it.»

Are Bat Ye’or’s claims correct, or even possible? Bernard Lewis has pointed out that, by common consent among historians, «the modern history of the Middle East begins in the year 1798, when the French Revolution arrived in Egypt in the form of a small expeditionary force led by a young general called Napoleon Bonaparte-who conquered and then ruled it for a while with appalling ease.» In an unsuccessful effort to gain the support of the Egyptian populace, Napoleon issued [1] proclamations praising Islam. «People of Egypt,» he proclaimed upon his entry to Alexandria in 1798, «You will be told that I have come to destroy your religion; do not believe it! Reply that I have come to restore your rights, to punish the usurpers, and that more than the Mamluks, I respect God, his Prophet, and the Qur’an.»

According to an eyewitness, Napoleon ended his proclamation with the phrase, «God is great and Muhammad is his prophet.» To Muslim ears, this sounded like the shahada the declaration of belief in the oneness of Allah and in Prophet Muhammad as his last messenger. Recitation of the shahadah, the first of the five pillars of Islam, is considered to mark one’s conversion to Islam. Muslims could thus conclude that Napoleon had converted to Islam [2]. In fact, one of his generals, Jacques Menou, did convert to Islam. The French were later defeated and forced to leave Egypt by the English admiral Lord Nelson. Although the French expedition to Egypt lasted only three years, it demonstrated that the West was now so superior to the Islamic world that Westerners could enter the Arab heartland, then still a part of the Ottoman Empire, at will. Only another Western power could force them to leave. The shock of this realisation triggered the first attempts to reform Islam in the 19th century. A positive result of Western conquest was the influx of French scientists into Egypt and the foundation of modern Egyptology. Most importantly, it led to the discovery of the Rosetta Stone, which was later used by French philologist Jean-Francois Champollion to decipher the ancient Egyptian hieroglyphs. However, the encounter also left a lasting impact in Europe, and above all in France. The French invasion of Algeria in 1830 marked another chapter in this tale. Later, the French ruled Tunisia and Morocco. Finally, after the First World War, the French gained mandates over the former Turkish territories of the Ottoman Empire that make up what is now Syria and Lebanon. After the Second World War, French troops gradually left Arab lands, culminating with war and Algerian independence in 1962. However, their long relationship with Arabs resulted in France’s belief that she had a special relationship with and an understanding of Arabs and Muslims. Along with French leadership in continental Europe, this would now provide the basis of a new foreign policy. President de Gaulle pushed for a France and a Europe independent of the two superpowers. In a speech, he stated that «Yes, it is Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals, it is Europe, it is the whole of Europe, that will decide the destiny of the world.» In 1966, he withdrew France from the common NATO military command, but remained within the organisation. Following the Six Days War in 1967, de Gaulle’s condemnation of the Israelis for their occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip marked a significant change in French foreign policy. Previously, France — as well as the rest of Western Europe — had been strongly pro-Israel, even going to war together with Israel as late as 1956 against Nasser’s Egypt. From 1967 on, however, France embarked on a decidedly pro-Arab course. It has been said that English foreign policy has remained the same since the 16th century. Its goal was to prevent any country, whether Spain, France, or later Germany, from dominating continental Europe to the extent that it represents a threat to England. On the other hand, one could argue that French foreign policy has also remained the same for several centuries; its goal is to champion French leadership over Europe and the Mediterranean region in order to contain Anglo-Saxon (and later Anglo-American) dominance. This picture was complicated by the unification of Germany in the late 19th century, but its outlines remain to this day. Napoleon is the great hero of French PM de Villepin. Several prominent French leaders stated quite openly in 2005 that the proposed EU Constitution was basically an enlarged France. Justice Minister Dominique Perben said: «We have finally obtained this ‘Europe a la francaise’ that we have awaited for so long. This constitutional treaty is an enlarged France. It is a Europe written in French.»

From its inception, European integration has been [3] a French-led enterprise. The fact that the French political elite have never renounced the maintenance of their leadership over Europe was amply demonstrated during the Iraq war. President Chirac famously said in 2003 after Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic backed the US position «They missed a good opportunity to shut up,» adding «These countries have been not very well behaved and rather reckless of the danger of aligning themselves too rapidly with the American position.» Jean Monnet, French economist never elected to public office, is regarded by many as the architect of European integration. Monnet was a well-connected pragmatist who worked behind the scenes towards the gradual creation of European unity. Richard North, publisher of the blog EU Referendum [4] and co-author (with Christopher Booker) of The Great Deception: Can The European Union Survive, relates that for years — at least from the 1920s — Jean Monnet had dreamed of building a «United States of Europe.» Although what Monnet really had in mind was the creation of a European entity with all the attributes of a state, an «anodyne phrasing was deliberately chosen with a view to making it difficult to dilute by converting it into just another intergovernmental body. It was also couched in this fashion so that it would not scare off national governments by emphasising that its purpose was to override their sovereignty.» In their analysis of the EU’s history, the authors claim that the EU was not born out of WW2, as many people seem to think. It had been planned at least a generation before that. The Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950, widely presented as the beginning of the efforts towards a European Union and commemorated in «Europe Day,» contains phrases which state that it is «a first step in the federation of Europe», and that «this proposal will lead to the realisation of the first concrete foundation of a European federation.» However, as critics of the EU have noted, these political objectives are usually omitted when the Declaration is referred to, and most people are unaware of their existence. A federation is, of course, a State and «yet for decades now the champions of EC/EU integration have been swearing blind that they have no knowledge of any such plans. The EEC/EC/EU has steadily acquired ever more features of a supranational Federation: flag, anthem, Parliament, Supreme Court, currency, laws.» The EU founders «were careful only to show their citizens the benign features of their project. It had been designed to be implemented incrementally, as an ongoing process, so that no single phase of the project would arouse sufficient opposition as to stop or derail it.» Booker and North call the European Union «a slow-motion coup d’etat: the most spectacular coup d’etat in history,» designed to gradually and carefully sideline the democratic process and subdue the older nation states of Europe without saying so publicly. The irony is that France is now held hostage [5] by the very forces she herself set in motion. The Jihad riots by Muslim immigrants in France in 2005 demonstrated that Eurabia is no longer a matter of French foreign policy, it is now French domestic policy. France will burn unless she continues to appease Arabs and agree to their agenda. The growth of the Islamic population is explosive. According to some, one out of three babies born in France is a Muslim. Hundreds of Muslim ghettos already de facto follow sharia, not French law. Some believe France will quietly become a Muslim country, while others are predicting a civil war in the near future.

Maybe there is some poetic justice in the fact that the country that initiated and has led the formation of Eurabia will now be destroyed by its own Frankenstein monster. However, gloating over France’s dilemma won’t help. The impending downfall of France is bad news for the rest of the West. What will happen to French financial resources? Above all, who will inherit hundreds of nuclear warheads? Will these weapons fall into the hands of Jihadist Muslims, too? MEDEA (the European Institute for Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperation), supported by the European Commission, is one of the key components of the Euro-Arab dialogue. On its own webpage, it states that: «The Euro-Arab Dialogue as a forum shared by the European Community and the League of Arab States arose out of a French initiative and was launched at the European Council in Copenhagen in December 1973, shortly after the «October War» and the oil embargo. As the Europeans saw it, it was to be a forum to discuss economic affairs, whereas the Arab side saw it rather as one to discuss political affairs. MEDEA Institute wishes to be a resource and a reference point for people wanting to engage in the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue. Via its meetings and talks the Institute seeks to create exchanges between political, economic, and diplomatic players, experts, journalists, academics and others.» As Bat Ye’or points out, while most of the workings of Eurabia are hidden from the public view, sometimes we can catch glimpses of it if we know what to look for. If you search the archives of the MEDEA website and other sources and read the documents carefully, the information is there. Even more material exists on paper, both in French and in English. I argue, as does Bat Ye’or, that there are sufficient amounts of information available to validate the thesis of Eurabia. One of the documents Bat Ye’or was kind enough to send me (which she mentions in the French version of her book about Eurabia but not in the English version) is the Common Strategy of the European Council — Vision of the EU for the Mediterranean Region, from June 19th 2000. It includes many recommendations, such as:
«to elaborate partnership-building measures, notably by promoting regular consultations and exchanges of information with its Mediterranean partners, support the interconnection of infrastructure between Mediterranean partners, and between them and the EU, take all necessary measures to facilitate and encourage the involvement of civil society as well as the further development of human exchanges between the EU and the Mediterranean partners. NGOs will be encouraged to participate in cooperation at bilateral and regional levels. Particular attention will be paid to the media and universities [my emphasis].»

It also includes the goal of assisting the Arab partners with «the process of achieving free trade with the EU.» This may be less innocent than it sounds, as I will come back to later. The Strategy also wants to «pursue, in order to fight intolerance, racism and xenophobia, the dialogue between cultures and civilisations.» Notice that this statement preceded both the start of the second Palestinian intifada as well as the terror attacks of September 11th 2001. It was thus part of an ongoing process, rather than a response to any particular international incident. One point in the document is particularly interesting. The EU wanted to «promote the identification of correspondences between legal systems of different inspirations in order

to resolve civil law problems relating to individuals: laws of succession and family law, including divorce.» In plain English, it is difficult to see this bureaucratic obfuscation as anything other than an indicator that the EU countries will be lenient, adjusting their secular legislation to the sharia requirements of Muslim immigrants in family matters. In another document from December 2003, which is available online, Javier Solana, the Secretary General of the Council of the European Union, Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission and Chris Patten, member of the European Commission, have signed a plan for «Strengthening the EU’s Partnership with the Arab World.» This includes the creation of a free trade area, but also plans to «invigorate cultural/religious/civilisation and media dialogue using existing or planned instruments, including the planned Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue of Cultures and Civilisations. Arab immigrants make a substantial contribution to the development of Europe. The EU is firmly committed to fight all manifestations of racism and discrimination in all its forms. [What constitutes discrimination? Secular laws?] Full respect for the rights of immigrants in Europe is a consistent policy throughout Europe. Its implementation should be improved further and co-operation in the framework of existing agreements should be enhanced to take into account the concerns of Arab partners.» Super-Eurocrat Romano Prodi wants more cooperation with Arab countries. He talks about a free trade zone with the Arab world, but this implies that Arab countries would enjoy access to the four freedoms of the EU’s inner market, which includes the free movement of people across national borders. This fact, the potentially massive implications of establishing an «inner market» with an Arab world with a booming population growth, is virtually NEVER debated or even mentioned in European media. Yet it could mean the end of Europe as we once knew it. Another statement [6] from the «Sixth Euro-Med Ministerial Conference: reinforcing and bringing the Partnership forward» in Brussels, 28 November 2003, makes the intention of this internal Euro-Mediterranean market:
«This initiative offers the EU’s neighbouring partners, in exchange for tangible political and economic reforms, gradual integration into the expanded European internal market and the possibility of ultimately reaching the EU’s four fundamental freedoms: free movement of goods, services, capital and people [my emphasis]. Ministers are also expected to back the Commission’s proposal1 to set up a Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue of Cultures, a Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly.»

In June 2006, then newly elected Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi stated that [7]: «It’s time to look south and relaunch a new policy of cooperation for the Mediterranean.» Prodi was outlining a joint Italian-Spanish initiative which sought to provide countries facing the Mediterranean with «different» political solutions from those offered in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. The prime minister then explained that the Barcelona Process — whose best known aspect is the creation of a free trade zone by 2010 — was no longer sufficient and a new different approach was needed. «The countries on the southern shores of the Mediterranean expect that from us» he added. Notice how Prodi, whom Bat Ye’or has identified as a particularly passionate Eurabian, referred to what the Arabs expected from European leaders. He failed to say whether or not there was great excitement among Europeans over the prospect of an even freer flow

of migrants from Arab countries and Turkey, which is what will result from this «EuroMediterranean free trade zone.» During the Euro-Mediterranean mid-term Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Dublin in May 2004 [8], the participants declared that:
«Work is now in progress to develop an agreed view on relations with the area which extends from Mauritania to Iran — the Mediterranean and the Middle East. The [European] Union has proposed to include Mediterranean partners in the European Neighbourhood Policy.» The EU can offer a more intensive political dialogue and greater access to EU programmes and policies, including their gradual participation in the four freedoms particularly the Single Market, as well as reinforced co-operation on justice and home affairs.»

Again, exactly what does «co-operation on justice and home affairs» with Egypt, Syria and Algeria mean? I don’t know, but I’m not sure whether I will like the answer. The Barcelona declaration [9] from 1995 encouraged «contacts between parliamentarians» and invited the European Parliament, with other Parliaments, to launch «the Euro-Mediterranean parliamentary dialogue.» In March 2004, this was converted into a specific institution called The Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly, EMPA (pdf) [10]. During the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference in Crete in May 2003, the Ministers included a provision which envisaged the consultative role the Parliamentary Assembly will play within the framework of the Barcelona process. EU Commissioner Chris Patten has reiterated the European Commission’s readiness to co-operate fully with the Assembly, giving the Assembly the right to comment on any subject of interest to the Euro-Arab Dialogue. The Assembly consists of 120 members from EU countries, both members of national parliaments and of the European Parliament, and an equal number of representatives from the Parliaments of the Mediterranean partner countries. Like most Europeans, I hadn’t even heard about this institution before coming across it during an Internet search. However, it is apparently going to influence the future of my entire continent. This set-up leaves me with some questions. When we know that these «Mediterranean partner countries» include non-democratic Arab countries such as Syria, isn’t it disturbing that representatives from these countries should participate in a permanent institution with consultative powers over the internal affairs of the European Union? Especially when we know that our own, democratically elected national parliaments have already been reduced to the status of «consultation» with unelected federal EU lawmakers in Brussels? The Algiers Declaration [11] for a Shared Vision of the Future was made after a Congress held in Algeria in February 2006. The document states that: «It is essential to create a Euro-Mediterranean entity founded on Universal Values» and that «It is crucial to positively emphasise all common cultural heritage, even if marginalised or forgotten.» A Common Action Plan draws up a large number of recommendations on how to achieve this new Euro-Mediterranean entity. Among these recommendations are:

Adapt existing organisations and the contents of media to the objectives of the NorthSouth dialogue, and set up a Euro-Mediterranean journalism centre

Set up a network jointly managed by the Mediterranean partners in order to develop «a harmonised education system» [A «harmonised education system» between the Arab world and Europe? What does that include? Do I want to know? Will they tell us before it is a fait accompli?] Facilitate the transfer of know-how between the EU countries and the Mediterranean partner nations and «encourage the circulation of individuals» Prepare action and arguments in support of facilitating the mobility of individuals, especially of students, intellectuals, artists, businessmen «and all conveyors of dialogue» Set up Ministries responsible for Mediterranean affairs in countries of the North and of the South [Europe and the Arab world, in Eurocrat newspeak], in order to benefit from a better management of Mediterranean policy; Train teachers and exchange students between the North and the South and set up a network of Euro-Mediterranean Youth clubs Establish a «civil watchdog» anti-defamation observatory (with an Internet tool and a legal help network), to cope with racist remarks and the propagation of hate towards people of different religion, nationality or ethnical background

• •

• •

These agreements, completely rewriting European history books to make them more Islam-friendly, and gradually silencing «Islamophobia» as racism, are being implemented even now. Walter Schwimmer, the Austrian diplomat and Secretary General of the Council of Europe from 1999 to 2004, told foreign ministers at the Islamic conference in Istanbul (June15th 2004) that the Islamic component is an integral part of Europe’s diversity. He reaffirmed the commitment of the Council of Europe to work against Islamophobia, anti-Semitism and other forms of intolerance. The Council was also actively involved in the co-organisation of a Conference on the Image of Arab-Islamic culture in European history textbooks, which took place in Cairo in December 2004. The event was held within the framework of the Euro-Arab Dialogue »Learning to Live together.» [12] The aim of the conference was to examine negative stereotyping in the image of Arab-Islamic culture presented in existing history textbooks, and to discuss ways to overcome this stereotyping. In the European Parliament, the German Christian Democrat Hans-Gert Pottering [13] stated that school textbooks should be reviewed for intolerant depictions of Islam by experts overseen by the European Union and Islamic leaders. He said textbooks should be checked to ensure they promoted European values without propagating religious stereotypes or prejudice. He also suggested that the EU could co-operate with the 56nation Organisation of the Islamic Conference to create a textbook review committee. In June 2005 in Rabat [14], Morocco, a conference was held on «Fostering Dialogue among Cultures and Civilisations.» The Conference was jointly organised by UNESCO, the Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (ISESCO), the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the Arab League Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organisation (ALECSO), the Danish Centre for Culture and Development (DCCD) and the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures (Alexandria, Egypt).

Notice that this was months before the Danish Muhammad cartoons created havoc. It was not a reaction to this issue; rather it was a part of a sustained, ongoing process to promote the Arabic-Islamic culture in Europe. Among the recommendations that were raised by Mr. Olaf Gerlach Hansen, Director General of the DCCD: «We are interested in new actions in the media, in culture and in education. These proposals include:
— Concrete initiatives to develop «intercultural competencies» in the training of new generations of journalists — Concrete initiatives for links and exchanges between journalists, editors, media-institutions, which encourage intercultural co-operation» — Concrete initiatives for curriculum development through new educational materials and revision of existing textbooks.

Although not stated directly, one may reasonably assume that among the «negative stereotypes» to be removed from the textbooks used to teach history to European schoolchildren are any and all references to the 1300 years of continuous Jihad warfare against Europe. These recommendations were accepted and incorporated into The Rabat Commitment [15]. According to Serge Trifkovic [16], «The present technological, cultural and financial strength of Europe is a facade that conceals a deep underlying moral and demographic weakness. The symptoms of the malaise are apparent in the unprecedented demographic collapse and in the loss of a sense of place and history that go hand-in-hand with the expansion of the European Union. The emerging transnational hyper-state is actively indoctrinating its subject-population into believing and accepting that the demographic shift in favor of Muslim aliens is actually a blessing.» He points out specifically the EU Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation N° 1162 (19 September 1991) on «the contribution of the Islamic civilisation to European culture.» A decade later, in its General policy recommendation n° 5: «Combating intolerance and discrimination against Muslims,» the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance emphasised «Islam’s positive contribution to the continuing development of European societies, of which it is an integral part.» It expressed strong regret «that Islam is sometimes portrayed inaccurately [as] a threat.» The ECRI called on the EU member states to adopt measures that would effectively outlaw any serious debate about Islam and introduce pro-Muslim «affirmative action.» European countries should:

• •

Modify curricula to prevent «distorted interpretations of religious and cultural history» and «portrayal of Islam on perceptions of hostility and menace»; Encourage debate in the media on the image which they convey of Islam and on their responsibility to avoid perpetuating prejudice and bias.

Trifkovic says «Cynically defeatist, self-absorbed and unaccountable to anyone but their own corrupt class, the Eurocrats are just as bad as jihad’s fellow-travelers; they are its active abettors and facilitators.» Eurabians want to create a unity of the Mediterranean region. This desire is strikingly similar to the goals of some Islamic organisations.

The Muslim Brotherhood, regarded as the most important Islamic movement of the past century, was founded by Hassan al-Banna in 1928, inspired by contemporary European Fascists in addition to Islamic texts. German historian Egon Flaig [17] quotes Banna as saying:
«We want the flag of Islam to fly over those lands again who were lucky enough to be ruled by Islam for a time, and hear the call of the muezzin praise God. Then the light of Islam died out and they returned to disbelief. Andalusia, Sicily, the Balkans, Southern Italy and the Greek islands are all Islamic colonies which have to return to Islam’s embrace. The Mediterranean and the Red Sea have to become internal seas of Islam, as they used to be.»

Patrick Poole describes [18] how discussion of a document called «The Project» so far has been limited to the top-secret world of Western intelligence communities. Only through the work of an intrepid Swiss journalist, Sylvain Besson, has information regarding The Project finally been made public. It was found in a raid of a luxurious villa in Campione, Switzerland on November 7, 2001. The target of the raid was Youssef Nada, who has had active association with the Muslim Brotherhood for more than 50 years. Included in the documents seized was a 14-page plan written in Arabic and dated December 1, 1982, which outlined a 12-point strategy to «establish an Islamic government on earth» — identified as The Project. According to testimony given to Swiss authorities by Nada, the unsigned document was prepared by «Islamic researchers» associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. It represents a flexible, multi-phased, long-term approach to the «cultural invasion» of the West. The Project has served for more than two decades as the Muslim Brotherhood «master plan.» Some of it recommendations include:

• • • • •

Using deception to mask the intended goals of Islamist actions Building extensive social networks of schools, hospitals and charitable organisations Involving ideologically committed Muslims in institutions on all levels in the West, including government, NGOs, private organisations Instrumentally using existing Western institutions until they can be put into service of Islam Instituting alliances with Western «progressive» organisations that share similar goals

Included among this group of Muslim Brotherhood intellectuals is Youssef al-Qaradhawi, an Egyptian-born, Qatar-based Islamist cleric. Both Sylvain Besson and Scott Burgess provide extensive comparisons between Qaradhawi’s publication, Priorities of the Islamic Movement in the Coming Phase, published in 1990, and The Project. They note the striking similarities in the language used and the plans and methods both documents advocate. As Patrick Poole says, «What is startling is how effectively the Islamist plan for conquest outlined in The Project has been implemented by Muslims in the West for more than two decades.»

Youssef al-Qaradhawi, one of the most influential clerics in Sunni Islam, has predicted that «Islam will return to Europe as a conqueror [19] and victor,» was an important figure during the Muhammad cartoons riots, whipping up anger [20] against Denmark and the West. According to Dr. Rachel Ehrenfeld [21]and Alyssa A. Lappen, «Clearly, the riots in Denmark and throughout the world were not spontaneous, but planned and organised well in advance by Islamist organisations that support the MB, and with funding mostly from Saudi Arabia.» The current leader of the international Muslim Brotherhood, Mohammad Mahdi Akef, recently issued a new strategy calling on all its member organisations to serve its global agenda of defeating the West. Akef has called the U.S. «a Satan.» «I expect America to collapse soon,» declaring, «I have complete faith that Islam will invade Europe and America.» Ehrenfeld and Lappen state that the Muslim Brotherhood and its offspring organisations employ the Flexibility strategy:
«This strategy calls for a minority group of Muslims to use all «legal» means to infiltrate majority-dominated, non-Muslim secular and religious institutions, starting with its universities. As a result, «Islamised» Muslim and non-Muslim university graduates enter the nation’s workforce, including its government and civil service sectors, where they are poised to subvert law enforcement agencies, intelligence communities, military branches, foreign services, and financial institutions.»

In the Middle East Quarterly, Lorenzo Vidino [22] writes about «The Muslim Brotherhood’s Conquest of Europe.» According to him, «Since the early 1960s, Muslim Brotherhood members and sympathisers have moved to Europe and slowly but steadily established a wide and wellorganised network of mosques, charities, and Islamic organisations.» One of the Muslim Brotherhood’s first pioneers in Germany was Sa’id Ramadan, the personal secretary of Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna. The oil-rich kingdom of Saudi Arabia has granted an influx of money to the powerful Islamic Center of Geneva, Switzerland, run by Sa’id’s son Hani Ramadan, brother of Tariq Ramadan. Hani Ramadan was made infamous by — among other things — a 2002 article in the French daily Le Monde defending the stoning of adulterers to death. Tariq Ramadan, a career «moderate Muslim,» later called for a «moratorium» on stoning. According to Vidino, «The ultimate irony is that Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan alBanna dreamed of spreading Islamism throughout Egypt and the Muslim world. He would have never dreamed that his vision might also become a reality in Europe.» Former Muslim Dr Patrick Sookhdeo [23] warns that the Islamicisation going on in European cities is not happening by chance. It «is the result of a careful and deliberate strategy by certain Muslim leaders which was planned in 1980 when the Islamic Council of Europe published a book called Muslim Communities in Non-Muslim States.» The instructions given in the book told Muslims to get together and organise themselves into viable Muslim communities. They should set up mosques, community centres and Islamic schools. At all costs they must avoid being assimilated by the majority, and to resist assimilation must group themselves geographically, forming areas of high Muslim concentration.

Douglas Farah [24] writes about the largely successful efforts by Islamic groups in the West to buy large amounts of real estate, territory that effectively becomes «Muslim» land once it is in the hands of Islamist groups. Some groups are signing agreements to guarantee that they will only sell the land to other Muslims. The Brotherhood, particularly, is active in investments in properties and businesses across Europe, laying the groundwork for the future network that will be able to react rapidly and with great flexibility in case of another attempted crackdown on the group’s financial structure. Most of the money comes from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. According to Farah, the governments of Europe and the United States continue to allow these groups to flourish and seek for the «moderate» elements that can be embraced as a counter-balance to the «radical» elements. «We do not have a plan. They do. History shows that those that plan, anticipate and have a coherent strategy usually win. We are not winning.» In March 2006 [25], the two-day plenary session of the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly, held in Brussels approved a resolution which «condemned the offence» caused by the Danish cartoons of the prophet Muhammad as well «as the violence which their publication provoked.» These MEPs and national MPs from the EU and Arab countries also urged governments to «ensure respect for religious beliefs and to encourage the values of tolerance, freedom and multiculturalism.» During the parliamentary assembly, Egyptian parliament speaker Ahmed Sorour insisted that the cartoons published in Denmark and other recent events showed the existence of a «cultural deficit.» Jordanian MP Hashem al-Qaisi also condemned the cartoons, claiming that it is not sufficient to deplore the cartoons as these things might occur again in another country. And European Parliament president Josep Borrell referred to the Mediterranean as «a concentrate of all the problems facing humanity.» He said that after one year presiding over the assembly he «still did not fully understand the complexities of the Mediterranean.» Following the cartoons affair, EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana [26] had travelled to the Middle East and made joint statements with Islamic leaders that «freedom of the press entails responsibility and discretion and should respect the beliefs and tenets of all religions.» Solana said that he had discussed means to ensure that «religious symbols can be protected.» He held talks with Sheikh Mohammed Sayed Tantawi of Al Azhar University, the highest seat of learning in Sunni Islam, and Arab League SecretaryGeneral Amr Moussa. Solana also met with the leader of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu. Following their discussion, Solana «expressed our sincere regret that religious feelings have been hurt», and vowed «to reach out… to make sure that people’s hearts and minds are not hurt again.» Only a few years earlier, Mr. Solana, then Secretary General of NATO, in a speech [27] stated that «the root cause of conflicts in Europe and beyond can be traced directly to the absence of democracy and openness. The absence of the pressure valve of democratic discourse can lead these societies to explode into violence.» The irony that he himself is now trying to curtail the democratic discourse in Europe through the promotion of Islamic censorship apparently did not occur to him.

Meanwhile, the tentacles of the vast, inflated EU bureaucracy insinuate themselves into regulations on every conceivable subject. Some of the examples of the bureaucracy are ridiculous; some are funny. But there is a sinister side to the European bureaucracy:

• • •

The promotion of an official, «EU federal ideology» advocating multiculturalism; The denunciation as «xenophobes» of all those who want to preserve their democracy at the nation state level; and Calling those who would limit Third World immigration «racists.»

A report from the EU’s racism watchdog said that more must be done to combat racism and «Islamophobia.» One method of accomplishing this is the promotion of a lexicon 28[] which shuns purportedly offensive and culturally insensitive terms. This lexicon would set down guidelines for EU officials and politicians prohibiting what they may say. «Certainly ‘Islamic terrorism’ is something we will not use … we talk about ‘terrorists who abusively invoke Islam’,» an EU official said. Early in 2006, the EU’s human rights commissioner Alvaro Gil-Robles’s criticised a plan to revamp Christianity as a school subject [29] in elementary schools in Denmark. GilRobles said doing so went against European values. «Religion as a school subject should be a general course that attempts to give students insight into the three monotheistic religions [my emphasis],» he said. The «three monotheistic religions» means Christianity, Judaism and Islam. As I see it, there are several possible ways of dealing with the issue of education about religion.
1. Teach the traditional religions within a particular country, which in Europe means Christianity and Judaism. 2. Teach all the major world religions. 3. Leave religion out of the curriculum.

What the European Union does, however, is to treat Islam as a traditional, European religion on par with Christianity and Judaism. This is a crucial component of Eurabian thinking and practice. Notice how EU authorities in this case directly interfered to force a once-independent nation state to include more teachings of Islam in its school curriculum in order to instill their children with a proper dose of Eurabian indoctrination. Notice also that they didn’t ask for more teaching of Buddhism or Hinduism. Only Islam is being pushed. In another case, the European Commission rebuffed a call by the Polish president for an EU-wide debate on reinstating the death penalty [30]. «The death penalty is not compatible with European values,» a Commission spokesman said. Again, the issue here is not your opinion regarding the death penalty. The real issue is that the metasticising EU has already defined for you what constitutes «European values.» Thus, major issues are simply beyond public debate. This innocent-sounding phrase «European values» cloaks a federal, Eurabian ideology enforced across the entire European Union without regard to the popular will. Perhaps the most shameful and embarrassing aspect of the history of Eurabia is how the supposedly critical and independent European media has allowed itself to be corrupted or deceived by the Eurabians. Most of the documents about the Euro-Arab Dialogue place particular emphasis on working with the media, and the Eurabians have played the European media like a Stradivarius. Aided by a pre-existing anti-Americanism and anti-

Semitism, European media have been willing to demonise the United States and Israel while remaining largely silent on the topic Eurabia. In May 2006, a big conference [31] was held in Vienna involving media figures (journalists) from all over Europe, who met with partners from the Arab world as a part of the Euro-Arab Dialogue. European officials responded publicly with «regret» to Israel’s ambassador to Austria Dan Ashbel’s decision to boycott the conference on racism in the media because of concern in Jerusalem that anti-Semitism was getting short shrift at the meeting. Speaking for the conference — entitled «Racism, Xenophobia and the Media: Towards Respect and Understanding of all Religions and Cultures» — an official claimed that anti-Semitism was not taken off the agenda. This official countered that the meeting was «primarily a dialogue between the media representatives of all the Euro-Med partners on the problems that beset their profession. These include xenophobia, racism, anti-Semitism and Islamophobia [my emphasis].» Writer Bruce Bawer [32] thinks that many Europeans recognise that multiculturalism is leading their societies to disaster. But they’ve heard all their lives from officially approved authorities that any concern about multiculturalism and its consequences is tantamount to racism:
«There’s a widespread resignation [33] to the fact that multiculturalists control the media, academy, state agencies, and so on. They know very well that if you want to get ahead in European society, you don’t take on multicultural orthodoxy. The political establishment seems solidly planted, unmovable, unchangeable. There may be a widespread rage, in short, but it’s largely an impotent rage. Europeans today have been bred to be passive, to leave things to their leaders, whose wisdom they’ve been taught all their lives to take for granted. To shake off a lifetime of this kind of indoctrination is not easy.»

According to Bat Ye’or, fear of awakening opposition to EU policy toward the Arab Mediterranean countries led to the repression of all discussion of the economic problems and difficulties of integration caused by massive immigration. Any criticism of Muslim immigration is basically brushed off as being «just like the Jews were talked about in Nazi Germany,» a ridiculous but effective statement. Bat Ye’or agrees with Bawer’s analysis «concerning the totalitarian web cohesion of ‘teachers, professors, the media, politicians, government agency workers, talking heads on TV, the representatives of state-funded «independent» organisations like SOS Racism’ to indoctrinate the politically correct. This perfectly expresses the political directives given by the European Commission to coordinate and control in all EU member-states the political, intellectual, religious, media, teaching and publishing apparatus since the 1970s so as to harmonise with its Mediterranean strategy based on multiculturalism.» Professional harassment, boycott and defamation punish those who dare to openly challenge the Politically Correct discourse. According to Bat Ye’or, this has led to the development of a type of «resistance press» as if Europe were under the «occupation» of its own elected governments. This free press on the Internet and in blogs has brought some changes, including the rejection of the European Constitution in 2005. Despite overwhelming support for the Constitution by the governments in France and the Netherlands and a massive media campaign by political leaders in both countries, voters rejected it. Blogs played a significant part [34] in achieving this. Only a few months later, EU authorities lined up together with authoritarian regimes [35] such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Cuba and the Chinese Communist Party in favor of «more international control with» (read: censorship of) the Internet.

According to Richard North of the EU Referendum blog [36], «The most dangerous form of propaganda is that which does not appear to be propaganda. And it is that form at which the BBC [the British Broadcasting Corporation] excels. Perhaps the biggest sin of all is that of omission. By simply not informing us of key issues, they go by default, unchallenged until it is too late to do anything about them.» Vladimir Bukovsky is a former Soviet dissident, author and human rights activist who spent a total of twelve years in Soviet prisons. Now living in England, he warns against some of the same anti-democratic impulses in the West, especially in the EU, which he views as an heir to the Soviet Union. In 2002, he joined in on protests against the BBC’s compulsory TV licence [37]. «The British people are being forced to pay money to a corporation which suppresses free speech — publicising views they don’t necessarily agree with.» He has blasted the BBC for their «bias and propaganda,» especially in stories related to the EU or the Middle East. Conservative MP, Michael Gove and political commentator Mark Dooley also complain about lopsided coverage [38]: «Take, for example, the BBC’s coverage of the late Yasser Arafat. In one profile broadcast in 2002, he was lauded as an «icon» and a «hero,» but no mention was made of his terror squads, corruption, or his brutal suppression of dissident Palestinians. Similarly, when Israel assassinated the spiritual leader of Hamas, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, in 2004, one BBC reporter described him as «polite, charming and witty, a deeply religious man.» This despite the fact that under Yassin’s guidance, Hamas murdered hundreds.» Polish writer Nina Witoszek [39], now living in Norway, warns that people who have lived under Communist regimes are struck by a strange feeling of deja vu in Western Europe:
«Before formulating a sentence, you put on a censorship autopilot which asks: Who am I insulting now? Am I too pro-Israeli, or maybe anti-Feminist, or — God forbid — anti-Islamic? Am I «progressive» enough? Soon we shall all write in a decaffeinated language: We shall obediently repeat all the benign mantras such as «dialogue,» «pluralism,» «reconciliation» and «equality.» Norway has never been a totalitarian country, but many people now feel the taste of oppression and of being muzzled. I know many wise Norwegians — and even more wise foreigners — who no longer have the energy to waste time on contributing to a castrated, paranoid democracy. We prefer safety above freedom. This is the first step towards a voluntary bondage.»

She quotes follow writer from Poland Czeslaw Milosz, who won the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1980 for books such as The Captive Mind, where he explained the seductiveness of totalitarian ideology. One essay by Milosz is titled «Ketman.» [40] «Ketman» or «kitman» is an Islamic term brought to Milosz’s attention by Arthur Gobineau’s book Religions and Philosophies of Central Asia. He had noticed that the dissidents in Persia, long accustomed to tyranny, had evolved a style of their own. The need for survival often involved more than just keeping your mouth shut, but of actively lying in every way necessary. This strategy of dissimulation and deceit, which is especially pronounced by Shia Muslims but also used by Sunnis, is primarily used to deceive non-Muslims, but can also be used against other Muslims under duress. According to Milosz, a very similar strategy was used in Communist countries. Similar to Islam, those practicing dissimulation felt a sense of superiority towards those who were stupid enough to state their real opinions openly. In Communist societies, dissimulation was just as much a technique of adaptation to an authoritarian regime as a conscious, theatrical form of art that became increasingly refined.

It is frightening to hear people who have grown up in former Communist countries say that they see this same totalitarian impulse at work in Western Europe now. According to them, we in the West are at least as brainwashed by multiculturalism and Political Correctness [41] as they ever were with communism. It is frightening because I believe they are right. Have we witnessed the fall of the Iron Curtain in Eastern Europe only to see an Iron Veil descend on Western Europe? An Iron Veil of EU bureaucracy and Eurabian treachery, of Political Correctness, Multicultural media censorship and the everpresent threat of Muslim violence and terrorism that is gradually extinguishing free speech. The momentum of bureaucratic treachery is accelerating. Native Europeans and indeed some non-Muslim immigrants are quietly leaving in growing numbers, gradually turning the continent into a net exporter of refugees rather than an importer of them. When large parts of Europe are being overrun by barbarians — actively aided and abetted by our own trusted leaders — and when people are banned from opposing this onslaught, is Western Europe still a meaningful part of the Free World? Have the countries of Eastern Europe gone from one «Evil Empire» to another? Are they and we — back in the EUSSR? Vaclav Klaus, the conservative President of the Czech Republic, has complained that: «Every time I try to remove some piece of Soviet-era regulation, I am told that whatever it is I am trying to scrap is a requirement of the European Commission.» In an interview with Paul Belien of the Brussels Journal [42] in February 2006, Vladimir Bukovksy warned that the European Union is on its way to becoming another Soviet Union. Mr Bukovsky called the EU a «monster» that must be destroyed, the sooner the better, before it develops into a fully-fledged totalitarian state. «The ultimate purpose of the Soviet Union was to create a new historic entity, the Soviet people, all around the globe. The same is true in the EU today. They are trying to create a new people. They call this people «Europeans», whatever that means. According to Communist doctrine as well as to many forms of Socialist thinking, the state, the national state, is supposed to wither away. In Russia, however, the opposite happened. Instead of withering away the Soviet state became a very powerful state, but the nationalities were obliterated. But when the time of the Soviet collapse came these suppressed feelings of national identity came bouncing back and they nearly destroyed the country. It was so frightening.» Timothy Garton Ash is considered a leading expert on Europe’s future. Bruce Bawer views Garton Ash as typical of Europe’s political elite. Ash mistrusts national patriotism but adores the EU. He writes about the need for a factitious European patriotism («flags, symbols, a European anthem we can sing») to encourage «emotional identification with European institutions.» And just why does Europe need the EU? Garton Ash’s answer: «To prevent our falling back into the bad old ways of war and European barbarism.» Among his suggestions is that Europe encourage «the formation of an Arab Union.» He makes no mention of Arab democracy. Imagining «Europe in 2025 at its possible best,» he pictures it as a «partnership» with Arab countries and Russia that would extend «from Marrakesh, via Cairo, Jerusalem, Baghdad, and Tbilisi, all the way to Vladivostok.» The European Commission proposed the controversial idea of a singing event in all member states to celebrate the European Union’s 50th «birthday,» the 50th anniversary of the 1957 Treaty of Rome. Commissioner Margot Wallstrom was lobbying for big-style birthday celebrations to «highlight the benefits that European integration has brought to its citizens.» Diplomats said the idea had sparked feelings of disgust among new, formerly Communist member states such as Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, which were reminded of «Stalinist times» when people were forced by the state to sing. Brussels decided on a more modest celebration, also intended to spend around €300,000 on the appointment of 50 citizen «ambassadors,» dubbed the «Faces of Europe,» who are

supposed to «tell their story» throughout the year on what the EU means to them in their daily life, as well as a series of activities for school children and youngsters. Germany will go ahead with its own idea to let thousands of its bakeries bake 54 sorts of cakes with recipes from all 27 member states. Commissioner Wallstrom [43] in 2005 argued that politicians who resisted pooling national sovereignty risked a return to Nazi horrors of the 1930s and 1940s. Her fellow commissioners also issued a joint declaration, stating that EU citizens should pay tribute to the dead of the Second World War by voting Yes to the EU Constitution. The commissioners gave the EU sole credit for ending the Cold War, making no mention of the role of NATO or the United States. Is the EU an instrument to end wars? In October 2006, Michel Thoomis, the secretary general of the French Action Police trade union, warned of a civil war [44] in France created by Muslim immigrants:
«We are in a state of civil war, orchestrated by radical Islamists. This is not a question of urban violence any more, it is an intifada, with stones and Molotov cocktails. You no longer see two or three youths confronting police, you see whole tower blocks emptying into the streets to set their ‘comrades’ free when they are arrested.»

These Muslim immigrants were allowed in by the very same European elites who now want European citizens to celebrate their work through cakes and songs. While civil society is disintegrating in Western Europe due to Islamic pressures, EU authorities are working to increase Muslim immigration, while congratulating themselves for bringing peace to the continent. What peace? Where? The Peace of Westphalia [45] in 1648 ended the Thirty Years’ War, the last major religious war in Europe, and helped lay the foundations for modern nation states. Before nation states, we thus had a pattern of borderless religious wars and civil wars. This is what we have returned to, full circle, only this time a borderless Jihad is triggering civil wars in Europe. While the EU may help prevent wars between nation states with old grudges, such as Germany and France, it may also actively cause other kinds of wars. It accomplishes this by increasing Multicultural tensions and a dangerous sense of estrangement between citizens and those who are supposed to be their leaders. Wars have existed for thousands of years before the advent of the modern nation state. It is far more likely that weakening nation states will end our democratic system, a system which is closely tied to the existence of sovereign nation states, than that it will end wars. When asked whether the member countries of the EU joined the union voluntarily, and whether the resulting integration reflects the democratic will of Europeans, Vladimir Bukovksy replied, «No, they did not. Look at Denmark which voted against the Maastricht treaty twice. Look at Ireland [which voted against the Nice treaty]. Look at many other countries, they are under enormous pressure. It is almost blackmail. It is a trick for idiots. The people have to vote in referendums until the people vote the way that is wanted. Then they have to stop voting. Why stop? Let us continue voting. The European Union is what Americans would call a shotgun marriage.» In 1992, Bukovksy had unprecedented access to Politburo and other Soviet secret documents, as described in his book, Judgement in Moscow. In January 1989, during a meeting between Soviet leader Gorbachev, former Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone, former French President Valery Giscard d’Estaing, American banker Rockefeller and former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Giscard d’Estaing supposedly stated:

«Europe is going to be a federal state and you have to prepare yourself for that. You have to work out with us, and the European leaders, how you would react to that.»

This was in the 1980s, when most of the media still dismissed as scaremongering any talk of a political union that would subdue the nation states. Fifteen years later, Valery Giscard d’Estaing became the chief drafter of the truly awful EU Constitution, an impenetrable brick of a book, hundreds of pages long, and lacking any of the checks and balances so crucial to the American Constitution. Giscard has argued that the rejection of the Constitution in the French and Dutch referenda in 2005 «was a mistake which will have to be corrected» and insisted that «In the end, the text will be adopted.» Giscard has also said that «it was a mistake to use the referendum process» because «it is not possible for anyone to understand [46] the full text.» Does it instill confidence among the citizens of Europe that we are supposed to be under the authority of a «Constitution» that is too complex for most non-bureaucrats to understand? According to Spain’s justice minister [47] Juan Fernando Lopez Aguilar «you don’t need to read the European constitution to know that it is good.» Jean-Luc Dehaene, former Belgian Prime Minister, said that «We know that nine out of ten people will not have read the Constitution and will vote on the basis of what politicians and journalists say. More than that, if the answer is No, the vote will probably have to be done again, because it absolutely has to be Yes.» Journalist Nidra Poller [48], however, is more skeptical. Commenting on the debate prior to the EU Constitution referendum in France, she noted a submissive attitude among EU leaders towards Muslim demands: «The Euro-Mediterranean ‘Dialogue’ is a masterpiece of abject surrender.» The European Union functions as an intermediate stage of an ominous project that calls for a meltdown of traditional European culture, to be replaced by a new, Eurabian cocktail. And she asks: «When subversive appeasement hides behind the veil of ‘Dialogue,’ what unspeakable ambitions might be dissembled by the noble word ‘Constitution’?» The European Union gave the Palestinians $342.8 million in aid in 2005 [49] — or, more accurately, $612.15 million when assistance from the 25 EU governments is included. Even the United States has repeatedly donated millions of American tax dollars to the Palestinian Authority, though not at EU levels. In July 2005, as a response to the Islamic terrorist attacks on London a few days earlier, leaders of the G8, the group of influential industrialised nations, offered the PA some $9 billion [50], dubbed an «alternative to the hatred.» The West’s largesse continued despite a demographic study in 2005 which revealed that the number showing the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza had been inflated [51] by 50% by the government. Almost all of the new infrastructure [52] in the Palestinian territories from the beginning of the Oslo Peace Process in the 1990s — schools, hospitals, airports — were arranged and paid for by Brussels. As Jihad was once again unleashed with the second Intifada in 2000, Israel stopped its transfer of payments to the Palestinians. So the EU stepped in with another 10 million Euros a month in direct budgetary assistance to the Palestinian Authority. EU Commissioner for External Affairs Chris Patten [53] stated in 2002 that «there is no case for stating that EU money has financed terrorism, has financed the purchase of weapons, or any similar activities.» However, a report by the Foundation for the Defence of Democracies [54] later found that: «There is indisputable evidence that PA money has been used to fund terrorist

activities.» This was confirmed by Fuad Shubaki, who used to serve as the finance chief in the Palestinian security forces. According to him, former Palestinian Authority chairman Yasser Arafat [55] ordered millions of dollars, taken from international aid funds, tax money transferred by Israel and from Arab countries, to be used to purchase weapons and ammunition, including the 50 tons of armaments on board the ship Karine A. The transaction was coordinated between the PA, Hizballah in Lebanon and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. In May 2006, Mahmoud Abbas — President of the Palestinian Authority after Arafat’s death in November 2004 and a leading politician in Fatah — talked to the European Parliament about the peace process. At the same time, the al-Aksa Martyrs Brigades, the armed wing of Fatah, threatened to strike [56] at US and European economic and civilian interests in response to international sanctions on the PA. Financial support evokes no gratitude in the Palestinians. However, they will threaten you with violence if aid is not forthcoming. This is plainly extortion. This shakedown corresponds to the Muslims’ view of the Jizya, the tributary tax paid by non-Muslims in exchange for not being killed. Documents from the Euro-Arab Dialogue frequently mention about «financial assistance» from the EU to Arab countries. Bat Ye’or points out that some of this Jizya tax is extracted from Europeans without their awareness. In November 2005, the EU’s official financial watchdog [57] refused to approve the EU’s accounts for the 11th year in a row because they were so full of fraud and errors. The European Court of Auditors refused to give a statement of assurance on the EU’s $160.3 billion budget for 2004. «The vast majority of the payment budget was again materially affected by errors of legality and regularity,» it said. It specifically refused to approve the budgets for the EU’s foreign policy and aid programs, many of which are geared towards Arab countries. Half the project budgets approved by the European Commission were inadequately monitored. The European Commission is considered the EU’s «government,» and thus the government of nearly half a billion people. But it can release accounts with massive flaws for over a decade straight because it is largely unaccountable to anybody and was intended to be that way. Muslims use deception to advance Jihad until it is almost too late for the infidels to stop them. The EU federalists and Eurabians have taken a page out of the Islamic playbook, and have been approaching their goals by stealth for decades, buried beneath a mass of detail and technocratic newspeak all but incomprehensible to non-bureaucrats. In a frank moment, Jean-Claude Juncker [58], Luxembourg’s prime minister, once described the EU’s «system» in this way:
«We decide on something, leave it lying around and wait and see what happens,» he explained. «If no one kicks up a fuss, because most people don’t understand what has been decided, we continue step by step until there is no turning back.»

In The Economist, columnist Charlemagne writes:
«What Mr Juncker and those who think like him are trying to do is, in essence, to drown opposition to European federation in a mass of technical detail, to bore people into submission. As a strategy, it has gone a long way. [My emphasis] The greatest single transfer of sovereignty from Europe’s nations to the European Union took place, in 1985, as part of the project to create a single European market. Even [British Conservative

PM] Margaret Thatcher, not usually slow to spot a trick, later claimed that she had not fully appreciated the ramifications of what she was then signing up to.»

Writer Christopher Booker has called this the EU’s «culture of deceit» [59]:
«What in fact has been taking place has been a transfer of power (…) to Brussels on a scale amounting to the greatest constitutional revolution in our history. But much of this has remained buried from view because our politicians like to preserve the illusion that they are still in charge. The result is that remarkably few people now have any proper understanding of how the political system which rules our lives actually works.»

I have used the term «neo-Feudalism» to describe the EU. There are definitely certain elite groups in Europe who think that everything that’s wrong with Europe is because of «populism» — what others call democracy. The motive force behind the EU aims to cede national sovereignty to a new ruling class of bureaucrats, a new aristocracy. This is a throwback to the pre-democratic age. Karl Zinsmeister notes [60] that:
«The EU apparatus is exceedingly closed and secretive. Relatively few of the confederation’s important decisions are currently made by democratically accountable officials. On front after front, bureaucratic mandarins are deciding how everyday Europeans will live. … Many Europeans, in a way Americans find impossible to understand, are willing to let their elites lead them by the nose. There is a kind of peasant mentality under which their «betters» are allowed to make the important national judgments for them.»

MP Gisela Stuart was a member of the Praesidium which drafted the proposed EU Constitution. She sums up her experiences thus:
«The Convention brought together a self-selected group of the European political elite, many of whom have their eyes on a career at a European level, which is dependent on more and more integration, and who see national parliaments and governments as an obstacle … Not once in the sixteen months I spent on the Convention did representatives question whether deeper integration is what the people of Europe want, whether it serves their best interests or whether it provides the best basis for a sustainable structure for an expanding Union.»

In 2005, an unprecedented joint declaration by the leaders of all the British political groups in Brussels called for an end the «medieval» practice of European legislation being decided behind closed doors. Critics claim that the Council of Ministers, the EU’s supreme law-making body, which decides two thirds of all Britain’s laws, «is the only legislature outside the Communist dictatorships of North Korea and Cuba to pass laws in secret.» According to British Conservative politician Daniel Hannan, this is how the EU was designed. «Its founding fathers understood from the first that their audacious plan to merge the ancient nations of Europe into a single polity would never succeed if each successive transfer of power had to be referred back to the voters for approval. So they cunningly devised a structure where supreme power was in the hands of appointed functionaries, immune to public opinion. Indeed, the EU’s structure is not so much undemocratic as anti-democratic.» The European Union has been compared to the Roman Empire, but such comparisons are not very apt. Rome was the military superpower of its time, while the EU is but a military midget. However, there is one intriguing commonality: Julius Caesar was murdered

because he wanted to crown himself king. This was not a popular move among the powerful elite in the Senate, who reminded Caesar that Rome had become a Republic precisely because they had rebelled against the «tyrant» kings of old. Caesar’s successor Octavian, better known today as Caesar Augustus, is considered both the first and one of the most important Roman Emperors. He downplayed his own position by preferring the title princeps, usually translated as «first citizen». He also preserved the outward form of the Roman Republic, paid lip service to the old elite, and veiled the changes to make them seem less upsetting to the public. He may have been a monarch, but he never called himself one. Some might see a parallel in the present-day EU. When up to three-quarters of our national laws originate in Brussels, what is then the point of holding national elections? Just as in Octavian’s Rome, the real power has been moved elsewhere, but the old order is draped over reality as a democratic fig leaf in order not to upset the common people. The EU operates largely by stealth; its edicts are implemented through traditional parliaments, which are increasingly reduced to decorative appendages. The funny aspect of this is that those who are against the EU are labelled xenophobes, nationalists or simply anti-democratic forces. The EU is an organisation where unelected bureaucrats dismantle democracy, yet denounce their critics as anti-democratic forces. In order to create this new entity, the old nation states must be deliberately crushed. Massive numbers of non-European immigrants are introduced, and the resulting situation is termed a «Multicultural society». This demolition is followed by the demand that our entire society be changed accordingly. Since Europeans feel less «European» than they experience themselves as French, Italian, Dutch, etc., national allegiances have to be broken down. At the same time, an external rival must be created. The closest model is Bismarck’s unification of Germany. The numerous German states rallied to Prussia’s side against the French in the FrancoPrussian War in 1870, thus paving the way for a new, powerful German federation. The EU federalists strive to build a united European state through a shared animosity against the USA, while constructing a Eurabian entity of Europe and the Arab world via their common hostility towards Israel. One tactic is the deliberate use of the media to whip up anger against these countries and to demonise them. However, Bismarck’s German states were united by a common language. Even if a «new us» could be constructed from dozens of nations — which is highly questionable — melding various ethnic groups into a cohesive nation takes centuries. Without a shared identity, without a European demos, how can the EU be anything but authoritarian? Perhaps the EU elites believe that a large mass of people lacking a distinct cultural identity would be easier to control? The problem is that the nation state itself has been declared evil or obsolete, not collectivism, anti-individualism or totalitarianism. But there is a crucial distinction between nationalism and patriotism, which George Orwell saw clearly:
«Nationalism is not to be confused with patriotism. By ‘patriotism’ I mean devotion to a particular place and a particular way of life, which one believes to be the best in the world but has no wish to force on other people. Patriotism is of its nature defensive, both militarily and culturally. Nationalism, on the other hand, is inseparable from the desire for power.»

Totalitarian regimes can be national, such as Nazi Germany, but they can also be supranational, such as the Soviet Union, which sought to suppress all pre-existing national loyalties. How was a project as big as the creation of Eurabia pulled off? I have thought a lot about this question, and come to the conclusion that it succeeded precisely because of its size. St. Augustine tells the story of a pirate captured by Alexander the Great. «How dare you molest the sea?» asked Alexander. «How dare you molest the whole world?» the pirate replied. «Because I do it with a little ship only, I am called a thief; you, doing it with a great navy, are called an emperor.» It’s a matter of scale. If a small group of people sideline the democratic process in one country and start imposing their own laws on the public, it’s called a coup d’etat. If they do so on an entire continent, it’s called the European Union. Adolf Hitler’s autobiography Mein Kampf described a propaganda technique known as «the Big Lie». The EU has adopted this strategy, which consists of telling a lie so «colossal» that it would be impossible to believe anyone «could have the impudence to distort the truth so infamously.» This has been combined with the technique, perfected by Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels in Nazi Germany, of repeating a point until it is taken to be the truth. Here are some Big Lies:
— Diversity is always good; — Multiculturalism is inevitable, as is continued EU integration; — Those opposing it are ignorant racists standing against the tide of history; — Muslim immigration is «good for the economy» and is necessary for funding the welfare state in the future, despite the fact that it drains away enormous resources.

The creation of Eurabia ranks as one of the greatest betrayals in the history of Western civilisation. Does that mean that all EU federalists or those who participate in the various instruments of the Euro-Arab Dialogue are evil? No, reality isn’t that simple. As Hugh Fitzgerald points out, «A whole class of people has gotten rich from Arab money and bribes; lawyers, public relations men, and diplomats, journalists, university teachers and assorted officials.» However, while ignorance, corruption and the self-serving search for personal power explains some of the behaviour of the Eurabian elites, it cannot explain the behaviour of ALL those thousands of people who have been involved in these networks. Some of them must have convinced themselves that what they were doing was for a just cause, if for no other reason than because human vanity demands that we justify our actions by covering them with a veneer of goodness. In the science fiction movie Serenity [61], the two great superpowers, the United States and China, have merged into the Alliance, which has moved humanity to a new star system. On the little-known planet Miranda, a gas called Pax was added to the air processors. It was intended to calm the population, weed out aggression. It worked. The people stopped fighting. They also stopped doing everything else, including breeding and physical self-preservation. A small minority of the population had the opposite reaction to this pacification. Their aggression increased beyond madness, and they killed most of the others. Tens of millions of people quietly let themselves be wiped out. Movie director Joss Whedon is careful to point out that the Alliance isn’t some evil empire, but rather a force that is largely benevolent. They meant it for the best, to create

a better world, a world without sin. However, according to Whedon, «Whenever you create Utopia, you find something ugly working underneath it.» Former Europeans who fought against Jihad fought for a number of things: Their religion, their culture and their nation. EU federalists and Eurabians are deliberately suppressing all of these instincts in their quest to create a New Man and weed out aggression. However, because they have wrongly identified the nation state as the root cause of all evil, they are suppressing not just aggressive nationalism, but defensive patriotism. And since some of the Muslims have actually become even more aggressive in response to what they perceive as our nihilism, the Eurabians have suicidally disarmed their own people, literally and metaphorically, and put them up for slaughter. Many Communists, at least in the beginning, really believed in their ideology. The result was mass slaughter; tens of millions of people were killed in the quest for a world without oppression or exploitation. The road to Hell is paved with good intentions. Regardless of how good your intentions may be, you cannot use millions of people as guinea pigs in massive social experiments without also causing massive harm. Perhaps one of the reasons why this has been allowed to happen in Western Europe and the European Union is because we never fully understood or attempted to confront the reasons for the abysmal failure of Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union following the Cold War. The concept of massive social experiments to create a New Man was allowed to survive. It mutated and then migrated West. Jean Monnet, who set in motion the process of European integration, reflected on how the European civil service constituted a ‘laboratory’ in which a new kind of ‘European Man’ would be born. But the New European Man, just like the New Soviet Man before him, is all but certain to fail. Can the European Union be reformed? I doubt it. The EU is bound together by a selfserving class of bureaucrats who want to expand their budgets and their power, despite the harm they do. These functionaries will use traditional methods of deception to counteract any calls for reforms so they can retain control. It is instructive to watch the reactions of the EU elites to the popular rejections in France and Holland of the EU Constitution in 2005. They put together a «wise» group [62] of European politicians, led by Giuliano Amato, Italian Interior Minister in «super-Eurabian» Romano Prodi’s government, to come up with possible solutions to this impasse. Suggestions discussed included dropping the name «constitution» in favor of «treaty.» The same Amato, who is a former Italian Prime Minister and also the Vice-President of the EU Convention which drafted the Constitution, has earlier stated [63] that:
«In Europe one needs to act ‘as if’ — as if what was wanted was little, in order to obtain much, as if states were to remain sovereign to convince them to concede sovereignty … The Commission in Brussels, for example, should act as if it were a technical instrument, in order to be able to be treated as a government. And so on by disguise and subterfuge [my emphasis].»

That a man who has openly bragged about how EU federalist goals are advanced by «disguise and subterfuge» leads the attempts to «renew» the EU Constitution tells ordinary Europeans everything we need to know about the EU. If the EU elites have deliberately deceived us for decades to achieve their goals, why should we suddenly trust them now? Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me. These people have fooled us enough. «I think that the European Union, like the Soviet Union, cannot be democratised,» says Vladimir Bukovksy. «There will be a collapse of the European Union pretty much like the

Soviet Union collapsed. But do not forget that when these things collapse they leave such devastation that it takes a generation to recover.(…) Look to the huge number of immigrants from Third World countries now living in Europe. This was promoted by the European Union. What will happen with them if there is an economic collapse? We will probably have, like in the Soviet Union at the end, so much ethnic strife that the mind boggles.» In their book about the EU, Richard North and Christopher Booker conclude: «The project Monnet had set on its way was a vast, ramshackle, self-deluding monster: partly suffocating in its own bureaucracy; partly a corrupt racket (…) The one thing above all the project could never be, because by definition it had never been intended to be, was in the remotest sense democratic.» They believe the EU is doomed and will «leave a terrible devastation behind it, a wasteland from which it would take many years for the peoples of Europe to emerge.» I understand concerns that the destruction of the EU could cause «instability» in Europe. It will. But we will probably end up with «instability» anyway, given the number of Muslims the EUrabians have let in. The choice is between a period of painful years in which most of Europe prevails, and death, where Europe simply ceases to exist as a Western cultural entity. Some would hope that we could keep the «positive» aspects of the EU and not «throw out the baby with the bath water.» I beg to differ. The EU is all bath water, no baby. There never was a baby, just a truckload of overpaid babysitters. Multiculturalism separates people into «tribes» below the nation state level. This is precisely the situation we had in Europe in the Middle Ages. Likewise, the idea that we should «respect» other cultures by not criticising them means turning the clock back several centuries to the pre-Enlightenment era. Multiculturalism is merely a medieval ideology, and will generate medieval results. Although the EU will fail in creating a pan-European identity, it has already partly succeeded in weakening